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CONSTANCY AND THE CALM PASSIONS IN HUME’S TREATISE 
(Order No.                        ) 
JASON F. MCCULLOUGH 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015 
Major Professor: Aaron V. Garrett, Associate Professor of Philosophy 
ABSTRACT 
The ‘prevalence of the calm passions over the violent’ is Hume’s general formula 
for both virtue and happiness. I argue in this dissertation that Hume’s detailed account of 
the causes and effects of the relative calmness and strength of motivating passions in 
Treatise 2.3 is a main goal of Hume’s project in the Treatise, Books I and II, and the 
reason why he published them together in 1739 as a “compleat chain of reasoning by 
themselves.” However, despite widespread recognition of the general importance of this 
doctrine to Hume’s ‘science of man’, no adequate attempt has been made to investigate 
those sections of Treatise 2.3 which bear directly on a deeper understanding of the causes 
of this ‘prevalence of the calm passions’.  Such attention is particularly warranted 
because, as I argue, these sections of the Treatise constitute Hume’s attempt at an 
‘anatomy’ of deliberation which accounts for the principles of human nature by which we 
successfully regulate our conduct and remain constant in pursuit of our long-term greater 
good.  However, these sections also give rise to interpretative challenges that threaten the 
coherence of this central doctrine.  Accordingly, my aim in this dissertation is to analyze 
Hume’s anatomy of deliberation and of the prevalence of calm passions in Treatise 2.3 
and to work through the interpretative difficulties it poses.  I present a novel resolution of 
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these interpretative problems which calls attention to the importance both of Hume’s 
Treatise, Book I account of causal belief and of his neglected account of the influence of 
the passions on the imagination and understanding for his theory of motivation.  I 
demonstrate that it is only when we attend to these key features of Hume’s account of 
human nature that we can appreciate the coherent Humean theory of prudential 
motivation that emerges from Treatise 2.3.   
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Introduction:  Constancy and Calm Passions in Hume’s Treatise 
“The prevalence of the calm passions over the violent” may justly be said to be 
Hume’s general formula for both virtue and happiness.1  The general importance of 
Hume’s doctrine of calm passions to his ‘science of man’ is widely appreciated by Hume 
scholars.  However, despite general recognition of the importance of this doctrine, no 
adequate attempt has been made to investigate Hume’s relatively detailed account of the 
causes and effects of the relative calmness and strength of motivating passions in 
Treatise, Book II, Part III.  Such an investigation is particularly warranted not only 
because these sections of the Treatise together present a Humean account of some of the 
basic principles of deliberation which would illuminate other important parts of Hume’s 
system, but also because, as a few commentators have noted, Hume’s account of these 
causes and effects gives rise to several interpretative challenges that threaten the 
coherence of this central doctrine.  Accordingly, my overall aims in this dissertation are 
to attend to this T 2.3 anatomy and to work through these difficulties in order to elaborate 
                                                     
References to Hume’s works in this dissertation will appear as follows.  Passages from the Treatise will be 
cited by book, part, section and paragraph number, followed by the corresponding page number in SBN.  
Similarly, passages from An Abstract, and the ‘Appendix’ and ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise, will be cited 
by paragraph numbers as they appear in the Norton edition of the Treatise, followed by the corresponding 
page number in SBN.  For example, (3.2.7.8; SBN 538), (Abs. §3; SBN 646), (App. §9; SBN 627), (Intro. 
§6; SBN xvi). Hume’s ‘Advertisement’ to Books I-II of the Treatise will be cited as ‘Adv. (T1-2) 2; SBN 
xii’, and his ‘Advertisement’ to Book III as ‘Adv. (T3) 292; SBN facing 455’. The Nortons have inserted 
the corrections to Treatise, Book I which Hume lists in his ‘Appendix’ into the main text of that work, per 
Hume’s explicit instructions.  Accordingly, I cite these passages as part of the main text of the Treatise as 
above.  For Hume’s Enquiries (‘EHU’, ‘EPM’), I cite section and paragraph number and the corresponding 
page number in SBN. For example, (EHU 3.1; SBN 23).  In the case of A Dissertation on the Passions and 
The Natural History of Religion, I simply cite section and paragraph numbers as they appear in the 
Beauchamp editions, preceded by ‘DP’ and ‘NHR’. Citations of Hume’s Essays refer to page numbers in 
the Miller edition, and are preceded by ‘EMPL’. 
 
1
 2.3.3.10; SBN 418. This is the particular thesis of the prefatory essay of Hume’s first volume of Essays, 
Moral and Political (1741), “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion”.  For an appreciation of this general 
point in regard to Hume’s account of human happiness, see in particular, John Immerwahr, “Hume on 
Tranquilizing the Passions,” Hume Studies 18.2 (1992): 293-314. 
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a coherent account of Hume’s doctrine of strong, calm motivating passions, and to 
account for the role of this doctrine in his wider project in the Treatise.      
The core of Hume’s account of the causes of the relative calmness and strength of 
motivating passions is contained in T 2.3.4-8.  As I indicated above, in these sections of 
the Treatise, Hume offers us what amounts to an anatomical account of deliberation that 
draws on principles of human nature he establishes and treats throughout Treatise, Books 
I and II.  However, while T 2.3.1-3 are among the most carefully read passages in 
Hume’s entire corpus, the remaining sections of T 2.3 are some of the most neglected. 
Because the doctrines of these neglected sections of the Treatise are the primary subjects 
of my dissertation, I will attempt in this introduction to account for the reasons for this 
neglect and to offer a reappraisal of their value to an understanding of Hume’s overall 
Treatise project.  I will then outline the argument of the remaining chapters of the 
dissertation.    
 
0.1 The Role of Hume’s Anatomy of the Passions in His Treatise Project 
On my reading, one’s view of the value of Hume’s T 2.3 anatomy of the relative 
calmness and strength of our motivating passions play is in large part determined by 
one’s general assessment of the importance of Hume’s treatment of the passions in 
Treatise, Book II to his wider Treatise project.  Hume gives us very little explicit 
guidance in Book II itself as to the role it is to play in his system.  At first glance, he 
seems to present it as a desultory treatment of the production of particular passions in 
terms of the associationism of Treatise, Book I.  The general organizing principle of 
3 
 
 
 
Book II seems merely to be a classificatory scheme of the passions based on the 
complexity of the causal mechanisms that produce them, and Hume offers us little 
explicit guidance as to any deeper unity of purpose in his explanations of the particular 
passions he treats there, or their bearing on the problems of Treatise, Books I and III.  His 
general procedure in Book II seems simply to be to take up the explanation of the 
production of passions opportunistically, introducing increasingly complex mechanisms 
and ever more “remarkable” or “curious” principles of human nature he finds necessary 
either to explain adequately the origins of a passion
2
 or to dissolve the contradictions and 
difficulties which arise in the course of those explanations.  Accordingly, in an influential 
work widely credited with the reinvigoration of the study of Hume’s thought in the 
middle of the last century, Norman Kemp Smith concluded that beyond its role in 
Hume’s  general project of developing a Newtonian “statics and dynamics” of the mind, 
Book II has “little direct bearing” on the concerns of Book I, and “no very direct bearing 
upon Hume’s ethical problems”, and so “play[s] indeed no really distinctive part in his 
system” as a whole.3          
Most commentators of this and the latter part of the last century have rightly 
rejected Kemp Smith’s view of the role of Book II in Hume’s Treatise project, and have 
most often adopted the view, famously endorsed by Pall Ardal in his Passion and Value 
                                                     
2
 For instance, this aspect of Hume’s procedure is particularly evident in the way the absolutely central 
mechanism of sympathy is taken up in T 2.1.11 merely as “remarkable” principle of human nature that 
explains our “love of fame”. (2.1.11.1-2; SBN 316-7) For some other clear examples of this feature of 
Book II, see 2.2.7.5; SBN 370-1, 2.2.9.1, 11-12; SBN 381, 384-5.   
3
 Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan & Co., 1941), 160-1.  Kemp Smith takes Hume’s 
Newtonian ambitions to be secondary, a recessive feature of Hume’s theory, the dominant being an attempt 
to develop Hutcheson’s insight primarily in Treatise, Books I and III that it is feeling rather than reason that 
is the basis of human nature.  See also, John Passmore, Hume’s Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 
106, 127-9. cf. Terrence Penelhum, Hume (New York: St. Martin’s, 1975), 110. 
4 
 
 
 
in Hume’s Treatise (1966), that the significance of Hume’s anatomy of the passions lies 
largely in the significance of many of its central doctrines for an understanding Hume’s 
account of morals in Treatise, Book III.  Indeed, Hume himself explicitly intended Book 
II to play this role.  Hume published an ‘Abstract’ of the first two books of the Treatise 
anonymously in 1740, in which he Hume attempted to offer the reader guidance as to his 
intentions in the Treatise: “This treatise therefore of human nature seems intended for a 
system of the sciences. The author has finished what regards logic, and has laid the 
foundation of the other parts”—that is, for the projected volumes on morals, politics and 
criticism—“in his account of the passions.”4  Accordingly, the importance of many of the 
doctrines of Hume’s Treatise, Book II account of the passions to his moral theory has 
been detailed by Hume scholars, in particular the centrality of sympathy to Hume’s 
ethical theory, the relationship between Hume’s T 2.3.3 non-cognitivist account of 
motivation and Hume’s sentimentalist moral theory5, as well as the direct relevance of 
both his account of the “indirect passions” of pride, humility, love and hatred (T 2.1-2), 
and his arguments for compatibilism (T 2.3.1-2) to his accounts of moral evaluation and 
attributions of moral responsibility, as well as his virtue ethical focus on durable 
character traits as the proper objects of our moral evaluations.
6
     
                                                     
4
 Abs. §3; SBN 646, my emphasis; cf. Adv. (T1-2); SBN ii. 
5
 cf. 3.1.1.6-12, 3.3.1.18; SBN 457-60, 583-4.  See J.L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory (Boston: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1980), John Bricke, Mind and Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) and 
Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
6
 The classic account of the relationship between Hume’s determinism and his account of moral 
responsibility is Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).  The classic account is of the relationship of the indirect 
passions to Humean moral evaluation is that of Pall Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume’s Treatise 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 1-5, 109-33.  Ardal argues that Hume’s account of the 
passions is of “vital importance for the correct interpretation of Hume’s views about the evaluations of 
human character” and the moral sentiments in Book III. (Passion and Value 1; cf. 4)  In this view, he is 
5 
 
 
 
  However, most commentators have not detected in Hume’s T 2.3.4-8 treatment 
of the “causes and effects of the calm and violent passions” much of great significance to 
his moral theory in Book III, particularly when compared to the contributions which the 
earlier sections of T 2.3—especially T 2.3.3—are taken to make in this regard.  Indeed, 
where T 2.3.3 is not read as Hume’s contribution to contemporary debates on motivation 
and the limits of practical reason, it is treated as a virtual preface for Treatise, Book III
7
:  
not only are Hume’s T 2.3.3 arguments for an anti-rationalist theory of motivation a key 
part of his defense of an anti-rationalist, sentimentalist theory of moral distinctions, but 
so too is his general distinction at the close of T 2.3.3 between “calm” and “violent” 
passions: this distinction plays a key role in Hume’s Book III explanation of why the 
calm operation of our “sense of morals” is often confused with the operation of reason. 
(cf. 3.1.2.1, 3.3.1.18; SBN 470, 583-4)  Indeed, because Hume takes our sentiments of 
morals and beauty to be paradigmatic examples of “calm passions” (cf. 2.1.1.3; SBN 
276), Hume scholars often wrongly take these passions to be reducible in practice (and 
often even in theory
8
) to our sentiments of morals and beauty.  This view of calm 
                                                                                                                                                              
followed by too many commentators to list here. Ardal is preceded in this view by Alfred Glathe, who 
argues that “the unity of the discussions of Books II and III consists in the predominance in each of the 
assertion of principles descriptive of certain regular processes of human emotion and ideation and in their 
exhibition of moral phenomena as causally determined by these processes.” (Hume’s Theory of the 
Passions and of Morals: A Study of Books II and III of the “Treatise” (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1950), 24; cf. 21-2) 
7
 For a clear, recent example of this tendency, see Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Morality: Feeling and 
Fabrication.  For other clear examples, see, e.g., D.G.C. MacNabb, David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge 
and Morality (New York: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1951), 159-67, John Bricke, Mind and 
Morality, chapters 1-2, Barry Stroud, Hume (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 154-70, 171, and 
J.L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory 44-50. 
8Jane McIntyre expresses a typical view when she writes that the moral sentiments are “the instances of the 
calm passions that Hume was most concerned with” (“Strength of Mind: Prospects and Problems for a 
Humean Account”, Synthese 152.3 (2006): 393-401, 399; cf. 396, 398)  However, some commentators 
have argued (wrongly, in my view) that Hume intends the calm-violent distinction ultimately to be 
equivalent to a distinction between our sentiments of morals and beauty on the one hand and violent 
6 
 
 
 
passions serves to turn attention directly from T 2.3.3 to Book III’s account of the origin 
and nature of our calm sentiments of morals.   
On the other hand, the detailed account of the causes of the relative violence and 
strength of motives in T 2.3.4-8 is largely irrelevant to Hume’s aim of elaborating a 
sentimentalist theory of a spectator’s ability to distinguish between virtue and vice: on 
his “spectator-centered” account of morals in Book III, Hume is not directly concerned 
                                                                                                                                                              
passions on the other, often arguing for this claim on the basis of Hume’s preliminary taxonomy at T 2.1.1.  
On this reading, the calm passions are taken essentially to be emotions either constitutive of or based on 
disinterested evaluation of an object—what Hume calls a “distant view or reflection.” (T 3.3.1.18; SBN 
583) For older examples of this view, see Norman Kemp Smith (Philosophy of David Hume 167; cf. 168), 
Mary Warnock (“The Justification of Emotions,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 31 
(Supplementary) (1957): 43-58, 45-8), Rachel Kydd (Reason and Conduct in Hume’s Treatise (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1964), 147-9); for more recent examples, see Louis E. Loeb (“Hume’s Moral Sentiments 
and the Structure of the Treatise”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 15.14 (1977), 395-403: 396-99, and 
Stability and Justification 3-6), Thomas K. Hearn (“General Rules and the Moral Sentiments in Hume’s 
‘Treatise’”, Review of Metaphysics  30.1 (1976), 57-72: 59, 62-3), and Walter Brand (Hume’s Theory of 
Moral Judgment: A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of Human Nature (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1992), 150nn.4-5).  (Louis Loeb deepens his earlier view in Stability and Justification in 
Hume’s Treatise ((New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3-6), arguing that Hume uses ‘calm’ and 
‘violent’ to refer to dispositional states as well as occurrent manifestations of those states, and when he uses 
them in the latter sense, he is referring not to emotional intensity, but to the underlying causal mechanism 
responsible for the phenomenal quality of the emotion produced.)   
On my reading, Ardal’s criticisms of such views are decisive. (Passion and Value 95-103)  (Ardal 
defends his account of the calm/violent distinction against Loeb’s criticism in “Another Look at Hume’s 
Account of Moral Evaluation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 15.4 (1977): 405-21: 409-11.)  The 
class of calm passions contains, but is not identical to that of “sentiments”—any token passion may be calm 
or violent, despite the fact that some passions are typically calm. (2.1.1.3; SBN 276) The primary ground of 
the division is clearly felt emotional intensity, as is indicated by both the very terms ‘calm’ and ‘violent’, 
and, more importantly, the very presence of the detailed investigation into the causes by which “a calm 
passion may easily be chang’d into a violent one” and vice versa in T 2.3.4-8 (2.3.8.13; SBN 438, my 
emphasis). (Passion and Value 94, 97) (On this point, see Penelhum, Hume 92, James Fieser, “Hume’s 
Classification of the Passions and its Precursors”, Hume Studies 18.1 (1992): 1-17, 9-12, and James A. 
Harris, “‘A Compleat Chain of Reasoning’: Hume's Project in a Treatise of Human Nature, Books One and 
Two,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109.1/2 (2009): 129-48, 142.)   
Indeed, Hume took Hutcheson to task in a letter of January 1743 for introducing a sharp type-
distinction of precisely this sort in the latter’s Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria (1.1.5-6).  
(Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Grieg, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932),  I:46; cf. Philosophiae 
Moralis Institutio Compendaria: with A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, ed. Luigi Turco 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 28-30)  Unlike Butler and Hutcheson, Hume does not limit the calm 
principles of our nature to self-interest and benevolence: Hume writes, echoing the T 2.3, “There is a calm 
Ambition, a calm Anger or Hatred, which tho’ calm, may likewise be very strong, & have the absolute 
Command over the Mind.  The more absolute they are, we find them to be commonly the calmer.  As these 
Instincts may be calm, without being weak, so Self-love may likewise become impetuous & disturb’d, 
especially where any great Pain or Pleasure approaches.” (Letters I:46)      
7 
 
 
 
with the mechanics of virtuous agency, or even of distinctively moral motivation (i.e. the 
causes of the motivational strength of our paradigmatically calm sentiments of morals), 
except insofar as the general issue of the relationship between moral agency and moral 
evaluation bears on the plausibility of Hume’s sentimentalist account of moral 
distinctions. (cf. 3.1.1.10; SBN 458)   
Accordingly, the most common way of approaching the later sections of T 2.3, 
has been to read them merely as a series of loosely connected observations, which, 
though perhaps not uninteresting, are nevertheless ultimately unimportant to Hume’s 
system. Capturing succinctly the standard appraisal of these sections, John Laird writes, 
[T]he remainder of Hume’s examination of the passions [i.e. post-T 2.3.3] was 
rather desultory.  He discussed the violence of passion, the pleasure of a 
moderate and the staleness of an excessive habituation, the effect of the 
imagination upon the passions with special reference to Time’s Arrow and to the 
way in which distance, height and the golden aura of the past induced the 
sentiment of sublimity.  An account of the direct passions followed [in T 2.3.9]; 
and his final Section [T 2.3.10] dealt with scientific curiosity.  This final Section 
was a particularly charming example of Hume’s more detailed discussion of 
these questions…9   
Terrence Penelhum deems these sections an “obviously incomplete treatment…of the 
psychological mechanism of our choices”.10  Annette Baier has similarly characterized T 
                                                     
9
 John Laird, Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1967), 205. Indeed, this 
is the tacit judgment of many commentators who treat them by merely mentioning or briefly summarizing 
their theses. (e.g. Rachael Kydd, Reason and Conduct in Hume’s Treatise 132-5, Alfred Glathe, Hume’s 
Theory of the Passions and Morals 77-81, John B. Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume’s Political 
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 112, and Tito Magri, “Hume on the Direct 
Passions and Motivation” in A Companion to Hume, ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2008): 185-200, 197.)  
10
 Penelhum, Hume 111. Annette Baier treats the subject of the causes of the calm and violent passions to 
2.3.6, but omits consideration of 2.3.7-8 entirely, presumably because she takes them to cover ground 
already tread in 2.3.4.1 and 2.3.6.  (cf. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 166-73) Baier similarly questions how Hume’s 
discussions in T 2.3.4-8 cohere: “It is not clear to me how to apply Hume’s fifth rule for judging causes”—
that which states “where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some 
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2.3.4-8 in particular as Hume’s loosely connected “hints” as to what a Humean account 
of the prevalence of calm motivating passions might look like
11
, and more recently, as 
Hume’s random “musings” on the causes of the relative violence of passions.12  On this 
view, the later sections of T 2.3 constitute little more than an attempt to sketch out in a 
desultory fashion some explanations for a few of the more “curious”, but perhaps less 
important phenomena of the passions.   
When the importance of T 2.3.4-8 is measured by the standard of this common 
reading of Treatise, Book II, it is easy to see why Hume’s anatomy of deliberation in 
these sections has not received the level of close scrutiny Hume scholars have given to 
other parts of his anatomy of the passions.  However, Hume also intended his theory of 
the passions in Treatise, Book II to play another important role in his ‘science of man’.  
Whatever the usefulness of the doctrines of Treatise Book II, (and of T 2.3 in particular) 
for the ethical theory of Book III, Hume makes it absolutely clear in both his 
‘Advertisement’ and ‘Introduction’ to his 1739 publication of Treatise, Books I and II, he 
intended these two books to be a “compleat chain of reasoning by themselves”, and the 
division between T 1-2 and the other projected volumes on morals, politics and criticism 
                                                                                                                                                              
quality, which we discover to be common amongst them” (T 1.3.15.7; SBN 174)—“to get a unification of 
these various causes of violence in passions.” (Progress of Sentiments 167; cf. Death and Character 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 156)  In a similar vein, Jane McIntyre writes, “Hume 
enumerates many of the conditions that tend to make passions violent [at T 2.3.4-7]…Nevertheless, Hume 
fails to provide any comprehensive explanation of how the calm passions gain strength.” (“Strength of 
Mind” 397, first emphasis mine)   
11
 Progress of Sentiments 169. 
12
 Annette Baier, “Hume”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. Timothy O’Connor and 
Constantine Sandis (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012): 513-20, 515.  Baier argues (somewhat 
puzzlingly) that these “musings” reflect his own “predilections…rather than his researched findings about 
human nature”, or “observations…more revealing of his own nature than confirmed generalizations in a 
science of man”. (“Hume” 515) 
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to be a “natural division.”13  Indeed, despite the fact that he intended his account of the 
passions to be the “foundation” of his moral theory, in his ‘Advertisement’ to Treatise, 
Book III, Hume tells his readers that this third volume is also “in some measure 
independent” of the argument of the other two volumes, “and requires not that the reader 
shou’d enter into all the abstract reasonings contain’d in them”—all the reader need grasp 
for an understanding of Book III is his general distinction between impressions and ideas. 
(Adv. (T3); SBN 455 facing)  I argue that it is only when we appreciate the role Hume’s 
T 2 account of the passions plays in this “compleat chain of reasoning” and its 
implications for a reading of Hume’s T 2.3 account of motivation in particular, that we 
can appreciate the true importance of Hume’s T 2.3.4-8 anatomy of deliberation to his 
wider Treatise project. 
 
0.2 Treatise, Books I and II as a ‘Compleat Chain of Reasoning’: the Role of 
T 2.3  
 “Human nature”, Hume writes, is “compos’d of two principal parts, which are 
requisite in all its actions, the affections and the understanding”, and “’tis certain, that the 
blind motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for 
society.” (3.2.2.14; SBN 493)  As I will argue here, Hume intends his treatment of these 
“two principal parts” of human nature in Treatise, Book I (“Of the Understanding”) and 
Book II (“Of the Passions”) to constitute a “compleat chain of reasoning” because he 
                                                     
13
 Adv. (T1-2) 2; SBN ii, my emphasis; cf. T Intro. §5-6; SBN xv-xvi. 
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intends his Book I account of causal reasoning to have direct implications for his account 
of the regulation of the passions and conduct in Book II, and in particular, T 2.3.  
The importance of Book I to the account of the passions in Book II in this regard 
is made especially clear in the ‘Abstract’.  There Hume cites Leibniz’ claim that probable 
reasoning has been unjustly neglected by philosophers, as it is that form of reasoning “on 
which life and action entirely depend”.14 (Abs. §4; SBN 646-7; cf. Abs. §§10, 33; SBN 
650, 661) The Treatise, Hume tells us in the ‘Abstract’, is in large part an attempt to 
remedy this defect.  (Hume is even more explicit on the importance of causal reasoning 
for deliberation, motivation and the “conduct of life” in the first Enquiry than he is in the 
Treatise.
15
)  Accordingly, despite the fact that on Hume’s empiricist theory of the mind, 
ideas always presuppose some prior impressions, Hume will nevertheless first treat the 
imagination and its objects—ideas: “as the impressions of reflection, viz. passions, 
desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas, 
‘twill be necessary to reverse that method, which at first sight seems most natural…” and 
treat ideas before (“secondary”) impressions, or passions.16  Treatise, Book II, then, is 
also intended as the locus of Hume’s integration of his account of causal reasoning into 
his account of the production of the passions, and in particular into his account of 
motivation and deliberation in T 2.3.  For this reason, on my reading, Hume’s T 2.3 
                                                     
14
 cf. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, eds. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.21.66, 4.2.14, 4.16.9.  As Butler puts it, “…to us, probability is 
the very guide of life.” (Analogy of Religion, “Introduction” §3 (in The Works of Bishop Butler, ed. David 
E. White (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 152); cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum in Nature 
of the Gods, Academica, ed. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 1.12.  
15
 EHU 5.6, 5.21-2; SBN 44-5, 54-5; cf. EHU 3.9.  
16
 1.1.2.1; SBN 8, my emphasis; cf. 1.3.10.1; SBN 118. 
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anatomy of deliberation and motivation constitutes in an important way the ‘conclusion’ 
of Hume’s “compleat chain of reasoning” in T 1-2.   
On the other hand, commentators who have attempted to account for the unity of 
T 1-2 as a “compleat chain of reasoning by themselves” tend to attribute unity to those 
books in a relatively weak sense: T 1-2 are a unity either because they employ a common 
methodology (“experimental” reasoning in moral subjects), or a common explanatory 
mechanism (associationism, or more specifically, the idea-enlivening associationist 
mechanisms of belief and sympathy).
17
  However, James Harris has recently offered a 
reading of T 1-2 as a unity in the sense of possessing in addition a unity of common 
purpose along the lines I propose above, one which also appreciates the central role of T 
2.3 in Hume’s project: 
Books One and Two of the Treatise are not connected only by a single method 
of causal-explanatory analysis.  Taken together they give an account of one of 
the oldest issues in philosophy, the relation between reason and passion.  My 
suggestion is that this relation should be seen as a theme not just of §2.3.3, ‘Of 
the influencing motives of the will’, but of the 1739 Treatise taken as a whole.  
An additional way in which Books One and Two make a ‘compleat chain of 
reasoning’, on this reading, is that they circumscribe and define a discrete 
philosophical topic.
18
 
                                                     
17
 See P.J.E. Kail, “David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature,” in Central Works of Philosophy: 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century, ed. John Shand, 5 Vols. (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2005): II:167-92, 170-4, for a helpful summary of these approaches to the unity of the Treatise.  See also 
John Passmore, Hume’s Intentions 106, Eugene Rotwein, “David Hume, Philosopher-Economist,” in David 
Hume: Many-Sided Genius, eds. K.R. Merrill and R.W. Shahan (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1976): 117-34, 119, Lilli Alanen, “The Powers and Mechanisms of the Passions,” in The Blackwell 
Guide to Hume’s Treatise,  ed. Saul Traiger (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006): 179-98, 182, and Haruko 
Inoue, “The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the Treatise: An Analogy Between Books 1 and 2”, Hume 
Studies 29.2 (2003): 205-221.  Inoue argues that the unity of Books I and II of the Treatise is the analogy 
(which, Inoue notes, Hume himself points out (cf. 2.1.5.11; SBN 290)) between Book I’s account of the 
origin of belief in causal reasoning, and Book II’s mechanisms of sympathy and the double relation of 
impressions and ideas. This, of course, is a point of unity between the material doctrines of the two books, 
but it speaks little to what Hume’s unity of purpose is in T 1-2.   
18James A. Harris, “Compleat Chain” 130-1.   
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Harris’ suggestion explicitly builds on Jane McIntyre’s persuasive claim that the 1739 
Treatise is rightly read as a part of and as critically engaged in a wider seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century tradition of writing on the management of the passions.
19
  When read 
in this context, Hume’s anti-rationalist account of motivation in T 2.3.3 can be 
characterized as a rejection of the more “rationalistic” accounts of the relationship 
between reason and passion in that tradition.  On Harris’ reading, the aim of Treatise, 
Book I is primarily negative, to deny to reason the regulative role often attributed to it on 
this tradition—its pretensions to being “a faculty of government and control”20—while 
the aim of Book II is not to recommend other methods of controlling the passions, but to 
sketch out a purely anatomical theory of how our passions regulate themselves to a 
significant degree by means of what Harris calls our “sympathetic sociability”.21  
More importantly, on Harris’ narrative, T 2.3.3’s direct attack on this rationalist 
tradition, its re-characterization of the predominance of reason over passion as the 
“prevalence of the calm passions over the violent”, and his T 2.3.4-8 account of “the 
ways in which calm and violent passions succeed each other in the mind, both incited and 
abetted by reason, and never directly at odds with it”, are not the isolated, curious topics 
of a few sections of T 2.3, but represent the very “climax of the story that Hume is 
                                                     
19
 Jane L. McIntyre, “Hume’s ‘New and Extraordinary’ Account of the Passions”, in The Blackwell Guide 
to Hume’s Treatise, ed. Saul Traiger (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006): 199-215. Harris, “Compleat Chain” 
131; cf. 145-6.   
20
 Harris, “Compleat Chain” 133.  As Harris notes, following McIntyre, it was not uncommon for writers of 
treatises on the passions in this tradition to emphasize the utter weakness of reason in this regard. (cf. 
McIntyre, “‘New and Extraordinary’” 202-4)  Thus, the role of reason was already being undercut in many 
ways within the tradition itself, leading McIntyre to the conclusion that Hume’s anti-rationalism in T 2.3.3 
is actually intended as the final death blow to an already weakened reason.  As McIntyre notes, “Hume 
recognized an emerging incoherence with the commonly accepted account of the relation of reason to the 
passions, and attacked it.” (“New and Extraordinary” 200; cf. 204-8) 
21
 Harris, “Compleat Chain” 139-40.  cf. McIntyre, “New and Extraordinary” 212-3. 
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telling” in the 1739 Treatise.  In Harris’ words, these sections constitute a “reconstruction 
of what had usually been taken to be the central problematic of human nature”—the 
relationship between reason and the passions—and for that reason constitute “a 
remarkable moment in the history of moral philosophy.”22  
I am in fundamental agreement with the underlying thesis of Harris’s reading.  On 
my own reading, which I will present in more detail below, T 1-2 are correctly read 
together as a critical engagement with what Hume takes to be the traditional rationalist 
picture of the relation of reason and passion, and both to virtue and happiness, and that 
Hume’s elaboration of the doctrine of the prevalence of calm passion is accordingly read 
correctly as the “climax” of the 1739 Treatise.   
However, I also disagree with Harris on several important points. First, because 
Harris takes the role of Book I in the “compleat chain of reasoning” in T 1-2 to be 
primarily the negative task of undermining the regulative role of “reason”, he 
underemphasizes the importance of Hume’s Book I account of the “influence” of causal 
reasoning and belief to his Book II theory of motivation (the integration of which, I 
argue, occurs primarily in T 2.3), and at the same time overemphasizes the degree to 
which the passions are shown in Treatise, Book II to “regulate themselves” via the 
sympathy-enabled ‘rencounter’ of passions in society.23  Hume, on the other hand, clearly 
intended his account of causal reasoning in Book I to bear directly on his account of 
motivation and “the conduct of life” in Book II.  As I will make clear in this dissertation, 
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 Harris, “Compleat Chain” 141-2. 
23
 “…Hume presented the realm of the passions as structured in such a way as to make permissible talk of 
the self-regulation of the passions—though with the proviso that it be understood that the self-regulation in 
question operates in the context of the social realm taken as a whole, rather than within the breasts of 
individual men and women.” (“Compleat Chain” 132) 
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the regulation of our conduct, though certainly guided in important ways by the ‘external’ 
force of the sympathetic ‘rencounter’ of passions in society, is no less influenced by the 
‘internal’ force of causal reasoning and the principles of the mind which govern that 
reasoning as Hume accounts for them in Treatise, Book I.   
Moreover, I do not agree with Harris’ strong claim that “Hume’s account of the 
reason-passion relation [in T 1-2] is correctly understood as a thoroughgoing rejection of 
Stoicism in all its guises, modern as well as ancient”.24  Though Hume certainly does 
reject much of the content of the Stoic account of the relationship between reason, 
passion, virtue and happiness, Hume’s own account of this relationship in T 2.3 seems to 
have a roughly ‘Stoic’ form: Hume’s concept of “calm passions” has clear roots in Stoic 
thought, as does the connections I argue Hume draws between the constancy or stability 
of our motives, the virtue of constancy or “strength of mind” which promotes this 
stability, and the calmness or tranquility of the passions that results from ‘constancy’ in 
both senses.
25
  Though I cannot elaborate the point in any detail here, I would argue that 
                                                     
24
 “Compleat Chain” 132, my emphasis.  See also James A. Harris, “Introduction: The Place of the 
Ancients in the Moral Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8.1 
(2010): 1-11, 5. Indeed, the image of a “combat” of reason and passion is, on its face at least, more a 
Platonic than a Stoic one.  (John Wright, for instance, appreciates this point (Hume’s A Treatise of Human 
Nature: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 216), but see, e.g., Margaret 
Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (70-75) for a discussion of whether the Platonic and Stoic theories are 
actually at odds on this point.)  Unlike the Platonic/Aristotelian theory of the soul (cf. Plato, Republic, 
Book IV, 440e-441e), the Stoic theory does not posit non-rational parts of the soul, and all impulses 
(whether passionate ‘disturbances’ or the “good-emotions” (eupatheiai) of the sage) are the product of the 
“assent” of the rational faculty.  The Stoics were criticized by Platonists such as Plutarch for their theory 
precisely because they thought it could not explain phenomena like incontinence or akrasia, which seems 
to require there to be multiple parts in the soul that ‘conflict’ with one another. (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, 
in Moralia 3.441c-d, 7.446e-51b)  
25
 This connection between constancy and calmness of the passions is one Hume would have found also in 
Cicero’s De Officiis—a work which Hume admits to have had “in [his] Eye in all [his] Reasonings” in the 
Treatise (Letters I:34-5)— and in many of Hume’s predecessors with Stoic predilections.  See, in 
particular, in Cicero’s discussion of the master-virtue of ‘decorum’ in De Officiis, Book I. (De Officiis 
1.93-146, especially 1.93-111, 120-5. cf. Tusculan Disputations 4.10-14, 31, 38, and Seneca De Constantia 
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it is plausible to read Hume as attempting in T 2.3 to underpin this formal ‘Stoic’ scheme 
with a radically alternative psychology of action.     
More importantly, in light of Harris’ view that T 2.3 represents the “climax” of 
the anatomical project of the 1739 Treatise, I take it to be a particular difficulty of his 
reading that he attributes very little importance to the actual content of Hume’s relatively 
elaborate T 2.3.4-8 anatomy of the causes and effects of the relative violence and strength 
of passions.  Harris instead seems tacitly to adopt the common views of T 2.3 outlined 
earlier in this introduction, views I have argued are primarily responsible for the neglect 
of T 2.3.4-10.  That is, he takes Hume’s discussion in T 2.3 to point us directly to the 
ethical and political theory of Treatise, Book III, and treats T 2.3.4-8 as merely a 
desultory sketch treatment of some remarkable causes and effects of the strength and 
violence of passions which contributes little to Hume’s overall aims in the 1739 Treatise.   
In line with the latter view, Harris suggests that Hume’s intent in T 2.3.4-8 is to 
enumerate the many causes of the relative calmness and violence of passions, but merely 
in order to give us a “sense of the ultimate inscrutability of the ways in which the 
passions succeed and alter each other” in terms of strength and violence26: 
At the end of his [T 2.3.4-8] account of the calm and violent passions, Hume 
admits that there is a certain mysteriousness to the whole business. There are so 
                                                                                                                                                              
Sapientis 6.2-3, Epistulae Morales 20.2-6, 31.8, 35.4, 120.18-22.  It is in the Stoics’ eupatheiai and 
constantiae that we find the origins of the calm passions as presented in the writings of Hume’s 
predecessors, particularly Shaftesbury, Malebranche and Hutcheson.  On Shaftesbury, see Christian 
Maurer & Laurent Jaffro, “Reading Shaftesbury's Pathologia: An Illustration and Defence of the Stoic 
Account of the Emotions,” History of European Ideas 2 (2013): 207-220, and, on Hutcheson, Christian 
Maurer, “Hutcheson’s Relation to Stoicism in the Light of his Moral Psychology,” Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy 8.1 (2010): 33-49, 35-9. It was not only from the Stoics and Neostoics that the early moderns 
adopted the doctrine of calm passions, but from Augustine as well.  On this point, see Peter King, 
“Dispassionate Passions” in Emotion & Cognitive Life in Medieval & Early Modern Philosophy, eds. 
Martin Pickave and Lisa Shapiro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 9-31. 
26
 “Compleat Chain” 143, my emphasis. 
16 
 
 
 
many things that can turn a calm passion into a violent one that men differ in 
respect of how they settle the supposed struggle of passion and ‘reason’ not only 
from each other, ‘but also from themselves in different times’.27  
Harris takes Hume’s intentions to be similar in regard to his discussion of the virtue of 
‘strength of mind’ (or ‘constancy’)—also a key element of the “climax” of T 1-2 in T 
2.3—a virtue whose effect is the prevalence of the calm passions over the violent in our 
temper:   
What Hume calls ‘strength of mind’ ‘implies the prevalence of the calm 
passions above the violent…, but it appears that there is nothing to be said about 
how one might ensure such a prevalence, given that, as Hume says himself, 
‘there is no man so constantly possess’d of this virtue, as never on any occasion 
to yield to the sollicitations of passion and desire’.28 
The possession of this strength of mind, Harris argues, “is presented by Hume as 
something akin to a matter of luck”29, and not something that can be accounted for in any 
general anatomical detail. Thus, on my view, it is an oddity of Harris’ reading that 
although Hume’s adoption of the strict “pose of an anatomist of the mind” is that 
“startling” feature of the Treatise that distinguishes it from those traditional treatises on 
the management of the passions with which he is in dialogue
30
, the ultimate  aim of that 
anatomy is to demonstrate its severely limited use for a deeper understanding of the 
principles of human nature which underlie the successful regulation of conduct—that is, 
for the “prevalence of calm passions” and the virtue of  constancy or “strength of mind” 
which promotes that prevalence.  Rather, on Harris’ reading, it seems that Hume’s 
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 “Compleat Chain” 142-3. 
28
 “Compleat Chain” 142. 
29
 “Compleat Chain” 144. 
30
 “Compleat Chain” 145.  “The task for the analyst of human nature was now to register and explore this 
economy of feelings,” Harris aptly writes of Hume’s intentions in the 1739 Treatise.  (“Compleat Chain” 
132, my emphasis) 
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ultimate aim in T 2.3.4-8 is to demonstrate the “mysteriousness” and “inscrutability” of 
the ‘internal’ mechanisms of human nature responsible for the successful regulation of 
conduct by means of an elaborate, but futile exercise in the anatomy of those very 
mechanisms.  
In line with the former view—that which treats Hume’s Book II account of the 
passions as a preface of sorts to the moral and political theory of Treatise, Book III—
Harris takes Hume’s T 1-2 “compleat chain of reasoning” to be by design incomplete in 
this way in order to communicate to his readers the ultimate impossibility of “a perfectly 
self-contained and self-regulating system” of the passions—the limits of our “sympathetic 
sociability”31—and so to bring us to a appreciation of the necessity of the moral and, 
ultimately, the (Hobbesian or Mandevillian) political solution for the regulation of 
individuals’ passions Hume elaborates in Treatise, Book III.32   
Though I believe Harris is absolutely right to read Treatise, Books I and II 
together as a critical engagement with questions of the relationship between reason, 
passion and the regulation of conduct, in this dissertation I will attempt a very different 
reading of the role of Hume’s abstruse anatomy of the causes of the “prevalence” of the 
calm passions, one which takes this anatomy to be a meaningful part of the climax of 
Hume’s T 1-2 “compleat chain of reasoning” in T 2.3.   
 
                                                     
31
 “Compleat Chain” 145; cf. 146. 
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 See also Harris, “Introduction” 5-6.  cf. James A. Harris, “The Government of the Passions,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, ed. James A. Harris (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013): 270-90, 280-1. That this is also the intended point of Hume’s four essays on 
happiness (1741) is the thesis of Harris’ essay, “Hume’s Four Essays on Happiness and Their Place in the 
Move from Morals to Politics,” in New Essays on David Hume, ed. Emilio Mazza and Emanuele Ronchetti 
(Milan: Franco Angeli, 2007): 223-35.     
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0.3 Summary of Chapters  
Given this reading of T 1-2, it is not plausible to treat Hume’s T 2.3 anatomy of 
deliberation as having little significance to his wider Treatise project.  Indeed, despite 
what may be the “fragmentary” nature of the later sections of T 2.3, a closer reading of 
the overall structure of T 2.3 as whole reveals that they constitute more than a merely 
desultory treatment of some curious phenomena of the passions.  In Chapter 1, I attempt 
to argue against this common view of T 2.3, and to account for the unity of T 2.3.1-8 in 
particular as a coherent “chain of reasoning”: I argue that Hume’s well-known T 2.3.1-2 
arguments for a compatibilist account of the necessitation of human action are intended 
to demonstrate the legitimacy and importance of the anatomy of the relative “constancy” 
and coherence of human action Hume offers in T 2.3.3-8.   
Hume takes the most important objection to his argument for the compatibilist 
doctrine of the “liberty of spontaneity” to be what I call the ‘Inconstant Constancy 
Objection’ which runs as follows: because phenomena which are necessitated are 
characterized by regularity and certainty, and because human action, given the frequent 
inconstancy of the human will, is irregular and uncertain, human action is not 
necessitated.  Hume’s desire to answer this objection, I argue, is the impetus for much of 
T 2.3.  For, as I will elaborate in more detail in Chapter 1, not only do Hume’s 
counterarguments for the necessity of human action serve to justify the anatomy of 
deliberation he undertakes in T 2.3.3-8, but they also in large part set the program for the 
remainder of T 2.3: to set out the basic principles of a mechanistic account of deliberation 
and motivation that accounts for the relative prevalence of the constant and settled 
19 
 
 
 
principles of our nature and the “gusts” of violent passion which knock us off our 
constant course—what l call a “climatology” of human motivation.  
In the remainder of the dissertation—Chapters 2-4—I undertake a detailed 
investigation of the fundamental principles of Hume’s T 2.3.4-8’s “climatology” of 
motivation and deliberation, and attempt to show how together they form the basic 
elements of a coherent Humean account of the “prevalence of the calm passions” and the 
effects of this “prevalence” on happiness.  Hume opens and closes his T 2.3.4-8 
climatology of human motivation with a ‘program’ of sorts, a summary of the general 
principles and mechanisms that govern the “greater and more sensible events of [the] 
war” between the constant principles of our individual nature that operate with a 
calmness that resembles reason, and those violent gusts of passion that disrupt their 
operation.  The elements of this program are neatly outlined by Hume at the start of his 
anatomy of deliberation in T 2.3.4.1 (SBN 419) and again at its close in T 2.3.8.13 (SBN 
438), and may be summarized as follows:  
1. The conversion of weaker passions into “predominant” ones, and the effects 
of this conversion on the strength and violence of the latter.
33
 (T 2.3.4) 
2. The calming and strengthening effects of custom on the passions.34 (T 2.3.5) 
3.  The causes of the relative vivacity of our ideas of the object of the passions—
those factors, including the “circumstances” or “situation” of the objects of 
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 cf. 2.3.4.2-10; SBN 419-22. 
34
 cf. 2.3.5; SBN 422-4. 
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passions, that “excite the imagination”—and the effects of that vivacity on the 
strength and violence of the passions.
35
 (T 2.3.6-8) 
4. The effects of the “disposition” or “temper” of a person on the relative 
strength of certain motives.
36
 (T 2.3.8) 
As I will show in this dissertation, all of these causes of the relative strength and violence 
of passions contribute to a coherent explanation of strong, calm motivating passions.  
Because, as some commentators have noted, many of the claims Hume makes in these 
sections seem to be contradictory, or to rely on principles of human nature which are 
contradictory
37
, I will attempt in my account of these elements in the next three chapters 
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 cf. 2.3.1.4; SBN 400-1 ; cf. 2.3.1.11, 15, 2.3.2.2, 4, 2.3.8.13; SBN 437-8. We must not take Hume’s 
apparent claim in T 2.3.4.1 that “all depends upon the situation of the object” in determining the calmness 
or violence of any passions too seriously—as many commentators unfortunately do.  I add this caveat 
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served to obscure the importance of many of the other causes of the relative violence and calmness of 
passions Hume outlines in 2.3.4-8 to a Humean account of strong, calm passions and to “strength of mind”.  
For instance, Tito Magri, though he acknowledges the importance of 2.3.4-5, argues that “the causal 
principle that has the greatest influence on the calmness or violence of the direct passions has to do with the 
‘situation of the object’”. (“Hume on the Direct Passions and Motivation” 197) Consequently, Magri 
disproportionately emphasizes the importance of 2.3.6-7 and ignores 2.3.4-5 (and 2.3.8) almost entirely. 
However, all Hume means to claim is that when we would govern a man, (“push” a man to any action, the 
implication being “against his natural inclination or established habits”) the best course of action is to 
manipulate the object, presumably since 1) we cannot in such an instance easily inculcate a habit of acting 
in some way and 2) we cannot easily know for sure whether the passion we seek to arouse is already a 
predominant one in his natural temper, or in some other way consonant with it.  That is, out of all the 
parameters which determine the strength and violence of a man’s passions, the situation of the object is 
most easily manipulated by someone else.  As we will see in 2.3.6-8, the importance of the “circumstances 
of the object” is their effect on the vivacity of the idea of the object, which itself has a great effect on the 
corresponding passion.  In T 2.3.6, Hume treats this cause of the violence of passions as merely one among 
many, and certainly cannot be plausibly read as limiting the causes of the violence of passions mainly to the 
“circumstances and situation of the object” of passions.  See John B. Stewart, The Moral and Political 
Philosophy of David Hume (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 77-8, and especially McIntyre, 
“Strength of Mind” 393-4, for an appreciation of this nuance in Hume’s account.      
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 cf. 2.3.1.11, 2.3.1.15, 2.3.2.2, 2.3.3.10, 2.3.8.13; SBN 403, 404, 409, 418, 437-8. 
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It may be helpful to discuss a few of these difficulties First, Hume tells us calm passions are generally 
weak, while violent ones are generally strong (cf. 2.3.4.1, 2.3.8.13; SBN 419, 437-8), but, it is argued, he 
does not and perhaps cannot offer us a coherent explanation of how a passion can be calm and strong given 
the material we have to work with in T 2.3.4-8. Hume argues that calm passions typically arise for goods 
that are psychologically “distant” from us (e.g. in space and time), but proceeds to argue in T 2.3.7 that our 
passions for such goods are typically weaker than those psychologically “proximate” to us.  And while he 
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to clarify the precise role each of them play in a Humean account of strong, calm 
passions and the constancy of motives.
38
  However, though this dissertation is an earnest 
attempt to understand the nature of the doctrines Hume outlines in these sections, my aim 
is not merely to provide a running commentary of T 2.3.  Indeed, in order to show how T 
2.3 serves as the ‘climax’ of the 1739 Treatise, and reveal the ways in which Hume 
intended his treatment of causal reasoning in Book I to be integrated into Book II, I must  
draw on key principles of human nature Hume treats in more detail elsewhere in the 
Treatise.   
In Chapter 2, I treat Hume’s T 2.3.4-5 account of the first and second elements of 
Hume’s program—the effects of opposition and custom on the relative strength and 
violence of our motivating passions.  I argue that Hume’s account of the effects of 
                                                                                                                                                              
does attempt in T 2.3.8 to explain the superior strength often possessed by such “distant” goods, his 
explanation rests on principles of human nature which seem to many to be directly contrary to those he 
employs in T 2.3.7, leading some commentators to conclude that the principles Hume’s T 2.3.7-8 account 
of the effects of psychological distance on the relative strength and calmness of seem to be “complicated to 
the point of contradiction.” (John J. Richetti, Philosophical Writing: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 241; see Dale Jacquette, Hume’s Critique of Infinity ((Boston: Brill, 
2001), 316-8), for a more nuanced statement of the difficulty.) Thus, J.E. Tiles concludes that the doctrines 
of T 2.3.7-8 are unpersuasive observations of human nature: in “Treatise, II, iii, 7-8, Hume offers some 
fairly unconvincing mechanisms which would explain how an object distant in time or space might excite a 
stronger passion than one ‘contiguous’.” (“The Combat of Reason and Passion”, Philosophy 52.201 (1977): 
321-30, 327) 
38
I take my approach to T 2.3.4-8 to be the same in spirit as that of John Rawls, who writes:  
You will find parts of these sections very tedious, and there are passages that I feel I don’t 
understand. Hume’s psychological doctrine is enormously complicated, and it is hard to assess 
what it implies. Nevertheless, you really should read these sections since they show Hume 
seriously engaged in trying to sketch the more obvious psychological principles of his science of 
human nature, which of course it is the aim of the Treatise to do. (“Hume II: Rational 
Deliberation and the Role of Reason”, in Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. 
Barbara Herman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000): 36-50, 37)   
Though Rawls does pay some attention mainly to elements of T 2.3.4.-6 and 9, and does not treat in his 
rather idiosyncratic reading what I take to be the absolutely crucial sections, T 2.3.7-8.  In this dissertation, 
I aim at a more comprehensive treatment of these sections. Accordingly, I largely ignore Rawls’ reading in 
what follows.  (See also Patrick Fleming, “Hume on Weakness of Will” (British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 18.4 (2010): 597–609) for a more recent serious attempt to employ various parts of Hume’s T 
2.3.4-8 anatomy of deliberation to the question of akrasia.  Fleming’s analysis, however, largely 
piggybacks on Rawls’ incomplete and in many ways flawed analysis of these sections.) 
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custom in particular forms the core of his general account of the process of character 
formation, the process by which we develop constant or “settled” motives which tend to 
prevail over other principles of action—“constancy” in the first sense, on Hume’s 
scheme.  Though several commentators have appreciated the importance of these sections 
to an understanding of Hume’s doctrine of the ‘prevalence of the calm passions’, neither 
the true relationship of these two mechanisms of human nature, nor the limits of their 
usefulness for accounting for the constancy of our motives have been fully appreciated. 
As I show, the effects of opposition and custom on the passions presuppose the 
antecedent relative strength of passions: only passions that are already predominant in our 
temper benefit from the effects of opposition and, more importantly, from their 
strengthening and calming effects.   
On Hume’s account, certain passions are naturally strong in our frame—natural 
instincts, such as benevolence to our children, and passions which naturally predominate 
in our individual tempers and dispositions.  These passions are for that reason naturally 
calm as well.  However, while some passions and principles of action may be naturally 
strong, the process of character formation—strengthening a passion or motive that is not 
naturally dominant in our temperament or frame—is often goal-oriented and reflective in 
a way that the mere habituation of motives and passions “natural” to our individual 
temperament or “implanted” in the human frame are not.  Accordingly, the calm passions 
in whose strength we are primarily interested are what are commonly called ‘the calm 
passions’—those (typically calm) passions and motives which are affective responses to 
our stable and comprehensive judgments of the value of objects, and whose “prevalence” 
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accounts for the reflective control of our conduct.  In particular, it is the strength or 
“prevalence” of these (typically calm) passions which Hume considers most indicative of 
the possession of “strength of mind” or constancy, a virtuous quality of mind by which 
we adhere to what Hume calls our long-term “interests and designs” and “general 
resolutions”.  In the following sections of T 2.3 (T 2.3.6-7), Hume accounts for the causes 
of the relative strength of such motives: the relative vivacity of our beliefs concerning an 
object’s existence and value.  Accordingly, Hume’s account of the causes and effects of 
the relative vivacity of our hedonic beliefs—the third element of Hume’s program in 
these sections—is the general topic of Chapter 3.   
My discussion in Chapter 3 of the effects of the relative vivacity of hedonic 
beliefs has two primary aims. The first aim is to elaborate Hume’s general account 
influence of the vivacity of our ideas on conduct. The second is to investigate the nature 
of the virtue of “strength of mind” or ‘constancy’ (in its second sense, on Hume’s 
scheme), a virtue “useful to oneself” which promotes the prevalence of ‘the calm 
passions’ so necessary for the successful regulation of conduct. Moreover, these two aims 
are intimately related, and it will be helpful here to sketch this relationship in more detail 
as my discussion in Chapter 3 will raise important questions which I take up in Chapter 4.  
One critical function causal reasoning serves is to make possible, by means of 
belief or the vivacity of our ideas, the anticipation of goods and evils which are not 
immediately present to sense or memory.  Vivacity, on Hume’s account, is that quality of 
a perception which not only constitutes our belief in the existence of its object, but also 
that which gives that perception influence on the passions.  Moreover, differences in the 
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relative strength and violence of passions are fundamentally attributable to differences in 
the relative vivacity of the ideas of the objects of those passions: the relative strength and 
violence of a desire or aversion is, all other things being equal, directly proportionate to 
the relative vivacity of our beliefs concerning their objects, on Hume’s theory. Though 
Hume first introduces and defends his novel account of belief and its relevance to the 
regulation of conduct in T 1.3.10, it is not often appreciated that Hume brings important 
features of his wider T 1.3-4 account of causal reasoning and belief directly to bear in T 
2.3.6-7.  The particular feature of his T 1.3-4 account of causal belief Hume integrates 
into his theory of motivation in these sections is his account of what he calls 
“unphilosophical probability”, his general term for forms of causal reasoning which 
produce beliefs that are unjustified in some way.  In T 2.3.6-7, Hume’s emphasis is on the 
causes and effects of ‘unphilosophical’ differences in the relative vivacity of our causal 
beliefs, that is, relative to other beliefs which are equally certain, or relative to the same 
belief at different times or in different circumstances.  Accordingly, an important part of 
my first aim in Chapter 3 is to account for the consequences of these ‘unphilosophical’ 
disparities in the vivacity of our hedonic beliefs on our conduct.  As I will argue, Hume’s 
account of these consequences is a clear early ancestor of theories of ‘utility discounting’ 
in contemporary behavioral economics.   
Hume’s theory of causal belief is, I argue, an “epistemology of ease” (to use 
Christine Battersby’s apt characterization39): for the most part, we believe most strongly 
what is most easily conceived.  Accordingly, ‘unphilosophical’ differences in the relative 
                                                     
39
 Christine Battersby, “Hume, Newton, and ‘the Hill called Difficulty’,” in Philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, ed. Stuart C. Brown (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979): 31-55, 38.  
25 
 
 
 
vivacity of our ideas is in general a function of the relative ease or difficulty with which 
we conceive of objects not immediately present to sense or memory.  The primary cause 
of these differences in vivacity on Hume’s account (as well as in contemporary 
discussion of utility discounting) is, I argue, what I will call “psychological distance”: in 
carrying the mind away from what Hume calls our “present situation” to ideas of objects 
not immediately present to sense or memory, causal reasoning conveys the mind over 
varying degrees of psychological distance (a primary form of which is spatiotemporal 
distance).  All other things being equal, the vivacity of a causal belief will be inversely 
proportional to this distance, because in carrying the mind over this distance causal 
reasoning proceeds against what Hume deems “natural propensities” of the imagination.  
Given that the relative strength of our motives is determined in significant part by the 
relative vivacity of one’s idea of its object, differences in the psychological distance of 
the objects of our passions will often have detrimental consequences for our conduct: 
indeed, disparities in psychological distance of objects can, on Hume’s account, effect 
‘preference reversals’ in which an object of insignificant value is more strongly desired 
than an object which is of far greater value, but is more faintly conceived.  Although the 
nominal subject of T 2.3.7 is the narrower issue of the effects of relative spatiotemporal 
distance of the objects of our passions on their relative strength (why spatiotemporally 
contiguous object “have an influence [on the imagination and passions] much superior to 
the distant and remote” (2.3.7.3; SBN 428)), I attempt to show in Chapter 3 that we ought 
to read this section as Hume’s integration of his broader T 1.3-4 account of the effects of 
psychological distance on the vivacity of our beliefs into his theory of motivation.  
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As I noted above, elaborating Hume’s account of the effects of psychological 
distance on the passions in T 1.3-4 and 2.3.7, is also bound up with my second primary 
aim in Chapter 3: to investigate the nature of the virtue of “strength of mind” and the 
prevalence of ‘the calm passions’ it promotes.  The “strength” of the mind that 
characterizes this virtue, I argue, is primarily what Hume calls the “strength” or “force” 
of the imagination—the ability of the imagination to preserve the vivacity of its ideas 
over great psychological distances.  Accordingly, it is part of my task in Chapter 3 to 
investigate the nature of this “strength” of the imagination and to demonstrate why such a 
quality of mind is necessary for the prevalence of ‘the calm passions’.  
 ‘The calm passions’, on Hume’s account, are those principles of action produced 
by reflective reasoning which “corrects” for the distorting effect psychological distance 
(and other sources of ‘unphilosophical’ disparities in the relative vivacity of our ideas) on 
our perceptions of the value of an object.  ‘The calm passions’ for this reason are 
affective (and intrinsically motivating) responses to our beliefs concerning what Hume 
calls the “true” or “real” value of an object.  However, the reflective causal reasoning 
which establishes these beliefs also carries the mind over a great psychological distance, 
on Hume’s account, rendering ‘the calm passions’ typically weaker than those (typically) 
violent passions (‘the violent passions’) which are “blind” and “deceitful” because 
founded on ‘unphilosophical’ appraisals of the value of objects.  Given the relationship 
between the vivacity of our ideas and the strength of our motives, the “strength” of the 
imagination, defined as that ability to preserve vivacity over longer psychological 
distances, is a virtuous quality of mind ‘useful to oneself’ precisely because it promotes 
27 
 
 
 
the strength of ‘the calm passions’ by fostering a more vivid conception of their objects.  
It would take a far greater disparity in the vivacity of the ideas of the objects of our 
passions for such a disparity to effect a ‘preference reversal’ in a mind that is “strong” in 
this sense.       
However, the I account I offer of this “strength” of the mind in Chapter 3 raises 
two important questions which I take up in Chapter 4: 1) Can this “strength” be 
cultivated, or it is simply what Hume calls a “natural ability” that is “almost invariable by 
any art or industry”40 on our part? and 2) how can the “strength” of the mind play the 
explanatory role Hume attributes to it in his theory of the regulation of conduct in light of 
Hume’s famous analysis of dispositional properties as explanatorily vacuous?  I argue in 
Chapter 4 that both of these questions can be answered in some detail by attending to T 
2.3.8.   
In T 2.3.8, Hume takes up the fourth element of his program for T 2.3.4-8—the 
“temper” or “disposition” of the agent—and Hume’s account of this element plays a key 
role in addressing the two questions posed above.  My particular focus in Chapter 4, 
however, is question 1). In regard to that question, it is clear that if the cultivation of the 
“strength” of the imagination is to be possible, the primacy of imaginative ease in 
determining the strength of our passions (via the strength of our hedonic beliefs) must be 
limited.  Given the role custom plays on Hume’s account of causal belief, I argue that 
question 1) is structurally parallel to the question that I raised in Chapter 2 regarding the 
strengthening of motives which are not naturally predominant in the mind: if custom is to 
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 3.3.4.4; SBN 609. 
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strengthen some principle of the mind or body X so that it predominates over others, then 
there must also be some mechanism Y which renders X antecedently predominant so that 
its predominance can be further solidified by the formation of a habit. Thus, if the 
“strength” of the imagination in conceiving some psychologically distant object is to be 
cultivated by custom, there must be some mechanism of human nature which causes the 
imagination to run against its natural propensity to conceive psychologically distant 
objects less vividly than psychologically contiguous objects.  I argue that Hume offers us 
an account of this mechanism in T 2.3.8, for in that section of the Treatise, Hume 
attempts to account for what he calls the “reverse” of the phenomena described in T 2.3.7 
(2.3.8.1; SBN 433)—that is, he will attempt to explain why desires for objects very 
distant in space and time are often stronger than desires for spatiotemporally contiguous 
objects. If my Chapter 3 claim that T 2.3.7 ought to be read more broadly as Hume’s 
integration of his general account of the effects of psychological distance on belief and 
the passions is persuasive, we ought to read T 2.3.8 equally broadly as an attempt to 
account for the mechanisms of the mind which prompt the imagination to proceed in 
opposition to its natural propensities, and to conceive very “distant” objects vividly.  
Where the imagination repeatedly conceives such “distant” objects, it becomes 
accustomed to do so, and the vivacity-preserving ease of conception this habit produces 
gives our beliefs in such distant objects—particularly the objects of ‘the calm passions’—
greater weight and influence on the will and passions.          
Accordingly, I first take up in Chapter 4 a commonly neglected principle of 
human nature central both to Hume’s ‘science of man’ and to Hume’s discussion in T 
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2.3.8, which I argue accounts for the limits of the influence of imaginative ease on the 
strength of our passions—a principle which I call Hume’s “Principle of Agitation-
Seeking”.  I then attempt to show how certain mechanisms of human nature grounded in 
this principle play key parts in Hume’s T 2.3.8 explanation of why the imagination 
proceeds in a ‘difficult’ course of thought, in opposition to its natural propensities.  As I 
noted above, the key mechanism of human nature responsible for this reversal in T 2.3.8 
is a change in the passionate “temper” or “disposition” of the person, a change which 
Hume describes more particularly as the “elevation” of the mind’s disposition by those 
pride-based passions which characterize “greatness of mind”.  Thus, I argue that it is the 
regulative role played by pride and “greatness of mind” on Hume’s account that is 
responsible for the constancy of our motives and the successful regulation of our conduct.  
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Chapter 1: The “Constancy” of Motives: Hume’s Justification of a Mechanistic 
Science of Motivation in Treatise 2.3 
The aim of this chapter is to argue that T 2.3.1-2, the sections of the Treatise in 
which Hume argues for the necessitation of human action, may be read as constituting 
Hume’s justification of the application of his general analytical framework—the “true 
idea of the human mind” as a double ‘train’ of interrelated and mutually influencing ideas 
and passions
41—to a mechanistic account of human motivation and deliberation.  Indeed, 
Hume makes this intention explicit at the close of his argument in T 2.3.2: there he 
writes, “having prov’d, that all actions of the will have particular causes,” that he will in 
the following sections “proceed to explain [1)] what these causes are, and [2)] how they 
operate.” (2.3.2.8; SBN 412)  Hume addresses 1) in T 2.3.3, where he argues that these 
causes must be passions, calm or violent, and it is in T 2.3.4-8 that he addresses 2)—how 
these causes “operate”.42  However, I will argue in this chapter that Hume’s basic T 
2.3.1-2 argument for the necessitation of human action serves not only to clear the 
theoretical ground for this investigation, but also serves to set in large part the nature of 
its program—outlining the main principles of what I will call, following Hume’s 
suggestion, the development of a “climatology” of human behavior—a scientific account 
of the principles and mechanisms of the mind that explain the relative constancy and 
inconstancy of our will and passions.      
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 1.4.6.19; SBN 261; cf. 2.1.4.2-4; SBN 283-4. 
42
 Kemp Smith, who takes the organization of Book II of the Treatise to be characterized by “confusion”, 
points in particular to the placement of T 2.3.1-2 as a prime example: “The arrangement of Book II is yet 
further complicated by Hume’s lengthy digression, in Part iii, on the subject of free-will and necessity, 
which, as he there treats it, is mainly epistemological in character and therefore, as he came to recognize in 
preparing the Enquiries, ought properly to have followed immediately upon the discussion of the idea of 
necessary connexion in Book I.” (Philosophy of David Hume 16-7)  I hope to show in what follows that T 
2.3.1-2 is neither a “digression”, nor misplaced in the order of Hume’s argument in Treatise, Book II. 
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1.1 Constancy, Character and Hume’s Justification of a Refined Science of 
Human Action: T 2.3.1-2 
One of Hume’s main aims in T 2.3.1-2 is to argue that the moral sciences lend 
themselves to the same scientific treatment as the natural sciences, on the grounds that 
moral phenomena are characterized by the very same regularity and necessity that govern 
natural phenomena. “’Tis universally acknowledged,” Hume tells us, “that the operations 
of external bodies are necessary” (2.3.1.3; SBN 399), and so a major part of Hume’s 
project in Book II, Part III of the Treatise is to argue that the same necessity we readily 
and universally acknowledge to govern the workings of nature also governs the voluntary 
actions of human beings.
43
  In arguing for this claim, Hume’s overall strategy is use his 
own Treatise, Book I account of necessity as a premise in an argument a pari ratione 
meant to bring to light the “manifest absurdity” and inconsistency of those who would 
deny the necessity of moral phenomena while asserting the necessity of physical 
phenomena. (2.3.1.14; SBN 404)
44
 On that two-pronged account
45
 necessity is nothing 
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 Donald Livingston has aptly called this Hume’s “Unity of the Sciences Thesis.” (Donald W. Livingston, 
Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 187-8) 
44
 cf. 2.3.1.18; SBN 407.  Thus, on my reading, there is an essential ad hominem strain to Hume’s overall 
argument, and this is more than just a trivial and accidental feature of it.  This feature is especially 
prominent in EHU 8. (See, e.g., EHU 8.15; SBN 88)  On this point, I am in fundamental agreement with 
the reading of James Harris, who suggests that “Hume is better seen as going no more than presenting an 
extended ad hominem argument to the effect that, if you believe that matter is necessitated in its operations, 
by a parity of reasoning you should also believe that human actions are necessitated.” (Harris, Liberty and 
Necessity 69n.14)  For a similar reading, see Baillie, Hume on Morality (London: Routledge, 2000), 76, and 
Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment 128, though Garrett is uneasy that this should be the basis for 
Hume’s argument for strict determinism.  Attention to this feature mitigates, in my view, many of the 
objections to Hume’s overall argument raised by those commentators, who object that Hume has not 
proven universal causation and so cannot demonstrate, ispo facto, that all moral phenomena are in fact 
caused.  (e.g. Tony Pitson (“Liberty, Necessity and the Will”, in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise, 
219-221), George Botterill (“Hume on Liberty and Necessity”, in Reading Hume on Human 
Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry, ed. Peter Millican (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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more than 1) the constant conjunction of two objects in experience which 2) determines 
the mind to pass from the perception of one object to the idea of the other.  (1.3.14.1; 
SBN 151-2; cf. 2.3.1.4, SBN 400-1, EHU 7)
46
 Moreover, Hume argues, if the necessity 
that exists between physical causes and effects lies not in some property of the objects 
themselves but is rather simply a result of their habitual conjunction in the mind, then 
moral phenomena are subject to “necessity” in the very same sense as physical 
phenomena are so subject. (2.3.1.5; SBN 401; cf. 1.3.16.2; SBN 176, EHU 8.21-2; SBN 
93) As Hume argued in Book I, “there is but one kind of necessity”—any distinction 
                                                                                                                                                              
2002), 277-300: 285-7, Don Garrett (Cognition and Commitment 120-8, especially 120), and Terence 
Penelhum (Themes in Hume 165-9)) Universal causation, it must be admitted, is assumed by Hume as a 
fundamental “maxim” of philosophical reasoning, and Hume himself recognizes that it is not 
demonstratively certain.“’Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a 
cause of existence.  This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or 
demanded” (1.3.3.1; SBN 78-9) and can be established only by “observation and experience”, and not by 
demonstration (1.3.3.2-9; SBN 79-82) As Penelhum notes, Hume never explains or justifies this maxim 
explicitly.  However, if, as on my reading, Hume’s primary aim in T 2.3.1-2 is not to give an air-tight case 
for compatibilism, but to demonstrate the legitimacy of the project he will undertake in the following 
sections of T 2.3—the elaboration of a mechanistic account of motivation and deliberation—such a strong 
a pari ratione argument seems adequate to remove the theoretical obstacles to such a project.  (See Barry 
Stroud, Hume 153-4, for a similar reading of T 2.3.1-2.)   
45
 An account which corresponds to his two-pronged definition of cause. (2.3.2.4; SBN 409, EHU 8.27; 
SBN 97; cf. 1.3.14.31; SBN 170, EHU 7.29; SBN 76-7) 
46
 We do not and cannot perceive the “ultimate connexion” between bodies or objects that are conjoined in 
experience, but only discover this “uniform and regular conjunction.” (2.3.1.4; SBN 400-1; cf. 1.3.14.7-19, 
2.3.1.16; SBN 158-64, 405-6)  Rather, when we talk of a “necessary connexion” between a physical cause 
and its effect, what we refer to is not something in the object itself, but rather an impression of reflection—
an internal impression that arises from their constant conjunction.  (1.3.14.22, 25, 2.3.1.16; SBN 165-6, 
167, 405-6) Our idea of “necessary connexion” then, on Hume’s account, is simply the idea we have of this 
impression or feeling of the determination of the mind. (1.3.14.22; SBN 165-6)  In the case of external 
objects, we have a natural tendency to believe that the “necessity” that governs these regular conjunctions 
lies in the objects themselves. However, as Hume explains, this is the result of the mind’s natural 
propensity to suppose that impressions that attend visible objects are “in” the objects themselves. 
(1.3.14.25; SBN 167)  As our ignorance of the “ultimate connexion” of bodies does not at all prevent us 
acknowledging the necessity, Hume argues, the essence of that necessity cannot consist in some property of 
the material cause. (2.3.1.4; SBN 400-1)  
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drawn between physical and moral necessity “is without any foundation in nature”. 
(1.3.14.33; SBN 171; cf. 2.3.1.14, 16; SBN 404, 405-6)
47
   
In accordance with his two-pronged account of necessity, Hume’s explicit 
strategy in T 2.3.1-2 is also two-pronged.  He will argue 1) that moral phenomena—our 
motives and the actions they cause—are conjoined in experience with the same constancy 
(and so necessity) with which physical phenomena are (2.3.1.5-13; SBN 401-4), and 2) 
that these regularities determine our minds to make inferences concerning these moral 
phenomena (i.e. from motives to actions and from actions to motives) just as they do in 
analogous cases in natural science. (2.3.1.14-17, 2.3.2.4-6; SBN 404-7, 409-11)  Thus, a 
significant part of Hume’s strategy in making his a pari ratione argument for necessity is 
simply to show that in common life 1) such constant conjunction is observed to  exist 
between the motives, sentiments, and actions of men, and 2) that we in fact commonly 
acknowledge the “force of moral evidence”, we in fact naturally proceed to draw 
inferences from our observations of certain motives, tempers and situations of human 
beings to their actions and from actions back to these principles, whatever our stated 
philosophical positions may be regarding necessity.
48
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 Hume took this simplifying of the question to be the innovative part of his treatment of the topic.  In the 
anonymously published Abstract, he writes, “Our author pretends, that this reasoning puts the whole 
controversy in a new light, by giving a new definition of necessity.  And, indeed, the most zealous 
advocates of free-will must allow this union and inference with regard to human actions.  They will only 
deny, that this makes the whole of necessity.  But then they must show, that we have an idea of something 
else in the actions of matter, which, according to the foregoing reasoning, is impossible.” (Abs. §34; SBN 
661) 
48
 And much of T 2.3.2 is devoted not only to detailing common reasons why many commonly assert the 
“liberty of indifference” and deny the necessity of human actions in philosophical and religious speculation 
(despite the fact that they at the same time tacitly and undeniably acknowledge it in practice), but also why 
the doctrine of necessity is, in fact, more consistent with many of the ends of such speculation.  In the 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume focuses less on the inconsistency of this position, and 
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Accordingly, Hume’s main procedure in making these two points is relatively 
straightforward: in arguing for both claims he will simply enumerate plain, obvious 
instances of these conjunctions and inferences.  It is not surprising, then, that Hume 
should emphasize the concept of ‘character’ in T 2.3.1-2: characters are plain, and more 
importantly plainly acknowledged causes of actions in the sense that their attribution is 
the result of an observed uniformity in the operations of passions, motives and sentiments 
on our actions and manners: “No union can be more constant and certain,” Hume tells us, 
“than that of some actions with some motives and characters.” (2.3.1.12; SBN 403-4, my 
emphasis; cf. EHU 8.16; SBN 88-9)
49
  In proving claim 1), then, Hume simply surveys 
instances in which such acknowledged uniformities exist in the moral sphere, and 
compares them to analogous, acknowledged natural regularities.  Characters are 
ubiquitous in human nature: there are “sentiments, actions, and passions” that are 
characteristic of each the two sexes (2.3.1.6; SBN 401), of the same man at different ages 
of life (2.3.1.7; SBN 401), and of men of different “stations” in society. (2.3.1.9; SBN 
                                                                                                                                                              
more on the way in which it can be “reconciled” with the doctrine of necessity, despite the prima facie 
disagreement.   
49
 I do not mean to imply here that the attribution of characters is always a “plain” business. Of course, 
such inferences are more complex that Hume often lets on.  Donald Ainslie rightly points out the 
difficulties that the complexity and “heterogeneity” of the manifestations of many such “durable” passions 
and character traits causes for a Humean account of character traits, particularly in light of the fact that our 
knowledge and attribution of such traits is in large part governed by complex causal inferences from such 
heterogeneous actions to a single passion or motive. (“Character Traits and the Humean Approach to 
Ethics”, in Moral Psychology, ed. Sergio Tenenbaum (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007): 79-110, 88ff.)  But, as I 
will show below, Hume is concerned with the difficulty and uncertainty of our inferences concerning the 
motives and actions of men, and the consequences of this difficulty for his projected mechanistic treatment 
of motivation in T 2.3.  More on this below.  
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402) And there are “characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well 
as common to mankind.” (2.3.1.10; SBN 402-3)50   
Similarly, in arguing for claim 2), Hume again points to the plain role knowledge 
of the characters and ‘settled’ principles of action of men play in our inferences both “in 
speculation” in moral sciences such as history and politics (cf. EHU 8.17-9; SBN 89-90),  
as well as in “practice” and conduct of common life. (2.3.1.15, 17; SBN 405-7) Indeed, 
Hume argues, such inferences have plain import for our conducting even the most 
common business in everyday life, where our coordination and prediction of, as well as 
our influence on the actions of others is necessary even in the simplest cases such that 
“’tis impossible to act or subsist a moment without having recourse to” such reasoning. 
(2.3.1.15; SBN 405; cf. EHU 8.9; SBN 84-5)  Moreover, the existence and function of 
many of our central social structures and institutions, such as government, military, and 
the conduct and regulation of trade operate on the assumption of the reliability of the 
connections between motives and actions in that they operate on the expectation that 
prevailing upon the common, settled motives of men will reliably produce certain actions. 
(2.3.1.15; SBN 405; cf. EHU. 8.17; SBN 89) Similarly, in the case of the penal system, it 
could never have “enter[ed] into the thoughts of any reasonable being to inflict” 
punishment on someone for an action where they did not already assume that that agent’s 
character was the cause of the action (2.3.2.6; SBN 410-11), nor could the threat of 
punishment be seen as a useful general tool to “influence” the motives of men where 
                                                     
50
 Indeed, many of the regularities Hume treats in T 2.3.1 become the subjects of essays in Hume’s Essays, 
Moral and Political (1741-2).  See, e.g., T 1.3.13.8; SBN 146-7, and Hume’s essay, “Of National 
Characters”, EMPL 197-215. 
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human motivation was not thought to be uniform in its response to pain. (2.3.2.5; SBN 
410)  
 
1.2 Necessity, Moral Responsibility and the Constancy of our Passions 
Perhaps the most important and interesting example of a social practice that 
depends on the necessity of the connection between characters and actions is our practice 
of assigning moral blame and praise because of the intimate connection Hume clearly 
draws between his T 2.1-2 anatomy of the “indirect passions” of pride, humility, love and 
hatred and his T 2.3 argument for the necessity of moral phenomena.  To possess a 
virtuous character, Hume argues, is to possess a “power of producing” these passions in 
oneself and others (cf. 2.1.7, 3.1.2.5, 3.3.1.3-4; SBN 294-8, 473, 574-5; cf.3.3.5.1; SBN 
614) such that these passions, when directed at qualities of mind, essentially constitute 
affective attributions of moral responsibility.  And as the “constancy” of character and the 
inferences this constancy grounds concerning the actions of agents play a necessary role 
in the production of these passions, Hume’s account of their production (one which 
occupied nearly the whole of Book II prior to T 2.3) offers direct support for his 
arguments for the necessity of moral phenomena in T 2.3.1-2.  Indeed, Hume refers to 
this very feature of his account of the indirect passions in T 2.3.2 in order to argue that 
even one who in principle denies the necessity of moral phenomena accepts it in practice 
when he blames and praises the actions of others.  (2.3.2.6; SBN 411, my emphasis; cf. 
EHU 8.29; SBN 98) 
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On Hume’s account of the production of the “indirect” passions, each has a 
“cause”, which Hume analyzes as a “subject” with a certain pleasing or paining “quality”, 
for instance, my benevolent-character, or my beautiful-house (quality-subject).  The 
subject naturally produces, by an association of ideas, an idea of the “object” of the 
passion (e.g. in the case of my house, the object is myself, and the association of ideas is 
founded on the relation of property, a species of causation), while the pleasure aroused 
by the quality (its beauty), by an association of impressions by resemblance, produces the 
passion itself (here, the pleasing sentiment of beauty produces the resembling 
(pleasurable) impression of pride).  To paraphrase Hume, all agreeable objects, related to 
ourselves or others, by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride or love, 
respectively, and disagreeable ones, humility and hatred, respectively. (cf. 2.1.6.1; SBN 
290)   
The function of the relation of ideas in producing these passions is to turn our 
attention from the cause of the passion (the pleasing or painful object) to its object 
(oneself or another), which shift of attention gives rise to these passions.  Given that the 
relation of ideas “forwards” the relation of impressions (in the sense that it is required to 
produce the transition of impressions necessary for these passions
51
), the stronger the 
former relation is, the more naturally the mind is turned to its object, and the stronger the 
                                                     
51
 Of course, at T 2.1.4.4, Hume writes of the mutual forwarding influence of these relations. (SBN 284; cf. 
2.1.5.10; SBN 289)  However, Hume is otherwise clear that where there is no relation of ideas, the 
transition of the passions is thereby eliminated. (cf. 2.1.8.7; SBN 301-2, 2.2.8.20; SBN 380) A pleasant 
impressions or sentiment whose cause bears no relation to another object may drive us to search for an 
appropriate object on which to found a passion, but without a related object, the separate pleasure or pain 
cannot be converted into a “constant and establish’d passion” of pride, love, hatred or humility. (cf. 2.2.2.7-
8; SBN 335) The influence of relations of ideas on the train of passions in our mind will be the subject of a 
more detailed treatment in a later chapter.   
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passion that is raised, ceteris paribus. (2.1.4.4; SBN 284) However, a relation of ideas 
between the subject and object of these passions, though necessary, is often not sufficient 
to produce an indirect passion even where there would be a resemblance of impressions.  
“As it [i.e. the relation of ideas] has a double task to perform [i.e. to turn our thought to 
the object and to “convert” the pleasurable or painful emotion into the resembling 
passion], it must be endow’d with a double force and energy.” (2.1.6.2; SBN 291; cf. 
2.1.6.5; SBN 292)  Accordingly, Hume notes that there are certain “limitations” on the 
kinds of things that can serve as proper causes of these passions.   
The “constancy” or “durability” of the connection between causes of these 
passions to their objects is such a limitation: 
The fourth limitation is deriv’d from the inconstancy of the causes of these 
passions, and from the short duration of its connexion with ourselves.  What is 
casual and inconstant gives but little joy, and less pride.  We are not much 
satisfy’d with the thing itself; and are still less apt to feel any new degrees of 
self-satisfaction upon its account.  We foresee and anticipate its change by the 
imagination; which makes us little satisfy’d with the thing: We compare it to 
ourselves, whose existence is more durable; by which means its inconstancy 
appears still greater.  It seems ridiculous to infer an excellency in ourselves from 
an object, which is of so much shorter duration, and attends us during so small a 
part of our existence. (2.1.6.7; SBN 293; cf. DP 2.42) 
Of course, among the primary causes of the indirect passions are qualities or durable 
“principles in the mind and temper”—the virtues and vices52, and primary among the 
virtues and vices are dispositions or “propensities” to certain passions, both non-
motivating passions such as pride (‘greatness of mind’ (cf. T 3.3.2)) and humility 
                                                     
52
 cf. T 2.1.7.  Our virtues and vices “are the most obvious” (2.1.7.2; SBN 295) and the most “natural and 
immediate causes” (2.1.9.1; SBN 303-4) of these passions.  In fact, on Hume’s account, virtue and vice are 
said to be equivalent to the “power” of producing the indirect passions (3.3.1.3; SBN 574-5; cf. 3.1.2.5; 
SBN 473), and “nothing operates more strongly on these passions” than our “personal character” or the 
“good and bad qualities of our actions and manners” that “constitute virtue and vice.” (2.1.5.2; SBN 285)   
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(‘meanness’ (cf. EPM 7.10; SBN 253)), as well as motivating or “impelling” passions 
such as benevolence (“humanity” or “goodness” (cf. T 3.3.3)).53  Accordingly, as Hume 
reminds us throughout the Treatise, this constancy requirement applies equally to all of 
these virtues and vices as well.
54
  
     It is because of this constancy requirement that where the motivation of an agent 
comes under our review, the proper objects of our moral evaluation are dispositions to 
certain passions rather than actions: 
Actions by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed 
not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who 
perform’d them, they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound to 
his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil.  The action itself may be blameable; it 
may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the person is not 
responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable or 
constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, ‘tis impossible he can upon 
its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. (2.3.2.6; SBN 411, 
my emphasis; cf. EHU 8.29; SBN 98) 
Of course, we only have access to a person’s character and disposition through “external 
signs”, and actions are useful in moral evaluation only insofar as they are such “signs” of 
character—that is, insofar as they are as “indications of certain principles in the mind and 
temper.” (3.2.1.2; SBN 477, my emphasis)55 It is here that Hume’s account of our 
affective attributions of moral responsibility demonstrates the necessity and central 
importance of our inferences concerning moral phenomena and the constant conjunction 
which grounds them.  What we know of someone’s character we infer from their actions, 
and we are able to make such inferences from external signs because we have 
experienced in our own inner life a certain conjunction of some passion with some action, 
                                                     
53
 cf. T 3.2.1.2-4, 18, SBN 477-8, 483-4, EPM 7.2n; SBN 251n. 
54
 3.3.1.3-5; SBN 574-5; cf. 2.2.3.4-5, 2.3.2.6, 3.2.1.2-8; SBN 348-50, 411, 477-9. 
55
 cf. 2.1.11.3, 3.3.1.4-5; SBN 317, 575, EHU 8.9; SBN 84-5. 
40 
 
 
 
which habitual association determines our mind to infer the existence of such an 
impelling passion in the mind of another from his or her action.
56
  As Hume indicates 
throughout his account of the indirect passions, this “constancy” of proper causes of the 
indirect passions can be cashed out in terms of the constancy of the union of our idea of 
this inferred passion with the idea of a certain person—the object proper to such 
passions—which constant conjunction is necessary to “facilitate the transition of ideas” 
(2.2.3.4; SBN 349) from that of the action to that of the impelling passion, and finally to 
that of the person.
57
  This constant conjunction is the product of our experience not 
merely of the general connection between certain actions and certain passions, but of 
what Hume elsewhere deems the “steadiness and uniformity” of the motives and conduct 
of an individual agent. (1.3.12.6; SBN 133)  Hume’s example in T 3.2.1.6 is “humanity”: 
“Here is a man, that does many benevolent actions; relieves the distress’d, comforts the 
afflicted, and extends his bounty even to the greatest strangers.  No character can be more 
amiable and virtuous. We regard these actions as proofs of the greatest humanity.” (SBN 
478, my emphasis)  The nature (and scope) of his actions indicates that he is actuated by 
humanity, but the frequency with which he is actuated by that motive indicates that his 
humanity is a durable or constant motive, or part of his settled character. It is by means 
of such inferences that impelling passions may be considered “constant and durable” 
principles of that individual’s motivational economy.  And it is in this sense that such 
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 Thus, Hume emphasizes the central importance of the shared nature of our emotional life and our 
common human nature as a basis for these inferences. (2.1.3.4, 2.1.11.3, 3.3.1.4-5; SBN 280-1, 318, 575; 
EHU 8.7; SBN 83)  Of course, such “signs” are integral to the operation of Humean “sympathy”. (cf. 
2.1.11.3-4; SBN 317-8) 
57
 On Hume’s account, the “constant and universal object” of our indirect passions “is a person or creature 
endow’d with thought and consciousness.” (2.3.2.6; SBN 410-11; cf. 2.2.1.2, 2.2.1.6; SBN 229, 331) 
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‘durable’ and ‘constant’ motives, since they are bound up with the ongoing projects and 
“designs” of the agent, and so may characterized as being “left behind” (2.2.3.4, 2.3.2.6; 
SBN 349, 411) or as “lasting” or “remaining” after any particular action (2.2.3.4, 2.3.2.3; 
SBN 349, 409), or as “infixed upon” a person. (2.3.2.6; SBN 411)  Only such qualities 
are proper objects for our moral sentiments.     
In this way, such attributions depend on the necessity of moral phenomena, 
because they depend more fundamentally on such double inferences—from actions to 
passions, and from passions to persons—inferences grounded in the constancy and 
necessity of the conjunction between their conjuncts in experience.  Indeed, as I 
suggested above, insofar as the inference from action to impelling passion, as well as that 
from impelling passion to person, is a necessary condition of the production of the 
indirect passions which figure so prominently in Hume’s account of moral responsibility, 
Hume’s elaboration and defense of his account of their origin in T 2.1-2 directly support 
his arguments for a more refined science of motivation in T 2.3.1-2.
58
  The very fact that 
actions can prompt moral praise and blame—love of the virtuous and hatred of the 
                                                     
58
 In this way, at least, Book II as a whole might be considered a unity in some sense other than being 
merely a classificatory scheme of the passions or a demonstration of the explanatory power of the 
principles of association.  Indeed, it seems that Hume treats the indirect passions—which arise by 
necessarily means of a complex causal mechanism—before the direct passions, “which arise from good and 
evil most naturally, and with the least preparation” (2.3.9.1; SBN 438), in order to prepare the reader for his 
claims in Book II, Part III regarding the extension of the science of human nature to the causes of human 
behavior.  That his science of the passions in general is intended, at least in part, to show this is evidenced 
by the closing paragraphs of the Dissertation on the Passions, where Hume states, “I pretend not to have 
here exhausted this subject.  It is sufficient for my purpose, if I have made it appear, that, in the production 
and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a 
disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy.” (DP 6.19)  The 
indirect passions in particular, as the most causally complex passional phenomena, would be an ideal way 
of demonstrating the validity of this type of inquiry.  Indeed, Hume seems to treat the more complex 
passions he discusses precisely to bring to light the “curious principles of philosophy, for which [each] 
affords us an uncontestable argument.” (2.1.11.1; SBN 394)  Of course, in the related passages in the 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume moves right from a discussion “Of the idea of 
necessary connexion” in EHU 7 to a discussion of the possibility of a science of morals in EHU 8. 
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vicious, even in a libertarian, is grounded in the necessity of moral phenomena, and so 
these very phenomena are in turn evidence for that necessity. 
 
1.3 The Constant Inconstancy (or Inconstant Constancy) of the Human Will 
and the Denial of the Necessitation of Human Action 
If our basic reasoning concerning the actions, passions, and characters of men in 
common life so plainly reflects our tacit acknowledgement of the necessity of moral 
phenomena, what, then accounts for the fact that so many—philosophers in particular—
deny this necessity to human behavior?  As answering this question will bring us a long 
way to understanding the nature of Hume’s wider program in T 2.3, it will be important 
for my purposes to address it in some detail.   
Hume takes the more important part of his argument in T 2.3.1 to be establishing 
claim 1)—that the connection between human passions and actions are in fact 
characterized by a certain constancy.  The importance of demonstrating claim 1) is 
explained by Hume’s account of causal reasoning: “’Tis the observation of the union, 
which produces the inference; for which reason it might be thought sufficient, if we prove 
a constant union in the actions of the mind, in order to establish the inference, along with 
the necessity of these actions.” (2.3.1.4; SBN 400-1, my emphasis; cf. EHU 8.16; SBN 
88-9)  Since, the inference is “founded on” the conjunction (2.3.2.4; SBN 409), claim 2) 
follows directly from claim 1). 
Accordingly, though Hume notes and refutes several common reasons for the 
denial of necessity and for the corresponding “prevalence of the doctrine of liberty” 
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among philosophers in T 2.3.1-2
59
, he tells us that only one objection takes aim at the 
heart of his argument for that necessity, and claims to refute the fundamental premise 
that constitutes its basis—claim 1), that certain motives or characters are in fact conjoined 
in experience with the same constancy (and so necessity) with which physical phenomena 
are conjoined:           
I can imagine only one way of eluding this argument, which is by denying that 
uniformity of human actions, on which it is founded.  As long as actions have a 
constant union and connexion with the situation and temper of the agent, 
however we may in words refuse to acknowledge the necessity, we really allow 
the thing.  Now some may, perhaps, find a pretext to deny this regular union and 
connexion.  For what is more capricious than human actions?  What more 
inconstant that the desires of man?  And what creature departs more widely, not 
only from right reason, but from his own character and disposition?  An hour, a 
moment is sufficient to make him change from one extreme to another, and 
overturn what cost him the greatest pain and labour to establish.  Necessity is 
regular and certain.  Human conduct is irregular and uncertain.  The one, 
therefore, proceeds not from the other. (2.3.1.12; SBN 403-4, my emphasis) 
Let us calls this the Inconstant Constancy Objection (ICO).  The “inconstancy” of the 
human will seems to provide the only pretext for denying this necessity because it claims 
to provide a prima facie reason to deny the crucial claim 1).  Although we may 
acknowledge that a man has a certain “character and disposition”, he may nevertheless 
fail to be absolutely “constant”—that is, he may act in ways that cross his more “durable” 
motives, and so act in a way that is not “uniform” or “regular” in this regard.  (Indeed, in 
numerous places in the Treatise and elsewhere, Hume himself notes what he takes to be 
the “essential changeableness” (2.1.4.3; SBN 283) and inconstancy of the human will and 
passions: “[n]othing is more fluctuating and inconstant on many occasions, than the will 
                                                     
59
 For instance, a confused understanding of or an aversion to the term ‘necessity’ because of its 
connotation of ‘compulsion’ and ‘violence’ (2.3.2.1; SBN 407-8; cf. 2.3.1.13; SBN 404), conclusions based 
on superficial introspection of a supposed feeling or experience of liberty in our actions (2.3.2.2; SBN 408-
9), or theological considerations about the nature of the soul and divine justice. (2.3.2.3-6; SBN 409-11)   
44 
 
 
 
of man.” (2.1.10.6; SBN 313, my emphasis)60)  Thus, ICO goes, because human conduct 
is “irregular” and “inconstant” in this way, whereas necessity is (absolutely) “regular” 
and “constant”, human conduct cannot be governed by necessity.   
 Of course, this is merely a pretext as there is nothing at all inconsistent in denying 
the absolute constancy or uniformity of any individual’s motives (an absolute constancy 
which Hume, as we have just noted, repeatedly denies), even while acknowledging that 
certain motives and actions are constantly and so necessarily conjoined in our general 
experience of behavior.  Though a motive or passion which is constantly conjoined with a 
certain type of action in human behavior generally may be the cause of an individual’s 
performing an action of this type, the motive or passion need not be part of an 
individual’s constant or settled “character”—that is, it need not be what Hume calls in T 
2.3.4 his or her “settled principle of action”. (2.3.4.1; SBN 419, my emphasis)  As we 
noted above, the proper attribution of a “durable” motive to an agent requires a double 
inference on Hume’s account: from action to impelling passion and from impelling 
passion to the idea of the agent’s person.  The first inference can be made by observation 
of human behavior generally: actions of type Y are typically motivated by (constantly 
conjoined with) motive X.  The second inference is based only on observation of an 
individual agent’s behavior over time: where we find that actions Y are constantly 
conjoined in our experience with individual Z, we conjoin the idea of the motive X with 
the idea of individual agent Z, such that we expect the motive-action complex X-Y when 
we observe Z in the appropriate situation.  That is, we attribute motive X to individual Z 
                                                     
60
 See also T 2.1.4.3-4, 2.2.2.22, 2.3.3.10, 2.3.8.13; SBN 283-4, 343-4, 428, 437-8, EHU 8.15; SBN 88. 
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as what Hume elsewhere calls a “settled” or “constant” principle of action (as part of his 
“durable” character), such that (in the appropriate circumstances) we immediately infer 
the idea of motive X from our perception of agent Z.  The argument that the occasional 
inconstancy of an individual in this respect refutes the constancy and so necessity of the 
conjunction of motives and actions generally, then, is based largely on the conflation of 
motives simpliciter and the “durable” motives that make up the characters of 
individuals.
61
  The absolute constancy of the conjunction of motive X and action Y may 
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 Indeed, this is a conflation Hume himself sometimes seems to commit, but in his more careful moments 
avoids.  What makes this conflation so natural in Hume’s case is that he uses the term ‘motives’ to refer 
both to particular ‘impelling passions’(which I have deemed ‘motives simpliciter’) and to those “durable” 
principles of actions which govern our longer-term “interests and designs” and which “endure” beyond any 
particular action.  (Indeed, the general poverty of Hume’s terminology for motivating passions and related 
principles of human nature was noted by Thomas Reid. (Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh 
and London, 1788), 182-4).) Thus, in a passage from T 2.2.3 echoed in the T 2.3.2 passage quoted above, 
Hume suggests that in the case of actions, an intention—“a particular fore-thought and design”—is not only 
a necessary condition of the indirect passions and attributions of responsibility, but also in itself sufficient 
to “connect this action with the person” in such a manner as to produce them. (T 2.2.3.4; SBN 349)  Of 
course, Hume claims that we can make a justified causal inference from one “experiment”, but the 
inference in this instance “piggybacks” on some other causal custom already formed, and so is still an 
attribution of a durable causal connection. (cf. T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104-5)  Similarly, Hume’s account of the 
object of our moral evaluation in T 3.2.1.2-6—especially when compared with the parallel account at T 
3.3.1-4-5 quoted above—also seems to make the same conflation.  There, as we noted, Hume argues that 
the object of our evaluation are “motives” (as opposed to actions—their external “signs”). (cf. 3.2.1.2-3; 
SBN 477-8)  But in T 3.2.1.6, he also seems to suggest that individual motives are themselves naturally 
taken to be signs of a more “settled” and “durable” character.  To cite a passage quoted earlier: “Here is a 
man, that does many benevolent actions; relieves the distress’d, comforts the afflicted, and extends his 
bounty even to the greatest strangers.  No character can be more amiable and virtuous. We regard these 
actions as proofs of the greatest humanity.  This humanity bestows a merit on the actions.” (3.2.1.6; SBN 
478) It seems in this case it is the man’s “principle of humanity” —that is his “settled” or “constant” motive 
of benevolence—rather than any one of the several benevolent motives (impelling passions) that ground the 
merit of his actions.  As Hume notes in T 2.3.2 that men not only escape blame for actions they perform 
“ignorantly and casually” (i.e. “accidentally” and without the related motive or intention) but are also 
blamed less for those actions they perform “hastily and unpremeditatedly, than for such as proceed from 
thought and deliberation.” (2.3.2.7; SBN 412)  This is not because there is no (blamable) intention or 
motive in the case, but rather because the motive “infects not the whole character.” (2.3.2.7; SBN 413 = 
EHU 8.30; SBN 97-8)  Furthermore, Hume suggests that if an action is committed intentionally, but the 
intention is not accompanied in the agent by the passion commonly associated with that motive, the blame 
or praise is also mitigated.  In this case, the inferred passion gives rise by a relation of impressions to the 
uneasiness of blame or pleasure of praise. (2.2.3.5; SBN 349-50)  Where the inferred passion differs from 
the actual passion (which difference we may and often do come to realize upon further investigation), the 
relation of impressions is eliminated, and so too the blame or praise.  These mitigations would not be 
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still hold generally even where we observe individual Z to act in ways that oppose the 
ends of any “settled” motive X we may have attributed to him.  Indeed, it is certainly true 
that there are motives (invariably violent passions) that are constantly conjoined with 
actions in human nature generally that are not the “durable” motives of any individual.62   
The interesting issue ICO raises, however, does not concern its validity, but rather 
concerns what Hume thinks it says about the psychology of the objector.  And to 
appreciate the full force of Hume’s reply, and how his subsequent “anatomy” of human 
motivation in T 2.3.3-8 is a vital part of it, we need to understand this psychology.  Hume 
proceeds to sketch in this instance, as he does in other cases in the Treatise, the outlines 
of an “error theory” that not only reveals the fallacious reasoning that underlies this 
                                                                                                                                                              
intelligible unless Hume would also make some significant distinction between motivating passions 
simpliciter and durable motives or characters proper.   
A valuable but overlooked discussion of this point can be found in Paul Russell, Freedom and 
Moral Sentiment, 96-7, 114-5.  Russell rightly notes that there is “no support offered for the thesis that 
intentional action is always indicative of durable principles of mind.” Rather, he argues, Hume simply 
holds “that intentional action always reveals or manifests some durable principle of the mind—i.e. a 
character trait of some kind.” (106n8) I disagree with Russell that Hume actually holds this stronger 
claim—Hume offers no support for it, I would argue, because he does not ultimately hold it.  Indeed, as 
Hume suggests elsewhere, we often naturally (and often incorrectly) make this conflation.  In fact, he 
suggests that our natural tendency is to assume the “constancy” of those motives revealed to us by actions: 
“when we receive harm from any person, we are apt to imagine him criminal, and ‘tis with extreme 
difficulty we allow of his justice and innocence.” (2.2.3.9; SBN 351, my emphasis)  This is especially true, 
Hume points out, in cases where the action is a sign of particular motive that gives rise to a violent passion 
in us which resembles praise or blame in hedonic charge (e.g. where an action is of a sort that generally 
indicates a love for us, and so gives us a sense of pride, or where an injury is of a sort that typically 
indicates a hatred of us, and so gives rise to anger in us).  The resemblance of passions in this case 
artificially strengthens the relation of ideas (i.e. that between the motive and the character of the person).  It 
is only “when the violence of the impression is once a little abated” that “the defect of the relation begins to 
be better felt” and that we see that the “character of a person is no wise” implicated in the case. (2.2.3.6; 
SBN 350) Thus, Hume writes, “When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the 
character of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent: But always esteem ourselves and allies equitable, 
moderate, and merciful.  If the general of our enemies be successful, ‘tis with difficulty we allow him the 
figure and character of a man…He is bloody-minded, and takes pleasure in death and destruction.  But if 
the success be on our side, our commander has all the opposite good qualities, and is a pattern of 
virtue…’Tis evident the same method of thinking runs thro’ common life.” (2.2.3.2, my emphasis; cf. 
3.2.1.8; SBN 479)  See also T 3.2.1.3, where Hume also notes our tendency to blame or praise first and 
then “retract” that blame or praise given more information about an agent’s motives.  (SBN 477-8) 
62
 For example, current law mitigates a charge of murder when it is committed “in the heat of passion” to 
voluntary manslaughter, because it takes the murder to be the result of a sort of “provocation”.  
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position, but also accounts for its ‘natural appeal’.63  ICO can be schematized more 
simply as follows: 
P1) Necessity is characterized by regularity and certainty.   
P2) The natural inconstancy of the human will renders human conduct irregular 
and uncertain.   
C) Therefore, human conduct is not necessitated. 
Hume’s “error theory” of the denial of moral necessity turns on the relationship between 
Hume’s two definitions of ‘necessity’ (which correspond to his two definitions of 
‘cause’) reflected in P1 above: necessity may be defined as both the constant and 
“regular” conjunction of two objects and the natural determination of the mind to infer 
one object from the other (a tendency founded on the perception of that conjunction).  
But, as Hume points out in T 2.3.1 and elsewhere, one’s (‘subjective’) uncertainty 
regarding the causes of some effect in no way entails the (‘objective’) irregularity or 
inconstancy in the operation of those causes and their connection with their effects.
64
  
However, as Hume claims elsewhere, subjective uncertainty, where it is not recognized 
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 I want to thank Aaron Garrett for helping me to clarify this point.  Hume’s arguments against the 
motivational power of reason and his subsequent elaboration of the doctrine of “calm passions” in T 2.3.3 
is another example of this. 
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 My distinction here between subjective uncertainty and objective inconstancy is a distinction Hume 
himself makes, a distinction which is at the heart of Hume’s distinction between the two kinds of 
probability in T 1.3.11-2: “Probability is of two kinds, either when the object is really in itself uncertain, 
and to be determin’d by chance; or when, tho’ the object be already certain,yet ‘tis uncertain to our 
judgment, which finds a number of proofs on each side of the question.” (2.3.9.20; SBN 444) What is more, 
subjective uncertainty does not even entail a complete lack of a (subjective) determination of the mind to 
infer the existence of one object from another.  Thus, in his response to this objection, Hume also draws on 
his T 1.3 account of probable reasoning: where a cause has been conjoined in experience with more than 
one effect, the mind does not lack a determination to infer either effect, but proportions its belief to the 
superiority of its determination to conceive one object over the others. (2.3.1.12; SBN 403-4; cf. 1.1.1.7, 
1.3.11-12, 2.2.6.2, SBN 4, 124-42, 366-7, EHU 7. 8; SBN 63-4) As many commentators have pointed out 
in the case of ‘cause’, the relationship between these two definitions is problematic, in part for the reason 
discussed here. I cannot enter into the controversy concerning Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ or 
‘necessity’ and its implications here, however.  
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as merely subjective, may naturally lead to the rejection of the objective regularity or 
constancy of the conjunction of causes and effects as a result of what he calls “vulgar” 
causal reasoning.  And, as many commentators have noted, Hume takes the denial of the 
necessity of moral phenomena is a prime example of such reasoning.  
“Vulgar” reasoners, among their other errors, ascribe irregular phenomena 
automatically to “chance” (or what amounts to the negation of causes—causal 
indeterminism—on Hume’s account): that is, they “attribute the uncertainty of events to 
such an uncertainty in the causes, as makes them often fail of their usual influence,” 
though they perceive “no obstacle nor impediment in their operation.” (1.3.12.5; SBN 
132)  To cite Hume’s well-known example: 
A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than 
to say, that commonly it does not go right: But an artizan easily perceives, that 
the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the 
wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which 
puts a stop to the whole movement.” (1.3.12.5; SBN 132) 
That is, where they have experienced an irregularity in a case where there had previously 
been an unvaried regularity, the vulgar reasoner’s default explanation of the inconstancy 
of what is normally to appearance a regular and constant phenomenon is “chance”.  
(Accordingly, the vulgar are rightly deemed “mild indeterminists”, as Don Garrett nicely 
puts it.
65
)  This “vulgar” tendency is the product of superficial reasoning: because the 
vulgar “take things according to their first appearance”, they attribute to ‘chance’ what is 
in reality the operation of “secret and conceal’d causes”. (1.3.12.1; SBN 130) On the 
other hand, the watchmaker is prompted to a deeper investigation to account for any 
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 Cognition and Commitment 127. 
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irregularity in appearance in terms of a contrary cause, and Hume implies, that this is 
largely the result of the watchmaker’s already having an appreciation and grasp of the 
concealed principles which govern the deeper “internal operations” of the watch.  Like 
the watchmaker, the philosopher is not a superficial reasoner:  
…[philosophers,] observing, that almost in every part of nature there is 
contain’d a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of 
their minuteness or remoteness, find that ‘tis at least possible the contrariety of 
events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret 
operation of contrary causes.  This possibility is converted into a certainty by 
farther observation, when they remark, that upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety 
of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual 
hindrance and opposition. (1.3.12.5; SBN 132, my emphasis)
66
 
Because “farther observation” and “an exact scrutiny” always reveals the operation of a 
concealed cause in nature, philosophers form a general “maxim, that the connexion 
betwixt all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in 
some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes.” (1.3.12.5; SBN 
132)
67
  Thus, unlike the vulgar, the philosopher, guided by this maxim, will attempt to get 
beyond what are initially irregular appearances to discover these secret and concealed 
causes—that is, they push on in their inquiries in order to discover the deeper causes of 
the regularity of what may only appear to be irregular.  
Thus, in the present case, the rejection of moral necessity, Hume argues, is the 
result of ‘vulgar’ reasoning on the part of philosophers.  Hume’s targets here in T 2.3.1 
are not the vulgar, but those philosophers who, despite their philosophy, are even more 
‘vulgar’ than the vulgar in regard to moral phenomena. The “philosophers” in T 2.3.1-2 
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 In Hume’s account of liberty and necessity in the first Enquiry, he incorporates this very passage 
verbatim into his argument at the same point. (cf. EHU 8.13; SBN 87-8) 
67
 Hume, in fact, makes this maxim the sixth of his “rules by which to judge of causes and effects”. 
(1.3.15.8; SBN 174) 
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are strict determinists in regard to natural phenomena, despite whatever subjective 
uncertainty may arise from perceived irregularities and recalcitrant phenomena in the 
operation in nature.  They not only fail to apply the methodological maxims they adopt in 
physical to moral science (the vulgar are at least consistent in their failure to form, adopt 
and consistently apply such maxims), but as a consequence adopt the ‘vulgar’ doctrine of 
“chance” as a general philosophical position: that is, they elevate “chance”, the ‘vulgar’ 
principle of the negation of causes, to the status of a philosophical doctrine, the doctrine 
of the “liberty of indifference”.68  (2.3.1.18; SBN 407)  Their subjective uncertainty 
results not merely in “mild”, but in full-fledged indeterminism in regard to moral 
phenomena.   
Thus, Hume’s reply to this objection to his doctrine of necessity is aimed 
specifically at such philosophers, and clearly echoes his earlier distinction between 
‘vulgar’ and ‘philosophical’ reasoning.  At T 2.3.1.12, Hume writes,  
…[I]n judging of the actions of men we [i.e. we philosophers] must proceed 
upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects.  When 
any phænomena are constantly and invariably conjoin’d together, they acquire 
such a connexion in the imagination, that it passes from one to the other, without 
any doubt or hesitation.  But below this there are many inferior degrees of 
evidence and probability, nor does one single contrariety of experiment entirely 
destroy all our reasoning.  The mind ballances [sic] the contrary experiments, 
and deducting the inferior from the superior, proceeds with that degree of 
assurance or evidence, which remains.  Even when these contrary experiments 
are entirely equal, we remove not the notion of causes and necessity; but 
supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the operation of contrary 
and conceal’d causes, we conclude, that the chance or indifference lies only in 
our judgment on account of our imperfect knowledge, not in the things 
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 That is, they adopt this doctrine in principle, but not in practice.  As I noted above, some of Hume’s most 
powerful arguments against indeterminism concern the inconsistency of the principles of philosophers and 
their practice in common life.  On the other hand, the “scholastic doctrine of free-will…enters very little 
into common life, and has but a small influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking.” (2.1.10.4; 
SBN 311-12) 
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themselves, which are in every case equally necessary, tho’ to appearance not 
equally constant or certain. (2.3.1.12; SBN 403-4, my emphasis; cf. EHU 8.13-
4; SBN 86-7) 
On Hume’s error theory, the ‘inconstancy’ of an individual’s behavior gives rise to 
uncertainty which leads ‘vulgar’ moral philosophers to ascribe the behavior ultimately to 
“chance” (that is, to the ‘liberty of indifference’).  Were their reasoning truly 
philosophical, recalcitrant phenomena would push them to investigate the “conceal’d 
causes” of this irregularity and, as a result, to “enlarge” the stock of principles by which 
they account for the conduct of men.  However, as in the case of the vulgar, the 
subjective uncertainty to which human inconstancy gives rise in the philosophical 
observer cuts off inquiry into its deeper causes before it can even begin, and in doing so 
prevents the development of the very framework of causes in which such phenomena 
may be account for.
69
    
Indeed, on Hume’s account, this “vulgar” failure to apply the maxims or “rules” 
by which a philosopher ought to govern his reasoning in order to uncover the deeper 
causes of human behavior is itself a result of a certain “inconstancy”, in the sense a lack 
of ‘fortitude’ or ‘steadiness’ or ‘perseverance’ in his causal reasoning and philosophical 
inquiry.  Shortly after annunciating these maxims or rules in T 1.3.15, Hume writes:  
There is no phenomenon in nature, but what is compounded and modify’d by so 
many different circumstances, that in order to arrive at the decisive point, we 
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 And as Hume notes in a relevant passage in his essay, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and 
Sciences”: “To say, that any event is derived from chance, cuts short all farther enquiry concerning it, and 
leaves [a philosopher] in the same state of ignorance with the rest of mankind.”  (EMPL 111)  Hume’s 
point at the beginning of this essay is actually to caution the philosopher against ascribing certain 
phenomena in human affairs too rashly to “causes” merely as a means to show off his subtlety and 
ingenuity.  (EMPL 111-3)  The opposite of “causes” here is “chance”, but not “chance” in the vulgar sense; 
rather, by “chance” Hume simply means by causes too minute and delicate to be subjected to a general 
philosophical analysis and its “grosser” principles. (EMPL 112)  
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must carefully separate whatever is superfluous, and enquire by new 
experiments, if every particular circumstance of the first experiment was 
essential to it.  These new experiments are liable to a discussion of the same 
kind; so that the utmost constancy is requir’d to make us persevere in our 
enquiry, and the utmost sagacity to choose the right way among so many that 
present themselves.  If this be the case even in natural philosophy, how much 
more in moral, where there is much greater complication of circumstances, and 
where those views and sentiments, which are essential to any action of the mind, 
are so implicit and obscure, that they often escape our strictest attention, and are 
not only unaccountable in their causes, but even unknown in their existence? 
(1.3.15.11; SBN 175, my emphasis) 
‘Constancy’ is thus the special virtue of the consistent philosopher engaged in the 
difficult investigation of these “remote”, “minute” and “conceal’d” causes of moral 
phenomena, and, in particular, that virtue by which he adheres firmly to the maxims 
which push him on to discovery of the deeper causes of the regularity in human behavior 
where that behavior is only irregular “in appearance.”70  
To put Hume’s point differently, the ICO rests on the illicit conflation of two 
distinguishable senses of “regularity” or “constancy” in P1) and P2): superficial 
constancy or uniformity (constancy “to appearance”, as he puts it) and a principle- or 
law-based regularity.  The difference between these two senses can be conveniently 
illustrated by an analogy Hume subtly employs to make his a pari ratione argument for 
the necessity of moral phenomena: “There is a general course of nature in human actions, 
as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate.” (2.3.1.10; SBN 402-3, my 
emphasis) The sun and climate, of course, are very different types of things and maintain 
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 And we may note here that “constancy” and “strength of mind” were taken to be principal virtues of the 
philosopher engaged in what may be more broadly called the “science of man” in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  See, in particular, Sorana Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, Locke and the 
Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), especially 28-9, 
65-6, 74-5, and 102-5. The “constancy” and “strength of mind” or “firmness” of the philosopher in 
following such rules or maxims, of course, is in particular a clear echo of Descartes’ Discourse on Method.  
(cf. II.6-10)      
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very different “general courses”.  The sun maintains a constancy or uniformity both in its 
visual or “outward” appearance and in its “general course”.  Indeed, in Treatise, Book I, 
Hume not only took the constancy of the sun’s appearance to be a prime example of the 
“constancy” of impressions responsible for our belief in the independent and continuous 
existence of certain objects (1.4.2.24; SBN 199), but also took the steadiness of its course 
to render the belief that “the sun will rise to-morrow” a prime example of “proof” or 
causal reasoning “entirely free from doubt and uncertainty”. (1.3.11.2; SBN 124)  The 
climate, on the other hand, is not a “constant” or “regular” object at all in this sense.  
Rather, it is a system of diverse phenomena, often fluctuating and highly irregular “to 
appearance”, and, unlike the movement of the sun, extremely difficult to predict with any 
great degree of certainty (e.g. the “mutability and uncertainty” of Scotland’s climate71).  
Nevertheless, through long, careful observation we may detect a certain regularity or 
cyclicality in its varied operations which can be accounted for by general laws or 
principles.  And though these principles may not render the climate perfectly predictable, 
they do provide us with knowledge with a certain degree of certainty, however often it 
may be inferior to proof.
72
 Though the climate’s general course is far less uniform in 
appearance, it nevertheless manifests a kind of “regularity” in the sense of being 
governed by uniform principles that account for what Hume would call the deeper 
“coherence” of its various changes and what is to appearance its inconstancy and 
irregularity: the events that constitute the climate may not be uniform in appearance, but 
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 “Of National Characters,” EMPL 207. 
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 As Hume notes in a related passage. (EHU 10.3; SBN 110) 
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nevertheless have a mutual connection with and dependence on each other underwritten 
by stable general laws.   
Accordingly, as in the case of the climate, the difficulty of discerning the 
principles of the “internal operations” which explain the coherence of an individual 
human being’s actions and passions is not proper grounds for denying the existence of 
such principles and, in turn, the “regularity” (and so necessity) of their operation.  Thus, 
as Hume writes in his parallel treatment of the issues of T 2.3.1-2 in the first Enquiry, 
again using the analogy of the climate:  
The philosopher, if he be consistent, must apply the same reasoning [he applies 
in the case of natural phenomena] to the actions and volitions of intelligent 
agents.  The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently 
be accounted for by those, who know every particular circumstance of their 
character and situation…The internal principles and motives may operate in a 
uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same 
manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather are 
supposed to be governed by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by 
human sagacity and enquiry. (EHU 8.15; SBN 88, my emphasis) 
Accordingly, the inconstancy of human beings—their tendency to depart from their 
established characters, to cross their otherwise “settled principles of action”, and to 
violate their general resolutions—is not grounds for the denial of the necessity of human 
conduct, but is rather something to be explained by a more refined causal account of 
human motivation and behavior. And as Hume indicates in this passage, this more refined 
framework would be composed of the “conceal’d” causes and principles that can account 
not only for the causes of the constancy and regularity of human behavior—the causes of 
the relative prevalence of the “durable” and “constant” motives in the conduct of an 
individual—but also the causes that disturb this constancy.  In other words, Hume 
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prescribes the development of a ‘climatology’ of human motivation—an account of the 
general principles which account for the calm and constant winds that move a man 
steadily toward his ends, as well as the violent “gusts of passion” (2.3.4.1; SBN 419) 
which interrupt and disturb the “steadiness and uniformity” of his conduct.        
It is to this more refined causal analysis—this “climatology”—of human behavior 
that Hume turns in T 2.3.3-8.  As I suggested earlier, this is made clear in the very last 
sentence of T 2.3.2, where Hume takes the strength of arguments for the necessity of 
moral phenomena to justify precisely this analysis: “Upon a review of these reasonings, I 
cannot doubt of an entire victory; and therefore having prov’d, that all actions of the will 
have particular causes, I proceed to explain [1)] what these causes are, and [2)] how they 
operate.” (2.3.2.8; SBN 412) Accordingly, Hume makes the case in T 2.3.3, “Of the 
influencing motives of the will” for 1), that the motives of all human actions are 
passions—whether calm or the violent.  There he establishes it that only passions can 
motivationally “combat” passions, and re-characterizes the role “reason” plays in 
motivation.  As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, Hume’s overall aim in T 2.3.3 is 
to show in addition that the “strength of mind” or constancy traditionally associated with 
the power of reason to control or counteract passion is a capacity reassigned to our “calm 
passions”.  It is in T 2.3.4-8 that Hume accounts for 2), “how [these causes] operate”.73 In 
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 Of course, when Hume proposes that we examine “how they [i.e. passions] operate,” he does not intend 
to account for how passions cause the motions of the body as, for instance, Descartes attempts to do (cf. 
EHU 7.13; SBN 66), despite Hume’s pervasive use of Cartesian “spirits” in his explanations, particularly in 
T 2.3.4-5. Nor does Hume intend otherwise to anatomize the operation of the “force” or “active power” of 
our motivating passions—as we noted earlier, on his account, we do not have nor can we possibly have any 
“idea of power or agency, separate from the mind, as belonging to causes” (1.4.3.9; SBN 223, my 
emphasis), or of that “efficacious quality” or “energy in the cause, by which it operates on its effect.” 
(1.4.7.5; SBN 266, cf. 1.3.14 passim)  Indeed, on Hume’s “deflationary” account of the will, the will is not 
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these sections of the Treatise, Hume develops his prescribed “climatology” of human 
behavior, and later characterizes it in precisely the terms we have come to expect: this 
climatology, he tells us, will sketch the general principles that govern those “variations of 
temper” which not only “diversif[y] human life, and [make] men so different not only 
from each other, but also from themselves in different times.” (2.3.8.13; SBN 438, my 
emphasis)
74
        
Moreover, given Hume’s account of the relationship between subjective 
uncertainty and the need for deeper philosophical inquiry sketched above, Hume’s T 
2.3.3-8 “climatology” of human behavior will in turn support Hume’s T 2.3.1-2 
arguments for the necessity of moral phenomena by giving us a coherent causal 
framework in which these phenomena can be accounted.  Given that the inconstancy of 
human beings gives rise to the subjective uncertainty which grounds philosopher’s 
‘vulgar’ rejection of necessity in moral matters, Hume’s aim in outlining the principles 
that govern human behavior is likewise to provide us with the conceptual tools to account 
in significant part for the very variations in our principles of action that initially led to 
this uncertainty.  (Indeed, Hume often writes that his aim in presenting his detailed 
                                                                                                                                                              
an “active power”, but is (merely) an impression we are conscious of in certain cases of a “new motion of 
our body, or new perception of our mind” following upon a passion. (2.3.1.2; SBN 399) Hume was, in 
particular, concerned to argue against Locke’s claim that our perception of the “active power” of our own 
will was the source of idea of the “power” operational in causation generally.  (cf. 1.3.14.5, 1.3.14.12; SBN 
157, 632-3) Locke writes, “But yet, if we will consider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, do not afford us 
so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds” 
(Essay 2.21.4), namely on the voluntary actions of the understanding and will, on “the power to being or 
forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or 
preference of the mind ordering, or as it were commanding, the doing or not doing such or such a particular 
action.” (Essay 2.21.5) Thus, Hume’s talk of the “exertion” of the will at T 2.3.1.2 (SBN 399) and 2.3.9.7 
(SBN 439) can be misleading—rather, we must interpret such language to the ease of speaking in a 
common (i.e. not strictly philosophical) idiom.       
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 cf.  Montaigne, “Of the Inconsistency of our Actions”, Essays 2.1. 
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“anatomy” of the passions is precisely to encourage others to press on in his naturalistic 
project in this regard by offering curiosity-piquing “hints, which men of genius may carry 
father”.75)  Just as the knowledge of the internal workings of a watch give the artisan the 
requisite framework to pursue the deeper causes of the inconstancy of the operation of an 
individual watch, Hume’s climatology of human behavior is intended to give 
philosophers a framework with which they can account for the deeper causes of the 
“inconstancy” of human behavior.    
However, it is important to note that Hume does not claim to offer us a science of 
algorithms to predict all human behavior with great certainty, or explain it with perfect 
accuracy.  As in other contexts, Hume is keenly aware of the limitations of the reach of 
philosophical reasoning in this case. Indeed, he frames T 2.3.4-8 with warnings of the 
inherent difficulty of predicting or understanding the behavior of individual human 
beings, and the ineliminable uncertainty that will attend such speculations where they 
become too minute:   
Men often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and 
designs: ‘Tis not therefore the present uneasiness alone, which determines them.  
In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and 
where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general 
character or present disposition of the person.  What we call strength of mind, 
implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; tho’ we may 
observe, there is no man so constantly possess’d of this virtue, as never on any 
occasion to yield to the sollicitations of passion and desire.  From these 
variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning the 
actions and resolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and 
passions. (2.3.3.10; SBN 418) 
Both the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty 
variable, and depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition 
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 Abs. ‘Preface’ §2; SBN 643-4.  See, in particular, DP 6.19, Letters I:39, and EPM 6.33n; SBN 248n. 
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of every individual.  Generally speaking, the violent passions have a more 
powerful influence on the will; tho’ ‘tis often found, that the calm ones, when 
corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able to controul them 
in their most furious movements.  What makes this whole affair more uncertain, 
is, that a calm passion may easily be chang’d into a violent one, either by a 
change of temper, or of the circumstances and situation of the object, as by the 
borrowing of force form any attendant passion, by custom, or by the exciting of 
the imagination.  Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and reason, as it is 
call’d, diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from each 
other, but also from themselves in different times.  Philosophy can only account 
for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war; but must leave all 
the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent upon principles too fine 
and minute for her comprehension. (2.3.8.13; SBN 438, my emphasis) 
As Hume puns in the first passage quoted here, the virtue of constancy—or what he calls 
“strength of mind”, a virtue which enables us to resist the force of those violent passions 
which throw us from our constant course—is a virtue of which “there is no man so 
constantly possess’d”: that is, no man can be constantly constant.  For this reason, Hume 
acknowledges what we have called “constant inconstancy” of the human will—as he puts 
it both in the Treatise and first Enquiry, human inconstancy and caprice is, paradoxically, 
a “constant cause in the mind”, in that it is inherent in human nature76—but denies that 
such inconstancy is legitimate grounds to deny the necessity of human motivation.  The 
uncertainty of human action is nothing more than a superable psychological obstacle to 
the development of a mechanistic account of human motivation.  Thus, Hume’s 
paradoxical claim that the “characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant and 
irregular” ought not to be read as a weakening of his commitment to the absolute 
necessity of moral phenomena.
77
  Rather, his point is that an acknowledgment that the 
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 2.3.2.7; SBN 412, EHU 8.15, 8.30; SBN 88, 98-9. 
77
 Thus, I disagree with Don Garrett, who for this reason characterizes Hume’s doctrine of necessity as 
being ultimately akin to the “mild indeterminism” of the vulgar in that it allows some events to remain 
uncaused while claiming that most events are caused. (Cognition and Commitment 126-8) 
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causes of this inconstancy are, in “delicate” cases where there are a vast number of 
minute springs and principles operative, not subject to a general philosophical account is 
often a conclusion we must accept. That is, the great difficulty of giving a general 
philosophical account is not grounds for a rejection of the necessity of moral phenomena, 
but merely a reason to acquiesce in some particularly delicate cases in our unavoidable 
ignorance of those hidden ‘minute’ and ‘delicate’ causes of this inconstancy.78         
 In this way, Hume’s arguments for the necessity of moral phenomena not only 
provide the theoretical justification for the mechanistic account of human motivation he 
will elaborate in T 2.3, but also establish its primary explananda—the causes of the 
inconstant constancy of the human will.  The general framework Hume will employ is his 
conception of the mind as a double train of ideas and passions, and the causes whose 
operation and effects he will attempt to explain within this framework are the causes of 
the relative strength and violence of our motivating passions.  In the following three 
chapters, I turn to an examination of the principles of Hume’s climatology of human 
motivation, and attempt to tease out a coherent Humean doctrine of the strong, calm 
passions which account, in particular, for the constancy and coherence of our actions.   
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 Again, this is clearly implied by Hume at EHU 8.15 (SBN 88): “the internal principles and motives may 
operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities…though not easily discoverable 
by human sagacity and enquiry.” (cf. EHU 8.14 for an analogous “physical” example (SBN 87).)  Thus, we 
find Hume adopting a form of “mitigated skepticism” in his theory of action as he does in his more 
“metaphysical” philosophy.  
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Chapter 2: The Calmness of Constant Motives: the Roles of Predominance and 
Custom in Determining the Strength and Violence of the Passions     
(T 2.3.4-5) 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Hume intended T 2.3 to be a “climatology” 
of human motivation—an account of the causes and effects of the relative “constancy” or 
“inconstancy” our motives and passions and the effects of this relative constancy on our 
deliberation, and so ultimately on action—and that T 2.3.1-2 is intended as a justification 
for the elaboration of such a climatology.  Hume’s T 2.3 “anatomy” of deliberation opens 
with two sections that are clearly devoted in large part to explaining the “constancy” and 
“durability” of certain motivating passions in our passional economy—that is, to 
explaining the mechanics of a constant will.  In particular, Hume’s aim is to explain how 
the strength of our motivating passions function over time to establish those motives as 
strong, calm, predominant passions or “settled principles of action”.  In this chapter, I 
will elaborate Hume’s T 2.3.4-5 account of these mechanisms.  Because these sections of 
the Treatise are oft-cited in scholarly discussion of Hume’s doctrine of the calm passions 
and of character formation,  I will be particularly concerned to put Hume’s account in its 
proper context within T 2.3, as well as to argue against several well-known readings 
which mischaracterize the nature and significance of that account.  I conclude that a full 
account of the role these mechanisms play in Hume’s account of character development 
depends more fundamentally on his account of the influence of belief, or the vivacity of 
our ideas, on the relative strength and violence of our passions—an account to which I 
turn in the following chapter.   
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2.1 The Mechanism of the “Predominant Passion”: T 2.3.4 
The notion of a “predominant passion” would have been a familiar one to an 
eighteenth-century reader of the Treatise.  The concept has its roots in Galenic humoral 
theory, and was employed by thinkers such as Bacon, Montaigne, Shaftesbury and, 
perhaps most importantly for the Treatise, Alexander Pope.
79
  Pope’s account in Epistle 
II of his Essay on Man of the “predominant”80 or “ruling” passion of an individual is 
perhaps the most detailed account of this traditional concept, and Hume’s account in 
many ways reflects the influence of Pope.  On Pope’s account, this passion is the cause of 
                                                     
79See, e.g., Francis Bacon, “Of Empire”, (Works VI: 419), and Advancement of Learning II (Works III:437-
42, 443-7, 459-60).  (References are to The Works Of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie 
Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, 15 vols. (London: Longmans, 1857-74).)  See also Montaigne, Essays I.37 
(“That we Laugh and Cry at the Same Thing”) II.33 (“The Story of Spurina”).  In the former essay, 
Montaigne writes, “[O]ur souls are often agitated with divers passions.  And as they say, that in our Bodies 
there is a Congregation of divers Humours, of which, that is the Soveraign, which according to the 
Complexion we are of, is commonly most predominant in us:  So, though the Soul have in it divers motions 
to give it Agitation; yet must there of necessity be one to overrule all the rest, though not with so necessary 
and absolute a dominion but that through the flexibility and inconstancy of the soul those of less authority 
may, upon occasion, reassume their place and make a little sally in turn.” (Essays of Michel Montaigne, 3 
vols., trans. Charles Cotton, revised by William Carew Hazlett,  (London: George Bell & Sons, 1905), 
I:249-50.)  As Maynard Mack notes, though Pope surely was influenced the earlier conceptions of a ruling 
passion of Bacon and Montaigne, Pope’s own treatment is “considerably the most complete.” (“An 
Introduction to An Essay on Man”, in Collected in Himself 1:210)  Pope himself paraphrases Montaigne’s 
essay “Of the Inconstancy of our Actions” on this point when he writes of the “quick whirls, and shifting 
eddies, of our minds” that indicate our inconstancy in ‘Epistle to Cobham’ (or Moral Epistle I, “Of the 
Knowledge and Characters of Men”), l.24 in Alexander Pope, Moral Essays: in Four Epistles [1731-5] 
(Glasgow: R. Urie, 1754).  Hereafter I will cite these epistles under Moral Essays, the title given to these 
Epistles to Several Persons by Pope’s editor, William Warburton, by epistle and line number.  See also 
Moral Essays I.174ff, and ‘Epistle to Bathurst’ (or Moral Epistle III, “Of the Use of Riches”) III.154, also 
in Pope, Moral Essays, and Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, ed. Douglas Den Uyl, 3 vols. (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2001), II:15, 60.  In addition, see, e.g., the article “Constitution” in Ephraim Chambers, 
Cyclopedia , 2 vols. (London, 1728), I:312, as well as Richard Steele, in The Tatler No. 120 [1709], 
(Glasgow: Robert Urie, 1754), 85-6.  See also Amy Schmitter’s discussion of the use of the concept of 
“master passions” in Hume’s more immediate predecessors, in “Passions, Affections, Sentiment: 
Taxonomy and Terminology”, in The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, 
ed. James A. Harris (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 197-225, 219-221.  
80
 Pope first deems this passion the “predominant Passion” in his précis of the Second Epistle. (An Essay on 
Man An Essay on Man [1733-4], (London: J. Wright, for Lawton Gilliver, 1734)) All citations of An Essay 
on Man will refer to the epistle and line numbers in this edition.) 
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the “constancy” (or consistency) of his actions: whereas we are tossed about by “other 
passions” as by “varying winds,” this passion “drives” us like a strong, steady wind 
“constant to a certain coast.”81  Pope describes this feature of human nature fittingly in 
humoral terms: “Each vital humour which should feed the whole, / Soon flows to this, in 
body and in soul. / Whatever warms the heart, or fills the head, / As the mind opens, and 
its functions spread, / Imagination plies her dang’rous art, / And pours it all upon the 
peccant part.”82  Using the image from Exodus of Aaron’s staff-turned-serpent devouring 
those of Pharaoh’s sorcerers, Pope tells us this passion “swallows up all the rest.”83   
Pope, like Hume, acknowledges and emphasizes the constant inconstancy (or 
inconstant constancy) of man: as he writes in his “Epistle to Cobham”, “That each from 
other differs, first confess; / Next, that he varies from himself no less.”84  But whereas in 
the Essay on Man our “predominant passion” seems to be taken to be a given feature of 
our nature, in the “Epistle to Cobham”, it is treated more as heuristic device which we 
may impose on the actions of men in order to make judgments regarding their true 
characters.  One of Pope’s aims in the Epistle is clearly to instill in the reader a certain 
humility regarding his or her ability to judge of the characters of men.  We may attempt 
to reason to motives from actions, but we have a tendency to conclude too much in such 
reasonings, because we tend to ascribe all actions to the agent’s settled character.85  Even 
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 Essay on Man II.167-8. 
82
 Essay on Man II.139-44. “Peccant”, according to Chambers’ Cyclopedia is “in medicine, an epithet given 
to the humours of the body, when they offend either in quantity or quality, i.e. when they are either morbid, 
or in too great abundance.” (“Peccant”, in Cyclopaedia, 2 vols. (Londom, 1728), II:769-70) 
83
 Essay on Man II.132. See Exodus 7:8-12. 
84
 Moral Essays I.19-20. 
85
 Moral Essays I.21-30, 99-118. 
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our own motives are often hidden from us: “Oft, in the passions’ wide rotation tost, / Our 
spring of action to ourselves is lost.”86 Indeed,  
Judge we by nature? Habit can efface, 
Interest o’ercome, or policy take place: 
By actions? Those uncertainty divides: 
By passions? These dissimulation hides: 
Opinions? They still take a wider range: 
Find, if you can, in what you cannot change. 
Manners with fortunes, humours turn with climes, 
Tenets with books, and principles with times. 
Search then the RULING PASSION… 87 
 
On the other hand, if we grant that “strongest” actions are the best available means of 
discerning a man’s motives, we ought to attempt to reconcile them by attributing them to 
some single, general “ruling passion”, such as the love of fame.  As he notes in his précis 
of the argument of this epistle, “It only remains to find (if we can) his RULING 
PASSION: That will certainly influence all the rest, and can reconcile the seeming or 
real inconsistency of all his actions.”88  It is by means of this predominant passion that 
“The Wild are constant, and the Cunning known.”89   
In addition, Pope’s notion of a “predominant passion” is employed against the 
rationalist picture of virtue as living constantly according to reason, a feat achieved on 
that picture by a suppression of the passions.  This is rather a “lazy Apathy” in which 
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 Moral Essays I.41-2. 
87
 Moral Essays I.166-74. 
88
 As such a cause, the “predominant passion” is also that by which we can gain knowledge of the principle 
of the consistency of an individual’s actions.  On Pope’s account, this passion is not only a fact of human 
nature, but also a heuristic for explaining the “constancy” of a given individual.  In the first of Pope’s 
Epistles to Several Persons—“To Richard Temple, Viscount Cobham”—the notion of a “predominant 
passion” is introduced not as it is in An Essay on Man (as part of a wider theory of the “Nature and State of 
Man, with respect to Himself, as an Individual”), but primarily as a solution to the problem of accounting 
for and so knowing the apparent inconsistency of man.  As I noted earlier, the epistle itself is subtitled “Of 
the Knowledge and Characters of Men”. cf. Pope’s note to Essay on Man II.175, and Bacon, “Of Empire”.   
89
Moral Essays I.175. 
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virtue is “fix’d”, but “fix’d as in a frost.”90 Rather, Pope writes, “Strength of mind is 
Exercise, not Rest”91: that is, as our strength of mind is manifested in our actions, and it 
is our passions that move us to action, strength of mind is a function of our passions 
(more specifically, our predominant passion given to us by nature), not a passionless state 
of apatheia.  Reason cannot restrain this passion, but instead “gives it edge and pow’r”92, 
for “Reason [is] the card [i.e. the map], but Passion is the gale.”93 Thus, on Pope’s 
account, reason relative to the ruling passion is rather a “weak queen”: a queen de jure 
though not de facto.
94
 Virtue, on Pope’s account, lies not in the control of passion by 
reason, but by reason’s guiding the predominant passion to sociable expression.  The 
passions are the “stock” on which the virtues are grown—where these passions are not 
restrained by reason, they are vicious, but as is “thro’ some certain strainers” they are 
                                                     
90
 Essay on Man II.101-2.  On the anti-Stoicism of his part of Pope’s Essay, see Bertrand A. Goldgar, 
“Pope’s Theory of the Passions: The Background of Epistle II of the Essay on Man,” Philological 
Quarterly 41.4 (1962): 730-43, 735-7. 
91
 Essay on Man II.104. 
92
 Essay on Man II.147. “Let pow’r or knowledge, gold or glory, please, / Or (oft more strong than all) the 
love of ease; / Thro’ life ‘tis followed, ev’n at life’s expence; / The merchant’s toil, the sage’s indolence, / 
The monk’s humility, the hero’s pride, / All, all alike, find Reason on their side.” (II.169-74) For a similar 
point, see Hume, T 1.3.10.4; SBN 120 and EHU 5.1; SBN 40-1, as well as “The Sceptic”, EMPL 159-60. 
93
 Essay on Man II.108; cf. II.153-4 
94
 As Pope puts it, “Ah! If she lend not arms, as well as rules, / What can she more than tell us we are 
fools!” (II.151-2) Some passions, it seems, are able to be restrained by reason (Essay on Man II.150, 
158)—but in regard to the ruling passion, all reason can do in opposition is “Teach us to mourn our Nature, 
not to mend…” (Essay on Man II.153)  In Epistle II of An Essay on Man, Pope attributes to man two 
principles: self-love and reason.  Self-love is an active principle, whereas the role of reason is to restrain 
self-love, as well as to guide it by comparing its objects and “advising” it in its attempts to maximize 
pleasure, the “one end” to which both principles “aspire”. (II.53-70, 87-88)  As in Hume, self-love is 
initially stronger than reason, since its objects are “nigh,” while those of reason are “at distance, and in 
prospect lie.” (II.71-2) Self-love “sees immediate good by present sense,” while reason sees “the future and 
the consequence.” (II.73-4) However, “attention”—or one’s ability to focus or direct the mind to the 
consideration of the object at hand—as well as “habit and experience” are features of human nature which 
are able to strengthen reason’s ability to restrain self-love. (II.79-80) 
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“well refin’d” by reason, and anger becomes courage, avarice becomes prudence, envy 
becomes emulation, lust becomes love, sloth becomes philosophy.
95
  
Hume adopts much of Pope’s account of the role of the predominant passion, and 
puts it to similar use in accounting for the “constancy” of character: given the account of 
Hume’s aims in T 2.3.3-8 we elaborated in the last chapter, it is no surprise that on 
Hume’s theory this becomes both a basic principle of human nature, and a useful 
heuristic in accounting for the actions of human beings, particularly for an account of the 
coherence of our actions.
96
  (Indeed, in his own brief autobiography, Hume organizes 
much of the plot of his life around the pursuits of his “ruling passion”, the “love of 
literary fame.”97)  As Hume writes in the first Enquiry,  
In human nature, there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and 
inclinations; so that when, from any fact, we have discovered one intention of 
any man, it may often be reasonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw 
a long chain of conclusions concerning his past and future conduct. (EHU 11.27; 
SBN 146) 
On Hume’s theory, the “swallowing up” of lesser passions by the predominant becomes 
one among several operations of mind he uses to explain this coherence and constancy of 
our actions by assigning it a fundamental place in his explanation of how the (strong, 
calm) passions fill motivational roles traditionally assigned to reason.  Moreover, 
throughout his corpus, Hume’s primary examples of “ruling passions” and their ends are 
traditional examples (e.g. ambition (the desire for power), avarice (the desire for riches), 
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 Essay on Man II.181-202. 
96
 As Hume’s “Sceptic” puts it, “Almost every one has a predominant inclination, to which his other desires 
and affections submit, and which governs him, though, perhaps, with some intervals, through the whole 
course of his life.” (“The Sceptic”, EMPL 160)  Again, see T 1.3.10.4; SBN 120, and EHU 5.1; SBN 40-1.   
97
 “My Own Life”, in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (EMPL): xxxi-xli, xl; cf. xxxi, xxxiii. 
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knowledge (philosophy, or the love of truth), reputation (the love of fame)) which mark 
out the main “pursuits” and “designs” of human beings.98   
Hume’s account, however, differs from Pope’s in two important ways.  First, the 
concept of a “predominant” or “ruling” passion in Hume’s hands loses much of its 
mystery and its fatalistic and providential overtones.  The “predominance” of a passion 
on Hume’s account is, in one sense, simply that relative strength that any passion in our 
breast can achieve at any given time.  Of course, on Hume’s account, some passions 
achieve relative strength of a very great degree in an individual’s passional economy, and 
in this way achieve “predominance” in the sense of becoming a primary driving force of 
our actions, but the force of such passions on Hume’s account is never as absolute as that 
which Pope attributes to them. On Pope’s account, particular ruling passions are the work 
of divine providence which distributes them among men so that all of the necessary roles 
that men need to play in the scheme of nature are filled.
99
 However, as I will argue in 
greater detail in the following chapter, Hume’s ruling passions are more “artificial”: 
Hume subsumes the traditional predominant or ruling passions under his general theory 
of motivation, and accounts for the operation of the traditional ends of these passions 
(e.g. riches and power) not as objects which simply have a mysterious, natural sway over 
particular minds, but in the general terms of his sophisticated hedonism and the role 
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 In particular, these traditional predominant or “ruling passion” play an important and regular role in 
Hume’s History of England to account for the actions of the primary actors in history. (e.g. II:499, III: 37, 
66, 73) 
99
 cf. Essay on Man II.165-6.  Compare Addison, Spectator No. 255, in The Spectator, ed. George A. 
Aitken, 8 vols. (London, 1898): 4:16.  
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sympathy plays in directing our desires to the traditional ends of such passions in 
particular.
100
   
The second (and related) way in which Hume’s account differs from Pope’s is 
that Hume offers a mechanistic explanation of the operations of these passions on the 
mind, not in the humoral terms Pope employs, but in terms of the mutual influence of the 
association of impressions and ideas.
101
 In order to explain the operation of a 
predominant passion, Hume extends the picture of the mind as a double train of 
impressions and ideas he utilized in T 2.1-2 to explain the production of the ‘indirect’ 
passions of pride and love, humility and hatred:    
‘Tis true; in order to make a perfect union among passions, there is always 
requir’d a double relation of impressions and ideas; nor is the one relation 
sufficient for that purpose.  But tho’ this be confirm’d by undoubted experience, 
we must understand it with its proper limitations, and must regard the double 
relation, as requisite only to make one passion produce another. (2.3.4.2; SBN 
419-20) 
That is, the double relation of impressions and ideas is not necessary to advance the 
succession of passions in our mind, but only for one passion to ‘produce’ another by 
means of the mutual forwarding effect of these relations, as in the case of the indirect 
passions.  Thus, the “separate pleasure” that gives rise to pride and the pride itself have a 
                                                     
100
 Samuel Johnson criticizes Pope’s theory of ruling passions on precisely these points, arguing 1) that the 
belief in “moral predestination” it engenders is both “false” and “pernicious” (in that it gives a man an 
excuse to submit blindly to his whims and caprices), and 2) that passions such as avarice and patriotism  
cannot be “natural” because their objects (money, the greatness of one’s country) are “artificial” in the 
sense of being the product of human contrivance.  On the other hand, if ruling passions are as natural as 
Pope makes them out to be, their objects must be desirable “antecedent to reason and observation” and 
“must have an object independent on human contrivance.” (“Pope”, in The Lives of the Most Eminent 
English Poets, 4 Vols. (London, 1781), 4:114-6)  On the former point, see also EHU  5.1 (SBN 40-1) and 
Hume’s “Sceptic”, who criticizes Pope’s predestinarianism on the same grounds. (EMPL 171)   
101
 Hume’s scientific approach to the operation of “predominant” or “ruling” passions may be that feature 
of Hume’s Treatise account of the passions which prompted him to present a copy of the Treatise to Pope 
himself.   
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“perfect union” not only in the sense that there is a strong, double relation of impressions 
and ideas, but also in the sense that one object-passion complex regularly and necessarily 
precedes the other, as a cause which “produces” its effect.102     
But beside this double relation of impressions and ideas, there are several other 
ways in which passions mix together Hume considers in his discussion of the will and 
direct passions, in particular in T 2.3.4 and 9.
103
  And as Hume tells us in T 2.3.9, 
whether or not passions mix together is primarily a function of the relation of the ideas of 
their objects.  Unlike the imagination which is “extremely quick and agile” in changing 
its ideas, the passions are “slow and restive”—like the notes struck on an unmuted string 
instrument, “where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound”, the passions 
decay away by degrees.  (2.3.9.12; SBN 440-1; cf. 2.2.6.1; SBN 366) Thus, unlike the 
ideas of the imagination, which remain distinct, like the notes of a wind instrument 
(2.3.9.12; SBN 440-1), the passions are “naturally transfus’d into each other.” (2.3.4.4; 
SBN 421) Where the imagination proceeds from one idea to another with any “great 
celerity”, the passions that arise from those ideas mix together in proportion to that 
celerity, which speed is itself a function of the strength of the relation of the ideas of their 
objects.
104
  Accordingly, where the mind finds difficulty in passing from one idea to 
                                                     
102
 In the Treatise, Hume tends to employ the term “conversion” rather than “production” in his account of 
the indirect passions (though, cf. 2.1.5.5, 2.1.6.2,  2.1.12.8; SBN 286-7, 290, 327), but his meaning is clear 
enough.  (In the Dissertation on the Passions, talk of “production” predominates; however, he does use 
“conversion” in this context. (DP 2.17)) One passion “causes” another, strictly speaking, by being 
constantly conjoined with each other in a certain temporal order.  On this point, see below, as well as 
Amytas Merivale “Mixed Feelings, Mixed Metaphors: Hume on Tragic Pleasure,” British Journal of 
Aesthetics 51.3 (2011): 259-69, 263-5.  How my account of the MPP differs from Merivale’s will be made 
clear below.     
103
 The Treatise account of the “mixture” of passions is repeated without much difference in DP 1. 
104
 As Hume says in his account of this mixing, “The influence of the relations of ideas is plainly seen in 
this whole affair.” (2.3.9.17; SBN 442 = DP 1.24) The “rencounter” of passions “depends upon the 
69 
 
 
 
another, the passions have proportionally less of a tendency to mix, and where this 
relation is lacking or weak, none at all.  Thus, “when a man is afflicted for the loss of a 
law-suit, and joyful for the birth of a son, the mind running from the agreeable to the 
calamitous object, with whatever celerity it may perform this motion, can scarcely temper 
the one affection with the other, and remain betwixt them in a state of indifference.” 
(2.3.9.14; SBN 441-2; cf. 2.2.8.15-20; SBN 378-80)  Rather they remain “like two 
opposite liquors in different bottles” because “the objects of the contrary passions [are] 
totally different.” (2.3.9.17; SBN 443, my emphasis)  On the other hand, passions whose 
objects are related or identical readily mix together according to the degree of the 
“perfection” of their relation.     
Accordingly, though passions achieve what Hume calls a “perfect” union only by 
the double relation of impressions and ideas, passions are also subject to an “imperfect 
union” or mixture in cases where there is a relations of the objects of passions, but a 
strong resemblance of the passions themselves is lacking (or even where there is an 
outright contrariety of passions).
105
 One example of the “imperfect” union of passions is 
that which Hume outlines in T 2.3.4, what we will call Hume’s ‘mechanism of the 
predominant passion’ (hereafter, MPP): 
’Tis a remarkable property of human nature, than any emotion, which attends a 
passion, is easily converted into it, tho’ in their natures they be originally 
different from, and even contrary to each other…When two passions are already 
produc’d by their separate causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily 
                                                                                                                                                              
relations of those ideas, from which they are deriv’d, and is more or less perfect, according to the degrees 
of the relation.” (2.3.9.16; SBN 442) 
105
 In 2.3.9.13-17, Hume outlines in particular the effects of the relation of impressions and ideas in the 
cases of objects which give rise to contrary passions, the most complex phenomenon being the “imperfect” 
union of grief and joy that gives rise to hope and fear. (SBN 441-3) 
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mingle and unite, tho’ they have but one relation, and sometimes without any.106  
The predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself. 
(2.3.4.2; SBN 419-20) 
As Hume notes, when the mind is agitated by a passion, the spirits, “when once excited, 
easily receive a change in their direction; and ‘tis natural to imagine this change will 
come from the prevailing affection.” (2.3.4.2; SBN 420) The conversion of the inferior 
passion into the predominant, then, occurs by means of this change in its “direction”—the 
ground of this new resemblance being the weak, but universal resemblance all passions 
have simply in virtue of being passions.  This universal resemblance, Hume implies, 
becomes stronger by comparison when it is their only significant point of resemblance, as 
it is many of the cases where the MPP operates: the “connexion is in many respects closer 
betwixt any two passions, than betwixt and passion and indifference.” (2.3.4.2; SBN 420)   
On my reading, what seems to be operative in one passion “swallowing up” 
another or “converting” it into itself is the principle of human nature Hume calls 
“comparison”—on his account, “an original quality of the soul” (2.2.8.2; SBN 372) not 
subject to further analysis which operates on both our passions and ideas: “a small degree 
of any quality, succeeding a greater, produces the same sensation, as if less than it really 
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 Amyas Merivale worries about the phrase “and sometimes without any”, as it seems Hume says 
elsewhere that a relation of ideas is necessary for such mixture. (“Mixed Feelings” 264n.18)  Two ways of 
reading this passage which avoid this worry clearly present themselves, however.  1) Hume is easily read 
here as strictly speaking about relations between passions—the passions readily mingle even though they 
have no significant resemblance (though their objects are related).  This is suggested by Hume’s examples 
throughout T 2.3.4 which all assume a relation of ideas between the passions. 2) In Hume’s three-emotion 
examples to be discussed below, there are what we might call “byproduct” emotions which strictly 
speaking have no objects, and so no correspondent ideas which can be related to those of other passions.  
These emotions, again strictly speaking, have no strong relations of ideas or impressions to the other 
passions except for the weak resemblance all passions have in comparison to indifference.  Hume may 
simply be referring to such cases.  I believe the first reading to be the correct one, and in any case, Hume’s 
examples make clear that a relation of ideas is present in each of the cases he discusses in T 2.3.4. 
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is, and even sometimes as the opposite quality.”107 (2.2.8.2; SBN 372; cf. 2.2.8.3; SBN 
372) For instance, “any gentle pain, that follows a violent one, seems as nothing, or rather 
becomes a pleasure; as on the other hand a violent pain, succeeding a gentle one, is 
doubly grievous and uneasy.” Hume likens this phenomenon to the familiar result of 
moving our hand from extremely cold water to cool water—the cool water will not only 
feel less cool than it actually is, but will feel warm. (2.2.8.2; SBN 372) Similarly, when 
we survey the misery of another, for instance, it produces (by sympathy) a pain in us, 
which often then augments our own happiness by comparison. (2.2.8.9; SBN 376)  
However, in a passage of T 2.2.8, “Of malice and envy”, which clearly foreshadows 
Hume’s account of the MPP in T 2.3.4, he writes: 
A person, who indulges himself in any pleasure, while his friend lies under 
affliction, feels reflected uneasiness from his friend more sensibly by a 
comparison with the original pleasure, which he himself enjoys.  This contrast, 
indeed, ought also to enliven the pleasure.  But as grief is here suppos’d to be 
the predominant passion, every addition falls to that side, and is swallow’d up in 
it, without operating in the least upon the contrary affection.  (2.2.8.11; SBN 
376, my emphasis) 
Comparison, Hume implies here (by “ought”) and elsewhere, is normally bidirectional in 
this sense that when two objects are presented the comparison enhances whatever quality 
constitutes the point of comparison in both objects —in the case of passions or emotions, 
this may be any of the qualities in which passions may resemble one another on Hume’s 
account: 1) resemblance in what I will call “hedonic charge” (that is, in two passions 
being, generally speaking, of a pleasurable or painful kind)
108
, 2) resemblance in the 
                                                     
107
 As far as I can tell, though commentators have taken note of the importance of comparison in Hume’s 
system of the passions, they have generally missed the relationship of comparison to the MPP.  
108Rachel Cohon has deemed this point of resemblance “hedonic tone.” (“Hume’s Indirect Passions,” in A 
Companion to Hume, ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe (Waltham, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 159-184:162)  However, I 
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“direction”109 of passions (e.g. whether other-directed as in the case of love, pity, 
benevolence or malice, or self-directed, as in self-interest and pride), 3) in their “degree” 
of violence or calmness
110, and 4) in their tendency either to “invigorate” the mind (as in 
pride or contempt) or “enfeeble” it (as in humility and love).111  However, in the example 
above, the effects of the operation of comparison are limited by the “predominance” of 
violent grief.
112
  On my reading, the effects of the MPP are brought about precisely by 
such a limitation of comparison (though, as I will note, perhaps one which challenges the 
coherence of Hume’s account of the operation of that principle).     
The explanation of this limitation requires that we take notice of two aspects of 
Hume’s account of the principles of sympathy and comparison.  The first is that there are 
varying degrees of the strength of sympathy.  Because of the universal resemblance of 
human beings, any idea we form of the passions of another has a tendency to be 
converted into an impression.  However, in T 2.2.9, Hume distinguishes a “weak” or 
“limited” sympathy (2.2.9.15, 17; SBN 387, 388) from a more “extensive”113, “strong” or 
“compleat” (or even “double”) sympathy. (2.2.9.15, 18, 20; SBN 387, 388, 389) In all 
                                                                                                                                                              
think “hedonic charge” captures more clearly its binary (i.e. + or –) character, and so I borrow it from Alex 
Neill. (“An Unaccountable Pleasure: Hume on Tragedy and the Passions,” Hume Studies 24.2 (1998): 335-
54, 339) Thus, for instance, we are in a “positive mood” when pleasurable passions and emotions make up 
our present “temper.”  
109
e.g. 2.2.9.2-3, 9, 15, 2.2.11.3, 2.3.10.7; SBN 381-2, 384, 387, 394, 451 
110
 e.g. 2.1.1.3, 2.2.2.22, 2.3.3.8-9, 2.3.4.1, 2.3.8.13; SBN 276, 343-4, 417-9, 437-8. 
111
 e.g. 2.2.10.6, 2.3.8.6; SBN 391, 434; cf. 3.3.2.8, 3.3.3.7; SBN 596-7, 605. 
112
 As Gerald Postema notes, “Hume rather summarily asserts” this here. (“‘Cemented with Diseased 
Qualities’: Sympathy and Comparison in Hume’s Moral Psychology,” Hume Studies 31.2 (2005): 249-298, 
280)  In what follows, I attempt an explanation.  In the present example, Hume thinks this may even give 
rise to perverse “self-malice” by which we aim to diminish our own pleasure to stop such a disagreeable 
comparison. (cf. 2.2.8.11; SBN 376)  We do this, Hume tells us, in order to avoid “so disagreeable a 
contrast” as the one in this example in which our grief is greatly increased beyond its original bounds.  
113
 The “extensiveness” of this sympathy is distinct from, but closely related to that which characterizes the 
“extensive sympathy” we employ in moral evaluation. (3.3.1.23, 3.3.6.3; SBN 586, 619)   
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cases, though the degree of the particular relations someone may have with us also vary 
the force of sympathy, sympathy is also fundamentally a function of the force of the 
original idea we form of his passions: “as pipes can convey no more water than what 
arises at the fountain,” where we only form a feeble idea of the passion of another, we 
feel by sympathy his passion rather feebly.  This distinction between degrees of sympathy 
is central to Hume’s T 2.2.9 account of why a “small degree” of misery in another gives 
rise to our contempt and anger, while a “great degree” of misery gives rise to 
benevolence.
114
 But its importance for our purposes is Hume’s general point that since 
“the same object causes contrary passions according to its different degrees,” thus the 
production of such “passions… must depend on principles, that operate in such certain 
degrees…” (2.2.9.16; SBN)  What principles ‘kick in’ to produce or vary our passions 
depends on a sort of internal trip-point switch sensitive to the force or strength of our 
sympathetically-communicated passions.        
The “trip points” of the principle of comparison—the second aspect we must take 
account of here—are described explicitly by Hume in T 3.3.2:  
…[I]f the idea [i.e. the idea of a passion, inferred from signs] be too faint, it has 
no influence by comparison; and on the other hand, if it be too strong, it operates 
on us entirely by sympathy, which is the contrary to comparison.  Sympathy 
being the conversion of an idea into an impression, demands a greater force and 
vivacity in the idea than is requisite to comparison. (3.3.2.5; SBN 595)  
                                                     
114Crucial for the phenomena described in T 2.2.9 are the “trip points” of our interest in (i.e. causal 
reasoning concerning) someone’s future well-being or misfortune. Too weak a sympathy with the present 
passions of someone prevents us reflecting on their future well-being or misfortune: “it engages not the 
imagination.” Likewise, too great a sympathy causes us to focus exclusively on the present situation of the 
object of our attention: the present passion seizes the mind and “entirely engage[s] our attention.” (2.2.9.18; 
SBN 388)  This phenomenon is analogous to that of the way in which the operation of comparison is 
limited by the strength of the passion.  
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Where sympathy is too weak, or where it is too strong, comparison fails to operate.  
Rather, there is a sweet spot or “medium” in which comparison operates along with 
sympathy. (3.3.2.5, 6; SBN 594, 595)
115
 A strong sympathetically-communicated 
passion, as Gerald Postema has aptly put it, “blunt[s] my always keen sense of my own 
condition” and “effaces the distinction between self and other” that is essential to the 
functioning of comparison.
116
 This is the force of Hume’s Lucretian example in T 3.2.2: 
where a ship “tost by a tempest, and in danger of every moment of perishing on a rock or 
sand-bank” is driven so near us that we can see the terror and hear the cries of the 
passengers, our mind is seized by the sight: “[n]o man has so savage a heart as to reap 
any pleasure [by comparison by his own safety on shore] from such a spectacle, or 
withstand the motions of the tenderest compassion and sympathy.” (3.3.2.5; SBN 594)117 
The great vivacity of one’s impression of their terror transfixes our mind, and prevents its 
transition back to oneself and one’s security.     
However, the passage from T 2.2.8 under discussion here requires that both strong 
sympathy and comparison (at least to some extent) operate at once.  Indeed, as Hume 
noted in T 2.2.9 as in T 3.3.2, “a great degree of misery” (as that of our friend in our 
example) in particular gives rise to “extensive” or strong sympathy because it naturally 
                                                     
115
 It is in this sweet spot, for instance, that envy (cf. 2.2.8.12-13; SBN 377-8) as well as respect and 
contempt operate.  (2.2.10; SBN 389-93) For a masterly account of this phenomenon of the “interplay”, as 
well as the general operations of, sympathy and comparison, see Gerald J. Postema, “‘Cemented with 
Diseased Qualities’” 280. 
116
 “‘Cemented with Diseased Qualities’” 282.   
117
 cf. Addison, Spectator 418, for an earlier example of this point that was surely familiar to Hume.  
Addison’s explanation of this Lucretian example, Baxter Hathaway notes, was unique in requiring that the 
tragic scene be past or fiction (and not simply distant in space from our present situation) in order to allow 
for the pleasurable comparison. (“The Lucretian ‘Return upon Ourselves’ in Eighteenth-Century Theories 
of Tragedy”, PMLA 62.3 (1947): 672-89, 677-8)  (Compare Hobbes’ more Lucretian explanation at 
Elements of Law 9.19) 
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gives rise to a relatively forceful idea (2.2.9.15; SBN 387; cf. 2.2.7.2; SBN 369), an idea 
which, in our example, would be further strengthened by the close relation of my friend 
to myself.
118
 The intense grief of my friend communicated to me by sympathy is then 
further increased by a comparison (in this case, of a contrariety in hedonic charge and 
perhaps degree of violence) to my own current pleasure or joy.  This suggests that, 
despite this “trip-point” feature of Hume’s account of the operation of comparison, this 
principle still remains operative in cases of such strong sympathy.     
Hume never explains why comparison would still operate in such cases, even if it 
is in a “limited” way, though a feature of Hume’s account of the mind we will take more 
extensive note of in the following chapter may offer us some explanation.  On Hume’s 
account, the imagination has natural “propensities” to move along its ideas in certain 
directions: the less lively an idea of some object is, the more one’s attention naturally 
gravitates back to (the very lively idea or impression of) one’s self, thus facilitating 
comparison.  But where our conception of the object is extremely vivid, as in an intimate 
sympathy with a person in close relation to us possessed by very violent passion, it fixes 
our attention on it and retards (though it does not completely prevent) this return. In the 
                                                     
118
 Of course, both sympathy and the effects of comparison here (i.e. in cases where the objects of 
comparison are our own passions and those of others) vary with the strength or degree of the relation of an 
object to oneself.  In sympathy, the degree of relation affects the vivacity that an idea of the passion of 
another is able to “draw” from the lively perception of oneself.  (2.1.11.3-6; SBN 317-8; cf. 3.3.1.14; SBN 
580-1)  The effects of comparison are in part a function of the degree of contrariety of the objects 
compared.  But, as in sympathy, the effects are greater where the relation of the objects in other respects is 
closest—here the relation of the object compared to ourselves.  For comparison to take place, the objects 
must also bear in turn some very close relation apart from the contrariety by which they are, we might say, 
brought into the same view. (cf. 2.2.8.13-4; SBN 377-8) Thus, the augmenting of my own great happiness 
by my view of my neighbor’s moderate sorrow (the objects of comparison—passions—having a strong 
contrariety in hedonic charge) is effected in its full force only because my neighbor and I are very closely 
related by, say, resemblance and contiguity.  Thus, the very same circumstance that varies the force of 
comparison, varies the force of sympathy as well.     
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case at hand, my attention is pulled from myself and my own joy to my friend and his 
grief, and comparison takes place, but it does not return with the same degree of facility 
to consideration of myself and my own situation, stunting the usual bi-directionality of 
comparison.  Thus, although, as Hume says, this contrast “ought also to enliven [our] 
pleasure” by a return of our attention to ourselves and our own joy, it does not because of 
the very intensity or violence of the grief which consumes our mind.   
It is in this sense that an inferior passion (here, my joy) may be said to be 
“swallow’d up” by a predominant passion (here, my friend’s grief), on my reading: the 
intensity of the sympathetically communicated grief, enhanced by comparison, consumes 
the mind, fixing our attention firmly on our friend and his grief rather than on ourselves, 
so that our own pleasure never benefits (or benefits to a far inferior, and ultimately 
insignificant degree) from the effects of that principle.  Perhaps, instead of “swallow’d 
up” we may say that the inferior passion is ultimately “overshadowed” or “effaced” by 
the predominant one.
119
  Generalizing from this case, we may then argue that the 
“predominance” of any passion (whether it is original to our own mind or communicated 
to it via sympathy) often makes it consume the mind in this way so that it alone benefits 
significantly from the mechanism of comparison.
120
   
                                                     
119In “Of Tragedy”, Hume speaks of the painful emotions raised in us by tragedy being “overpowered and 
effaced by something stronger of an opposite kind” and “the whole impulse of those [disagreeable] passion 
[being] converted into pleasure.” (EMPL 220; my emphasis)  The predominant passions “seize the whole 
mind, and convert the [subordinate] into themselves,” or, Hume hedges, “at least tincture them so strongly 
as totally to alter their nature.” (EMPL 220; my emphasis)     
120
 Hume also notes a similarly “one-sided” sympathy in his explanation of pity in T 2.2.7: sympathy can be 
of a “partial kind”, there one which “views its objects only on one side, without consideration of the other, 
which has a contrary effect, and wou’d entirely destroy that emotion, which arises from the first 
appearance.” (2.2.7.5; SBN 371)  In a case he discusses there, we may feel distress at the great misfortune 
of another, even if that person does not feel any such distress himself.  Our sympathy, in this case proceeds 
along the general rule that great affliction produces great sorrow.  However, sympathy with his actual 
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However we understand this metaphor of “swallowing up”, the MPP serves to 
augment the strength and violence of predominant motivating passions:   
Since passions, however independent, are naturally transfus’d into each other, if 
they are both present at the same time; it follows, that when good or evil is 
plac’d in such a situation, as to cause any particular emotion, beside its direct 
passion of desire or aversion, that latter passion must acquire new force and 
violence. (2.3.4.4; SBN 421, my emphasis) 
Hume’s treatment seems to countenance two distinguishable types of cases of the 
operation of the MPP.
121
  The difference between these two types of cases consists in the 
difference in the passions or emotions that are “converted into” the predominant passion.  
The first such case is a relatively straightforward two-emotion case, in which one passion 
(the inferior passion (PI)) is “swallowed up” by another (the predominant passion (PP)).  
In such cases, PI and PP have closely related objects (as required for any union of 
passions, “perfect” or “imperfect”), but 1) maintain a strong contrariety in their other 
features, and 2) one passion or emotion is significantly stronger or more violent than the 
other.  “When a person is once heartily in love, the little faults and caprices of his 
                                                                                                                                                              
feelings of indifference would immediately “destroy” the original emotion of grief.  But this is prevented, I 
would argue, because this idea of great grief “seizes” the mind and prevents the influence of that contrary 
sympathy, as this grief is an extremely lively impression (indeed, as Hume notes a few paragraphs before 
this passage (2.2.7.2; SBN 369)), even where it is aroused merely by the influence of general rules.  For an 
example of the same one-sidedness of sympathy, see T 2.2.9.18. (SBN 388)  In the Dissertation, Hume 
calls it an “imperfect sympathy”. (DP 3.11) 
121
 An important question Hume leaves ultimately unanswered concerns what exactly happens to the 
inferior passion that is “swallow’d up” beside its change in “direction”.  On my own reading, the 
subordinate passion, where it is not totally destroyed and is of sufficient force to remain diminished in the 
background of our attention, is, to use Hume’s own phrase in “Of Tragedy” quoted in a note above, 
“tinctured” by the predominant passion “so strongly as totally to alter [its] nature.” (EMPL 220)  The 
precise nature of this “tincturing” is left unexplained.  The most common reading is that the inferior 
emotion or passion is simply destroyed in its “conversion”.  (See Amytas Merivale, “Mixed Feelings” 266-
8, along with the citations at 266n.23-4.) But this reading can be supported not by textual evidence, but 
merely by Hume’s use of the metaphor of “swallowing up”, which he have parsed here more accurately in 
terms of comparison, and  to this question, Hume’s notion of the “stunted” or unidirectional comparison 
involved in the MPP offers no clear answers. Indeed, Merivale has argued that the most likely explanation 
for Hume’s lack of detail on this aspect of the MPP is likely his own failure to think it through for himself. 
(“Mixed Feelings” 269-70)   
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mistress, the jealousies and quarrels, to which the commerce is so subject; however, 
unpleasant and related to anger and hatred; are yet found to give additional force to the 
prevailing passion.”122 (2.3.4.3; SBN 420, my emphasis) Similarly, a “soldier advancing 
to the battle, is naturally inspir’d with courage and confidence, when he thinks on his 
friends and fellow-soldiers; and is struck with fear and terror, when he reflects on the 
enemy.”  Accordingly, whatever “new emotion” arises from either of these objects is 
converted into the predominant, and “naturally encreases the courage” or “augments the 
fear”, respectively.  As an example of an inferior emotion in this case Hume offers the 
sentiments of aesthetic beauty that arise from consideration of the “uniformity and lustre” 
of garb, and the “regularity” of the “figures and motions” of his allies and enemies as 
well as the general “pomp and majesty” of war. (2.3.4.3; SBN 420) In these two 
examples, PP (e.g. romantic love (a violent, pleasurable passion), or fear (a violent, 
painful or uneasy passion)) and PI (respectively, “little jealousies” (weak, painful 
passions), or sentiments of beauty, (calm or weak, pleasurable emotions
123
)) have a 
strong contrariety in hedonic charge and relative degree of calmness or violence.  
However, as PP (love or fear) is also significantly stronger than PI (little jealousies or 
sentiments of beauty), the latter is easily converted into (or united “imperfectly” with) the 
former.  In this way, the calm, weak, inferior passion that “attends” the stronger, more 
violent (predominant) passion easily sweeps up the weaker (inferior) passion and 
                                                     
122
 Of course, love, on Hume’s account has no direct motivational power except by being the cause, by an 
original quality of human nature, of benevolence, the desire for the happiness of the beloved. (T 2.2.6) 
Strictly speaking, then, the “force” of love cannot be equivalent to its “influence on the will” except by 
increasing the motivational force of attendant benevolence.  However, Hume likely has lust, or what we 
might euphemistically call “romantic love” in mind here, which is an instinctual, direct motivating passion 
akin to hunger. (cf. 2.2.11) 
123
 cf. 2.1.1.3; SBN 276. 
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converts it into itself.  Again, on my account, this would be the result of the great 
disparity in the vivacity of each emotion which stunts the bidirectional operation of 
comparison. For instance, though the contrariety of my admiration of the beauty of my 
enemies’ garb and disciplined maneuvers to my fear “ought also to enliven” that 
admiration just as it “augments the fear”, the far greater violence of my fear keeps my 
attention primarily fixed on its cause—the advance of my enemy—and thereby effaces 
that (weak) admiration by denying it the benefits of comparison.     
However, the second type of case Hume outlines in T 2.3.4 is more complex, and 
involves the conversion of what one might call “byproduct” emotions into the 
predominant passion.
124
  Unlike the PI in the first type of case, the PI in these cases is 
what one might call a ‘secondary’ emotion that arises merely as a result of the ‘primary’ 
operations of the mind, the operation of passions (that is, of full-fledged passions) or of 
the imagination.  In particular, the “emotion” that is converted into the predominant 
passion in these cases arises from an “agitation” of the mind that results from some form 
of “opposition” or “difficulty” (or “friction”) either among the passions or in the 
operations of the imagination—such opposition, as Hume puts it in “Of Tragedy”, 
“excites a…stock of spirit” in the mind. (EMPL 220)  In light of what we have already 
said regarding Hume’s examples of the MPP discussed earlier, it would seem that such 
                                                     
124
 Hume’s earlier example of the increase in the force of “love” by weaker forms of anger or hatred may 
also be one of these cases.  Hume says (2.3.4.3; SBN 420) that when we are deeply in love—a pleasant, 
enfeebling passion—the “faults and caprices” of our lover, and resulting the “jealousies and quarrels” give 
rise to weaker passions of hatred and anger—painful, invigorating passions—that “give additional force to 
the prevailing passion” of love.  It seems he is claiming that the weaker passions of hatred and anger are 
themselves converted into love.  But this claim does not strictly follow as he merely reports the result but 
does not explain how it arises. It seems more plausible that this case is one involving “byproduct” emotions 
in which the opposition of passions (in their points of contrariety) generates a third emotion that is 
converted into the predominant affection of love.   In any case, my taxonomy is not Hume’s, and could be 
revised without affecting the validity of my overall treatment of the MPP and its effects.   
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byproduct emotions are “easily converted” into the predominant because they are not 
only relatively weak (as in the first two-emotion case discussed above) but also lack any 
other substantial feature which may serve as a point of resemblance or contrariety with 
other passions (e.g. a “hedonic charge”, a “direction”).  They are, in this sense, “pure” 
emotions of the mind
125
, which serve as clean and ready fodder, fit for conversion into 
full-fledged passions by means of the MPP.   
What Hume provides us in the remaining paragraphs of T 2.3.4 is, in 
contemporary terms, a brief “phenomenology of effort”.126  The “effort” and “opposition” 
Hume discusses are of two kinds—physical and mental—and both “agitate” and “rouze” 
the spirits which, in turn, act as fodder for the MPP.  Hume has little to say concerning 
what he calls “external obstacles” (physical obstacles to any bodily action), and only 
notes that such obstacles have the same effect as the “internal” or mental obstacles posed 
by the imagination or contrary passions on our predominant passions: “the [predominant] 
passion commonly acquires new force and violence in both cases”: the “efforts, which the 
                                                     
125
 Hume himself uses “pure emotion” in a similar sense: pride and humility are, relative to love and hatred, 
“pure emotions in the soul” because they lack a “direction”—one of those qualities of passions which serve 
as points of resemblance to other passions—which the latter possess. (2.2.6.3, 2.2.9.2; SBN 367, 382) The 
byproduct emotions under discussion here are, therefore, even “purer” than pride and humility.  Hume 
provides us with an example of such a “pure” emotion in T 2.3.5: surprise, which, he tells us in the next 
section, is a byproduct of mental “difficulty”.  
126
 The “phenomenology of effort” plays an important role in contemporary discussions of the 
phenomenology of agency.  In these discussions, feelings of “effort” are often taken to be veridical 
experiences of agency. (See, e.g., the contributions by Anthony Marcel and Joëlle Proust, in Agency and 
Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, eds. Johannes Roessler and Naomi Eilan (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Tim Bayne and Neil Levy, “The Feeling of Doing: 
Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agency”, in Disorders of Volition, eds. Natalie Sebanz and 
Wolfgang Prinz (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006): 49-68, 57-62.)  Hume, of course, famously denies in 
the first Enquiry that these emotions—the “sentiments of nisus”—associated with mental and physical 
effort give us any window into the “inside” of agent causation.  However, as I will note here and again in 
Chapters 3 and 4, though these emotions do not represent anything,  like other passions they do play an 
important causal role in determining the nature of the succession of perceptions in the mind that will be 
crucial for a Humean account of strong, calm passions.   
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mind makes to surmount the obstacle, excites the spirits and enlivens the passion.”127 
(2.3.4.6; SBN 421) As Hume tells us T 2.3.8, in “collecting our force to 
overcome…opposition” of any sort, “we invigorate the soul…” (2.3.8.4; SBN 433, my 
emphasis)  These invigorated spirits are then converted into the predominant passion by 
means of the MPP.  
The sources of mental opposition, agitation and effort, on the other hand, are more 
fully treated, and are further divided into two kinds: imaginative, and passional.  
Regarding the former, Hume tells us, for instance, that “uncertainty has the same 
influence as opposition.”  Foreshadowing his account of hope and fear in T 2.3.9, Hume 
notes that when the good arising from any action is only probable, the mind fluctuates 
between the different possible outcomes, and the “agitation of the thought; the quick 
turns it makes from one view to another; the variety of passions, which succeed each 
other, according to the different views: All these produce an agitation in the mind, and 
transfuse themselves into the predominant passion.” (2.3.4.7; SBN 421)128  (Thus, both 
the secure possession of any good and the absolute impossibility of possessing it—the 
occasion of despair—both “diminish” the passions associated with that good precisely by 
eliminating the uncertainty surrounding its relation to ourselves and the concomitant 
                                                     
127
 Indeed, as I suggested in an earlier note, this excitation of the spirits upon physical resistance seems to 
be the very “sentiment of nisus or endeavor” which Hume takes in the first Enquiry to be the impression 
that enters into to the “vulgar” idea of causal power or force as something other than a determination of the 
mind. (EHU 7.15n, 7.29n; SBN 67n, 77-8n)  Nisus (or conatus or “endeavor”), on Hume’s account, is that 
great exertion of force which we obliged to make when we encounter “resistance” from external bodies, 
and so must “exert our force, and call up all our power” to overcome that resistance. (EHU 7.15n; SBN 
67n)   
128
 Hume, of course, will employ this mechanism explicitly in explaining the passions of hope and fear 
which arise from such uncertainty.  In that account, he implies that although the passions of hope and fear 
arise from a different principle of passion-mixing than the MPP, the MPP still serves to increase the force 
and violence of those passions where the uncertainty is greatest. (2.3.9.19) 
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MPP-feeding agitation that uncertainty creates. (2.3.4.8; SBN 421-2))  In addition, the 
“obscurity” of the object to which we are otherwise drawn by desire also gives rise to 
convertible byproduct emotions both by means of the uncertainty it causes, and by the 
mental “effort” it requires of us: “’Tis certain nothing more powerfully animates any 
affection, than to conceal some part of its object by throwing it into a kind of shade, 
which at the same time that it shows enough to pre-possess us in favour of the object, 
leaves still some work of the imagination.” (2.3.4.9; SBN 422, my emphasis)129  The 
effort to “compleat the idea, rouzes the spirits”, which agitation, by means of the MPP 
“gives an additional force to the passion.”130 (2.3.4.9; SBN 422)  
The byproduct emotions generated by passional opposition on the force and 
violence of predominant passions are particularly relevant for our purposes, given that the 
opposition or conflict of two or more motivating passions of desire and aversion are 
Hume’s prime examples of these causes of such byproduct emotions.131  
This [i.e. the increase in force and violence of the predominant passions] 
happens, among other cases, whenever any object excites contrary passions.  For 
‘tis observable that an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion 
in the spirits, and produces more disorder, than the concurrence of any two 
affections of equal force.  This new emotion is easily converted into the 
predominant passion, and encreases its violence, beyond the pitch it wou’d have 
arriv’d at had it met with no opposition. (2.3.4.5; SBN 421) 
                                                     
129
 cf. Hume’s related explanation (borrowed from Pliny the Elder) of why the unfinished works of an artist 
are always most highly valued. (“Of Tragedy”, EMPL 222). 
130
 Indeed, as Hume notes here in T 2.3.4 and in “Of Tragedy” is a common artifice of orators and 
politicians. ( T 2.3.4.3; SBN 420, EMPL 221) 
131
 The two-emotion cases of the MPP’s operation discussed earlier are central to Hume’s later account of 
the pleasure we take in tragedy, where weak painful emotions are “converted” into the pleasurable 
sentiments aroused by eloquence.  See “Of Tragedy,” EMPL 216-25. See also Amytas Merivale, “Mixed 
Feelings,” and Alex Neill, “'An Unaccountable Pleasure’: Hume on Tragedy and the Passions,” Hume 
Studies 24.2 (1998): 335-354.  
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Where there is an opposition in the directions of two motives (i.e. toward the object and 
away from it), this opposition gives rise to a third emotion, an agitation of the spirits, 
which, lacking a direction, is thereby easily converted into the predominant motive: 
“Hence we naturally desire what is forbid, and take a pleasure in performing actions, 
merely because they are unlawful.  The notion of duty, when opposite to the passions, is 
seldom able to overcome them; and when it fails of that effect, is apt rather to encrease 
them, by producing an opposition in our motives and principles.”132 (2.3.4.5; SBN 421, 
my emphasis)     
However, in one of the few serious treatments of Hume’s account of causes of the 
“prevalence” of the calm passions over the violent, Annette Baier has suggested Hume’s 
treatment of the effects of such “opposition” on strong or “predominant” passions is the 
source of one serious difficulty concerning his theory of the violence and strength of 
passions which “seems to threaten to make nonsense of his own previous talk of calm 
passions counteracting violent ones.”133 Baier argues that Hume, despite his eagerness to 
distinguish between the force and violence of a passion—that is, between a passion’s 
influence on the will and its felt “emotional intensity”—does not provide us with an 
adequate account of how a calm passion can at once “combat” a violent one without itself 
becoming violent.
134
  In fact, she argues, his account of the causes of the violence and 
                                                     
132
 Similarly, Hume writes later in Book III, that “…when a person opposes me in any thing, which I am 
strongly bent upon,” he thereby “rouzes up my passion by contradiction.” (3.3.2.3; SBN 593)  As in the 
case of duty, sympathy is operative here: by making the “sentiments of others…in some measure, our 
own,” those sentiments “operate upon us, by opposing and encreasing our passions, in the very same 
manner, as if they had been originally deriv’d from our own temper and disposition.” (3.3.2.3; SBN 593) 
133
 Progress of Sentiments 168. 
134
 Similarly, Jane McIntyre has noted, Hume’s account of “the causes of violence in the direct passions 
works at cross-purposes to his argument. Hume has, actually, very few comments on strengthening 
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calmness of passions itself seems to suggest that this is impossible, given what Hume 
does say about the effect this “opposition” of passions has on the predominant passion. 
For, as Hume tells us, when we have on the one hand a desire for some object, and on the 
other an aversion to the same object arising from our sense of duty, this opposition of 
motives increases the force and violence of the predominant passion by providing 
emotional fodder for it.  Baier’s reading attributes great weight to this example by taking 
it to be Hume’s explanation of what happens generally in the “combat” of our calm and 
violent passions.  Hume’s claim, Baier argues, must be that the common error of 
mistaking “calm” passions for reason—a mistake based in their resemblance in the (low) 
level of emotional intensity they produce in the mind—can only hold in the cases where 
typically calm passions remain calm, as in cases where such passions are not engaged in 
“combat”.  Unless this is the case, it is unclear, according to Baier, how there can be a 
combat of calm and violent passions (and especially unclear how rationalist and ancient 
philosophers could have mistaken the conflict at the center of our moral life as a combat 
of reason and passion), given that conflict or opposition seems to render the predominant 
among the conflicting passions violent.  In such a case, if the calm passion is to 
predominate in such a struggle, it seems that it must become violent in doing so.    
                                                                                                                                                              
passions without increasing their violence—this in spite of the fact that he asserted so clearly that we must 
‘distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one’.” (“Hume’s Passions: 
Direct and Indirect,” Hume Studies 26.1 (2000): 77-86, 83-4; cf. “Strength of Mind” 399, 397)   
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Baier attempts to resolve what she takes to be the difficulty with Hume’s theory 
by emphasizing we may call the “generic” rather than “adverbial” mode of the 
calm/violent distinction
135
:       
The best way to save Hume’s theses here is to suppose that “calm passion” 
usually means “typically calm,” not “necessarily calm, even when it meets 
opposition.”  The typically violent passions may derive their typical violence as 
much from other causes of violence (tempting closeness of the goods they are 
bent on, insecurity, and so on) as from their frequent disharmony with other 
passions. So then we could save Hume’s claim that the rationalists and popular 
moralists have mistaken the desirable prevalence of the calm over the violent 
passions for a supposedly welcome victory for reason in a combat between 
reason and passion.  There really is frequent “combat,” and the winner can be a 
force that typically avoids rather than causes “emotion” or disorder in the soul.  
But equally typically it may create a little violent disorder in order to win.
136
  
On Baier’s account, then, calm passions must become violent at the time of the ‘combat’ 
in order to overcome violent passions: “The most that could be expected to occur would 
be that a typically calm passion counteracts a typically violent one, by becoming briefly 
violent during the time of opposition.”137 On such an account, however, the force of a 
passion is, for all intents and purposes, simply equivalent to its violence, and the only 
way to rescue Hume’s notion of a “strong, calm passion” from incoherence is to interpret 
‘calm’ as merely meaning ‘typically calm (but violent when opposed)’.138  Baier admits 
                                                     
135
 I owe the particular terms I use here to John Immerwahr, “The Anatomist and the Painter: the Continuity 
of Hume’s Treatise and Essays,” Hume Studies 17.1 (1991): 1-14, 8.  Equally, we can employ the common 
talk of “type” versus “token” passions here: For Hume, it would be argued on such an account, calm-type 
passions may oppose violent-type passions, but both are at the time of opposition violent token passions.      
136
 Progress of Sentiments 168-9. 
137
 Progress of Sentiments 168.   
138
 Alfred Glathe’s own view seems to be a forerunner of Baier’s view in the sense that he takes a “lack of 
opposition” to be a necessary condition of the possibility of a strong passion that is at the same time calm. 
Glathe writes, “A passion which over a period of time has gained ascendancy over others becomes a 
‘settled principle of action’, and is thus a powerful determinant of action, although because of the lack of 
opposition to it from other passions, ‘it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation’.” (Hume’s 
Theory of the Passions and of Morals 76; my emphasis) As I will argue below, it is not a lack of opposition 
of other passions, but their habitual yielding, that characterizes the predominance of a passion in this sense.  
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that this is not a desirable result: if this is Hume’s settled position, it seems rather 
inconsistent, given that he seems to be at very great pains to distinguish strength and 
violence as features of passions (e.g. 2.3.4.1; SBN 418-9), and in fact needs to do so if his 
alternative to the rationalists’ theory of the “prevalence” of the calm principles of our 
nature is to be plausible. However, she feels compelled to adopt this reading on the basis 
of the implications of Hume’s theory of the predominant passion for an understanding of 
the “combat” of calm and violent passions.  
However, there are serious problems with Baier’s reading of Hume.  First, Baier 
clearly confuses the cause of a passion’s predominance over another in “combat” with its 
effect: she claims that a (typically) calm passion must “create a little violent disorder in 
order to win” and that “a typically calm passion counteracts a typically violent one, by 
becoming briefly violent during the time of opposition.”  In other words, she takes Hume 
to imply that it is the violence of the passion that is the cause of its prevailing when 
opposed.  However, this is clearly not what Hume says.  A passion must already 
predominate or “prevail” to benefit from the emotional fodder created by the opposition 
of other passions—only predominant passions become relatively more violent (and even 
                                                                                                                                                              
Baier takes Hume’s distinction between the strength and violence of a passion in 2.3.4.1 to be qualified by 
his subsequent remark that “notwithstanding this, ‘tis certain, that when we wou’d govern a man, and push 
him to any action, ‘twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions, and 
rather take him by his inclination, than what is vulgarly call’d his reason.” (2.3.4.1; SBN 419; cf. Baier, 
Progress of Sentiments 168)  On Baier’s reading then, Hume downplays the distinction he wanted to make 
between violence and strength, rather suggesting that violence in most or nearly all instances is 
proportionate to strength.  This, in my view, sets up the reading she proposes.  However, I take Hume not to 
be qualifying his distinction, but rather to point out that as custom is the key to the strength and calmness of 
passions, when we would “push” a man to any action—i.e. against his settled tendencies—we ought to 
operate on the violent passions.  Hume’s observation is rather innocent and, in fact, follows from his earlier 
assertion on the role of custom in strengthening calm passions: when we need to force someone to do 
something, we ought to appeal “in general”—or as Hume puts it, as a matter of “policy”—to his violent 
passions. This is completely consistent with Hume’s assertion that violence and strength, while generally 
correlated, are not necessarily correlated. 
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more “forceful” than they already are) by the MPP.139 “The spirits, when once excited, 
easily receive a change in their direction; and ‘tis natural to imagine this change will 
come from the prevailing affection” (2.3.4.2; SBN 420), these attendant emotions, when 
so converted, “are yet found to give additional force to the prevailing passion.” (2.3.4.3; 
SBN 420, my emphasis) That is, the “emotion” created by opposition tends to make the 
stronger passion even stronger.      
Second, Baier incorrectly assumes that all interactions of opposing motives 
necessarily generate MPP-feeding emotions which generate further violence.  On her 
reading, in the case of the interaction between a predominant, calm passion and a weaker 
violent one, the calm passion must increase in violence not only in order to “win” in this 
interaction (a claim which I have just shown to be false) but also in winning.  But this too 
is an incorrect reading of Hume, because it is premised on the assumption that this 
increase in violence is the necessary result of the interaction of any two opposing 
passions, one of which is predominant.  However, it is clear that this is not the case for 
                                                     
139
 Hume does not speak of the effects of opposition on the weaker passion in T 2.3.4, but one might 
plausibly hold that it remains at its original level of emotional intensity given that the emotion created by 
opposition rather than the emotion itself is converted into the predominant passion.  Thus, it seems at least 
possible that in the case of “combat” between a predominant violent passion and a weaker calm one, the 
rationalist’s confusion is still a plausible one.  The case is, of course, different where there are only two 
passions that do not strictly oppose one another. In such a case the weaker passion itself is converted into 
the predominant, not some tertia perturbatio arising from their opposition.  Hume offers us the example of 
the fear of a soldier about to engage in battle: “A soldier advancing to the battle, is naturally inspir’d with 
courage and confidence, when he thinks on his friends and fellow—soldiers; and is struck with fear and 
terror, when he reflects on the enemy  Whatever new emotion, therefore, proceeds from the former 
naturally encreases the courage; as the same emotion, proceeding from the latter, augments the fear; by the 
relation of ideas, and the conversion of the inferior emotion into the predominant.  Hence it is that in 
martial discipline, the uniformity and lustre of our habit, the regularity of our figures and motions, with all 
the pomp and majesty of war, encourage ourselves and allies; while the same objects in the enemy strike 
terror into us, tho’ agreeable and beautiful in themselves.” (2.3.4.3; SBN 420)  In such a case, the “calm” 
sentiments of beauty are themselves converted into the predominant emotions of courage and fear, 
respectively. 
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Hume.  Recall that in the introductory paragraph to T 2.3.4, the section dealing with the 
MPP, Hume characterizes a strong, calm passion in the following way: 
‘Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the 
disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion 
has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination 
of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation.  As repeated 
custom and its own force have made every thing yield to it, it directs the actions 
and conduct without that opposition and emotion, which so naturally attends 
every momentary gust of passion. (2.3.4.1; SBN 419-20, my emphasis) 
That is, when a passion has become a “settled principle of action, and is the predominant 
inclination of the soul” all other passions “yield to it” and it “directs the actions and 
conduct without…opposition” and so without violence-increasing emotion.  As Butler 
puts it in a passage from the Analogy of Religion on the effects of custom on which Hume 
surely draws in his discussion at T 2.3.4-5, where a predominant passion has repeatedly 
overcome the force of some opposing passion, the opposing principle (which on Hume’s 
theory initially causes the increase of the force and violence of the predominant one) “by 
being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, and of course.”140 Custom calms strong 
(violent) passions, and in doing so negates the effect of the very opposition which made 
such strong passions more violent: that is, the predominance of a passion and custom 
work together to increase strength while reducing violence.  As Hume indicates in his 
account of the “direct passions” in T 2.3.9, the increase of force and violence by the 
opposition of contrary passions operates “commonly…at their first rencounter” (2.3.9.13; 
my emphasis) with the clear implication that its operation is diminished or even 
                                                     
140
 Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 195, my emphasis. 
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eliminated in subsequent “rencounters”.141  Once a strong passion has racked up its 
victories, it seems its subsequent victories are achieved all the more calmly—this is 
precisely one of the effects of custom (“facility”) Hume outlines in T 2.3.5.  Perhaps, 
then, one might quibble over Hume’s retaining the traditional characterization of this as a 
“combat” of ‘reason’ or calm passion with our more violent passions, as it is often more 
like immediate and complete surrender.  But this quibble in no way “threatens to make 
nonsense” of Hume’s theory, as Baier claims it does: a swift and easy victory is a victory 
nonetheless.  Accordingly, we may rightly take issue with Baier’s reading for neglecting 
the central roles of the strengthening and calming effects of custom Hume discusses both 
in T 2.3.4.1 and 2.3.5.
142
      
 
2.2 The Effects of Custom: T 2.3.5 
What is most important to note in T 2.3.4 is that Hume utilizes the MPP in 
particular to explain how our passions are increased in force and violence by feeding off 
the byproduct emotions generated by forms of emotional “agitation” or what we might 
call the imaginative, passional, or bodily “friction” that results from the effort of the mind 
or body to overcome forms of opposition.  As I noted above, the main point of T 2.3.4 is 
                                                     
141
 In A Dissertation on the Passions, which Hume emphasizes that these effects are not necessary ones by 
adding phrases such as “in many instances” (i.e. not in all cases) (compare T 2.3.4.3 (SBN 420) with DP 
6.3, and T 2.3.4.5 (SBN 421) with DP 6.6), and altering others, such as “This happens” (T 2.3.4.5; SBN 
421) to “This often happens” (DP 6.6; my emphasis).    
142
 John P. Wright is one of the few commentators to chide Baier for her neglect of the importance of 
custom in this regard, and Wright’s account of custom has influenced the one I present here.  On my 
reading, however, Wright also neglects important aspects of Hume’s discussion, and I will take note of this 
in what follows. (See “Butler and Hume on Habit and Moral Character,” in Hume and Hume’s Connexions, 
ed. M.A. Stewart and John P. Wright (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 
105-118, and An Introduction 228-34, especially 228-9.  For Wright’s own criticisms of Baier, see “Butler 
and Hume” 109, and An Introduction 229n18.)   
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not (and cannot be) that the predominance of a passion renders it necessarily violent.
143
 
When this is appreciated, that Hume turns next to the effects of custom on the passions is 
no surprise: for, one of the main effects of custom is to eliminate these violence-
increasing effects of “opposition” or “difficulty” by eventually eliminating the opposition 
itself, thereby eliminating the emotional fodder for the MPP.   
Hume notes the prime importance of custom in his account at the start of T 2.3.5, 
writing that “nothing has a greater effect both to encrease and diminish our passions, to 
convert pleasure into pain, and pain into pleasure, than custom and repetition.” (2.3.5.1; 
SBN 422, my emphasis) The two most important effects of custom on the mind are as 
follows: 1) custom bestows “a facility in the performance of any action or the conception 
of any object”, and 2) creates, by means of this facility, a “tendency or inclination 
towards” that object.  (2.3.5.1; SBN 422, Hume’s emphasis)  Accordingly, custom shares 
with the MPP a strengthening effect on (predominant) passions, but unlike the MPP 
which feeds of emotional agitation, it renders passions calmer rather than more violent.  
It is for this reason that custom will play a crucial role in a Humean account of strong, 
calm passions, as I will show in what follows.   
  In discussing the effects of custom “in the performance of any action or the 
conception of any object,” Hume is clearly alluding to Bishop Butler’s account of the 
effects of “active” and “passive habits” in the Analogy of Religion (1736).   Indeed, at T 
2.3.5.5, Hume makes clear the influence of Butler—referred to there as “a late eminent 
                                                     
143
 Again, if this were the case, Hume could not have utilized the MPP in his explanation of the calm 
pleasure we take in tragedy. (cf. “Of Tragedy”, EMPL 216-225) 
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philosopher”144—and Butler’s account of “active” and “passive” habits on his own 
account of custom. (SBN 424)  It will be helpful for our discussion of T 2.3.5 to examine 
Butler’s account of the effects of such habits. 
In the Analogy of Religion I.5, Butler writes, “We are capable, not only of acting, 
and of having different momentary impressions made upon us, but of getting a new 
facility in any kind of action, and of settled alterations in our temper or character.”145 
Like Hume, Butler differentiates between “passive habits” and “active habits”.146  Active 
habits consist in a facility or “readiness” to perform an action, a readiness which results 
from repeated commission of the action itself.  “Passive habits”, on the other hand, are 
“habits of perception”, habits by means of which “perceptions come into our minds 
readily and of course, by means of their having been there before.”  Thus, such habits 
arise passively in the sense that we experience their objects (such as impressions of sense 
and emotions or passions) involuntarily.  Like Hume, Butler also includes among these 
                                                     
144
 C.D. Yalden-Thomson argues that Hume here refers to Francis Hutcheson.  (“An Index of Hume’s 
References in A Treatise of Human Nature” Hume Studies 3 (1977): 53-6.) Indeed, Hutcheson discusses the 
effects of custom in his work. For instance, he writes in the Inquiry, “Custom …only gives a disposition to 
the Mind or Body more easily to perform those Actions which have been frequently repeated.” (Francis 
Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises, ed. Wolfgang 
Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 70)  Moreover, Hutcheson discusses active and passive habits 
in his System of Moral Philosophy in terms similar to Butler’s, though less extensively. (A System of Moral 
Philosophy, (London: 1755), 30-33.)  Green and Grose, in their edition of the Treatise, claim that Hume is 
referring to Butler here (Philosophical Works of David Hume, II:202), and both John Wright and the 
Nortons have argued convincingly, that Butler is the likelier candidate. (John P. Wright, ‘Butler and Hume” 
105-6, 117nn.1-2; cf. An Introduction, 229-30; David Fate Norton and Mary Norton, “Editorial Appendix”, 
873 ad 2.5.5.6. See also John Laird, Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature 205n.2.) The only discussions of 
the significance of Butler’s account of the effects of custom for Hume’s account of the passions I know of 
are those of John Wright (“Butler and Hume” and  An Introduction). 
145
 Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 193. Butler’s discussion of active and passive habits in the 
Analogy of Religion is part of a wider aim of arguing by analogy that the undeniable capacity of human 
nature to develop habits necessary for life supports the “credibility” of the claim that we are placed in this 
world, a “state of so much affliction, hazard and difficulty”, in order to develop those characteristics and 
virtues the possession of which will constitute “the requisite qualification for a future state of security and 
happiness.” (I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 192) By analogy, we can reasonably conclude that “the present life 
was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one.” (I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 192)    
146
 Butler may get this distinction from Locke. (See Essay 2.9.9-10 and 2.21.69.) 
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habits “all associations of ideas not naturally connected”, associations which over time 
come to operate “imperceptibly to ourselves,” for example our ability to call to mind 
immediately those ideas that correspond to spoken or written words.
147
  More importantly 
for our purposes, Butler includes among such passive associations and habits the 
readiness to feel certain motivating passions
148
 such as fear upon the perception of danger 
or pity upon the perception of a person in distress.      
Whereas passive habits are the product of perception, “active habits” are the 
product of the active “use” and “exercise” of some faculty.  Butler divides active habits 
into habits of the body and habits of the mind.  The former are presumably those which 
are formed merely by physical rote, by the repeated motion of the body in some way or 
other, regardless of the motive.  The latter are habits of acting on the prompting of some 
specific “motive or excitement”—Butler calls these “general habits of life and conduct”.  
In other words, they are a “readiness” or inclination to perform acts which are done either 
from an “internal principle”, such as an intention (as in the case of virtuous actions like 
those of justice or charity), or a “passive impression” such as fear or pity.  In either case, 
it seems, the “motive or excitement” to the action is a necessary part of the habit because 
                                                     
147
 Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 193. Compare Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy, 
31. 
148
 While it is clear that passions such as fear and pity are motivating passions or “excitements” to actions 
on Butler’s account, it is less clear that this is case for fear on Hume’s account, and clear that it is not the 
case for pity, which for Hume is connected with (but not equivalent to) benevolence, which is the desire for 
(i.e. the passion which motivates action to secure) the happiness of the person pitied. (cf. 2.2.6-7; SBN 366-
71)   
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it is essential to making the corresponding (external) action an act of some specific type 
(e.g. and act of cowardice, and act of benevolence).
149
   
Important for our purposes in elaborating Hume’s argument in T 2.3.5 are the 
active habits we develop whose “motives and excitements” are themselves the very 
“passive impressions” which are the objects of passive habits, such as the motivating 
passions of fear and pity.
150
  These impressions become less perceptible by repetition, i.e. 
                                                     
149
 “And in like manner as habits belonging to the body are produced by external acts, so habits of the mind 
are produced by the exertion of inward practical principles, i.e. by carrying them into act, or acting upon 
them…Nor can those habits be formed by any external course of action, otherwise than as it proceeds from 
these principles; because it is only these inward principles exerted, which are strictly acts of obedience, of 
veracity, of justice, and of charity…” (Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 194, my emphasis) 
150
 Butler’s account of passive and active habits also bears on another aspect of Hume’s account of strength 
of mind: the role of “reflection” and “resolution” in strengthening calm passions. Hume tells us that “’tis 
often found, that the calm [passions], when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able 
to controul [the violent passions] in their most furious movements.” (2.3.8.13; SBN 438, my emphasis) 
Hutcheson also assigns a similar role in the Essay to reflection that certainly influenced Hume: “We obtain 
Command over the particular Passions, principally by strengthening the general Desires thro’ frequent 
Reflection, and making them habitual, so as to obtain Strength superior to the particular Passions.” (An 
Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections: with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. 
Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 30; my emphasis)  Butler, however, treats the process in 
more detail. “Resolutions” on Butler’s account are the means by which we can develop certain habits that 
are a sort of ‘hybrid’ of active and passive habits: we attempt to develop actively a certain “habit of 
perception” (which are, as we have seen, habits typically developed passively).  “Resolutions to do well are 
properly acts”—moreover, they are a “species of virtuous action”— in the sense that they are “real 
endeavours to enforce good impressions upon ourselves”. Butler describes resolutions as the means by 
which we may “enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue” and impress upon our mind the 
moral beauty or deformity of an action as a result of “admonition, experience, [or] example” or by “going 
over the theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it.” A resolution, in 
this way, may be contrasted with what Butler calls a “natural excitement”, like pity or fear, but like these 
(passive) impressions, the “good impressions” engendered in us by resolutions not only arise more readily 
in us, but also grow “weaker” (in the sense of ‘less perceptible’) by custom, as in the case of their truly 
“passive” counterparts.  Accordingly, when we “resolve” to act in a certain way but do not carry out the 
action, repeated resolution can give rise in us to what Butler characterizes as a moral numbness: simply 
reflecting on the goodness of any action “is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit 
of it, in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it 
gradually more insensible, i.e., form a habit of insensibility to all moral consideration.” Thus, resolutions 
can have a “remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming active habits”, but only to the extent 
that they actually prompt the corresponding action. (Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 194) 
  Like Butler, Hume seems to have thought resolution and reflection only to have a “remote 
efficacy” in strengthening motives.  In fact, Hume is likely echoing Butler’s account here when he writes in 
his essay “The Sceptic” that the “chief benefit” of philosophical reflection “arises in an indirect manner, 
and proceeds more from its secret, insensible influence, than from its immediate application.” (EMPL 170; 
cf. 177-9n) From what Hume tells us elsewhere (cf. 1.3.9.14, 2.2.9.4, 3.2.7.5; SBN 114-5, 382, 536-7), it is 
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by giving rise to “passive habits”: “For from our very faculty of habits, passive 
impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker [i.e. “less perceptible”, not “of less 
influence on the will”].  Thoughts, by often passing through our mind, are felt less 
sensibly.” Accordingly,       
…[F]rom these two observations together, that practical habits are formed and 
strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow weaker by 
being repeated upon us, it must follow, that active habits may be gradually 
forming and strengthening, by a course of acting upon such and such motives 
and excitements, whilst these motives and excitements, themselves are, by 
proportionable degrees, growing less sensible; i.e. are continually less and less 
sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen.  And experience confirms this; 
                                                                                                                                                              
clear that “resolution” achieves its effect, as on Butler’s account, by custom, and more specifically by what 
Hume calls “education”: a form of custom that yields belief by means of frequent, “designed” or intentional 
repetition of an idea or opinion. (1.3.12.23; SBN 140; cf. 2.2.4.5, 1.3.9.17, 19, 1.3.10.6; SBN 353, 116, 
117, 121-2) “[U]pon cool reflection on the importance of [a] subject”, Hume writes in a Butlerian tone, we 
may “by repeated meditation…imprint in [our] minds” the importance of any belief or action. (1.3.9.14; 
SBN 114-5; cf. 3.2.2.26, 3.2.7.5; SBN 500-1, 536-7) (Hume here echoes Butler’s talk of reflection “in a 
cool hour” in Sermon XI, “Upon the Love of Our Neighbour,” Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls 
Chapel (London, 1726), 223; Works (ed. White) 117) In this way, an idea or object achieves vivacity, and, 
as Hume tells us in T 2.3.6, the strength of any motive is proportional to the vivacity of its object.   
However, more than Butler, Hume emphasizes that resolution and education, as “artificial” 
sources of belief (1.3.10.6, 1.3.12.23; SBN 121, 140-1), are not only largely ineffective in restraining our 
stronger passions (cf. 3.2.7.5; SBN 546), but where they are effective in this regard, they are also supported 
by more “natural” principles. (See “The Sceptic,” EMPL 170-1, and especially T 1.3.9.14, where Hume 
argues that reflection may induce in a man an artificial belief in an afterlife, but that belief, lacking all 
relations of resemblance to our earthly life and its practical concerns, cannot significantly influence action 
in any natural way, except in men with an extraordinary degree of strength of mind.)  Indeed, at T 
1.3.12.23, Hume writes, 
For ‘tho custom and education produce belief by such a repetition, as is not deriv’d from 
experience, yet this requires a long tact of time, along with a very frequent and undesign’d 
repetition.  In general we may pronounce, that a person, who wou’d voluntarily repeat any idea 
in his mind, tho’ supported by one past experience, wou’d be no more inclin’d to believe the 
existence of its object, than if he had contented himself with one survey of it.  Besides the effect 
of design; each act of the mind, being separate and independent, has a separate influence, and 
joins not its force with that of its fellows. (1.3.12.23; SBN 140-1) 
In other words, we cannot produce an efficacious belief that is wholly artificial: in order for resolution to 
have any efficacy, they must reinforce ideas and connections between ideas that are the product of 
“undesign’d” experience.  Thus, Hume remarks in his famous “Letter to a Physician,”  
[Reflections], no doubt, are exceeding [sic] useful when joined with an active life; because the 
occasion being presented along with the reflection, works it into the soul, and makes it take a 
deep impression; but in solitude they serve to little other purpose than to waste the spirits—the 
force of the mind meeting with no resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like an arm when it 
misses its aim. (Letters I:14)  
The psychology that underlies the “natural” and “undesign’d” way “distant” ends motivate us effectively, 
as I will argue below, is contained in T 2.3.8.     
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for active principles, at the very same time that they are less lively in perception 
than they were, are found to be some how wrought more thoroughly into the 
temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing practice.
151
  
Butler’s examples bring to light the importance of his account for Hume.  For example: 
“[p]erception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear and active caution, and by 
being inured to danger habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the same time that the 
former gradually lessens.”  In Hume’s terms, the passion of fear becomes gradually 
calmer, less violent, while our inclination to respond actively to danger becomes 
stronger.  Thus, Butler concludes, “by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we 
get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in it.”152 
Hume deepens Butler’s account of these effects of custom (an account which he 
couches in Cartesian talk of ‘animal spirits’153) primarily by utilizing his concept of the 
MPP in explaining those effects. As we noted above, custom or repetition calms passions 
by gradually negating the “agitating” effects of the mental and physical obstacles Hume 
discussed in T 2.3.4: “When the soul applies itself to the performance of action, or the 
conception of any object, to which it is not accustom’d, there is a certain unpliableness in 
the faculties, and a difficulty of the spirit’s moving in their new direction.” (2.3.5.2; SBN 
                                                     
151
 Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 194.  This is what Felix Ravaisson has called the “double 
law” of habit: “The continuity or the repetition of passion weakens it; the continuity or repetition of action 
exalts and strengthens it.” (Of Habit [1838], trans. Claire Carlisle and Mark Sinclair (New York: 
Continuum, 2008), 49) See also, citing Butler, Pierre Maine de Biran, The Influence of Habit on the Faculty 
of Thinking [1802], trans. M.D. Boehm (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1929), 47.  
152
 Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 195. 
153
 cf. Malebranche’s account of habit (Search After Truth, LO 107-9) and novelty (Search, LO 383-4).  For 
the metaphorical nature of Hume’s use of the Cartesian language of animal “spirits” and other references to 
anatomy in his explanations of features of our mental life, see T 1.2.5.20 (SBN 60-1).  On my reading, 
Hume uses the notion of “animal spirits” merely as a convenient means to speak of diverse phenomena of 
the mind under one general idiom.    
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422-3, my emphasis)
154
  This difficulty “excites this sprits”, “enlivens the mind”, and 
gives rise to emotions like wonder and surprise.
155
  This agitation of the spirits provides 
“fodder” for the MPP, and such fodder is converted by that mechanism into the 
predominant passion whether painful or pleasurable, augmenting that passion’s force and 
violence. (2.3.5.2; SBN 423)
156
  Thus, custom calms our passions by counteracting the 
agitating effects of imaginative “opposition” or “difficulty”, of which novelty is a 
primary form.
157
 Repetition, as it gradually diminishes the “ferment of the spirits”, by 
degrees produces a facility.  Though a moderate conceptual facility, like a moderate 
novelty
158
 (i.e. a form of moderate difficulty), is “in itself very agreeable, like every thing, 
which enlivens the mind to a moderate degree (2.3.5.2; SBN 423) and “an infallible 
                                                     
154
 Here, as in T 2.3.4, Hume employs talk of “spirits”, and his account of novelty is thoroughly Cartesian. 
155
 See also T 2.3.9.26 (SBN 446), and “Of  Tragedy” EMPL 221: “Difficulties encrease passions of every 
kind; and by rouzing our attention, and exciting our active powers, they produce and emotion, which 
nourishes the prevailing affection.”  
156
 cf. T 1.3.14.24 (SBN 166) and “Of Tragedy”: “Novelty naturally rouzes the mind, and attracts our 
attention; and the movements, which it causes, are always converted into any passion, belonging to the 
object, and join their force to it. Whether an event excites joy or sorrow, pride or shame, anger or good-
will, it is sure to produce a stronger affection, when new or unusual. And though novelty of itself be 
agreeable, it fortifies the painful, as well as agreeable passions.” (EMPL 221) See also, “Whether the 
British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or To a Republic,” EMPL 50-1. 
157
Though Hume deals primarily here with the effect of novelty on the passions, in his account of belief in 
T 1.3, Hume also outlines the effect of novelty on the imagination as well.  There, he tells us that the 
emotion of surprise is, along with education, eloquence and our reasonings from cause and effect, a source 
of belief, precisely because it is a source of vivacity: “Admiration and surprize have the same effect as the 
other passions; and accordingly we may observe, that among the vulgar, quacks and projectors meet with a 
more easy faith upon account of their magnificent pretensions, than if they kept themselves within the 
bounds of moderation.  The first astonishment, which naturally attends their miraculous relations, spreads 
itself over the whole soul, and so vivifies and enlivens the idea, that it resembles the inferences we draw 
from experience.” (1.3.10.4; SBN 120; cf. 1.2.1.1; SBN 7-8)  It is unclear how Hume would reconcile this 
account of the effects of novelty with those he outlines in T 2.3.5, where these emotions increase the 
strength and violence of passions not by vivifying our ideas, but by being converted into the (predominant) 
passion by means of the MPP.  Perhaps Hume would distinguish cases where the emotions of novelty and 
surprise arising from imaginative difficulty attend ideas of non-hedonic objects from those where such 
emotions attend ideas of hedonic objects—as in the latter cases, passions attend such ideas, the MPP would 
be operative, and available to convert these emotions into the predominant passion, while in the latter case, 
the only available effect of such emotions would be to vivify ideas.    
158
 As Hume tells us in T 2.3.9.26-30 (SBN 446-7), novelty, when great, produces an agitation in the spirits 
that so strongly resembles fear (a painful passion and aversion) that it actually converts into fear itself.  I 
will have occasion to discuss this in a later chapter. 
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source of pleasure”, it is so not because it agitates the spirits, but because it puts them 
into an “orderly motion” which is naturally pleasurable. (2.3.5.3; SBN 423)  Moreover, 
while novelty augments both painful passions as well as pleasurable ones by producing 
emotional fodder for a predominant passion (which may be either of a pleasurable or 
painful hedonic charge
159), the pleasure of a moderate facility “has not the same 
tendency” precisely because it orders the spirits rather than agitates them.  The pleasure 
of this facility, moreover, can be so great that it can “convert pain into pleasure, and give 
us a relish in time for what at first was most harsh and disagreeable.” (2.3.5.3; SBN 423) 
Hume implies that this effect, too, is a result of the “ordering” of the spirits, which at 
once gives rise to its own pleasurable emotion (and so a concomitant desire), while 
rendering whatever aversion to the object or action weaker by eliminating the fodder that 
would feed the MPP.    
 This pleasure of facility and of the “ordering of the spirits”, says Hume (following 
Butler’s suggestion), seems to be the ground for his claim that custom can give us a 
positive “inclination and tendency” towards an object “where it is not entirely 
disagreeable, and can never be the object of inclination.” (2.3.5.5; SBN 424)  That is, it is 
by means of facility—the first effect of custom Hume discusses—that custom achieves its 
second effect, a positive tendency.
160
  However, Hume also supplements Butler’s account 
by noting the effect of too great a facility: when facility is too great, it can have the 
                                                     
159
 cf. T 2.3.9.26; SBN 446. 
160
 As Butler notes, when an active habit has been established, “the reasons for [performing the action] 
offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to 
make us go on in [that] course of action to which we have been accustomed.” (Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; 
Works (ed. White) 195)) 
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opposite effect, and change desire into aversion.
161
  It can convert pleasure into pain by 
“render[ing] the actions of mind so faint and languid, that they are no longer able to 
interest and support it.” (2.3.5.4; SBN 423)  The implication is that the faintness of the 
spirits is itself painful and the grounds of an aversion—a claim which Hume frequently 
makes throughout his works, and one which we have occasion to examine more closely 
in Chapter 4.
162
  This is especially the case with those actions of the body or passions 
which are “naturally attended” with some agitation or “ferment” of the spirits, such as sex 
or the enjoyment of a piece of music, which agreeable agitation is “destroy’d by the too 
frequent repetition”. (2.3.5.4; SBN 423; cf. 2.2.11.6; SBN 396)   
 
2.3 Predominance, Custom and the Antecedent Strength of Passions: the 
Explanatory Limits of T 2.3.4-5 
The picture that emerges from T 2.3.4-5 of the development of strong, calm 
passions—strong passions that operate with a phenomenological calmness that resembles 
that of reason—is one on which predominance, opposition, and custom work together not 
only to solidify gradually the influence of a passion on the will, but also to render it 
progressively calmer.  By means of the MPP, passions predominant in one’s motivational 
economy are further strengthened by the (superable) opposition of weaker motives; in 
overcoming this opposition, however, such motivating passions are initially rendered not 
only stronger, but more violent.  (This increase in strength and violence is (again, contra 
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 Hume made this point in the very first sentence of T 2.3.5. (2.3.5.1; SBN 422) 
162
 Indeed, as I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, the aversion to a lack of mental “agitation” is innate 
in human nature.  The specific passion Hume associates with such a lack is despair (2.2.4.4; SBN 352-3; cf. 
2.3.4.8; SBN 421-2), which is explicitly said to be a direct passion. (2.1.1.4; SBN 276-7) 
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Baier) the effect of the predominance of a passion, not its cause.) But given that such 
predominant motives by definition motivate action with a frequency and strength greater 
than other motives, their predominance also activates the effects of habit and custom.  
Custom gradually calms predominant motives by diminishing the increase in violence 
that results from the MPP-feeding opposition of weaker motives.  But it does not at the 
same time weaken passions as it calms them, despite the fact that it deprives the MPP of 
its emotional fodder: rather, it strengthens such passions, not by the conversion of 
emotional fodder as the MPP does, but by producing an “active habit”—a “positive 
tendency” or “inclination” towards their objects, solidifying further their influence over 
the will.
163
  The effect of custom is precisely to negate the effects of the MPP on the 
predominant passion, calming passions by ordering the spirits first “rouzed” by 
opposition, while at the same time strengthening passions by the formation of “active 
habits” which ‘replace’ the strength lost by the conversion of those roused spirits by the 
MPP.  This process of the gradual solidification of the predominance of a passion is 
surely the psychological underpinning of Hume’s claim in a letter to Hutcheson that the 
calmest passions commonly have the firmest control of our will: such passions, he writes, 
“though calm, may likewise be very strong, and have the absolute command over the 
mind,” and that “[t]he more absolute they are, we find them to be commonly the 
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 Aaron Zimmerman has puzzlingly claimed that custom only works to weaken passions, and can aid us in 
acting prudently, primarily by weakening passions for lesser goods:  “For on Hume's own description of the 
phenomena, habituation and training primarily work by diminishing the violence and force of imprudent 
desire, not by leaving that force in place and augmenting the opposing motivational strength of calm 
prudential concern.” (“Hume’s Reasons” 230) I hope to have shown this claim to be false, particularly in 
light of Hume’s adoption of Butler’s account of “active habits”. 
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calmer.”164  In other words, given the nature of this process, the calmness of a strong 
passion is directly proportional to, and so a sign of, its relative predominance and 
command over the mind.   
Several important issues are raised by Hume’s T.2.3.4-5 account of the roles of 
the MPP and custom in the development of strong, calm passions.  First, though the 
products of this joint effort of the MPP and custom are predominant calm passions, the 
process itself is by no means necessarily characterized by calm—in its ascension to 
power, a predominant passion will often have to overcome the opposing force of other 
passions, and the mental “unpliableness” that it encounters in the passions taking a new 
direction, which difficulty and opposition will render that passion relatively more violent. 
(Though, again, this increase in violence is neither a necessary cause nor necessary effect 
of the victory of such passions over their inferiors, as Annette Baier argues.) Thus, we 
need not fret, as for instance McIntyre and Baier do, over the fact that Hume “does little 
to explain how calm passions gain strength without becoming violent.”165 Though the 
possession of a character results in the calmness and stability of our motivating passions, 
the shaping and reshaping of character is not a calm affair: as Hume’s “Sceptic” puts it in 
a closely related passage, in order to shape or reform one’s character, one must, “for 
some time…impose a violence on himself.” (“The Sceptic” EMPL 171, my emphasis)   
Another important issue raised by Hume’s discussion in T 2.3.4-5 is that 
accounting for the roles of the MPP and of custom in the production of strong, calm 
passions only provides us a partial and incomplete picture of the formation of such 
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 Letters I:46, ‘To Francis Hutcheson’, January 1743. 
165
 “Strength of Mind” 399. 
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passions, despite the common tendency to treat these sections as the basis for a complete 
Humean theory.  Again, in these sections, Hume only accounts for the calmness of 
passions already predominant.  As I hope to have made clear above, on Hume’s picture in 
T 2.3.4-5, the operation of both the MPP and active habits presuppose the antecedent 
relative strength of the passions on which they operate. As Hume puts it, the formation of 
“active habits” depends on the “spirits” already being “sufficiently supported of 
themselves”—like the MPP, custom can only give an already predominant passions “new 
force”, it “bends them more strongly to the action.” (2.3.5.5; SBN 424, my emphasis)  
Thus, an important question that remains after T 2.3.4-5 concerns the sources of this 
requisite antecedent strength of passions.   
As I noted earlier, some passions are “implanted” in the general frame of human 
nature (2.3.3.8; SBN 417; cf. 2.2.7.1, 3.2.1.12; SBN 368, 481), and others are ‘natural’ to 
the particular temper of each individual, and as such passions are often naturally strong or 
predominant in our passional economy, they naturally achieve a calm command over the 
mind by means of the mechanisms Hume sketches in T 2.3.4-5.  Such passions are not 
only important sources of the constancy of our will and temper, but are often permanent 
and unchangeable features of our characters. (cf. 3.3.4.3; SBN 608)
166
 However, as I 
hope to have made clear above, it is also the case for Hume (to use Butler’s words) that 
“our nature is formed to yield…to use and exercise” such that custom can give rise to 
“many habitudes of life, not given by nature”, that is to “settled alterations in our temper 
                                                     
166
 Similar sentiments are expressed by Hume’s “Epicurean” and “Sceptic”. (cf. EMPL 138-9, 168-9)  In 
particular, the general constancy of the possession and operation of the implanted “instincts” and principles 
of action in human nature makes possible general philosophical accounts of important moral phenomena, in 
particular, a scientific account of origin and growth of political society.  (cf. 2.3.1.8; SBN 401-2) 
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and character.”167 The mechanisms Hume’s treats in T 2.3.4-5 cannot account for such 
“alterations” in our character, as Hume does not offer us in those sections an account of 
the strengthening of passions which are not naturally strong or predominant prior to the 
operation of the MPP and custom on them, but only an account of the further 
strengthening (and calming) of motives which are already predominant.
168
 Thus, 
emphasizing the “calming” effect of custom as the key to understanding Hume’s account 
of strong, calm passions, and their role in character formation (as for instance John 
Wright
169
 does) aids only partly in solving the interpretative difficulties of Hume’s 
account of predominant calm passions.  
Jane McIntyre has pointed to the explanatory limits of the effects of custom as a 
particularly serious problem for Hume’s account of strong, calm passions: 
Hume suggests, therefore, that there are two different axes along which passions 
can be measured (strong versus weak, calm versus violent), but his discussion 
primarily focuses on one of these.  Hume does argue in Treatise 2.3.5 that 
repetition can create a habit that strengthens the passions without making them 
more violent. But Hume's discussion leaves it unclear how a calm but weak 
passion (that is, a calm passion before it was strengthened by habit) would be 
acted on at all.
170
    
While McIntyre is, of course, right to argue that the formation of active habits minimally 
requires that passions actually (and repeatedly) lead to action, her claim that it is a serious 
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 Analogy of Religion I.v.ii; Works (ed. White) 193, my emphasis. 
168
 This is made particularly clear when Hume discusses facility converting pain into pleasure, and giving 
us “a relish in time for what at first was disagreeable” (2.3.5.3; SBN 423): in such cases, whatever aversion 
we may have must be “inferior” to (and so must be overcome in the first place by) the corresponding 
“predominant” desire.  
169
 Though Wright acknowledges the strengthening effects of custom, he nevertheless focuses mainly on its 
calming effect, and misses this problem. To be fair, it is not his aim to elucidate “strength of mind” in 
particular (he mentions it briefly at An Introduction 232) —his concern is primarily the development of a 
stable character, a concern which, I argued above, is closely related to, but not coextensive with accounting 
for “strength of mind”. (cf. An Introduction 228-9)   
170
 “Strength of Mind” 397; cf. “Hume’s Passions” 83-5. 
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problem for Hume’s account of custom that it leaves it unclear how a relatively weaker 
passion “would be acted on at all” is certainly too strong a claim, as many typically weak 
motives (e.g. many of our other-regarding moral motives) are at times effective in cases 
where they are not opposed by stronger combatants (e.g. our immediate interests or 
partial affections (cf. EPM 5.39; SBN 226)).  On my reading, the real question that still 
remains after T 2.3.4-5 is how such motives can achieve relative predominance and 
become reliable and “constant” in the way required for the possession of a “settled 
principle of action” rather than remaining a more intermittently effective principle of 
action—that is, how such initially weaker motives can become part of our settled 
character such that they not only sometimes move us to act, but also achieve greater 
relative strength over motives that may be initially stronger.  The solution to this question 
cannot rely on custom as a mechanism for strengthening passions, for, as I have noted, 
the operation of custom in such instances requires not only that a motive be at least 
intermittently efficacious, but that it already be predominant over other motives if custom 
is to further solidify this predominance. For this reason, custom can only play a 
secondary role in producing settled, predominant principles of action. 
Thus, McIntyre argues that the limits of custom is one important way in which 
Hume’s T 2.3 account of the causes and effects of the violence and calmness of passions 
fails to offer us a complete, coherent account of strong, calm passions.  However, like 
Baier
171
 and Wright, McIntyre fails to appreciate both the limits of Hume’s aims in T 
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 As I noted earlier, Baier does examine T 2.3.6 briefly (Progress of Sentiments 171), but she does not 
attempt to discern what that section contributes to Hume’s discussion of strong, calm passions.  She omits 
discussion of T 2.3.7-8 entirely. 
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2.3.4-5, and how the later sections of T 2.3, in particular, T 2.3.6-8, together contribute 
significantly to a coherent account of the causes of the antecedent strength of those 
passions which are not naturally predominant in our temper.  Instead, McIntyre argues, 
we must turn to Hume’s account of the effects of sympathy on our passions to fill in the 
gaps in Hume’s account.  However, while sympathy does have an important role to play 
in this respect (one which I will detail in the final chapter), it is not the primary cause of 
this strength. Rather, primary among these causes is the relative vivacity of our beliefs 
concerning pleasure and pain, and a treatment of these causes is Hume’s aim in T 2.3.6-7.  
Accordingly, in the following chapters I will attempt to demonstrate what resources 
Hume does offer us in T 2.3.6-8 for such an account, and how these sections, together 
with T 2.3.4-5, form the core of a coherent Humean account of strong, calm passions. 
  However, perhaps the most important question that remains open at the end of T 
2.3.4-5 concerns the antecedent strength of those passions which are not natural to our 
temper or frame, but which rest on our judgments of the value of objects.  Put differently, 
while T 2.3.4-5 account for the calmness of strong passions (i.e. passions which are 
already predominant), they do not account for the strength of ‘the calm passions’—that 
is, to use my earlier distinction
172
, ‘calm passions’ in the generic rather than the adverbial 
sense, which are calm, affective evaluations of the “real” or “true” value of an object.  An 
evaluation of this kind, as Hume puts it, is a “general calm determination of the passions, 
founded on some distant view or reflexion” on an object, and which, because of its 
generality and calmness, is often “improperly” or “vulgarly” considered the product of 
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 supra n. 135.  
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reason alone (i.e. “as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties” (2.3.8.13; SBN 437, 
my emphasis)). (3.3.1.18; SBN 583; cf. 2.3.4.1, 3.2.7.5; SBN 419, 536-7; EPM 6.15; 
SBN 239)  It is the antecedent strength of these passions which we are most interested in 
because their strength bears most not only on our long-term well-being, but of our 
‘control’ over it.  While some passions and principles of action may be naturally strong, 
the process of strengthening a passion or motive that is not naturally dominant in our 
temperament or frame is often focused, goal-oriented and even reflective in a way that 
the mere habituation of motives and passions “natural” to our individual temperament or 
“implanted” in the human frame are not.173  In particular, it is the strength or 
“prevalence” of these calm passions which Hume considers most indicative of the 
possession of “strength of mind” or constancy, a virtuous quality of mind necessary for 
our successful pursuit of what Hume calls our long-term “interests and designs” and 
“general resolutions”. (2.3.3.10; SBN 418, EPM 6.15; SBN 239-40)  It is an ability to 
resist firmly the violent temptations of present pleasure in the pursuit of these “distant 
ends”, many of which are the ends of the traditional predominant or ruling passions, and 
which ‘reason’ or ‘the calm passions’ point out to us as worthy ends and settled 
organizing principles of our long-terms plans of action. A complete Humean account of 
strong, calm passions and their role in promoting happiness, then, will account for the 
predominance of our motives for such ends, and so for the strength of “reason” in 
Hume’s sense of calmly determined, strong preferences for these goods.   
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 cf. McIntyre, “Strength of Mind” 395. 
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  Moreover, these last two issues are intimately related. The question of the causes 
of the predominance and efficacy of these calm, affective judgments of value on our will 
and passions is particularly pressing because of the general motivational inefficacy Hume 
sometimes attributes to these ‘calm passions’.  As I will note in more detail in the 
following chapter, many of the very features of objects that render a passion for them not 
only calm, but also responsive to their true value on Hume’s account, are at the same time 
those features which tend to render our passions weak.  “Strength of mind”, on the other 
hand, is that virtuous quality of mind which enables an individual agent, in spite of those 
general principles of human nature which typically render these calm passions weak, 
nevertheless to “persevere in a steady adherence to a general and distant interest, in 
opposition to the (typically violent) allurements of present pleasure and advantage”. 
(EPM 4.1; SBN 205; cf. EPM 6.15; SBN239)  And, as I will argue in the following 
chapter, since the primary causes of the calmness and weakness of such passions are 
those factors which determine the relative vivacity of the ideas of their objects, Hume’s 
account of constancy or “strength of mind” is intimately bound up with his account of the 
causes of differences in the relative vivacity of our ideas, and the effects of these 
differences on the relative strength and violence of our passions.  Thus, an understanding 
of the nature of this strength of mind can be fully appreciated only in the context of 
Hume’s account of the relationship between vivacity and the passions, and, as I will 
show, the value of T 2.3.6-8 in large part lies in its contribution to this understanding.  
The situation of strength of mind within the context of Hume’s account of the vivacity of 
our ideas, however, raises an important question regarding the possibility of cultivating 
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that virtuous quality of mind.  In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will attempt to 
discern what resources Hume’s T 2.3.6-8 account of the relationship between the 
imagination and the passions have to address this important question, and its implications 
for Hume’s account of the strong, calm passions which secure the constancy and 
coherence of our actions.  
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Chapter 3:  The Imagination and the Passions (I): the “Strength” of the Mind 
and Hume’s “Epistemology of Ease” 
As I noted in the previous chapter, my aim in this chapter is twofold.  First, I 
intend to investigate how Hume incorporates many of the key features of his Treatise, 
Book I account of belief as a “lively” or “vivacious” idea into his account of motivation 
in T 2.3.6-7—an integration of the doctrines of Treatise, Book I into Book II which I 
have argued is at the heart of Hume’s intentions for these books as a “compleat chain of 
reasoning”—in order to bring key features of that account to bear on Hume’s account of 
the ability of our calm, affective judgments of our greater good to regulate our conduct 
and long-term plans of action.  Second, I aim to expand Hume’s rather compressed 
treatment of the virtue of “strength of mind” by situating that treatment within the wider 
context of his account of the roles causal reasoning and the vivacity of our ideas play in 
determining the strength of our motives.  Before carrying out these two aims, however, I 
must first clarify further their relationship to one another, and to Hume’s T 2.3 theory of 
motivation and deliberation more generally.  
As I have argued, the mechanisms Hume presents in T 2.3.4-5 crucial for the 
calming and further strengthening of predominant passions depend more basically on the 
antecedent relative strength of those passions, and Hume turns in T 2.3.6-7 to an account 
of the primary cause of this relative strength of motives: the relative vivacity of our ideas 
of the objects of our motives.  It is in Hume’s treatment of the effects of vivacity on the 
will and passions in T 2.3.6-7 that we get his account of the effects of the 
“circumstances” or “situation” of an object on the strength our motives—yet another one 
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of the parameters Hume outlined both in T 2.3.1-2 and in his program for his T 2.3 
“climatology” of human motivation.   
Though the relationship between Hume’s account of motivation in T 2.3.3 and his 
T 1.3.10 account of the “influence of belief” on the passions has been frequently noted174, 
it has been raised mainly to illustrate the bare connection between (hedonic) belief and 
the production of the passions on Hume’s account.  However, given that Hume’s T 1.3-4 
account of belief has far richer implications for his account of the relative strength and 
violence of our passions, as Hume makes clear in T 2.3.6-7, the full extent of the 
continuity of his T 1.3-4 treatment of belief with his anatomy of motivation and 
deliberation in T 2.3 has not been fully appreciated.  In the course of this chapter, I will 
make this continuity and its implications for Hume’s theory of motivation and 
deliberation clearer.     
One likely reason these implications have been overlooked is that the nominal 
subject of T 2.3.7 is the relatively narrow topic of the strength of passions as a function of 
the spatiotemporal distance of their objects, a topic which Hume had already treated 
cursorily in T 2.3.4 (2.3.4.1; SBN 419), and which, given the common reading of T 2.3.4-
8, may seem to be yet another “remarkable” or curious, but ultimately unimportant 
feature of Hume’s theory of the passions he attempts to sketch out in these sections. 
However, as I will argue in this chapter, this reading is misguided, since T 2.3.6-7 
                                                     
174
 e.g., Stanley Tweyman , Reason and Conduct in Hume and his Predecessors (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1974), 134, Rachel Cohon and David Owen, “Hume on Representation, Reason and Motivation”, 
Manuscrito 20 (1997): 47-76, and Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Morality, 42 have all taken notice of the 
influence of Hume’s discussion “Of the influence of belief” in T 1.3.10 on T 2.3.3.  However, Annette 
Baier and Tito Magri are the only commentators I know of who have appreciated the relevance of T 1.3.10 
to both T 2.3.3 and T 2.3.6. (Baier, A Progress of Sentiments 157-9, 171-2, Magri, “Hume on the Direct 
Passions and Motivation”)    
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together represent Hume’s integration of important features of his Treatise, Book I theory 
of belief into his T 2.3 theory of motivation.   
The general thesis of T 2.3.6-7 is that, all other things being equal, the strength of 
a desire for any object is directly proportional to the vivacity of our idea of that object, 
vivacity being that quality of ideas which makes them beliefs, and which gives those 
beliefs their “influence” on the will and passions.  On Hume’s Treatise, Book I account 
of belief, the vivacity of an idea is a product of natural relations of causation to present 
impressions, and, all other things being equal, the vivacity of our causal beliefs is 
proportional to the strength or perfection of its causal relation to an object of present 
sense or memory.  However, there are sources of the vivacity of our ideas other than their 
causal relation to present impressions which may artificially augment or diminish the 
vivacity of our causal beliefs, and, more importantly, their vivacity relative to other 
causal beliefs that are equally certain. Hume deems causal reasoning subject to such 
distorting influences “unphilosophical probability”.175  And, as I will discuss in more 
detail later in this chapter, given that the vivacity of our ideas is that quality which gives 
them influence on the passions, these unphilosophical differences in the relative vivacity 
of our ideas have important consequences for the relative strength of our passions, and so 
for the regulation of our conduct.      
One of the most important “unphilosophical” sources of the vivacity of our ideas 
Hume treats in Treatise, Book I is the influence of para-causal natural relations of ideas 
                                                     
175
As I will note below, such causal reasoning is only one species of unphilosophical probability.  It is, 
however, the most important for an understanding of Hume’s theory of motivation, and so for my purposes 
in this chapter. 
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(natural relations of contiguity and resemblance) on our beliefs.  Accordingly, I will treat 
the effects of these para-causal relations of ideas on the vivacity of our causal beliefs in 
some detail in this chapter, for in T 2.3.7, Hume takes up the effects of natural relations 
of spatiotemporal contiguity and differences in the relative spatiotemporal distance of 
objects on the vivacity of our causal beliefs, and so on the strength of our motivating 
passions.  For reasons I will elaborate in this chapter, however, T 2.3.7 ought to be read 
more broadly as the locus of Hume’s integration of his Treatise, Book I account of the 
effects of what is called in contemporary behavioral economics and decision theory 
“psychological distance” on the vivacity of our beliefs, and so on the relative strength of 
our passions.        
As I will attempt to show in this chapter, Hume’s account of the causes and 
effects of “psychological distance” on the vivacity of our ideas, and so on the strength of 
our motives in T 2.3.7 is intimately related to my second aim in this chapter—to unpack 
Hume’s rather compressed account of the virtue of “strength of mind”.  Accordingly I 
will elaborate the general shape of this connection here. 
Strength of mind is the second form which “constancy”—here, the virtue of 
constancy—takes at the heart of Hume’s Treatise scheme of virtue and happiness as the 
;prevalence’ of the calm passions over the violent.  Strength of mind, on Hume’s account, 
is a virtue “useful to oneself” because it is a quality of mind which gives motivational 
force to our affective evaluations of the true value of objects, and so crucial for achieving 
112 
 
 
 
and maintaining “happiness and honour”.176 (EPM 6.15; SBN 239-40, T 2.3.3.10, 
3.3.2.13; SBN 418, 599)  Despite the importance of this virtue to Hume’s scheme, as Jane 
McIntyre has aptly put it, he “has surprisingly little to say about what strength of mind 
is”.177 However, as I will show in more detail in this chapter, what Hume does say in both 
the Treatise and second Enquiry reveals a deep connection to his account of the 
relationship between the “unphilosophical” causes of the relative vivacity of our ideas, 
their effects on the relative strength of our passions, and correction of this influences by 
what Hume calls “general rules”.  Specifically, I will argue that, in light of Hume’s 
account of the relationship between the vivacity of our ideas and the strength of our 
passions, the virtue of strength of mind consists largely in the imagination’s power to 
resist and overcome the influences of “unphilosophical” sources of vivacity on our causal 
beliefs, and to adhere firmly to those general rules which “correct” for these influences.   
Indeed, in several places in T 1.3-4, Hume characterizes the difference between a 
“strong” and “weak” mind in terms of differences in the degree to which individual 
minds possess this power or ability. (cf. 1.3.13.3, 1.4.3.9, 1.4.4.1; SBN 144, 223, 225) 
Thus, on my reading, the virtue of “strength of mind” which “implies the prevalence of 
the calm passions above the violent” in one’s temper is more fundamentally the product 
of what Hume calls a “strong and firm imagination”—the ability of an individual 
imagination to “preserve the evidence” or vivacity of a causal argument over 
psychological distance. (1.3.13.3; SBN 144, my emphasis)  As this strength of the 
                                                     
176
 Hume argues elsewhere that, in addition, a strong mind is also immediately agreeable to its possessor 
because of the pleasure the exertion of this strength brings to its possessor.  (3.3.4.13; SBN 613) This 
pleasure Hume explains in terms of what I will call in the next chapter his ‘Principle of Agitation-Seeking”.  
177
 McIntyre, “Strength of Mind” 393; cf. 394. 
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imagination is the primary cause of the ‘predominance’ of those passions which are 
responsive to the “real value” of objects—‘the calm passions’ (in the generic sense)—and 
as this relative predominance is what activates the formation of the active habits which 
further solidify their predominance, it is also the basis for “strength of mind”—a virtue 
which secures the “prevalence” of the calm passions whose strength it promotes.  For this 
reason, I argue Hume’s T 2.3.6-7 account of the influence of “unphilosophical 
probability” on our passions and conduct, and Hume’s T 1.3-4 account of the 
“correction” of this influence by adherence to rule-regulated causal reasoning, is crucial 
for a deeper understanding of this Humean quality of mind central to his account of 
happiness and virtue.  Moreover, I argue, it is primarily through understanding Hume’s 
account of the “unphilosophical” influence and effects of “psychological distance” on the 
relative vivacity of our beliefs in T 1.3-4, and of its effects on the passions in T 2.3.7 that 
we can get clearer on the nature of Humean “strength of mind”.  For, as I suggested 
above, it is in particular the “correction” of this influence of psychological distance on 
the vivacity of our ideas which is responsible for the successful regulation of our passions 
and conduct.   
The relation between my two stated aims in this chapter is even closer that I have 
suggested.  I argued above that, given that Hume has “surprisingly little” else to say 
about the nature of strength of mind, Hume’s Treatise account of unphilosophical 
probability, its correction by general rules, and the effects of both on the passions and 
conduct is crucial to an understanding of this quality of mind.  However, in light of 
Hume’s general analysis of dispositional properties like “strength” and “power” in the 
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Treatise and first Enquiry, there is a clear reason why Hume does not say much more that 
is explicit or direct concerning the ‘deeper’ nature of this virtuous “strength” of the mind 
apart from its effects on the imagination and passions as he accounts for them in the 
Treatise: he cannot. 
To appreciate why this is the case, we have to turn to Hume’s famous analysis of 
dispositional properties.  Hume emphatically argues in both the Treatise and first Enquiry 
that there are “no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain” than 
those of ‘power’ or ‘force’, and of related dispositional properties like ‘strength’178 
(which, Hume tells us, is “a kind of power” (2.1.8.4; SBN 300)).  On Hume’s account, 
“[t]he distinction, which we often make betwixt power and the exercise of it”—that is of 
“power” as a quality possessed by an object that we can know “independent[ly] of its 
actual exercise”— is “without foundation”, and “entirely frivolous.” (1.3.14.34, 2.1.10.4; 
SBN 171, 311-2)  Of course, we often talk of an object being “endow’d with a real force 
or energy” (1.3.14.13; SBN 161, my emphasis), of a “power or agency…as belonging to 
causes”. (1.4.3.9; SBN 223, my emphasis)179  However, as Hume argues, we never have 
an impression of a ‘power’ in this sense—that is, as some “efficacious quality” or an 
“energy in the cause by which it operates on its effect” (1.4.7.5; SBN 266)—so that when 
pressed by Hume’s ‘Copy Principle’ to trace our idea of ‘power’ back to the impression 
that produces it, we must ultimately conclude that we have no “clear and determinate” 
idea of ‘power’ “so apply’d”—it is without meaning. (1.3.14.14; SBN 162, Hume’s 
emphasis)   
                                                     
178
 cf. EHU 7.3; SBN 61-2; T 1.3.14 passim; SBN 155-72. 
179
 cf. 1.3.14.22, 1.4.7.5; SBN 166, 266. 
115 
 
 
 
However, there is a sense in which Hume thinks we can ‘justly’ speak of an object 
possessing a ‘power’ or ‘strength’: as Hume puts it, “’tis more probable, that these 
expressions do here lose their true meaning by being wrongly apply’d , that that they 
never have any meaning.” (1.3.14.14; SBN 162, Hume’s emphasis) We can speak 
appropriately of an object’s possessing a ‘power’ where we ultimately mean only that in 
light of our past experience of some object or quality of an object producing some effect, 
we find our minds determined to some degree to expect some effect as a result of the 
perception of its cause.  In light of the meaning empiricism dictated by Hume’s ‘Copy 
Principle’, the referent of terms like ‘strength’ and ‘power’ must be some impression, and 
Hume famously locates the proper source impression of these ideas not in the object or in 
one of its qualities, but to that impression of reflection–that feeling of mental fixity or 
determination—which characterizes the customary transition of the mind in causal 
reasoning.
180
  
[I]t may be justly concluded, that power has always a reference to its exercise, 
either actual or probable, and that we consider a person as endow’d with any 
ability when we find from past experience, that ‘tis probable, or at least possible 
he may exert it…[N]othing can be more likely of itself, without any farther 
reasoning, than that power consists in the possibility or probability of any action, 
as discover’d by experience and the practice of the world. (2.1.10.6; SBN 313, 
first emphasis mine)
181
   
                                                     
180
 cf. 1.3.14.20-2; SBN 164-6, EHU 7.28; SBN 75-6. On the other hand, the ‘vulgar’ idea of power as 
some causal property present in an object is the result of the natural human tendency to project impressions 
that accompany our perceptions of objects onto the objects themselves.  (1.3.14.25, 1.4.7.5; SBN 167, 266, 
EHU 7.29n; SBN 77-8n) 
181
 I do not follow Jane McIntyre in taking this position on the ‘just’ sense of power in T 2.1.10 to represent 
any change in his position from T 1.3.14. (“Character: A Humean Account,” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 7.2 (1990): 193-206, 197-9.) Indeed, he repeats his T 1.3.14 claim that we cannot distinguish 
between a power and its exercise just a few paragraphs earlier at 2.1.10.4. (SBN 311) 
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“[N]either man nor any other being ought ever to be thought possest of any ability, unless 
it be exerted and put into action.” (2.1.10.4; SBN 311, my emphasis)  Thus, Hume 
allows, where we do have past experience of some object X producing some effect Y we 
can justly attribute to that object a “power” or “strength” to produce Y of a degree 
proportionate to the probability it will produce that effect.
182
  This “probability of its 
exercise” is the “very essence of power”. (2.1.10.10; SBN 315) And our idea of that 
power or strength refers simply to that feeling of the determination of the mind to infer 
the production of some effect from the existence of its cause.   
On Hume’s account, the same is true of the “strength” of the mind we attribute 
both to others and ourselves: in these cases, as Hume explicitly argues in the first 
Enquiry, the degree of “command” I may justly attribute to my mind over its ideas must 
be proportionate to my past experience of the “exercise” of that strength or power—that 
is, to my experience of the actual production of the effects to which it that cause is 
supposed to give rise (in this case, either the successful regulation of the imagination by 
reason, or the successful regulation of our conduct in the face of violent temptation).  
Indeed, it is from the “history of…the instances” of the exercise of our understanding that 
we determine its “strength” and “constancy”. (1.4.1.1; SBN 180)183 For instance, as 
                                                     
182
 cf. EHU 7.29 (SBN 77n). Though, of course, we may unjustly attribute ‘powers’ to objects in this sense 
as well—given that the attribution of powers is a product of our causal reasoning concerning an object, 
such attributions would also be subject to all of the caprices of “unphilosophical” forms of probability, such 
as poor analogical reasoning, and what Hume calls ‘prejudice’. (cf. 2.1.10.4-5, 10; SBN 311-12, 315)  For 
instance, because men generally employ their money to obtain the pleasures of life, riches are associated 
with pleasure.  Thus a miser may take pleasure in his own riches because he extends this general prejudice 
to himself and infers his own pleasure from his riches, even though he will never employ them to obtain 
such pleasure.   
183
 cf. T 1.3.14.12; SBN 633, EHU 7.16-9; SBN 67-9, especially EHU 7.18; SBN 68.  Our judgments of 
this relative strength and constancy (as well as the “reflex doubts” concerning the reliability of our 
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Hume writes, “[o]ur reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause, of which truth is the 
natural effect”. (1.4.1.1; SBN 180) Accordingly, given Hume’s analysis of dispositional 
qualities, the power we attribute to our understanding or reason in this regard is simply a 
function of the force with which we expect truth (the effect) when we employ our reason 
(the cause) in light of past observation.  Hume could have written something similar 
regarding that “strength” and “firmness” of the imagination, and the role I will argue it 
plays in motivation.  A “strong” imagination is simply one for which it is highly 
probable, as Hume would put it, that the philosophical principles of reasoning will prevail 
over the unphilosophical.  Similarly, “strength of mind”, Hume writes, “implies the 
prevalence of the calm passions over the violent”. (2.3.3.10; SBN 418, my emphasis)   
Thus, in order to understand what Humean “strength of mind” is, we must turn to 
an account of the basis on which we attribute such “strength” to a mind—that is, to an 
account of the effects we expect from a person who ‘possesses’ this strength or power as 
Hume accounts for them.  That is, we must anatomize the structure of a “strong mind” in 
the terms of Hume’s analytical framework in the Treatise.  This is the primary task I set 
myself in the remainder of this chapter.  As I noted above, and will elaborate in more 
detail below, I take Hume’s T 2.3.6-7 investigation of the causes of the relative vivacity 
of our ideas and the effects of that vivacity on the strength of our motivating passions to 
bear directly on an understanding of this crucial quality of mind because these sections of 
the Treatise bear directly on a deeper understanding of its effects: to have a “strong” mind 
is at bottom to possess what Hume calls in T 1.3 a “strong and firm imagination”, or in T 
                                                                                                                                                              
reasoning ability to which such reflection also gives rise) in their present and future exercise play a key role 
in Hume’s account of the origin of “scepticism of reason” in T 1.4.1. (cf. 1.4.1.1; SBN 180) 
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1.4, a “force of genius” sufficient to “free” one’s mind from “vulgar”, unphilosophical 
reasoning (1.4.3.9; SBN 223, my emphasis) and so from the influence of such reasoning 
on the passions.  And the degree of this force or strength, like the degree of any power, 
can be judged on the basis of past experience: strong mind have a high probability of 
resisting (or “freeing” oneself from) the influence of psychological distance and other 
“unphilosophical” influences on the vivacity of its beliefs, and so on the strength of their 
corresponding passions.     
Indeed, in the few passages in which Hume does speak of this strength, he clearly 
characterizes it as an ability of the mind to overcome the distorting effects differences in 
the relative psychological distance (particularly the relative spatiotemporal distance) of 
objects have on our motivating passions—it is, as Hume puts it, a quality of a mind that 
promotes the “steady” or constant pursuit of more “distant” ends and (it is implied, 
greater) goods in opposition to the allurements and solicitations of (lesser) “present 
pleasures”. (2.3.3.10; SBN 418, EPM 4.1, 6.15; SBN 205, 239-40)  As Hume argues in T 
2.3.6-7, the relationship between the psychological distance of the objects of our passions 
and the strength of those passions is mediated by the imagination and the vivacity of our 
ideas.  For this reason, I argue, Hume’s discussions of the role of psychological distance 
in determining the vivacity of our ideas in T 1.3-4, and of its related role in determining 
the strength of our motives in T 2.3.7, are crucial for insight into the nature of strength of 
mind as Hume conceives it in the context of his theory of motivation.   
Accordingly, my procedure in this chapter will be as follows.  First, I will attempt 
to sketch carefully Hume’s general account of the relationship between the vivacity of 
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our causal beliefs and the strength of our motivating passions.  As I argued above, it is 
only in this general context that we can gain any deeper insight into the nature and 
usefulness of the central Humean virtue of strength of mind.  Next, I will argue that we 
must turn both to Hume’s account of the effects of “unphilosophical” influences on the 
vivacity of our beliefs, in particular the effects of the relative “psychological distance” of 
hedonic objects on the relative strength of the passions they produce, as well as to his 
account of their “correction” by reflection and general rules, in order to gain this insight 
into the anatomy of a “strong mind” as one in which ‘the calm passions’ prevail.  As I 
will show below, ‘the calm passions’—those (typically calm) passions which are 
responsive the true value of objects on Hume’s account—are passions which arise as a 
result of the corrective influence of these general rules, and “strength of mind” conceived 
more fundamentally as what Hume calls a “strong and firm imagination”, is that quality 
of mind which ensures the “prevalence” of these passions.  
“Strength of mind” in this sense is a virtue “useful to oneself” for this reason.  
Indeed, the very feature of ‘the calm passions’ which makes them responsive to the ‘true 
value’ of objects also makes them typically weaker passions (hence, why forms of mental 
‘strength’ are needed to secure their “prevalence” over typically stronger, violent 
motives).  Their origin in general rules (or “a general prospect” or view of their objects) 
renders the vivacity of the ideas on which they are founded relatively less vivacious than 
those which are the product of more “natural”, but “unphilosophical” causal reasoning—
that is, ‘the violent passions’ (again, in the generic sense of (typically violent) passions 
which are “blind” and “deceitful” because based on an “unphilosophical” appraisals of 
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value).  Indeed, though ‘the calm passions’ are the products of the reflective reasoning 
which corrects for the distorting influence of psychological distance on our appraisals of 
value, the general, reflective reasoning which produces these passions is itself a form of 
‘psychological distancing’: as Hume explicitly and repeatedly characterizes them in the 
Treatise and elsewhere “founded on a distant view or reflection”.  Thus, the reflective 
beliefs on which ‘the calm passions’ are based are typically less vivacious than those on 
which ‘the violent passions’ are founded, giving them less influence on the will.  Indeed, 
the passions which are responsive to true value are called ‘the calm passions’ precisely 
because they are grounded in such psychological distancing.     
Accordingly, I will attempt to distill from Hume’s Treatise, Book I account of 
belief—particularly from key sections of T 1.3-4—a general Humean account of how 
“psychological distance” and other closely related forms of imaginative difficulty affect 
the vivacity of our beliefs, and show how this account is integrated into his theory of 
motivation in T 2.3.6-7 in order to demonstrate the wider importance of these latter 
sections of the Treatise to an understanding of this virtuous quality of mind.  As I will 
argue, Hume’s treatment of the effects of spatiotemporal distance on the imagination and 
passions in T 2.3.7 (as well as its continuation in T 2.3.8) is thus plausibly read as having 
much broader implications both for an understanding of the influence of psychological 
distance on the imagination and passions and for the mind’s “corrections” of this 
influence.  
Indeed, as I will argue in the following chapter, the doctrines of T 2.3.8 will also 
help clear up two important questions concerning the nature of Humean “strength of 
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mind”.  First, can the strength of the mind be cultivated in any way on Hume’s account, 
and if so, how Hume can explain its cultivation in light of the analysis developed in this 
chapter?  A preliminary answer to 1) can be gleaned from central role imaginative 
‘propensities’ and customs play in his T 2.3.7 account of the effects of psychological 
distance on vivacity.  Accordingly, in this chapter I will attempt to bring out this feature 
of Hume’s T 2.3.7 analysis.  However, I argue that it is in T 2.3.8 that Hume provides us 
with insights crucial to addressing this questions—a claim which I will develop more 
fully in the following chapter.   
Second, in light of Hume’s analysis of dispositional properties, Hume’s account 
faces very serious problems given that he also wants to attribute to the “strength” of the 
mind an explanatory role in his science of man.  For this reason, Hume risks turning 
“strength of mind” into a quality akin to the “faculties”, “substantial forms” and “occult 
qualities” of the ‘ancient philosophers’.  Given that our ascriptions of ‘strength’ and 
‘power’ or ‘force’ to an object mean nothing more on Hume’s account than that object 
has a certain probability of producing some effect, the mere ascription of a “power”, 
“force” or “strength” to an object explains nothing more than this probability.  As our 
observation of these effects is at the same time the only basis for our attributions of 
powers, such attributions can bear no explanatory weight at all on Hume’s account.184  
Thus, it would seem that to explain an individual mind’s ability to overcome or resist the 
influence of unphilosophical probability by citing its ‘strength’ is, to paraphrase Molière, 
to point to the ‘resistive quality’ it possesses—its ‘vis resitiva’.    Accordingly, we may 
                                                     
184
 cf. 1.4.3.10 (SBN 224). 
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rightly wonder how Hume can attribute to the “strength” of the mind such an important 
explanatory role in his theory of motivation in light of his analysis of dispositional 
powers.  Hume’s ingenious answer to this question, I argue, can be drawn from an 
analysis of T 2.3.8, which will be my aim in the following chapter.  Accordingly, I will 
take both of these issues up again at the end of this chapter, in order to set the stage for 
their resolution in the next. 
 
3.1 Causal Reasoning and the Hedonic Value of Objects 
Causal reasoning and the beliefs which it produces play crucial roles at the heart 
of Hume’s account of the production of our passions and the regulation of our conduct, 
and so at the heart of Hume’s intentions in the 1739 Treatise.  Both our judgments of an 
object’s value, as well as its existence are the products of causal reasoning, and the 
influence of both of these judgments on the passions is the product of causal belief.  My 
aim in this and the following section is to detail the nature and importance of causal 
reasoning and belief to Hume’s account of human motivation in order to pave the way for 
a discussion of how the “strength and firmness” of the imagination, which I have 
characterized as a crucial element of Humean “strength of mind”, is, along with causal 
knowledge, a pillar of Hume’s account of the successful regulation of our conduct.   
Passions, on Hume’s account, are “impressions of reflection” or “secondary 
impressions, impressions triggered in the soul by the prior presence of other perceptions 
in the mind: impressions and ideas of pleasure and pain. (2.1.1.1-2; SBN 275-6)
185 
 It 
                                                     
185Hume also notes the existence of certain desires that are “instincts originally implanted in our natures” 
(e.g. benevolence and resentment, hunger, lust). (2.3.3.8; SBN 417; cf. 2.3.9.8, 3.2.1.12; SBN 439, 481, 
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would be more accurate to say that on Hume’s account, desires and aversions are thus 
caused by perceptions of pleasure and pain, but are directed to or away from what we 
may call a ‘hedonic object’—any object or state of affairs that has or will have a hedonic 
impact on us (i.e. an object that has pleasure or pain “in prospect” for us): as Hume puts 
it, “’[t]is obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we 
feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace 
what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction.” (2.3.3.3; SBN 414, my emphasis)  
On Hume’s account, both impressions and ideas of pleasure and pain (or of “good 
and evil”, as he sometimes puts it) produce passions.186  Although an object may give rise 
to a desire or aversion when it gives us an immediate sense impression of pleasure or pain 
(e.g. the aversion to fire that arises just after it burns my hand), Hume does not have 
much to say about such motives, likely because he takes the role anticipation of future 
pleasure and pain play in regulating present and future conduct to be the more important 
role of perceptions of pleasure and pain, and such anticipation is the product only of 
                                                                                                                                                              
3.2.2.5; SBN 486) Such instincts, strictly speaking, are not responses to, but as Hume puts it productive of, 
pleasure and pain—that is, they are not impressions of reflection—and they “produce” pleasure and pain in 
the sense that their satisfaction is pleasurable and the denial of their satisfaction painful.  (2.3.9.8; SBN 
439)  Tito Magri, for instance, has argued that Hume’s discussion of these instincts in effect constitutes 
another model of motivation that becomes prominent in the second Enquiry.  (“Hume on  the Direct 
Passions and Motivation” 198-99)  However, I will not have much to say about these instincts in what 
follows, as it is clear, on my reading, that Hume took them to be far less interesting than ‘reflective’ desires 
and aversions from the standpoint of an anatomist of the mind.   Unlike Magri, I am not convinced that 
Hume’s theory of motivation in EPM is so fundamentally different from that offered in the Treatise, though 
his polemical anti-Hobbist intentions in Appendix 4 may bring to the importance of the conceptual 
distinction of such instincts (particularly benevolence) from our reflective passions to the fore.)  Indeed, on 
Hume’s account, these instincts, once satisfied, are subsequently guided by parallel desires which aim at 
both the pleasure of satisfaction, and at related pleasures like the beauty of the object of satisfaction. (cf. 
2.2.11 passim, 3.2.1.12; SBN 394-6, 481, “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature,” EMPL 85-6)  In 
this way, the operation of these instincts may fall more meaningfully under the knife of the anatomist of the 
mind.  
186
 cf. 1.1.2.1; SBN 7-8, 2.3.9.2; SBN 438, 2.1.1.2; SBN 275-6.  (For Hume’s equation of pleasure with 
good and pain with evil, see 2.1.1.4; SBN 276, 2.3.9.1; SBN 428, 2.3.9.8; SBN 439, 3.1.1.1; SBN 399.) 
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ideas. Indeed, passions, he tells us, “arise mostly from ideas” of pleasure and pain; again, 
this is the reason Hume’s treatment of ideas comes before his discussion of the passions 
in the Treatise. (1.1.2.1; SBN 7-8, my emphasis) As Hume writes, “This idea of pleasure 
or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and 
aversion…which may properly be called impressions of reflection, because derived from 
it.” (T 1.1.2.1; SBN 7-8, my emphasis; cf. 2.3.9.7; SBN 439)  
These ideas of pleasure and pain, moreover, are conveyed to us by causal 
reasoning: the value we attribute to objects are a function of their causal connections to 
pleasure and pain.
187
 There are two basic causal relations an object may bear to pleasure 
and pain, on Hume’s account: direct and indirect. (I will have cause later in the chapter to 
investigate more sophisticated examples of such relations.)  First, an object becomes for 
us what I will call a hedonic object primarily in the following way: when we have 
experienced pleasure or pain from an object in some constant, reliable way, we come to 
associate the idea of that object or state of affairs (as cause) with the idea of pleasure or 
pain of some degree as its direct or immediate effect—that is, when we come to 
recognize what I will call its direct ‘hedonic impact’.  And as the connection between any 
object and pleasure and pain is not a relation of ideas, but a causal relation or “matter of 
                                                     
187
Hume never offers us an explicit axiology, but his scattered statements do reveal a relatively 
sophisticated account of our judgments of value which I will attempt to sketch out over the course of this 
chapter.  I do not pretend to treat Hume’s theory of value exhaustively here—much more can be said about 
the nature of Hume’s hedonism.  For instance, questions concerning the extent to which Hume is rightly 
called a hedonist (on this point, see n. 185 above), and the precise nature of his hedonism is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  (For more thorough treatments of different aspects of Hume’s hedonism, see, e.g., 
Stephen Hudson, “Humean Pleasures Reconsidered,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5.4 (1975): 545-62, 
and P.J.E. Kail, Projection and Realism chs. 3-6.) On my own reading, Hume espouses a pluralist 
phenomenalism (he recognizes that pleasures are not homogenous, and that they can be differentiated by 
phenomenal feel (cf. 3.1.2.4; SBN 471-2)), as well as a quantitative hedonism—the view that the value of 
an object is determined by the quantity of the pleasure it produces (which quantity is a function of the 
durability and intensity of that pleasure).     
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fact”, like any matter of fact, our knowledge of it is a product not of a priori reasoning, 
but of experience.
188
 (2.1.6.9; SBN 293-4 (= DP 2.46), 3.1.1.12; SBN 439)  Thus, on 
Hume’s account, an idea of a hedonic object is a complex one, composed of a causal 
relation between an object and its hedonic impact—that degree of pleasure or pain it 
typically produces.  And where we come to attribute to any object a direct hedonic 
impact, that object becomes on Hume’s theory an “ultimate end” of action, the pursuit or 
avoidance of which admits of no further justification.
189
 (EPM App. 1.18-9; SBN 293)  
Moreover, an object may become the mediate object of a desire or aversion where 
it is an instrumental means to those hedonic objects which are the ultimate ends of our 
desires:  “’Tis also obvious, that this emotion [of desire or aversion] rests not” on the 
hedonic object which triggers that desire or aversion, “but making us cast our view on 
every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the 
relation of cause and effect.” (2.3.3.3; SBN 414)  Our desires and aversions for hedonic 
objects “extend themselves” by instrumental (causal) reasoning over all other objects 
                                                     
188
 Since the relation between an object and pleasure and pain is a causal one, our attributions of value will 
also be affected by the degree of perfection or strength of this causal relation, in turn affection the strength 
of our desires and aversions.  First, where the existence of a hedonic object is certain and so our belief in its 
existence is strong, but that object’s causal relation to pleasure or pain is not certain (e.g. the relative 
probability of that object actually producing that degree of pleasure or pain is less than 1), the strength of 
the resulting desire or aversion will be proportionally weaker than if the hedonic impact was certain.  
Second, since we may reason by analogy to the hedonic impact of an object of which we have no 
experience, the strength of the causal relation between that object and pleasure or pain will be subject to 
variations in the degrees of resemblance that object bears to objects of which we do have such experience: 
“An man, who has contracted a custom of eating fruit but the use of pears or peaches, will satisfy himself 
with melons, where he cannot find his favourite fruit; as one, who has become a drunkard by the use of red 
wines, will be carried almost with the same violence to white, if presented to him.” (1.3.13.8 SBN 147; cf. 
1.3.12.15; SBN 142) For the sake of simplicity, I omit these complications of Hume’s theory here and 
elsewhere, and assume a ‘perfect’ causal relationship between an object and its hedonic impact. 
189
 This does not mean, however, that the connection between an object and pleasure or pain cannot be the 
subject of debate and disagreement, though Hume is often read as advocating such a view.  Rather, it only 
means that the causal connection between and object and its direct hedonic impact is the final question that 
must be settled.   
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which are the means to them, giving us a derived, or what Hume calls a “secondary”, 
desire for or aversion to those means. (2.3.3.7; SBN 417; cf. EHU 5.22; SBN 55)  In 
either case, however, it is the casual connection (whether immediate or mediate) of any 
object to pleasure and pain that grounds a desire for or an aversion to that object. 
 
3.2 Casual Reasoning and the ‘Influence of Belief’ 
The other crucial role causal reasoning plays in the production of passions and the 
regulation of conduct is its role in producing our judgments concerning the existence of 
goods and evils not immediately present to our senses, and bestowing on those judgments 
by means of the belief it produces in that existence an influence on our will and passions. 
Again, on Hume’s account, passions “arise mostly from ideas,” but in order for the idea 
of a hedonic object (or of any object that is a means to it) to raise a passion, it must be a 
vivid or lively idea:   
This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the 
calm as well as the violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any 
considerable influence upon either of them.  ‘Tis too weak to take hold of the 
mind, or be attended with emotion. (2.3.6.10; SBN 427, my emphasis; cf. 
2.2.5.4; SBN 358-9) 
That is, any idea of a hedonic object must be what we may call a ‘hedonic belief’.190 Our 
ideas of hedonic objects only raise desires and aversions and influence our actions where 
                                                     
190
 Following Rachel Cohon. (Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, passim) The account I offer here 
of Hume’s theory of motivation is controversial, and though I must adopt it here without argument, I take 
the account I offer of the relationship between belief and motivating passions Hume sketches in T 2.3 to be 
in part a defense of its plausibility. (Of course, much more needs to be said than what is said in this chapter 
about how the account of motivation and the role belief plays in it I offer here coheres with Hume’s well-
known arguments against the motivational power of reason in T 2.3.3 and 3.1.1.)  In what follows, I adopt 
what Rachel Cohon has called the “Spontaneous Creation” view of the role played by hedonic beliefs on 
Hume’s theory of motivation. (Hume’s Morality, chapter 2) On this view, (hedonic) beliefs produce 
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we believe such objects do exist or will exist.  Belief has this effect “by making an idea 
approach an impression in force and vivacity”: as Hume notes in both the Treatise and 
first Enquiry, the vivacity of our ideas is that quality which gives our perceptions an 
“influence” on the will and passions: the “effect…of [hedonic] belief is to raise up a 
simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the 
passions.” (1.3.10.3; SBN 119-20, my emphasis)191  
The general importance of belief for conduct is most clearly illustrated in Hume’s 
Treatise, Book I discussion of the “influence of belief,” or the way in which “our 
reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions.” (1.3.10.3; SBN 
120)  The main aim of this important passage, Hume tells us, is to show why nature has 
established a “medium” in regard to the influence of ideas on our will and passions—that 
is, why nature “has neither bestow’d on every idea of good and evil the power of 
actuating the will, nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence” and allowed 
only impressions to influence us. (1.3.10.3; SBN 119)  There Hume writes, 
[P]ain and pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind; of 
which the one has effects very different from the other.  They may either appear 
in impression to the actual feeling and experience, or only in idea, as at present 
when I mention them.  ‘Tis evident the influence of these upon our actions is far 
from being equal.  Impressions always actuate the soul, and that in the highest 
degree; but ‘tis not every idea which has the same effect.  Nature has proceeded 
with caution in this case, and seems to have carefully avoided the 
inconveniences of two extremes.  Did impressions alone influence the will, we 
shou’d every moment of our lives be subject to the greatest calamities; because, 
tho’ we foresaw their approach, we shou’d not be provided by nature with any 
                                                                                                                                                              
motives, and do not simply guide an existing, dispositional desire for pleasure and aversion to pain to their 
proper objects (a common view Cohon deems the “Background Impulse View”). For another recent 
defense of a version of this un-“Humean” view of Hume’s account of motivation, see, e.g., Mikael 
Karlsson, “Reason, Passion, and the Influencing Motives of the Will”, in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s 
Treatise, ed. Saul Traiger (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006): 235-55, especially 246-52. 
191
 cf. 1.3.7.7; SBN 629, EHU 5.12; SBN 49-50. 
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principle of action, which might impel us to avoid them.  On the other hand, did 
every idea influence our actions, our condition wou’d not be much mended.  For 
such is the unsteadiness and activity of our thought, that the images of every 
thing, especially of goods and evils, are always wandering in the mind; and were 
it mov’d by every idle conception of this kind, it wou’d never enjoy a moment’s 
peace and tranquillity. (1.3.10.2; SBN 118-9; cf. EHU 5.6, 5.21-2; SBN 44-5, 
54-5)  
On Hume’s account, then, the main role of causal reasoning and the belief to which it 
gives rise is to extend our view beyond what he calls the “narrow scene” of our present 
impressions.  These impressions are by definition perceptions with great vivacity (and so 
are perceptions automatically attended with belief (cf. 1.3.5.7; SBN 86)).  For this reason 
these perceptions “always actuate the soul”.  However, the superior influence of present 
impressions can be a source of short-sightedness and error
192
, and, moreover, would 
necessarily be a source of such error if our ideas—the means by which we perceive the 
approach of future goods and evils, the means to secure or avoid them, and the good or 
bad consequences of our present actions—had no influence on or will and passions.  As 
Hume argues in both the Treatise and first Enquiry, the important effects of causal 
reasoning and belief, and the mental customs on which they are based, are precisely to 
extend our view of “reality” beyond the “narrow sphere of our memory and senses” and 
to give rise to what he describes as a “second system of realities” (cf. 1.3.9.3; SBN 108, 
my emphasis): “’Tis [causal reasoning] which peoples the world, and brings us 
acquainted with such existence, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the 
                                                     
192
What Hume elsewhere deems the “blindness” and “deceit” of our violent passions.  I will discuss this 
characterization of the violent passions in further detail later in this chapter. 
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reach of the senses and memory” and allows one to “paint out the universe in [one’s] 
imagination.”193 (1.3.9.3-4; SBN 107-8)   
 Moreover, as Hume implies in the key T 1.3.10 passage above, nature must also 
limit what ideas influence the will and passions to those introduced into the mind by 
causation as a constraint on what Hume elsewhere deems the natural “inconstancy” of 
our imagination
194, which is a product of the absolute “liberty…to transpose and change 
its ideas” which natural relations among our ideas “gently” (though do not absolutely) 
constrain. (1.1.3.4; SBN 10)  This natural tendency of our train of ideas to be “unsteady” 
and “wandering” when not guided by natural relations of causation would also pose a 
threat to our “peace and tranquillity” were every idea to have equal influence on the will: 
for, just as in the case where impressions alone influenced the will, we would in this case 
be blown this way and that by “gusts” of desire and aversion as a consequence of the idea 
of any hedonic object popping into our often inconstant mind.   
Natural relations of causation, on the other hand, convey the mind from present 
impression to ideas with a perceptible “constancy” and “fixity”, and it is by this means, 
Hume argues, that ideas introduced into the mind by causation attain a “solidity” and 
“reality” which distinguishes them both from those which are the mere offspring of the 
imagination, as well as those introduced into the mind by relations of contiguity and 
resemblance.
195, 196
 Though Hume allows that the natural relations of contiguity and 
                                                     
193
 cf. 1.3.2.2-3; SBN 73-4, EHU 5.12, 20; SBN 50, 54. 
194
 cf. 2.1.4.2, 2.2.4.10, 12; SBN 283, 356, 357. 
195
 The lively ideas inferred from present impressions by causation are “fixt and unalterable” and “each 
impression [on which we found a causal inference] draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place 
in the imagination, as something solid and real, certain and invariable.” (1.3.9.7; SBN 110; cf. “solidity 
and force” 1.3.10.6; SBN 121)  “The thought is always determin’d to pass from the impression to the idea, 
130 
 
 
 
resemblance enliven ideas and guide the mind from perception to perception with a 
certain degree of ‘regularity’ (cf. EHU 3.1; SBN 23, T Abs. 35; SBN 661-2), these 
relations of ideas lack the fixity and constancy of causation, an “imperfection” which is 
“very sensible in every single instance” of ideas introduced into the mind by these 
relations, and is increased “by experience and observation, when we compare the several 
instances we may remember, and form a general rule against reposing assurance” in 
these other forms of vivacity.  (1.3.9.6; SBN 110) Given our experience of the inefficacy, 
falsehood, and harm that result from influence of lively ideas which are not attended this 
felt fixity and determination, we come to form general rules against “reposing belief” 
such ideas, no matter the degree vivacity they may possess. (cf. 1.3.10.11-12; SBN 631-
2) Thus, it is because our causal beliefs are characterized by this fixity, solidity and 
constancy that they achieve that feeling of “reality” necessary for ideas of objects not 
                                                                                                                                                              
and from that particular impression to that particular idea, without any choice or hesitation. (1.3.9.7; SBN 
110)  “A cause traces the way to our thought, and in a manner forces us to survey such certain objects, in 
such certain relations”—we cannot survey two objects related by causation in any other light without a 
“sensible violence”. (1.3.11.4; SBN 125)  Causal beliefs have a “force and settled order, arising from 
custom” by which “they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, where are merely the offspring of the 
imagination.” (1.3.9.4; SBN 108)  cf. 1.3.7.7, 1.3.9.6, 1.3.9.17, 1.3.10.6, 1.3.11.4, 1.3.12.22, 2.3.6.3, 
3.2.2.26; SBN 628-9, 109-110, 116, 121, 125, 140, 425, 501, EHU 5.12; SBN 48-50.  Indeed, Hume argues 
that this very feeling or impression of determination is the only impression from which our idea of the 
“necessary connection” between causes and effect can be derived. (cf. 1.3.14 passim) Hume opposes this 
feeling of mental “fixity” or “determination” to a “looseness, which we feel in passing or not passing from 
the idea of one to that of the other” object. (2.3.2.2; SBN 408, my emphasis; cf. 1.3.7.8, 1.3.8.16, 1.3.9.9, 
1.3.9.16, 1.3.10.9, 3.3.1.13, 3.3.2.6; SBN 97, 106, 110, 116, 123, 580, 595)   
196
 The “constancy” of causal relations, of course, is very different from the “constancy” (i.e. absolute 
invariability) which the naturally “inconstant” imagination cannot attain.  However, its effect on the mind is 
the same: when our mind glides easily over ideas (strongly) related by causation, the movements of the 
mind in both cases resemble one another in the sense that they put the mind into similar “dispositions”: 
where ideas are related by causation of this sort, “the change of objects  is so easy, that the mind is scarce 
sensible of it,” so that its “disposition” when it “fixes constantly on the same object” is indistinguishable 
from its disposition when it “passes easily and insensibly along related objects.” (1.3.8.2; SBN 98-99; my 
emphasis)  Accordingly, the tendency to confuse these dispositions will be integral for Hume’s account not 
only of the belief in the continued and independent existence of certain objects (cf. 1.4.2.35, 35n.; SBN 
204), but also of the belief that a concatenation of closely related properties belongs to one, simple, self-
same material substratum. (1.4.3.2-5; SBN 219-21)   
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immediately present to the senses or memory to move the will and passions
197:  “…[O]ur 
passions always regard the real existence of objects, and we always judge of this reality 
from past instances”, that is, from custom, or causation. 198  
This “constancy” of causal relations is crucial for the regulation of conduct not 
only because it determines by means of the felt “fixity” of the transitions of the 
imagination which objects not present to sense or memory we will consider “realities” 
and so objects of the passions, but also because, unlike other relations of ideas, causation 
orders our ideas to correspond with the “course of nature”: as Hume puts it in the first 
Enquiry, causal reasoning gives rise to “a kind of pre-established harmony between the 
course of nature and the succession of our ideas” by which the “train” of our thoughts 
goes on “in the same train with the other works of nature.” (EHU 5.21; SBN 54-5)  
Relations of resemblance are not grounded in the spatiotemporal positions of their relata, 
and relations of contiguity are diffuse and irregular. Indeed, where we find a perfectly 
regular spatiotemporal relation between two objects in experience, we take it as an 
indication of a causal relation of some sort between them.  (1.3.2.2; SBN 74) However, 
causal relations have a ‘direction’, and are established by our past experience of strict 
spatiotemporal regularities among objects.  Thus, causal reasoning also puts our ideas of 
those objects “we regard as real and existent…in their proper [temporal] order and 
[spatial] situation.”  (2.3.7.2; SBN 428, my emphasis)  Thus, without this “harmony” of 
                                                     
197
cf.  T 13.10.10-11; SBN 630-2, Abs. §22 (SBN 654) Thus, Hume tells us, it is for this reason that causal 
reasoning is necessary for the operation of sympathy. (2.1.11.8; SBN 320) 
198
 cf. 2.1.10.6; SBN 313; cf. 1.3.10.5-6, 2.3.3.2; SBN 121, 413.  Annette Baier writes, “Hume links force, 
or vivacity-communicating power, with constancy.  A belief is a vivacious idea, and it is a constant answer 
given to the question it answers.  Causal association depends on constancy in past experience, and produces 
constancy in our mind-set.” (A Progress of Sentiments 7) 
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the train of our ideas and the order of nature, not only would “all our knowledge…[be] 
limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses”, but we would not be able “to 
adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or 
avoiding of evil.”  (EHU 5.21; SBN 54-5; cf. EHU 5.6; SBN 44-5)  
The importance of causal reasoning concerning the existence of hedonic objects 
for the regulation of conduct is then three-fold.  Causal reasoning 1) “extends” our view 
from present objects or states of affairs, on the basis of our past experience, to objects 
which will exist, including hedonic objects and the means to them, 2) orders our ideas of 
these objects to correspond with the “order of nature” so that we may effectively exert 
our power in attaining or avoiding them, and 3) gives these reflections, by means of the 
belief such reasoning produces, an influence on our will and passions comparable in 
influence to present impressions, so that we may be moved to take the proper steps in the 
present to attain or avoid those objects in the future.  In other words, causal reasoning 
makes possible not only the longer-term hedonic planning necessary for happiness, but 
also the influence of that planning on our present actions. 
 
3.3 “Unphilosophical Probability”, the Passions and the “Strength” of the 
Mind     
However, though causal reasoning and causal belief may be necessary for the 
prudent regulation of our conduct, even perfect causal knowledge will not always be 
sufficient to guide our conduct with any great degree of success on Hume’s account: 
though nature provides us the mechanism of casual reasoning and the belief it produces 
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as “principles of action” by which we may better regulate our conduct (1.3.10.2; SBN 
119), the mere possession of such principles does not guarantee their successful 
operation.  For, as Hume notes, causal reasoning and the beliefs it produces concerning 
both the existence and the value of hedonic objects are naturally subject to the influence 
of other principles of the mind which may ‘distort’ or otherwise hamper the proper 
formation of causal conjunctions and beliefs.  In order to regulate our conduct 
successfully, what is required in addition to the ability to reason causally, is a strong and 
firm imagination in the sense I in which I characterized it earlier—an ability to resist and 
“correct” for those influences on the vivacity of our causal beliefs which Hume deems 
“unphilosophical”, and to give these corrections greater influence on the imagination 
(and so on the passions). It is my aim in this section to elaborate Hume’s account of these 
sources of error—which he collectively terms “unphilosophical probability” in T 1.3—
and their effects on our beliefs concerning the future existence of hedonic objects, and 
ultimately on our conduct regarding those objects.   
As I note above, the insufficiency of the mere possession of a principle of causal 
inference for the successful regulation of conduct can be illustrated by attending to 
Hume’s T 1.3.13 account of “unphilosophical probability” which he defines as forms of 
causal reasoning which do not receive the “sanction” of philosophers as “reasonable 
foundations of belief and opinion”. (1.3.13.1; SBN 143) Forms of unphilosophical 
probability fall into two general types on Hume’s account.199 First, those in which causal 
                                                     
199
 In my account of unphilosophical probability here, I draw on the resources of more than just the four 
forms Hume explicitly lists in T 1.3.13 (entitled “Of unphilosophical probability”), that section on which 
most commentators narrowly focus in their treatment of this subject.  Indeed, though Hume explicitly lists 
four forms of unphilosophical probability at the beginning of that section, his discussion in the remainder of 
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relations are improperly formed between or attributed to two objects.  Examples of this 
type are the “artificial” connections between objects engendered by ‘education’ (1.3.9.19; 
SBN 117) or by the formation of ‘prejudices’ (general rules “rashly” formed (1.3.13.7; 
SBN 146-7)), or forms of what Hume calls ‘vulgar’ reasoning, such as the “superficial” 
causal reasoning described earlier in Chapter 1, in which one mistakes “accidental” 
features of objects for those “efficacious” properties which actually cause that object’s 
typical effects. (1.3.13.8-9; SBN 147-8)  The second general type of unphilosophical 
probability includes those forms which cause us to maintain an improper degree of belief 
in causal relations properly formed and established.  In this section, we will be primarily 
concerned with the latter form of unphilosophical probability as it relates to the strength 
of our beliefs concerning the future existence of hedonic objects, and the effects of this 
strength on the strength of the passions. An understanding of these effects of such forms 
of unphilosophical reasoning is of prime importance for a deeper appreciation of the role 
of what Hume calls the “strength” of the imagination as a key element of Humean 
“strength of mind”.   
This second species of unphilosophical probability is characterized generally by a 
‘disproportion’ between the ‘evidence’ for a belief and the relative strength of our assent 
to it.  When we reason philosophically in this sense, we “proportion our belief to the 
evidence” for the casual connection, that is, to the degree of the observed constancy of 
                                                                                                                                                              
the section clearly suggests that he intends “unphilosophical probability” to encompass far more than just 
these four forms, including the forms Hume discusses in T 1.3.9-10 and throughout T 1.4 and, I argue, 
again in T 2.3.6-7.  For a similarly “wide” approach to Hume’s concept of “unphilosophical probability”, 
see Robert Fogelin, Hume’s Skeptical Crisis 22 and Chapter 2.      
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the conjunction between two objects in past experience. (EHU 10.4: SBN 110-11)
200
  An 
unphilosophical ‘disproportion’ between the strength of our assent and the evidence of a 
belief is often the result of differences in the relative vivacity of our causal beliefs. 
Though all beliefs are vivacious ideas, not all beliefs are equally vivacious—and this is 
often true even in cases where two beliefs are equally probable or certain.  Indeed, even 
two causal beliefs which are perfectly certain and are the product of “infallible 
experience”, and admit of no opposite probability or doubt, may possess vastly different 
degrees of vivacity, since, as I will note in more detail below, there are many causes of 
the vivacity of our ideas beside natural relations of causation to present impressions.  Any 
of these sources of vivacity can cause a belief to achieve a vivacity far superior to other, 
equally certain causal beliefs, and so can ‘unphilosophically’ augment our conviction in 
that belief beyond its just ‘proportion’ to its degree of certainty or ‘evidence’.   
 Accordingly, given the relationship Hume posits between the vivacity of our ideas 
and the strength of our motives, unphilosophical causal reasoning and belief concerning 
the existence of hedonic objects have important consequences for the regulation of our 
conduct.  Earlier I noted that belief in the existence or reality of a hedonic object not 
present to the senses or memory—the vivacity of our idea of that object—was necessary 
to raise a desire for or aversion to it.  In addition, Hume concludes, given that vivacity is 
that feature of ideas of hedonic objects that gives them “influence” on our will and 
passions, that differences between passions can in significant part be attributed to 
differences in the vivacity of our ideas of their objects.  (cf. 1.3.10.3; SBN 119) This is 
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 cf. 1.3.11.13, 1.3.13.19; SBN 130, 153. 
136 
 
 
 
true of the relative strength of our desires and aversions, on Hume’s account: the force or 
strength of a motivating passion for any object will increase or decrease in proportion not 
only to 1) the degree of its hedonic impact, but also to 2) the vivacity of the (hedonic) 
belief regarding its existence—a claim implied throughout T 2.3.6-8 (e.g. 2.3.6.9; SBN 
427), but stated explicitly in T 2.3.7-8 and related passages elsewhere in the Treatise.
201
 
Indeed, Hume also claims in T 2.3.6 and elsewhere that differences in vivacity also 
account in significant part for the relative violence of passions as well: 
‘Tis remarkable, that the imagination and affections have close union together, 
and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the 
latter.  Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions 
become more violent; and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations. 
(2.3.6.1; SBN 424, my emphasis; cf. 1.3.13.10; SBN 148-9)  
As stated, Hume’s claims of a direct proportionality between vivacity and both the 
strength and violence of the passions may seem to pose a serious obstacle to a coherent 
Humean account of strong, calm passions. However, as I will note in the following 
chapter, this is not Hume’s final word on the matter, and though a more detailed answer 
to this particular difficulty will have to wait, we may point here to the role custom plays 
in gradually diminishing the initial violence of strong passion.  In the present discussion, 
however, I will be concerned mainly with Hume’s picture of the relationship between the 
vivacity of our ideas and the strength of our motives.   
As I noted just above, Hume’s general thesis regarding the relationship between 
vivacity and the passions in T 2.3.6-7 (and implied in T 1.3.10) is that all other things 
                                                     
201
 cf. T 1.3.8.3; SBN 99 (= EHU 5.15; SBN 51), 1.3.10.3, 1.3.13.10, 3.2.7.2; SBN 119, 148, 534.  It is 
remarkable that Hume never explicitly states that, ceteris paribus, we have stronger desires for greater 
goods (i.e. that the relative strength of our desire, ceteris paribus, is directly proportional to an object’s 
relative hedonic impact).  Perhaps it is too obvious a claim to have to state explicitly.  Regardless, this 
claim is clearly implied throughout the Treatise. (cf. 1.3.12.24, 3.2.7.2, 5; SBN 141-2, 534-5, 536-7)        
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being equal, the strength (and violence) of a desire for or aversion to an object is directly 
proportional to the vivacity of the idea of that hedonic object (that is, the strength of our 
belief in its present or future existence).
202
 (1.3.10.3; SBN 119; cf. 2.3.6.1; SBN 424)  
The general implications of this picture can be illustrated clearly by means of a simple 
case (of the sort often used in experiments in behavioral economics)—a binary choice 
between two objects, for each of which we have clear knowledge of its hedonic impact.  
Where we have judged the hedonic impact of these two objects to be equal, we will have 
a stronger desire for (or aversion to) the object whose present or future existence we 
conceive with the greater vivacity.  On the other hand, where our ideas of the present or 
future existence of any two objects are equally strong and vivid, we will prefer the object 
with the superior hedonic impact.  However, because both the vivacity of an idea of a 
hedonic object and our appraisal of its hedonic impact affect the strength of a desire, and 
because the vivacity of an idea of a hedonic object varies for reasons independent of our 
assessment of its hedonic impact, in certain instances an idea of object of inferior hedonic 
impact may achieve a level of vivacity which renders my desire for that inferior good 
stronger than my desire for a good which has a superior value, but is less vividly 
conceived.  
It is thus helpful to read Hume’s account of the relationship between vivacity and 
the strength of our motives an attempt to account for the deeper basis in human nature of 
                                                     
202
 Of course, our will cannot exert itself in obtaining past pleasures.  But where that past pleasure is recent 
in time and so “fresh” in the memory, any resembling future pleasure that may be obtained will (ceteris 
paribus) exert a superior influence on the will than one that lacks this advantage. (2.3.6.5; SBN 426) 
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what modern behavioral economists and decision theorists call “utility discounting”.203  
Hume’s underappreciated use of the metaphor of ‘leverage’ in T 2.3.3 and 3.2.7 to 
describe the effects of vivacity on the passions is helpful in illustrating this point.  The 
“circumstances” or “situation” of an object (2.3.3.6, 2.3.4.1, 3.2.7.5; SBN 416, 419, 
536)—Hume’s generic term for those factors which affect the relative vivacity of our 
hedonic beliefs—often greatly diminish the vivacity of the idea even of a object of great 
hedonic impact, and so its vivacity relative to the vivacity of ideas of other hedonic 
objects.  Accordingly, as Hume himself often characterizes the vivacity of our ideas as 
that characteristic which makes objects “weigh more in the thought” (1.3.7.7; SBN 629, 
my emphasis; cf. EHU 5.12; SBN 49), the superior vivacity of an inferior good often 
provides an object with what he calls a “counterballance” (3.2.7.3; SBN 535) to the 
effects of another object’s superior hedonic impact on the strength of our passions:  
A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to 
what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any 
thing more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight 
raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation. (2.3.3.6; SBN 416, my 
emphasis)
204
   
                                                     
203
 For other commentators who develop this connection in related ways, see Tito Magri, “Natural 
Obligation and Normative Motivation in Hume’s Treatise”, and Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New 
York: Clarendon Press, 1984), 158-9, 313-4.  For an appreciation of Hume’s relevant to modern decision 
theory, see, e.g., Andre Lapidus, “The Valuation of Decision and Individual Welfare: A Humean 
Approach”, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 17.1 (2010): 1-28, Ignacio Palacios-
Huerta, “Time-Inconsistent Preferences in Adam Smith and David Hume,” History of Political Economy 
35.2 (2003): 241-68, Gordon F. Davis, “Philosophical Psychology and Economic Psychology in David 
Hume and Adam Smith,” History of Political Economy 35.2 (2003): 269-304.  I take my own treatment 
here to be a significant expansion on these accounts.   
204
 In the context of T 2.3.3, the metaphor of the “leverage” of vivacity serves to illustrate a slightly 
different point concerning the “reasonableness” of passions (or, more properly, the opinions or beliefs that 
cause passions).  Leverage can negate the effects of the absolute weight of objects because it depends 
ultimately on factors external to determination of weight; at the same time, the efficacy of leverage in no 
way depends on violations of the law of gravity.   Similarly, because the influence of a hedonic object on 
the will is a function not only of our assessment of the relative hedonic impact of an object, but also of the 
relative vivacity of our idea of that object (i.e. of the strength of hedonic belief), and because, as I have 
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Later, in Treatise, Book III, Hume refers back to his treatment of the sources and effects 
of unphilosophical probability on the passions in T 2.3.6-7 and writes, 
It has been observ’d, in treating of the passions [i.e. in T 2.3.6-7], that men are 
mightily govern’d by the imagination, and proportion their affections more to 
the light, under which any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic 
value.  What strikes upon them with a strong and lively idea commonly prevails 
above what lies in a more obscure light; and it must be a great superiority of 
value, that is able to compensate this advantage.  (3.2.7.2; SBN 534-5, my 
emphasis)   
To borrow language from behavioral economics, Hume’s theory postulates “indifference 
points” (or “points of subjective equality”) at which the greater vivacity of one object 
(again, a consideration external to its hedonic impact) is sufficient to cancel out the 
effects of the superior hedonic impact of another object on the will and passions.  Beyond 
such points, there occurs what is called a “preference reversal”, in which (in Hume’s 
terms) a lesser, but more vividly conceived good is preferred to a greater, but more 
faintly conceived one.
205
  It is in this way that ‘unphilosophical’ differences in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
argued above, this vivacity is subject to many variations that have nothing to do with the accuracy of our 
causal reasoning regarding the existence, or hedonic impact of, or means to the objects of our passions, we 
may thus have a stronger desire even for an acknowledged lesser good where the vivacity of our ideas of 
that lesser good is greater to a sufficient degree.  One object may have a far greater absolute hedonic 
“weight” than another, but by the “advantage” of its “circumstances” or “situation” the object of lesser 
“weight” will give rise to a stronger desire and have stronger influence on our actions.  It is helpful to keep 
in mind that Hume took one of the most original claims of Treatise, Book I to be his theory that belief is a 
function of the feeling or emotion that attends the conception of an idea rather than an effect of some 
feature of its representational or intentional content: because vivacity has nothing to do with the 
representational content of an idea but is an emotion or an impression of reflection that characterizes the 
conception of that idea, neither vivacity nor its consequence—the relative strength and violence of a 
passion—have anything necessarily to do with the truth of a belief.  Indeed, vivacity, as an impression of 
reflection, represents nothing.  
205
 The term “preference reversal” means different things in different contexts within decision theory.  I use 
the term as it tends to be used in discussions of hyperbolic discounting and time-inconsistent preference, as 
a the “reversal” of a preference for a larger, later reward (an ‘LLR’) over a smaller, earlier reward (an 
‘SER’) to one for an SER over a LLR as the psychological distance of the rewards decreases.  (See, e.g. 
Kris N. Kirby and R.J. Herrnstein, “Preference Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward,” 
Psychological Science 6.2 (1995): 83-9.)  Derek Parfit seems to recognize the same point in different terms, 
though he presents it as a needed supplement to Hume’s theory.  (Reasons and Persons 159-60) 
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relative vivacity of our ideas of hedonic objects may ‘distort’ our preferences and lead to 
errors in our conduct which undermine the successful pursuit of our greater good.   
 
3.4 T 2.3.6-7: Sources of Unphilosophical Probability and the Passions 
An enumeration of such forms of unphilosophical probability and a discussion of 
their effects on the passions are Hume’s overall aims in T 2.3.6-7.  The unphilosophical 
‘disproportion’ between the vivacity of a belief and its ‘evidence’ is largely a result of the 
fact that there are many sources of the vivacity of our ideas besides their natural relations 
of causation to present impressions.  Indeed, T 2.3.6 reads like a précis of the 
“unphilosophical” influences of the vivacity of ideas Hume first discussed in T 1.3.10 
and 13, and an account of their augmentative effect on the strength and violence of our 
passions.
206
 The particular form of unphilosophical probability which will concern us 
most in this chapter, however, is the influence of the natural relations of contiguity and 
resemblance (particularly the former) on our causal beliefs.  Indeed, this influence of 
para-causal relations of ideas on our causal beliefs is a primary cause of an 
unphilosophical ‘disproportion’ between the evidence for the existence of an object, and 
the strength of our belief in its existence.  For, unlike some of the unphilosophical 
sources of vivacity Hume treats in T 1.3 and again in 2.3.6 (such as the eloquence of an 
orator or poet, or the relative “liveliness” of one’s own imagination), the “influence” of 
para-causal relations on the vivacity of our ideas is a universal influence on causal 
                                                     
206
 Compare 2.3.6.6-9 (SBN 426-7) with 1.3.10.4-9 (SBN 120-3) generally, and, in particular, 2.3.6.5 (SBN 
426) with 1.3.13.1 (SBN 143)  on the relative “freshness” of a memory, 2.3.6.7 (SBN 426-7) with 1.3.10.8 
(SBN 122-3) on eloquence, 2.3.6.8 (SBN 427) with 1.3.13.10 (SBN 148-9) on passion, and 2.3.6.9 (SBN 
427) with 1.3.10.8-9 (SBN 122-3) on a “lively imagination”. 
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beliefs, in that the operation of such relations is a “propensity” (1.4.2.41; SBN 208) 
natural to all minds, a “gentle”, but ever-present force on the transitions of the 
imagination that “cannot altogether [be] exclude[d]” from its influence on causal 
reasoning and the vivacity of causal belief.  (1.1.4.1, 1.3.9.6; SBN 10-11, 109)  
On Hume’s theory, causation is only one of the three natural relations which serve 
to associate ideas (including ideas of pleasure and pain) in our imagination and to enliven 
those ideas when related to present impressions.  Though, as I noted above, the other 
natural relations of ideas—contiguity and resemblance—cannot by themselves establish 
the reality of objects beyond our impressions of sense and memory on Hume’s account, 
they can augment or diminish the vivacity of causal beliefs, including hedonic beliefs.  
Where these para-causal relations are “united to” or have “a parallel influence” on that of 
causation (1.3.9.10; SBN 112), they serve to “augment the conviction of any opinion” 
established by causal reasoning (1.3.9.8; SBN 110, my emphasis), and assist causal 
reasoning by “painting out” its conclusions in more lively colors: 
As to the influence of contiguity and resemblance, we may observe, that if the 
contiguous and resembling object be comprehended in this system of realities, 
there is no doubt but these two relations will assist that of cause and effect, and 
infix the related idea with more force in the imagination. (1.3.9.5; SBN 109, my 
emphasis)
207
 
On the other hand, Hume notes, where there is a “want of [these relations] in any great 
degree”, that lack is “able almost entirely to destroy” causal beliefs. (1.3.9.13; SBN 114, 
my emphasis; cf. 1.3.13.1; SBN 143)  Accordingly, the effect of contiguity and 
                                                     
207
 As Hume remarks in T 1.3 in the case of contiguity, for instance, “’Tis certain, that distance diminishes 
the force of every idea, and that upon our approach to any object; tho’ it does not discover itself to our 
senses; it operates upon the mind with an influence that imitates an immediate impression. (1.3.8.5; SBN 
100, my emphasis; = EHU 5.17; SBN 52)   
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resemblance on causal belief is one of the chief subjects of the later sections of T 1.3 (as 
well as much of T 1.4).  In T 2.3.6-7, Hume aims to integrate important parts of his T 1.3-
4 account of the “unphilosophical” influence of para-causal natural relations of ideas on 
our causal beliefs into his T 2.3 theory of motivation, in order to examine the deeper 
causes of their influence as well as its effects on our motivating passions. 
The influence of the relation of resemblance on hedonic belief is treated briefly in 
T 2.3.6 (2.3.6.5-6; SBN 426), but it is the natural relation of spatiotemporal contiguity 
that comes to the fore in T 2.3 as the subject of an extended treatment in T 2.3.7.
208
 In 
that section, Hume will investigate “why every thing contiguous to us, either in space or 
time, shou’d be conceiv’d with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other 
object, in its influence on the imagination” (2.3.7.1; SBN 427), and the consequences of 
this superiority in vivacity for the relative strength of our passions.  Because Hume seems 
only to treat the effects of spatiotemporal contiguity on the imagination and passions in T 
2.3.7, however, it has seemed to many commentators that Hume is treating yet another 
“remarkable” or “curious” phenomenon of human nature in a “desultory” T 2.3.4-8 
treatment of the causes and effects of the relative violence of passions.  Indeed, it is this 
feature of T 2.3.7-8 that seems to have obscured their significance to Hume’s wider 
Treatise account of the relationship of belief to motivation and the successful regulation 
of our conduct in the pursuit of happiness.  However, though the influence of 
spatiotemporal relations on the vivacity of our causal beliefs is one among the many 
                                                     
208
 Of course, the influence of contiguity in space and time on the will and passions was already mentioned 
by Hume at T 2.3.3.6 and 2.3.4.1. (SBN 416, 419) T 2.3.7 represents his elaboration of that part of what I 
deemed in the Introduction his T 2.3.4.1/2.3.8.13 “program”. 
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unphilosophical sources of the vivacity of our ideas which may give certain objects 
greater relative “weight” in the mind, the influence of spatiotemporal relations is not 
merely one among many such unphilosophical influences.      
First, unlike other unphilosophical sources of vivacity (including natural relations 
of resemblance) spatiotemporal relations play an absolutely essential role in Hume’s 
account of causal relations, and so in causal reasoning generally.  Indeed, as I indicated 
earlier, a causal relation on Hume’s well-known account is in large part an invariable and 
ordered spatiotemporal relation between two objects: on Hume’s definition of cause, a 
cause is “an object precedent and contiguous” to some other object (its effect), where, in 
addition, our ideas of these objects are constantly conjoined in experience, and the 
appearance of one naturally determines the mind to conceive the other.
209
  Causes, then, 
must not only be constantly conjoined with their effects in experience, but must precede 
their effects in time, and be contiguous to them in time and space in the case of extended 
objects (1.3.2.5-11, 1.3.15.3-4; SBN 75-77, 173), and in time in the case of non-extended 
objects such as our “passions and moral sentiments”.210 (cf. 1.4.5.8-13; SBN 235-6) 
“Remote” (non-contiguous) causes may meaningfully be called ‘causes’ only because 
there is a gapless (spatio)temporal causal chain that links that remote object by causation 
                                                     
209
 As Hume notes in relation to contiguity, “There is nothing in any objects to perswade us, that they are 
either always remote or always contiguous; and when from experience and observation we discover, that 
their relation in this particular is invariable, we always conclude that there is some secret cause, which 
separates our unites them” (1.3.2.2.; SBN 74, Hume’s emphasis), or, to put it more clearly, we conclude 
that they are causally related in some way.  
210
 Interestingly in the case of our passions and sentiments, Hume there argues that in addition to contiguity 
in time to bodily causes or effects, we tend (illicitly) to attribute to our passions and sentiments spatial 
locations contiguous to those bodily events in order to satisfy the imagination.  In the Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, Hume drops reference to spatiotemporal contiguity in his definitions of cause 
(though priority in time is still implied).  (cf. EHU 7.29; SBN 76-7) As my concern here is Hume’s doctrine 
in the Treatise, I shall not comment on the differences between it and the Enquiry on causation. 
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to some other cause (properly so-called) that is proximate in (space and) time to the 
ultimate effect.
211
  Thus, since causation alone grants an object that “reality” and 
“solidity” necessary for its influence on the passions, and since (spatio)temporal 
contiguity and temporal succession are constituent parts of the essence of a causal 
relation such that causal reasoning always carries the imagination over at least a temporal 
distance, it is fitting that Hume makes the influence of spatiotemporal relations on causal 
belief the primary focus of his wider theory of the influence of belief on motivation.  
Indeed, as I will show below, T 2.3.7 is directly concerned with the effects of 
spatiotemporal contiguity and temporal succession—two essential features of our ideas of 
‘cause’ and ‘effect’—on the vivacity of our hedonic beliefs. 
In addition, as I suggested earlier, it is crucial to note is that “distance” need not 
and, in the wider context of T 2.3 I would argue, ought not to be conceived very narrowly 
as spatiotemporal distance.  Rather, I argue, Hume is attempting in T 2.3.7-8 to account 
in terms of spatiotemporal distance for a more general phenomenon central to his theory 
of relationship between belief and the passions—the effects of what I have called 
“psychological distance” on our hedonic beliefs.  One of the prominent forms 
“psychological distance” takes is the ‘unphilosophical’ influence of para-causal relations 
of ideas (including spatiotemporal distance) on our hedonic beliefs.  Distance is, strictly 
speaking, a spatiotemporal relation.  However, throughout the Treatise, Hume uses 
“distance” as a metaphor for a lack of a strong relation of whatever kind between two 
                                                     
211
 For Hume, there can be no “action at a distance”. (cf. 1.1.4.3; SBN 11)  On this point, and the historical 
context of Hume’s adoption of this principle, see Rosenberg and Beauchamp, Hume on the Problem of 
Causation, chapter 4.  Hume’s account of causation has been criticized on this point, but this “gaplessness” 
will be important to his account of the effects of spatiotemporal relations of hedonic objects on the strength 
of our passions in T 2.3.7-8. (cf. 2.3.7.2; SBN 428)      
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objects, whether it is the relation of spatiotemporal contiguity, or of resemblance or 
causation.  As Hume pointed out at the very start of Treatise, Book I, while distance is a 
philosophical relation—that is, it “will be allow’d by philosophers to be a true relation, 
because we acquire an idea of it by the comparing of objects”—“distance” is also 
commonly used to mean the very opposite of “relation”.  Strictly speaking, “difference” 
rather than “distance” is the negation of relation (1.1.5.10; SBN 15), but we nevertheless 
say “in a common way” that “nothing can be more distant than such or such things from 
each other, nothing can have less relation; as if distance and relation were incompatible.” 
(1.1.5.1; SBN 14, Hume’s italics)  Thus, objects can also bear a “close” or “distant” 
resemblance.
212
 Similarly, Hume often characterizes causal relations in terms of 
                                                     
212
 One of Hume’s more interesting uses of the metaphor of “distance” in relation to resemblance, for 
instance, is his well-known treatment of the “missing shade of blue” in T 1.1.1.  There he writes, “Let all 
the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be plac’d before him, descending gradually from 
the deepest to the lightest, ‘tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be 
sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any other.” (T 
1.1.1.SBN 6, my emphasis) In this case, the colors are arranged in relations of contiguity on the basis of 
their resemblance, and the “distance” between them varies proportionately with the degree of their 
resemblance.  Hume’s treatment of the passions of respect and contempt in T 2.2.10 provide what is 
perhaps the clearest use of this metaphorical use of “distance” in the case of resemblance.  There, Hume 
employs this very metaphor in accounting for “why we commonly keep at a distance such as we contemn, 
and allow not our inferiors to approach too near even in place and situation.” (2.2.10.9; SBN 292-3, my 
emphasis)  To account for this, Hume draws on his theory of a “compound effect” that gives rise to our 
esteem for the rich as well as to their own vanity, noting as he did in his account of malice and envy in T 
2.2.8.4, that “almost every kind of idea is attended with some emotion, even the ideas of number and 
extension, much more those of such objects as are esteem’d of consequence in life, and fix our attention.” 
(2.2.10.9; SBN 393)  The rich man, to use a term from taken our explanation of the Humean “centers of 
ideational gravity” above, is “of considerable moment.”  Because of this compound effect we cannot “with 
entire indifference…survey either a rich man or a poor one, but must feels some faint touches, at least, of 
respect in the former case, and of contempt in the latter.” (2.2.10.9; SBN 393)  When a poor man is in close 
proximity to a rich one, the relation of contiguity causes a corresponding relation in the passions, giving 
rise naturally to a comparison which is, because of the great contrariety of the passions roused, is “uneasy”.  
The lack of resemblance is the reason why, by this natural principle of the imagination, the rich keep an 
actual distance from the poor (and vice versa), in order to reinforce one difference (non-resemblance, 
contrariety) by another (non-contiguity), in order to avoid the naturally uneasy comparison—that is, we 
reinforce the difference by a distance.  Thus, “any great difference in the degrees of any quality is call’d a 
distance by a common metaphor, which, however trivial it may appear is founded on natural principles of 
the imagination.” (2.2.10.10; SBN 393; cf. 2.1.9.10, SBN 307)  The “natural principle” of the imagination 
that gives rise to the metaphor seems to be the very tendency to take resembling objects as identical that 
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“distance”: relations of cause and effect in nature are “esteemed near or remote, 
according to the number of connecting causes interpos’d betwixt” them (1.1.4.3; SBN 11-
12), and a “distant” end or object on Hume’s account is often to be understood as one 
between which and oneself there are interposed a large number of instrumental ends 
related to each other by causal relations of power. (As Hume notes, hedonic objects often 
“approach” us in the sense of coming within one’s more immediate power. (2.1.10.8-9; 
SBN 314-5))
213
 Accordingly, Hume uses the phrase “close relation” to describe a strong 
or direct relation of ideas of any sort
214, and “distance” and related terms provide Hume a 
convenient metaphor under which he can subsume these diverse but related phenomena.  
Accordingly, in what follows, I will group these forms of relational “distance” 
under the common heading, “psychological distance”, borrowed from contemporary 
behavioral economics and social psychology of which Hume is clearly an early ancestor.  
Indeed, in just the same way that Hume groups many of the variables which determine 
the strength of our desires under the common idea of “distance” of an object from oneself 
and one’s present concerns, so too do contemporary behavioral economists describe the 
variables that determine the discount rate as forms of relative “psychological distance”, 
and parse that “distance” most frequently as distance  in time, but also as distance in 
                                                                                                                                                              
explained the rationalists’ confusion of reason and calm passions: a “great difference inclines us to produce 
a distance.  The ideas of distance and difference are, therefore, connected together.  Connected ideas are 
readily taken for each other; and this is in general the source of the metaphor…” (2.2.10.10; SBN 393) 
213
 Property is a causal relation because which gives the property owner power over the object.  (3.2.3.7; 
SBN 506) Blood relations, as well as relations of interest and power between two agents, are also causal 
relations which Hume often describes in terms of “closeness” and” remoteness”.  See also T 3.3.1.18 (SBN 
583), where Hume implicitly equates a “distant” object with something that “in no way redounds to [one’s] 
particular benefit.”  Two more of the obvious uses of the metaphor of “distance” in relation to causation are 
T 1.3.13.3 (SBN 144) and T 2.1.9.5 (SBN 306), where he speaks of the “distance or nearness of the 
relation” of causation, and its effect on the indirect passions.  
214
 In regard to “close” relations of causation, see, 1.1.4.3, 2.1.6.2, 2.1.10.1, 2.2.9.6-8; SBN 11-2, 291, 309, 
383, and of resemblance, see 1.2.5.14, 1.2.5.19; SBN 58, 60.  
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space, as “social distance” (“distance” in blood relations, relations of interest or power 
for which Hume accounts in terms of causal relations, or race and nationality, for which 
Hume accounts in terms of resemblance relations), and even as degrees of uncertainty or 
probability of outcome (what is called “hypothetical distance” (e.g. “long shots” and 
“remote possibilities”)).  Accordingly, talk of psychological “distance” is often deemed a 
“common currency” or “unifying construct” for discussion of these factors in decision 
theory.
215
 As I will show later in this chapter, not only does Hume’s T 2.3.7 account of 
the phenomenon of utility discounting share this feature with contemporary discussion of 
discounting in terms of the effects not only of various forms of “psychological distance”, 
but also of the relative ‘ease’ and ‘facility’  with which we conceive future goods, is a 
clear forerunner of recent explanations of discounting, particularly those which account 
for the time-inconsistency of preferences in terms of the relative “cognitive 
fluency”216and imaginative “effort”217 with which we conceive ideas of hedonic objects. 
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 For a useful summary of “psychological distance” (accounting for its effects in the framework of 
Construal-Level Theory, Hume’s anticipation of which I will discuss below ), see N. Liberman,, Y. Trope, 
& E. Stephan, “Psychological Distance”, in Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles, eds. A. W. 
Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 353-81, and especially Trope and 
Liberman, “Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance,” Psychological Review 117.2 (2010): 440-
63.    
216
 See, e.g., Adam L. Alter and Daniel M. Oppenheimer, “Effects of Fluency on Psychological Distance 
and Mental Construal,” Psychological Science 19.2 (2008): 161-7.  Alter and Oppenheimer conclude that 
“disfluently processed stimuli feel more psychologically distant than fluently processed stimuli, and 
consequently are judged as farther away and perceived more abstractly.” (“Effect of Fluency on 
Psychological Distance” 166) As we will note below, this is one of Hume’s central theses in his account of 
motivation in the Treatise.  Hume, however, takes distance to be a form of difficulty as well, but notes that 
we often take objects more difficult to conceive as being more distant. (2.3.7.9; SBN 431-2)  See also, C. J. 
Wakslak, “The Where and When of Low and High Probability Events”, Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 117 (2012): 150-157, and Y. Bar-Anan, N. Liberman, Y. Trope, and D. Algom, 
“The Automatic Processing of Psychological Distance: Evidence From a Stroop Task”, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 136 (2007): 610-622. 
217
 Indeed, John Rae’s The Sociological Theory of Capital which is considered a founding statement of 
time-discounting in economic contexts, was greatly influenced by Hume in this regard.  Because of the 
general shortness of human life and the uncertainty of its duration in any person’s particular case, a “mere 
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It is important to our prospects for a clearer understanding of Humean strength of 
mind that T 2.3.7’s discussion of spatiotemporal distance on the imagination and 
passions can be read as a sort of shorthand account of the effects of psychological 
distance generally on the passions and conduct.  For, on my reading, Hume offers us in T 
2.3.8 the only explicit account in his corpus of the mechanisms by which the imagination 
                                                                                                                                                              
reasonable regard to [one’s] own interest” would give the present a value “far above the future, in the 
estimation of most men.” “But it is besides to be remarked, that such pleasures as may now be enjoyed, 
generally awaken a passions strongly prompting to the partaking of them.  The actual presence of the 
immediate object of desire in the mind, by exciting the attention, seems to rouse all the faculties, as it were, 
to fix their view on it, and leads them to a very lively conception of the enjoyments which it offers to their 
instant possession.  The prospects of a future good, which future years may hold out to us, seem at such a 
moment dull and dubious, and are apt to be slighted, for objects on which the daylight is falling strongly, 
and showing us in all their freshness just within our grasp.  There is no man perhaps, to who a good to be 
enjoyed to day, would not seem of very different importance, form one exactly similar to be enjoyed twelve 
years hence, even though the arrival of both were equally certain.” (54) Also, the effort associated with 
delaying provides another stimulus to consume present goods: “to spend is easy, to spare, hard.”  On Rae’s 
importance in the development of the Discounted Utility Model of intertemporal choice, see Shane 
Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue, “Time Discounting and Time Preference: a Critical 
Review,” Journal of Economic Literature 50 (2002): 351-401, 351-3.  See also Dictionary of Political 
Economy, ed. Robert H.I. Palgrave, 3 Vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901), I:592-4, where it 
is argued that it is Locke and Hume that are the forerunners of Rae in this regard.  Another important figure 
here is Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk: “Provision for the future makes no inconsiderable demands on our 
intellectual strength; makes some demands, even, on our moral strength; and these demands are not equally 
met at all stages of civilization.  The present always gets its rights.  It forces itself upon us through our 
senses.  To cry for food when hungry occurs even to a baby.  But the future we must anticipate and picture.  
Indeed, to have effect on the future, we must form a double series of anticipations.  We must be able to 
form a mental picture of what will be the state of our wants, needs, feelings, at any particular point of time.  
And we must be able to form another set of anticipations as to the fate of those measures which we take at 
the moment with a view to the future.” (The Positive Theory of Capital [1891], trans. William Smart 
(Freeport, NY: Books for Library Press, 1971), 244, my emphasis)  This effect of our double anticipation 
on our time-discounting is a function of our “knowledge of causal processes”, which enables us to form 
“adequate picture[s] of the forms which goods will take”, but how and how long it will take to procure 
them.  Success in “anticipating” or imagining these things will affect the rate at which we discount their 
value. (244)  It takes “effort” to form these images of our anticipated ends, and the means to them. (269)  
More recently, Becker and Mulligan have argued similarly that the imaginative capacity of 
individuals influences their respective discount rates.  They argue that we need to “spend resources to make 
future consumption seem less remote and therefore to receive greater weight in current period decisions”, a 
process they call “patience formation.” (G. Becker and C. Mulligan, “The Endogenous Determination of 
Time Preference," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112.3 (1997): 729-758, 733) The model they have 
proposed is based precisely on the “vividness” of the image of pleasure or utility in one’s imagination. 
(733)  Humans can spend resources to build “imagination capital”—capital which can be employed to 
reduce the discounting of the future (by increasing its “propinquity”), such as spending on education. (735-
6) (For Hume’s appreciation of this point, see “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion” EMPL 3-8, 
especially 5-8, and  “Of the Study of History”, EMPL 563-8, especially 565-8)  
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runs against its natural and unphilosophical propensities to favor psychologically 
proximate objects, and thereby strengthens our passions for “distant” goods. For this 
reason, T 2.3.7-8 present us with the best prospect for a Humean account of the role the 
“strength” of the imagination plays in explaining the prevalence of ‘the calm passions’. 
However, before turning to an account of T 2.3.7 later in this chapter, and to T 
2.3.8 in the next, it is important to note that this is not yet even the full extent of the 
importance of psychological distance to Hume’s theory of motivation.  My aim in the 
next part of this chapter is to make clearer the centrality of “distance”—both in the 
straightforward sense of spatiotemporal distance, and in the richer sense of what I earlier 
called “psychological distance”—to Hume’s theory of deliberation and motivation, in 
order to make clearer the reasons Hume has not only for choosing a discussion of the 
effects of spatiotemporal relations on the passions as the primary vehicle for the 
integration of his T 1.3-4 account of “unphilosophical probability” into that account in T 
2.3, but for couching his discussions of the central Humean virtue of “strength of mind” 
in terms of an ability to resist and correct for the effects of forms of such “distance” on 
our passions and conduct.  Now that we have treated those propensities of the mind that a 
“strong mind” resists, we may turn to an account of the means by which it resists them: 
the formation of general rules, and their products, ‘the calm passions’. 
 
3.5 General Rules and ‘The Calm Passions’: the Correction of the Influence 
of “Psychological Distance” on Conduct 
There is no quality in human nature, which causes more 
fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to 
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prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote, and 
makes us desire objects more according to their situation 
than their intrinsic value. (3.2.7.8; SBN 538) 
   “Distance”—both “psychological distance” in general, and spatiotemporal 
distance in particular—is at the heart of Hume’s class distinction between ‘the calm 
passions’ (those (typically calm) passions which are responsive to what Hume calls the 
“real value” of objects) and ‘the violent passions’ (those (typically violent) passions 
which “blind” and “deceive” us concerning the true value of objects).  It is my aim in the 
following sections to make clear the importance of “distance” in all its various forms to 
this crucial distinction and the role it plays in a Humean account of the successful 
regulation of conduct.  First, as I will elaborate in more detail below, ‘the calm passions’ 
are motives which are produced by our imaginative corrections primarily for those 
variations in the spatiotemporal distance of hedonic objects which distort our appraisals 
of their value.  As I argued earlier, this distorting effect is the result of “unphilosophical” 
variations in the vivacity of our ideas of hedonic objects caused by these variations in 
spatiotemporal distance.  On Hume’s account, the imagination can correct for these 
variations by means of “general rules”, and ‘the calm passions’ are those passions which 
are the products of these imaginative corrections.  Second, however, Hume repeatedly 
characterizes ‘the calm passions’ as passions “founded on some distant view or 
reflection”. (T 3.3.1.18; SBN 583, my emphasis) In one sense, this second claim is rather 
straightforward in light of what I have already said regarding Hume’s T 2.3.6-7 account 
of the relationship between the vivacity of our hedonic beliefs and the violence of our 
passions: hedonic objects conceived faintly, such as those which are distant in space and 
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time, will give rise to weak passions that are also calm (in the adverbial sense of ‘of a low 
emotional intensity’).  However, it is not yet clear why passions that arise on such 
“distant views” of hedonic objects should at the same time generally be generally to their 
true value.  In what follows, I will attempt to elaborate the psychology which undergirds 
these claims, as this is crucial to an appreciation of the nature of ‘the calm passions’ and 
their role in the regulation of our conduct. 
Regarding the role ‘the calm passions’ play in correcting for the 
“unphilosophical” influence of variations in spatiotemporal contiguity on our 
preferences, it will be necessary to turn first to Hume’s account of the imaginative 
corrections we make to our unphilosophical beliefs.  
What Hume says regarding these corrections is sparse, but, as I noted above, he 
famously argues that the regulation of these influences on belief is achieved by the 
contrary influence of what he calls “general rules”.  General rules are of two basic types 
on Hume’s account: first, some general rules are simply empirical or inductive 
generalizations regarding objects of experience (e.g. ‘French cheeses are delicious’, or, to 
use Hume’s example, ‘Irishmen lack wit’. (1.3.13.7; SBN 146)) The second type of 
general rules, however, are higher-order empirical generalizations which we may call 
‘reflective rules’, because they have as their objects the operations of our minds (both of 
our imagination and our passions) and the epistemic and prudential consequences of 
these operations.   
The roles played by such reflective rules throughout Hume’s ‘science of man’ 
exhibit a general pattern: the human mind is subject to certain natural influences and 
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propensities, which lead to errors in belief and conduct when they are allowed to go 
uncorrected.  However, the human mind also naturally possesses the ability to take stock 
of these errors and their causes, and on the basis of this reflection form general rules 
which correct these natural propensities.
218
  In this way, for instance, the natural strength 
of human avidity for acquiring material goods, which, when uncorrected, leads directly to 
violent conflict, is “redirected” by the influence of the general rules of justice. (3.2.2.12-
4; SBN 491-3)  Upon reflection of the detrimental consequences of the unrestricted 
operation of this passion, we come naturally to restrain it by adhering to these shared 
rules. In a similar fashion, the natural propensity human beings have to expressions of 
pride, which when uncorrected leads to discord in our social interactions, is corrected by 
the “rules of good breeding” or manners. (1.3.13.15, 3.3.2.10-11, 14; SBN 567, 151-2, 
597-9, 600)  (We will have occasion to take note of other roles general rules play in the 
regulation of our passions below.) 
The case is the same for the operations of our imagination in causal reasoning—
the “unphilosophical” operations of the imagination are “corrected” by reflective rules 
“form’d on the nature of our understanding and on our experience of its operations in the 
judgments we form concerning objects.” (1.3.13.11; SBN 149; cf. 1.3.15.11; SBN 175) 
Indeed, as Hume argues, all forms of unphilosophical causal reasoning and belief can be 
corrected only by the influence of such reflective rules. (1.3.13.12; SBN 150)  On 
Hume’s general account of the formation of these rules, the mind naturally reflects on or 
                                                     
218
 I draw here on Thomas K. Hearn Jr.’s classic discussions in “‘General Rules’ in Hume’s Treatise,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 8.4 (1970): 405-22, and, in particular, “General Rules and the Moral 
Sentiments in Hume's Treatise” 60.  I borrow the term “reflective rules” from his work. 
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takes a “review” of our first-order (‘uncorrected’) beliefs and reasoning tendencies, and 
by observation and experience of the epistemic failures or successes that result from 
them, forms mental biases for or against them.  As I noted earlier, for Hume, “[o]ur 
reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect”. 
(1.4.1.1; SBN 180)  Thus, reflective rules, like all causal relations, are mental customs or 
habits which are formed on the basis of our reflective observation of the degree of 
constancy with which truth is conjoined with certain operations or tendencies of the 
imagination.  Where an operation is constantly conjoined with falsehood and epistemic 
failure, the mind naturally forms a bias against these operations which serve (and “ought 
always” to serve219) as a kind of “check or control” on them. (1.4.1.1; SBN 180)   
However, each of “unphilosophical” propensities of the mind remains a natural 
bias of the mind in that each “never fails to take place.” (1.3.13.2.; SBN 143)  Thus, our 
unphilosophical and our philosophical biases are always “in a manner set in opposition to 
each other.” (1.3.13.12; SBN 149, my emphasis)  As Hume puts it, we may ‘correct’ this 
unphilosophical propensity (and others) by reflection, but it is “still certain” that this 
propensity has the “first influence” on the mind, one “which precedes reflection, and 
which cannot be prevented by it”. (T 1.3.13.8, 12; SBN 147, 150) These unphilosophical 
propensities “[take] the start, and gives a biass [sic] to the imagination, which is only 
subsequently corrected by the “review” or “second influence” of the opposing biases of 
                                                     
219
 Hume clearly takes these reflective rules to be “normative”, and for that reason, they would form a key 
part of a Humean account of ‘justified belief’.  Some have argued that the normativity Hume attributes to 
these rules is problematic in light of his naturalism.  This topic, however, lies beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  On this issue, see, for instance, Jack C. Lyons, “General Rules and the Justification of 
Probable Belief in Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies 27.2 (2001): 247-78, Louis Loeb, Stability and 
Justification 112-138, as well as Thomas Hearn, “‘General Rules’ in Hume’s Treatise,” and William 
Edward Morris, “Belief, Probability, and Normativity,” in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise: 78-94.   
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reflective rules. (1.3.13.9, 12; SBN 148, 150, my emphasis)  Thus, even though 
uncorrected causal reasoning and the corrective general rules are both products of the 
imagination and are both forms of causal reasoning, they both take place at the same 
time, and produce an opposition or “contrariety” within the imagination (conceived 
broadly as the inferential faculty of the mind).  Accordingly, Hume divides the principles 
of the imagination proper along these lines, into the “unphilosophical” or “capricious and 
uncertain” (or the “irregular” and “changeable”) operations of ‘the imagination’ which 
tend to epistemic and prudential errors on the one hand, and on the other, the “general 
and authentic operations of the understanding” or “the judgment” or “reason” which are 
“extensive and constant” and tend to epistemic and prudential success by correcting and 
opposing ‘the imagination’.220 
Both the natural and corrective propensities of the imagination predominate in the 
mind at times—no mind is, as Hume would put it, constantly constant in its adherence to 
‘reason’ (i.e. reflective rules): “all of us, at one time or another” give in to their influence 
(1.4.2.36; SBN 205), and much of Hume’s discussion in T 1.4 is an illustration of how 
many philosophical systems are plagued by these influences: as he puts it, “[s]ometimes 
the one, sometimes the other prevails…” (1.3.13.12; SBN 150; cf. 3.3.1.16; SBN 582)  
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 1.3.13.11-12, 1.4.4.1; SBN 149-50, 225; cf. 1.3.9.19n, 2.2.7.6n; SBN 117-8n, 371n.  Accordingly, this 
bifurcation of the imagination proper into “reason”/”the understanding”/”the judgment” and the 
“imagination” plays a key role in a Humean account of akrasia.  Because the mind can be divided between 
two influences in this way, we may maintain a stronger passion for an inferior good, while at the same time 
judge that some other good has a superior hedonic impact.  This bifurcation of the mind explains why, 
“[t]ho’ we may be fully convinc’d, that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to regulate our 
actions by this judgment; but yield to the solicitations of our passions, which always plead in favour of 
whatever is near and contiguous. (3.2.7.2; SBN 534-5, my emphasis)  The natural “biass” of the mind in 
favor of the superior vivacity of spatiotemporally contiguous objects, along with bifurcation of the 
imagination into two principles which are able to oppose each other, Hume tells us, explains why human 
beings “so often act in contradiction to their known interest” (3.2.7.3; SBN 535, my emphasis), their “clear 
and avow’d”, even where we are “fully convinced” of that interest. (3.2.7.1-3; SBN 534-5, my emphases) 
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The quality of mind which determines which principle generally “prevails” is what Hume 
deems the relative “force”, or “strength” or “firmness”  (or, on the other hand, 
“weakness”) of the mind. (1.3.13.3, 1.4.3.9, 1.4.4.1; SBN 144, 223, 225)  
Hume’s account of the causes of our conduct (the passions) countenances a 
parallel dichotomy of principles which, given the relationship between imagination and 
the passions on Hume’s account, is a product of the division of the principles of the 
imagination proper into “reason” and “the imagination”: a division between ‘the violent’ 
and ‘the calm passions’ (in the generic, rather than adverbial sense).  As I will show 
below, ‘the violent passions’ (considered generally as (typically violent) passions which 
“blind and deceive” us as to the true value of objects) are those which have their basis in 
the “unphilosophical” inflation of the vivacity of ideas of some hedonic objects, and so 
respond blindly to what Hume calls the “trivial advantages” of those objects.  On the 
other hand, ‘the calm passions’ are those which originate in a general, “stable” 
philosophical judgment of the “real” or “just” value of their objects—passions which are 
the product of the corrective influence of general rules.  ‘The calm passions’ are, for this 
reason, responsive not to vivid ideas of the immediate but fleeting pleasure an object may 
offer, but to its overall general tendency to promote or harm our long-term interests.  
Thus, given that this division is directly founded on the previous one in the operations of 
the imagination, Hume tells us, a man may be actuated by either of these principles.  
Because of the inconstant constancy of the imagniation’s adherence to general rules, the 
passions of man are inconstantly constant:        
…[T]he view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them.  
Men often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and 
156 
 
 
 
designs: ‘Tis not therefore the present uneasiness alone, which determines them.  
In general, we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will. 
(2.3.3.10; SBN 418) 
And in a similar fashion to the “strength” of the imagination, the general prevalence of 
one principle over the other is determined by the “strength” of the mind: “what we call 
strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”, a 
quality of mind of which no man is “constantly possessed.” (2.3.3.10; SBN 418) 
 
3.6 Spatiotemporal Distance and the Blindness and Deceitfulness of ‘The 
Violent Passions’  
To understand the nature of ‘the calm passions’ and how they are our rule-based 
affective responses to ‘true value’, we also need to understand the forms of psychological 
distance which distort our perception of value, how they distort them, and how general 
rules correct these distortions.  To do this, we need to turn again to the ways in which 
causal reasoning determines the value of objects on Hume’s account.  Earlier I discussed 
the two basic causal relations an object may bear to pleasure and pain—a direct 
(immediate) relation and an indirect (instrumental) one.  However, these two basic 
relations by no means exhaust Hume’s account of the role causal reasoning plays in our 
perception of the value of objects.  Though Hume distinguishes objects with a direct 
hedonic impact—which I have called ‘hedonic objects’—from objects with an indirect 
hedonic impact (objects which are merely means to the attainment of these hedonic 
objects), he also appreciates that some hedonic objects are also at the same time the 
indirect or mediate causes of other hedonic objects.  This distinction between the direct 
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and indirect hedonic impact of an object is most often parsed by Hume as a distinction 
between the immediate hedonic impact of an object (the “present pleasure” (or pain) it 
will cause), and its more “remote” or “distant” hedonic consequences.221 This distinction 
is also the ground of another distinction Hume makes between kinds of value: between 
what he calls the “real” or “just” value of an object, and what is, by extension, merely its 
apparent value (or what he deems its “trivial advantages”).222  Though an object may be 
the cause of immediate pleasure (“present pleasure”, or an “advantage…[one] may 
immediately enjoy), it may also be an instrumental means, or be part of a complex of such 
means, to some other end or outcome that also has a hedonic impact which “lies at a 
distance”.  Accordingly, a proper judgment of what Hume deems the “real” or “true” 
value of an object must then be one which takes both of these causal relationships to 
pleasure and pain into account, and must weigh one hedonic impact against the other 
where they are opposed.  This is implied in Hume’s claim that the human propensity to 
prefer a contiguous to remote good “makes us desire objects more according to their 
situation than their intrinsic value.” (3.2.7.8; SBN 538, my emphasis)   Hume, of course, 
does not endorse a “monkish” morality, and so does not begrudge us our fleeting and 
trivial pleasures where they are “safe and harmless” (EHU 1.10; SBN 11), or “innocent”. 
(EPM 5.21; SBN 221)  However, in order to determine their innocence we must be sure 
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 See, for example, 2.3.3.10, 2.3.6.4, 2.3.8.13, 3.2.7.3, 3.2.8.1, 3.2.8.7; SBN 418, 426, 443, 535 539, 545; 
EPM 6.15; SBN 239. 
222
 2.1.6.4, 2.1.8.8, 2.2.8.2, 2.2.8.8, 3.2.7.2, 3.2.7.8, 3.3.2.4; SBN 291, 302, 372, 375, 524, 538, 593.  (cf. 
“Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion,” EMPL 6, and “The Stoic”, EMPL 148, 150) Hume, somewhat 
misleadingly, also deems an object’s “real” value its “intrinsic value” (2.2.8.8, 3.2.7.2, 8; SBN 371, 534, 
538), the value it has “in itself”. (3.2.7.5; SBN 536), where “intrinsic value” or value “in itself” means 
‘value independent of its connection to one’s present desires’.  An object that has “intrinsic value” is, 
however, not necessarily an object that is intrinsically valuable—that is, an object which it is 
unconditionally good to possess.  Indeed, an object’s “intrinsic value” in Hume’s sense of the term can be 
negative. 
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they do not have even greater negative consequences for our pursuit of our long-term 
good.
223
 
However, because the “immediate pleasure” or pain an object causes is, by 
definition, more proximate spatiotemporally than its “remote” or “distant” consequences, 
the greater relative vivacity of the former hedonic impact naturally gives it, ceteris 
paribus, more “weight” in the imagination and influence on the passions.  Accordingly, a 
difference in relative vivacity due to these differences in spatiotemporal distance may 
give an individual object’s present or immediate hedonic impact enough weight to 
“counterbalance” the influence of an object’s more “remote”, and often greater, hedonic 
consequences on the mind, in this way distorting our perception of an individual object’s 
‘real value’.224   
Indeed, given that the violence of a passions is itself an unphilosophical source of 
vivacity on Hume’s account, it is not only the case that our passions for present pleasures 
may counterbalance the (calmer and weaker) aversions raised by consideration of  their 
painful consequences in the more distant future, but may even entirely blind us to those 
consequences which are no less real or certain for being obscure: as Hume puts it, violent 
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 For instance, Hume famously defends the “innocence” of the pleasures of luxury consumption in his 
1752 essay, “Of Refinement in the Arts”. (EMPL 268-80; cf. EPM 2.21; SBN 181) 
224
 The ‘psychological proximity’ of an object’s immediate pleasure is not only a determined by its 
contiguity in space and time to our present situation, but also by any causal connection it may bear to our 
present desires and interest.  It is also by means of the abstract maxims and general rules I will discuss 
below that we can best evaluate an object by abstracting it from the distorting influences of its relative 
spatiotemporal position or of its particular connections to our present desires and circumstances.  On this 
point, see Tito Magri, “Natural Obligation and Normative Motivation” 242, and “Hume on the Direct 
Passions and Motivation” 197-8.  Magri’s discussions are the only significant treatments of these matters I 
know of. 
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passions tend to “blind us with regard to our own actions”225 and their distant 
consequences by means of a sort of ‘feedback loop’ Hume describes in T 1.3.13: 
[T]he imagination runs away with its object, and excites a passion proportion’d 
to it.  That passion returns back upon the imagination and inlivens [sic] the idea; 
which lively idea has a new influence on the passion, and in its turn augments its 
force and violence; and both his fancy and affections, thus mutually supporting 
each other, cause the whole to have a very great influence upon [the mind]. 
(1.3.13.10; SBN 148-9, my emphasis)  
The agitation of a violent passion, in such a case, is also an additional cause of the 
‘unphilosophical’ vivification of our ideas—as Hume puts it in the Dissertation, passion 
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 3.2.8.7; SBN 545, my emphasis; cf. 3.2.2.14, 3.2.2.24; SBN 493, 499.  Hutcheson, who was greatly 
influenced by Malebranche’s doctrine of calm inclinations of the soul, also clearly influences Hume’s own 
account on this point of the relationship between passion and reasoning.  Hutcheson makes a hard class 
distinction between calm “affections” and more violent “desires”, the latter being  
a confused Sensation either of Pleasure or Pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily 
Motions, which keeps the Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusion of 
every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens the Affection sometimes to such a degree, as to 
prevent all deliberate Reasoning about our Conduct. (Essay 30-1; original emphasis; cf. 
Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendaria (ed. Luigi Turco) 29)  
(Hutcheson cites Search, Book V, where Malebranche discusses the “calm” inclinations of the soul.) 
In the Essay, Hutcheson writes similarly: 
Perhaps what has brought the Epithet Reasonable, or flowing from Reason, in opposition to what 
flows from Instinct, Affection, or Passion, so much into use, is this, “That it is often observed, 
that the very best of our particular Affections or Desires, when they are grown violent and 
passionate, thro’ the confused Sensations and Propensities which attend them, do make us 
incapable of considering calmly the whole Tendency of our Actions, and lead us often into what 
is absolutely pernicious, under some Appearance of relative or particular Good.”  This indeed 
may give some ground for distinguishing between passionate Actions, and those from calm 
Desire or Affection which employs our Reason freely: But can never set rational Actions in 
Opposition to those from Instinct, Desire, or Affection. (Essay 175) 
On Hutcheson’s account, the “calm motions or affections of the soul and the stable desire of 
happiness…employ our reason for their conductor”, while the “vehement turbulent Impulses” hurry the 
soul on “with a blind inconsiderate force to certain actions, pursuits, or efforts to avoid”, which actions and 
pursuits “we have never deliberately determined to be of consequence to happiness or misery.”  In this 
sense, passions are not only “keen”, but “blind, impetuous motions” of the soul that operate “without any 
previous deliberate opinion about the tendency of [their] objects” to our happiness or misery.  As on 
Hume’s account, it is the opposition of our calm and violent passions that “[draws] the soul contrary ways. 
(Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendaria (ed. Luigi Turco) 29)  (See Jeffrey Barnouw, “Passion as 
‘Confused’ Perception or Thought in Descartes, Malebranche, and Hutcheson,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 53.3 (1992): 397-424.)   
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here “produces a species of belief”.226  In this way, the “emotions of the soul prevent any 
subtile reasoning and reflection”. (1.4.1.11; SBN 185-6, my emphasis)  It is because of 
this mutual reinforcement of the blindness and violence of passions that that “men 
of…lively passions are apt to be transported beyond all bounds of prudence and 
discretion, and to take false steps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable.”227  
‘The violent passions’ are not only “blind” but also “deceitful” on Hume’s account 
(2.3.3.1; SBN 413), and given the role played by the relative spatiotemporal distance of 
objects plays in determining and objects ‘real value’, they are “deceitful” precisely 
because they are “blind”: because they may blind us to the long-term future hedonic 
consequences of objects, they also deceive us as to their true value which must 
comprehend those consequences.  
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 DP 1.16; cf. T 1.3.10.4, 2.1.11.9, 2.3.6.8; SBN 120, 320, 427, EHU 10.16; SBN 117.  This passage is 
intended to offer an explanation of the “familiar” (anti-Stoic) thought experiment of the sage on the 
precipice.  (For a discussion of the history of this thought experiment, see Saul Traiger, “Reason Unhinged: 
Passion and Precipice from Montaigne to Hume,” in Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette 
Baier, eds. Joyce Jenkins, Jennifer Whiting, Christopher Williams (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005): 100-115.  See also Robert Fogelin, Hume’s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature 
(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) 61ff.)  That the passions are “self-justifying” in this way is a 
point repeatedly made by Malebranche, and Hume surely is influenced by Malebranche’s account. (cf. 
EPM 9.8n; SBN 275n)  I borrow the term “feedback loop” from Amy Schmitter’s discussion of the 
influence of Malebranche’s theory of the passions on Hume, in “Malebranche on the Emotions” URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD4Malebranche.html>, in Amy Schmitter, “17th and 
18
th
 Century Theories of Emotions,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotions-17
th
18th/>.  See also 
Éléonore La Jallé, “Hume, Malebranche, and the Self-Justification of the Passions” Hume Studies 38.2 
(2012): 201-20.   
227
 “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion”, EMPL 4; cf. EPM 6.15; SBN 239-40.  On the other hand, those 
ideas of hedonic objects of relatively weaker vivacity, which are in turn the objects of relatively weaker and 
calmer passions, maintain all the opposite advantages.  Because of the weak vivacity of psychologically 
“distant” hedonic objects, those objects trigger calm passions, whose calmness permits further reflection on 
and causal reasoning about the nature and longer-term consequences of our pursuit of any hedonic object, 
and so an evaluation of its ‘true worth’.  The inferior vivacity of the object of desire gives rise to no violent 
motion of the mind which would, together with the superior vivacity of an idea, seize the attention of the 
mind and prevent that further “corrective” reasoning and reflection. 
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 Moreover, to complicate his account of our perceptions of value, Hume also 
seems to mark out among objects which have some positive “real value” a class of 
objects which may be deemed supremely valuable—that is, things the possession of 
which is either the direct cause of lasting or durable pleasure (e.g. virtue, riches, 
knowledge, fame, power), or a sine qua non of enjoyment whatsoever (e.g. health).
228
  
Such objects are, as Hume puts it, of very great “consequence in life”.229 In turn, many of 
these goods render their possessor “considerable”, or of great “importance”, “weight” or 
“moment” in the world.230 They also make their possessor a lightning rod for the 
sympathetic gaze of others and the “rebounds” of pleasure which that gaze brings.  
Accordingly, these goods are the ends which determine what Hume deems the various 
“courses of life”, the main “projects”, our “interests and designs” or the “pursuits” that 
human beings undertake
231
, and are the ends that correspond to many of the primary 
predominant or ruling passions that govern human nature—for example, avarice, 
ambition, the love of fame, the love of truth.
232
  Such ends, as Hume puts it in the case of 
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 Similarly, Hume’s “Sceptic” talks about the “steady or constant” enjoyment or “durable pleasure and 
satisfaction” some objects bring, implicitly contrasting them to less durable or fleeting pleasures.  (EMPL 
167) 
229
 2.2.10.9; SBN 393; cf. 2.1.11.1, 2.2.8.4; SBN 318, 374. Hobbes includes these as prime examples of 
forms of “power” to procure future goods: “…Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour” 
are all reducible to the desire for ‘power’ (in a sense more general than political or social power): “For 
Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.”  (Leviathan, I.viii.15)  
230
 3.3.4.14, 3.3.5.5; SBN 613-4, 616-7. 
231
 See, e.g., T 2.3.3.10, 3.2.1.9, 3.3.2.8; SBN 418, 474, 597, EPM 11.25; SBN 143-4, “The Epicurean”, 
EMPL 145, “The Sceptic”, EMPL, 160, 176.  
232
 This is made clear in the examples Hume uses throughout his corpus. (cf. “The Stoic”, EMPL 151, “The 
Sceptic”, EMPL 161) Moreover, in the Treatise, the possession of these goods in some comparatively great 
degree become the main examples of the causes of the indirect passions of pride and love, and more 
importantly, of respect and admiration. In the second Enquiry, health, riches and virtue are Hume’s prime 
examples of “ultimate ends of action”. (EPM Appendix 1.18-20; SBN 293-4) But this is especially clear in 
Hume’s History of England, where these are the objects of the predominant or ruling passions which 
explain important actions in the course of English history.  (e.g., I: 370, II:15, 499, III: 29, 37, 66, 73, 425, 
IV: 192, V: 7, 329, 337, VI: 443) 
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fame, are “the grand object[s] of all [our] designs and undertakings.” (EPM 9.10; SBN 
276)  
Accordingly, when discussing the proper “weighing” of the value of an object in 
the second Enquiry, Hume not only makes a distinction between its “immediate” and 
“remote” hedonic impact, but also between its momentary and “lasting” hedonic impact, 
and parses the latter distinction as a weighing of the “present pleasure” it may offer 
against what Hume calls “distant views” of its (long-term) consequences for our 
attainment or continued possession of these supremely valuable goods, that is in light of 
“distant views of [good such as] fame, health, or fortune”.  (EPM 6.15; SBN 239, my 
emphasis)  Our indulgence in some trivial present pleasure may not only cost us some 
relatively greater, but still trivial future good (as where we pay for a night of drinking 
with a hangover), but have a great and “lasting” negative impact on us by undermining 
our pursuit or otherwise denying us the enjoyment of these ‘considerable’ goods.   
Such objects are what Hume calls our ‘general and distant interests’. (EPM 4.1; 
SBN 206, my emphasis; cf. EPM 6.15; SBN 239-40)  Such ends are “distant” in the 
causal-spatiotemporal sense in that typically they can only be achieved in any degree by a 
long-term, complex ‘scheme’ of action.233  But they are also what we may call ‘ongoing 
concerns’—concerns which are not extinguished even when we in some to some degree 
possess or achieve them.  (For instance, when we regain our health after an illness, our 
health nevertheless remains an ongoing concern, an end we still aim to achieve, even 
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 cf. Jane McIntyre, “Hume’s Passions” 82. 
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though we have in some sense achieved it.
234)  They are “general” ends in that they are 
what Elizabeth Anscombe has called “generic ends”, the existence of which is “an 
important fact of human nature”: human beings “are not merely concerned to bring about 
such circumstances as that object A be moved to point B.  They want, for example, 
happiness, glory, riches, power.”235 Thus, Anscombe writes,  
…the reckoning what to do or abstain from in particular circumstances will 
constantly include a reference, implicit or explicit, to generalities.  So much so, 
that this seems to be an important part of what makes morality.  Because of it 
human conduct is not left to be distinguished from the behaviour of other 
animals by the fact that in it calculation is used by which to ascertain the means 
to perfectly particular ends.  The human wants things like health and happiness 
and science and fair repute and virtue and prosperity, he does not simply want, 
e.g. that such-and-such a thing should be in such-and-such a place at such-and-
such a time.  Such generalities or principles are: to do good and avoid doing 
harm; not to do what will get you disrepute; not to do what will make you 
poorer; not to take other people’s property.236  
However, the influence of our passions for these ends are naturally weak, on Hume’s 
account, precisely because they are general in this way:   
’[T]is certain, that the more general and universal any of our ideas are, the less 
influence they have upon the imagination.  A general idea, tho’ it be nothing but 
a particular one consider’d in a certain view, is commonly more obscure [i.e. 
less vivacious]; and that because no particular idea, by which we represent a 
general one, is ever fix’d or determinate, but may easily be chang’d for other 
particular ones, which will serve equally in the representation. (2.3.6.2; SBN 
424-5)
237
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 Sebastian Rödl calls such ends “infinite ends”. (Self-Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007) 34-8.)  
235
 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Practical Inference” [1989], in Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. 
Anscombe, eds. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally (Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2005): 109-48, 
142; cf. Intention 63. 
236
 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Authority in Morals” [1961], in Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, 
Philosophy and Ethics, eds. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally (Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 
2008): 98. 
237
 “’Tis certain, that the imagination is more affected by what is particular, than by what is general; and 
that the sentiments are always mov’d with difficulty, where their objects are, in any degree, loose and 
undetermin’d.” (3.3.1.13; SBN 580) 
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Accordingly, these “general” and “distant” ends are, as Anscombe puts it, ‘diffuse’ ends 
in that success in our pursuit of them does not often require that we complete this or that 
particular action: “...when ends are of such a diffuse character as the ones I have 
mentioned, it is rare for some highly specific action here and now to be quite necessary in 
pursuing them.”238 Jane McIntyre puts it nicely in the following way:  
Having a virtuous character, or a fine reputation, involves patterns of actions 
over long periods of time.  As a further complication, these patterns can often be 
realized in many alternative ways.  Our experience here is often diffuse, and no 
one action, or set of actions, is associated with achieving these pleasures.
239
 
Not only are such goods naturally conceived faintly because they are only attained by 
long-term complex schemes of action, but given what appears to be the weak and diffuse 
causal relation of any particular object or action here and now to the attainment or loss of 
such goods, we naturally conceive the consequences of that present object or action for 
our pursuit of such generic ends as “remote”, and so faintly.  And since this faintness is 
further compounded by the generality of our ideas of these ends, the superior vivacity of 
a present pleasure and the violence of the passion to which it gives rise may also blind 
and deceive us to their ‘true value’ and lead to serious errors in our conduct.     
Though the weakness of the influence of the “remote” consequences of objects on 
the passions naturally leads to errors in our conduct, reflection on these errors makes it at 
least possible to remedy them on Hume’s account.  Reflection on our repeated errors in 
judging the value of objects leads us to form general or all-things-considered judgments 
of the real value of those objects, judgments which comprehend an object’s immediate 
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 Anscombe, “Practical Inference” 141. 
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 Jane McIntyre, “Hume’s Passions” 82. 
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hedonic impact along with its more “remote” hedonic consequences.  Hume deems these 
the “general establish’d maxims” of conduct, rules which ‘sum up’ the results of our 
previous errors and successes in judging of the value of an object. Such general 
assessments of value are based on what Hume calls a “general prospect” (EPM 6.15; 
SBN 239) or a “comprehensive…view” (DP 5.2) of an object—the same “steady and 
general [point] of view” from which we can get a “stable judgment” of a man’s character, 
one not subject to vicissitudes of unphilosophical probability and their effects on the 
passions. (3.3.1.15; SBN 581-2)  As Hume notes, men are “mightily addicted” to general 
rules and “maxims” (3.2.9.3; SBN 551), and the same is true in the particular case of 
those general rules which regulate our conduct: “the adherence to general rules…[has] a 
mighty influence on our actions and understanding” (2.2.8.5; SBN 374, my emphasis)   
Hume also notes that these all-things-considered or “comprehensive” judgments 
about the “true value” of an object are not solely the product of careful reasoning 
concerning the overall tendency of an object to produce pleasure or pain, but of both 
individual and shared accumulated experience, which parents and other educators, as well 
as literature, instill in us (cf. 3.2.2.26; SBN 500-1): 
‘[T]is evident, that if a person fullgrown [sic], and of the same nature with 
ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our world, he wou’d be very much 
embarras’d with every object and would not readily find what degree of love or 
hatred, pride or humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it.  The 
passions are often vary’d by very inconsiderable principles; and these do not 
always play with a perfect regularity, especially on the first trial.  But as custom 
and practice have settled the just value of every thing; this must certainly 
contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by means of 
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general establish’d maxims, in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring 
one object to another. (2.1.6.9; SBN 293-4, my emphasis; = DP 2.46)
240
 
They are, in this way, what Hume calls in another context “general observations 
treasured up by a course of experience” (again, not only in an individual’s experience, 
but also in our conversation and shared writings
241
). (EHU 8.9; SBN 85, my emphasis) 
Hume does not offer us a detailed account of the formation of these general maxims
242
, 
though like other general rules they would be the products of reflection on the overall 
tendency of an object to produce pleasure or pain, abstracted from a class of closely 
resembling experiences in the course of life.  As Hume’s “Stoic” puts it regarding the 
formation of “rules” and “precepts” of conduct, “mistakes” in conduct are frequently and 
“inevitably committed”, but we can “register these mistakes” and “consider their causes” 
and “enquire after remedies”: “When from this we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we 
are philosophers: When we have reduced these rules to practice, we are sages.” (“The 
Stoic”, EMPL 148-9, Hume’s emphasis)  I attempt here a brief Humean account of the 
main distortions these rules correct, which is rooted in relevant passages in Hume’s 
Treatise and elsewhere. 
The warrant of general maxims of conduct seems to be prudential rather than 
epistemic.  The usefulness of such general rules or maxims of conduct beyond their 
power to “correct” for our unphilosophical tendency to weight an object’s present 
pleasure above its more remote consequences seems to consist in two advantages, on 
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  cf. EHU 8.9; SBN 84-5, “The Stoic”, EMPL 148-9, and “The Sceptic”, who speaks of the “general 
maxims of the world,” the “maxims of common prudence, and discretion; what every parent inculcates 
upon his child, and what every man of sense pursues in the course of life he has chosen.”  (EMPL 161)   
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 On the theme of the social “pooling” of experience in Hume, see Annette Baier, A Progress of 
Sentiments 282-3, and Death and Character 163. 
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 But see e.g., EHU 5.5n; SBN 45n.   
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Hume’s account.  First, as I noted above, the principles which guide our conduct in 
common life must be “easy” and “natural”, and not “abstruse”, in order for them to have 
any influence on our passions: only “easy” reflections can “enter into business and 
action”, and have an “influence over our conduct and behaviour.”243  General or 
reflective rules, though still “subtile” forms of causal reasoning, are nevertheless “easier” 
and more “natural” reflections than what would necessarily more abstruse deliberations 
concerning the long-term hedonic consequences of an object we would have to undertake 
in every particular case.  Indeed, at the start of his essay “Of Commerce” (1752), Hume 
argues that in our deliberations concerning future actions, 
…no reasoning is to be trusted but what is natural and easy. When a man 
deliberates concerning his conduct in any particular affair, and forms schemes in 
politics, trade, oeconomy, or any business in life, he never ought to draw his 
arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of consequences together. 
Something is sure to happen, that will disconcert his reasoning, and produce an 
event different from what he expected. (“Of Commerce”, EMPL 254) 
Given our limited mental resources in deliberation, adherence to the “general establish’d 
maxims” of conduct is preferable to “fine” or intricate deliberation: given the uncertainty 
of events, such deliberation would be most often fruitless.
244
   
Most interesting for our purposes are those general rules or maxims which Hume 
calls “general resolutions” because they most commonly (though not exclusively) result 
from our interest to secure the possession or continued retention of the supremely 
valuable goods discussed earlier. Though, as in the case of general maxims, Hume does 
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 EHU 1.3; SBN 6-7; see also, e.g,, T 1.4.1.11; SBN 185-6, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 1.1, 
“The Sceptic”, EMPL 172 and 177-9n. (where Hume speaks in propria persona).  Of course, it is Hume’s 
position that as long as “abstruse” philosophy takes as its subject matter the “reflections of common life”, 
abstruse reasoning can (and ought to) enter into action indirectly, by “methodizing and correcting” our 
easy, general maxims of deliberation and action.   
244
 cf. “The Sceptic”, EMPL 180.   
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not give us an explicit, extended treatment of the nature of general resolutions, we can 
discern a coherent sketch theory from his scattered remarks on the subject in the Treatise 
and Enquiries.  General resolutions seem most often to take the form blanket 
endorsements of or, perhaps more commonly, blanket prohibitions (akin to “zero 
tolerance” policies) against certain actions and objects.  These general resolutions 
become habits or biases of thought when we inculcate them in ourselves by repeated 
reflection.
245
 The inculcation of such blanket resolutions function as a present means to 
guard ourselves against future reconsideration of the value of these objects or actions in 
light of some later temptation by engendering in our imagination a general or blanket 
‘bias’ against them, despite the fact that such a blanket policy may often have sub-
optimal outcomes in particular situations.
246
   
As in the case of all general maxims of conduct, the warrant for general 
resolutions is prudential, and rooted both in an appreciation of the facts of human 
motivational psychology, and in our own assessment of the strength of our individual 
mind.  For instance, given the general rule that ‘junk food is unhealthy’, we may form a 
resolution not to eat junk food at all.  Junk food may offer some “trivial”, immediate 
satisfaction, but its consumption is contrary to the supremely valuable (though “distant”) 
end of health.  Of course, if the general rule or maxim is simply taken to mean that every 
instance of the consumption of such food leads directly to ill health, it would be false (or 
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 See note 150 above for a more detailed account of “resolution” as a form of artificial self-education in 
Hume and Butler. 
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 In these ways, Humean “general resolutions” resemble resolutions as conceived by Richard Holton 
(“Intention and Weakness of Will”, Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 241-62), or “personal policies” as 
conceived by Michael Bratman (“Intentions and Personal Policies”, Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 
443-69, and “Taking Plans Seriously,” Social Theory and Practice 9.2/3 (1983): 271-87).  
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at least, a rashly formed “prejudice”)—as I noted above, the causal connection between 
any instance of the consumption of such food and poor health is only strong where this 
consumption becomes a habitual practice.  However, it is precisely because such 
particular connections are weak that we are strongly tempted in every instance to indulge, 
and so are motivated to guard against the naturally powerful temptation of such objects 
by means of a blanket bias against them.
247
  The need for such strong biases arises from 
our observation of our own weakness in resisting our inclinations to trivial goods, the 
ease with which we have overlooked (and so expect to overlook again) the more “remote” 
consequences of such goods, the likelihood of our committing such errors again, and the 
seriousness of the ultimate consequences of such failures.
248
  
Perhaps the clearest case in Hume’ corpus of a general resolution is our common 
resolution to adhere strictly to the rules of justice, despite the fact that this strict 
adherence may often result in sub-optimal distribution of goods: we have a strong, natural 
inclination to violate these rules (cf. 3.2.2.12-13; SBN 491-2), and every single violation 
of the rules has a more “distant” or “remote”, but sufficiently probable causal connection 
both to the complete loss of our reputation and the trust of others, and to the collapse of 
the beneficial scheme of justice given that the violations of one tend to inspire violations 
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 As Hume notes in a description of another general resolution, if we “embrace” one, “by a parity of 
reason, [we] must embrace them all”. (1.4.7.7; SBN 268) 
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 This is the picture of general resolutions Hume paints, for instance, in his account of the origin of 
government.  (cf. 3.2.7.5; SBN 536-7)  (Of course, on Hume’s account, our acceptance of the yoke of 
government is the result of the general inefficacy of these resolutions in restraining our interested passion in 
larger societies where there the immediate consequences of any violation are less evident.  Though this is 
sometimes taken as an admission of the inefficacy of resolutions generally, given the context of the 
passage, we need only read Hume as pointing out that in the case of the restraint of the passion of avidity or 
luxury such resolutions are typically ineffectual, given that this avidity is a passion to which Hume 
attributes such great strength that it must “restrain itself”.  My aim here is simply to note the nature of 
these resolutions and the circumstances of their formation.  I will have more to say on Hume’s opinion of 
their general efficacy below.)   
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by others. (3.2.7.3; SBN 535)
249
 The strong motive we have to violate these rules, 
coupled with the inherent risk that attends even a single violation of a strict adherence, as 
well as the magnitude of the personal evil of either of these consequences, provides the 
justification for adopting strict adherence as a personal resolution or policy. Indeed, this 
is precisely the basis for Hume’s admonishing the ‘sensible knave’ in the famous 
conclusion to the second Enquiry for not adopting a strict adherence to the rules of justice 
as “the best policy”. (EPM 9.22, 24; SBN 282-283)   
 
3.7 Psychological Distance, and the Natural Relative Weakness of ‘The Calm 
Passions’  
Though ‘the calm passions’ are the principles by which we may counter those 
‘violent passions’ which cause such “fatal errors” in our conduct, the same feature of ‘the 
calm passions’ which make them responsible to the true value of object—their grounding 
in a “general prospect” of and reflective reasoning concerning their objects—also renders 
them relatively weaker motives than their violent counterparts.  On Hume’s account, such 
generality is a form of the psychological distancing of an object.  This is the 
psychological basis for Hume’s repeated characterization of ‘the “calm passions’ as 
passions “founded on some distant view or reflection” (T 3.3.1.18; SBN 583, my 
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 The general resolutions of a chaste and modest woman against giving even the suggestion of conjugal 
infidelity out of concern for her reputation are formed under similar pressures, given that even one lapse is 
sufficient to sully her name. (See, in particular, T 3.2.12.5; SBN 571-2, EPM 6.14; SBN 238-9)  For other 
examples, see Hume’s discussion for the reasons for at least considering a general resolution against 
reposing any faith in the trivial and capricious propensities of the imagination  (though such a resolution 
could not be steadily executed) (1.4.7.6-7; SBN 267-8; cf. 1.3.9.6; SBN 109-110), the “general resolution” 
we form against belief in testimony concerning miracles (EHU 10.38; SBN 129), and the repeated 
meditation some men of faith employ to “imprint in their minds the arguments for a future state” in order to 
regulate their earthly conduct given both its importance for our eternal happiness and the natural inefficacy 
of such a belief where it is not supported by such a resolution. (1.3.9.14; SBN 114-5)   
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emphasis; cf. DP 5.2) Given that the vivacity of a belief diminishes in proportion to the 
increase in the psychological distance of its object, ‘the calm passions’ are naturally 
weaker, all other things being equal, than ‘the violent passions’ which are produced by 
hedonic beliefs concerning particular or determinate objects.  Thus, although ‘the calm 
passions’ are principles of action based in imaginative corrections of the distorting 
influence of psychological distance on conduct, the vivacity of these corrections, and in 
turn, the strength of these passions, are themselves subject to this distorting influence.      
The connection between psychological distance and the calm passions Hume 
posits can be explained in more detail in the following way.  As I noted earlier, the 
spatiotemporal contiguity of a hedonic object is a primary ‘unphilosophical’ source of 
that greater relative vivacity which “distorts” our perception of its hedonic impact relative 
to that of another, more distant object.  To put it again in the terms Hume employs, this 
greater relative vivacity may give an object of inferior hedonic impact enough weight to 
“counterbalance” the influence of the superior hedonic impact of a more distant object 
(that is, one which is less vividly conceived) on the will and passions.  On the other hand, 
where we view two objects at a distance, Hume argues we are able to weigh them 
according to their true value: “When we consider any objects at a distance…we always 
give the preference to whatever is in itself preferable.” (3.2.7.5; SBN 536, my emphasis)  
Hume clearly implies that this is because disparities in the relative vivacity of the idea of 
each object will approach zero where the entire choice is set at great spatiotemporal 
distance from our present situation, rendering the influence of each of these objects on 
the passions a product of its hedonic impact alone.  On the other hand, the diminished 
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vivacity of these goods gives rise to passions that are calm.  In this way, our preferences 
for objects where they are set at such a distance “give rise to what in an improper sense 
we call reason”—i.e. our calm preference for the greater good.     
Hume’s explanation of why psychological distance simulates reason (or general 
thinking) in this way and makes possible assessment of “real” value also clearly 
anticipates the “construal level theory” (CLT) of psychological distance in contemporary 
behavioral economics, and it will be helpful to parse Hume’s account in its 
terminology.
250
 According to the “basic premise” of CLT, human beings “tend to use 
increasingly higher levels of construal to represent an object as the psychological distance 
from the object increases”.251  That is, people conceive of present goods in relatively 
concrete terms, while they conceive of distant goods in relatively abstract terms: “Low-
level construals are relatively unstructured, contextualized representations that include 
subordinate and incidental features of events.  High-level construals, in contrast, are 
schematic, decontextualized representations that extract the gist from the available 
information.”252  According to CLT, whether we characterize something as low-level or 
high-level is determined in large part by what we, following Construal Level Theorists 
and behavioral economists, have called “psychological distance”.253 The more 
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 See, e.g., Yaakov Trope and Nira Libermann, “Temporal Construal,” Psychological Review 110 (2003): 
403-21, and “Construal Level Theory of Psychological Distance,” Psychological Review 117 (2010): 440-
63, and Yaakov Trope, Nira Libermann, and Cheryl Wakslak, “Construal Levels and Psychological 
Distance: Effects on Representation, Prediction, Evaluation, and Behavior,” Journal of Consumer 
Psychology 17.2 (2007): 83-95.  
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 Trope and Libermann, “Construal Level Theory of Psychological Distance,” 441. 
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 Trope, et al. “Construal Effects and Psychological Distance” 83. 
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 Indeed, recent studies in CLT have hypothesized and empirically support Humean these regarding the 
relationship between psychological distance and the passions—that “psychological distance” and construal 
level tends to have precisely the effects Hume’s theory predicts in T 2.3.6-7, among other affective 
consequences.  Psychological distance, for instance, “reduces the intensity of felt affect” and weakens both 
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psychologically distant an object is from the present, the less concrete and more abstract 
our “mental construal” of the object is, and the more its “central” or “essential” as 
opposed to “incidental” properties factor into of our representation of it.  One of the main 
benefits of this tendency, CLT holds, is that it aids human beings in maintaining the 
“perceptual constancy” across varying psychological distances necessary not only to 
draw general conclusions from past experiences but also to apply those conclusions to the 
future: “[i]dentifying an object in near and distant locations as being the same requires 
forming an abstract concept…that omits incidental features (e.g., perspective-specific 
appearances and contextual variations…) and retains essential, relatively invariant 
features.” Whereas the incidental features characteristic of “low-level”, concrete 
construals of objects are more likely to vary widely from instance to instance, the general 
and “essential” features that characterize “high-level”, abstract construals are more likely 
to remain stable, and “to remain unchanged as one gets closer to an object or farther away 
from it.”254   
We find all of this directly stated in Hume, with the added benefit of a well-
worked-out theory of mind to ground it.  A spatiotemporally “distant” view is 
psychologically equivalent to that “general prospect” of an object (EPM 6.15; SBN 239), 
or “steady and general [point] of view” discussed earlier from which we can get a “stable 
judgment” (3.3.1.15; SBN 581-2) or get a “comprehensive” view of the value of an 
object. (DP 5.2)  As Hume argues, the great psychological distance of two hedonic 
                                                                                                                                                              
positive and negative evaluations of objects. (Lawrence E. Williams, Randy Stein, and Laura Galguera, 
“The Distinct Affective Consequences of Psychological Distance and Construal Level,” Journal of 
Consumer Research 40.6 (2014): 1123-38)  See, in particular, T 2.3.6.2-4. (SBN 424-6) 
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 Trope and Libermann, “Construal Level Theory of Psychological Distance,” 441. 
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objects from our present situation not only cancels out those effects of differences in their 
relative vivacity that appear at a psychological proximity, but also activates the general 
perspective (constituted by general maxims and rules of conduct) from which we form a 
stable assessment of their value.  The phenomenon can be explained in terms of the 
resemblance of the vivacity of our ideas of psychologically distant objects and that of 
general ideas: as both are “obscure” (2.3.6.2, 2.3.7.1; SBN 424-5, 427; cf. 3.2.7.2; SBN 
534-5), the faintness and obscurity of an idea of a particular, but psychologically distant 
object takes on the sketchy or indeterminate nature of a general idea.
255
 Thus, in the 
Treatise Hume writes, 
When we consider any objects at a distance, all their minute distinctions vanish, 
and we always give the preference to whatever is in itself preferable, without 
considering its situation and circumstances.  This gives rise to what in an 
improper sense we call reason, which is a principle, that is often contradictory to 
these propensities that display themselves upon the approach of the object.  In 
reflecting on any action, which I am to perform a twelve-month hence, I always 
resolve to prefer the greater good, whether at that time it will be more 
contiguous or remote; nor does any difference in that particular make a 
difference in my present intentions and resolutions.
256
  My distance from the 
final determination makes all those minute distinctions vanish, nor am I affected 
by any thing, but the general and more discernible qualities of good and evil.
257
 
(3.2.7.5; SBN 536, first and last emphasis mine) 
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 The basis of this similarity of generality and obscurity is never spelled out by Hume, but seems to be 
explicable in terms of his T 1.1.7 theory of abstract or general ideas as a particular idea which is not 
“infix’d” in the mind, but entertained by the mind only provisionally, with a concomitant readiness to call 
to mind the ‘revival set’ of other particular ideas that also fall under that term. (cf. T 2.3.6.2; SBN 425)   
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 It is for this reason Hume would endorse a hyperbolic, rather than exponential, discount curve.  As the 
temporal distance of two goods between which there is a significant temporal delay increases, the 
difference in the rate at which we discount those goods between which there is a temporal delay approaches 
zero. 
257
 Making this point is in large part the aim of Hume’s discussion of the story of Themistocles and 
Aristides in T 2.3.6. (2.3.6.3-4; SBN 425-6) 
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That is, because we tend to construe “distant” goods in general terms, we tend to reason 
to their hedonic impact from their general properties—that is, on the basis of their all-
things-considered connections to pleasure and pain.   
It is in this way that Hume’s treatment of the “unphilosophical” influence of 
psychological distance on the vivacity of our ideas of hedonic objects bears directly and 
significantly on a deeper understanding of Humean “strength of mind”.  As I suggested 
earlier, if “weak” minds for Hume are those which are primarily governed by such 
unphilosophical influences, a “strong” mind is one which is able to overcome these 
influences in some way by correcting for them.  Given that the force of these corrections 
by general reasoning and reflection are themselves psychologically distant, “strength of 
mind”, conceived generally as the “strength” of the imagination to preserve vivacity over 
long psychological distances is a virtue “useful to oneself”.258 
Accordingly, strength of mind, particularly in the second Enquiry, is most often 
characterized by Hume as a virtuous ability some possess to overcome or oppose the 
distorting influence forms of psychological distance in particular have on the relative 
vivacity of our hedonic beliefs, and so on the strength and violence of our passions: 
strength of mind “…enable[s its possessor] to resist the temptation of present ease or 
pleasure, and carry them forward in the search of more distant profit and enjoyment” 
(EPM 6.15; SBN 239, my emphasis), or “to persevere in a steady adherence to a general 
and distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage.” 
                                                     
258
 Humean strength of mind functions in the same way as what is often called “patience” in the context of 
discussions of time-inconsistency of preferences in behavioral economics: patience “flattens” one’s 
effective discount curve (in relation to a ‘weak-minded’ or impatient person’s curve), so that differences in 
time delays between goods results in discounting more distant goods less.  
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(EPM 4.1; SBN 205, my emphasis)  “A man of a strong and determined temper,” Hume 
tells us, “adheres tenaciously to his general resolutions, and is neither seduced by the 
allurements of pleasure, nor terrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps still in view those 
distant pursuits, by which he, at once, ensures his happiness and honour.” (EPM 6.15; 
SBN 239-40, my emphasis)
259
  As I will show in the following part of this chapter, on 
Hume’s account, those who possess this “strength and firmness” of the mind overcome 
the imaginative difficulties associated with the conception of such psychologically 
“distant” objects and ends with greater ease, giving these ends greater influence over the 
will and passions.   
 
3.8  The “Strength” of the Imagination and the Centrality of Custom to 
Hume’s “Epistemology of Ease” 
So far in this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate the usefulness of “strength of 
mind” in terms of the “strength and firmness” of the imagination which underlies that 
ability or power—the imagination’s ability to resist the effects of ‘unphilosophical 
influences’ on our causal reasoning and on the formation of causal beliefs concerning the 
existence and value of the objects of our passions, primary among which is the influence 
of “psychological distance”.  However, the question remains as to whether Hume can say 
anything more about the nature of a “strong mind”.  
At first glance, the prospects for attaining a deeper understanding of strength of 
mind seem dim.  This seems especially true, given both the thinness of Hume’s account 
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 In the Treatise, the virtue of “strength of mind” is characterized as an ability to resist the “sollicitations” 
and “momentary gusts” of (violent) passions and desires, and to “counter-act violent passion in prosecution 
of interests and designs,” by which Hume means our long-term or “distant” ends. (T 2.3.3.10; SBN 418)   
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of “general rules”, and the fact that Hume never offers us an explicit, detailed account 
why ‘reason’ (both in the sense of general reflective rules of the understanding, and the 
calm passions) prevails in the mind.  He only notes rather cryptically that this prevalence 
of ‘reason’ depends upon the “general character” or present “disposition” of the person.  
In what follows, however, I argue that the best resource we have for such an account is 
Hume’s discussion of the effects of spatiotemporal distance on the imagination and 
passions in T 2.3.7-8.  If I am right in reading this discussion as having wider 
applicability to Hume’s theory of motivation as a shorthand account of the general causes 
of psychological distance and its effects on the imagination and passions, it will be 
particularly useful to an account of strength of mind and the prevalence of ‘reason’ in 
both senses.  For in T 2.3.8, Hume offers us an account of the mechanisms of the mind 
which account for the superior strength of our passions for “distant” goods, primary 
among which are those mechanisms which account for the imagination “running against” 
(2.3.8.9; SBN 435) those natural propensities of the mind which typically diminish the 
vivacity of our conception of these goods.    
Moreover, such an account offers us the best prospect for answering an important 
question that remains open: whether or not this “strength” can be cultivated to any 
degree.  In those few places in his corpus where Hume speaks of this virtue, he seems to 
imply that “strength of mind” is a natural endowment which one either is “possesst of” 
(2.3.3.10; SBN 418) or “wants”. (EPM 6.15; SBN 239)  Indeed, Hume explicitly 
comprehends among the virtuous “natural abilities”—which are “equally involuntary and 
necessary”, and “almost invariable by art or industry” (3.3.4.4; SBN 609)—not only the 
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virtue of “constancy”, but also all of the virtuous “qualities of the judgment and 
imagination”, such as genius and good sense, which are on my account important 
elements of “strength of mind”. (3.3.4.2-3; SBN 608; cf. 3.3.4.5-6; SBN 610)  However, 
if my account of the role the “strength” of the imagination—the mind’s power to 
resistance to ‘unphilosophical’ influences on our reasoning concerning the existence and 
value of objects—plays as a key element of the virtue “strength of mind” is correct, I 
argue it can be cultivated in some limited sense due to the role custom plays in Hume’s 
theory of causal reasoning.  However, in order to appreciate how Hume’s discussion in T 
2.3.7-8 addresses these questions, it will be necessary first to attend to T 2.3.7. In that 
section of the Treatise, Hume sketches an anatomy of the actual mechanics which 
underlie the influence of psychological distance on causal reasoning, revealing, in 
particular, the fundamental role imaginative customs play in that anatomy.    
In order to understand fully the effect of psychological distance on causal 
reasoning, and so to gain a fuller picture of the function of the “strength” of the mind and 
the way in which it may be cultivated, we must first appreciate the centrality of custom to 
Hume’s Treatise, Book I account of belief and the extent to which that account is what 
Christine Battersby has called an “epistemology of ease”: on Hume’s theory, Battersby 
argues, man “believes not that which is most correct, nor even that which is most simple, 
but rather that which is easiest—and it is thus the latter that determines reality.”260 As 
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 Christine Battersby, “Hume, Newton, and ‘the Hill called Difficulty’” 38. Hume’s Newtonianism, 
Battersby argues, goes beyond the adoption of a scientific methodology in this way to include some of the 
content of Newton’s laws of motion, the most prominent example being Hume’s postulation of a mental 
“inertia”: for Newton, Battersby writes, “bodies proceed passively along the line of least resistance; for 
Hume minds proceed passively along the easiest path.”  And Wayne Waxman argues that Hume’s theory of 
belief and many of the features of his theory of in influence of belief on our passions “demonstrate the 
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Battersby notes, terms such as ‘ease’ and ‘facility’ “echo through the Treatise” such that 
“Hume’s ‘principle’ of natural order’” may be plausibly said to be “‘the principle of 
ease’.”261  Similarly, John Passmore takes Hume’s associationism to be a “special 
example…only, of a much more general principle…that the mind moves in whatever 
direction will bring it most ease”.262  
There is much truth to this characterization of Hume’s account of belief, 
particularly the discussion of belief in T 1.3-4.  On Hume’s famous Treatise, Book I 
account of belief, a belief is in large part the product of the “easy” and “facile” transitions 
of the imagination—that is, of natural relations of ideas (causation, resemblance, and 
contiguity).  The effect of natural relations is to make the appearance of one idea in the 
mind “naturally introduce” another, or to make the mind “run easily” from one idea to 
another. (1.1.4.2; SBN 11, my emphasis)  And it is this naturalness and ease that fosters 
the transfer of vivacity from present impressions (either of memory or sense) to related 
ideas, which vivacity enlivens those related ideas into beliefs.  As I will show below, on 
that theory our strongest beliefs concern those objects which are most ‘easily’ conceived, 
all other things being equal: as Hume himself puts it, conviction or belief “diminishes in 
proportion to the efforts, which the imagination makes to enter into” any piece of 
reasoning, such that belief “can never be entire, where it is not founded on something 
                                                                                                                                                              
primacy” of the mind’s desire of facility (or, more strictly speaking, of what Waxman aptly calls “facility 
affect”) “over any other principle of human nature.” See, e.g., Waxman, “The Point of Hume’s Skepticism 
with Regard to Reason,” Hume Studies 24.2 (1998): 235-73, 239 and passim. John Wright has shown how 
Hume is influenced by Malebranche on this point. (An Introduction 55)   
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 Christine Battersby, “Hume, Newton and ‘the Hill called Difficulty’” 37-8.   
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 John Passmore, Hume’s Intentions 122. 
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natural and easy” (1.4.1.11; SBN 186, my emphasis), or where the “mind reaches not its 
objects with easiness and facility.” (1.4.1.10; SBN 185, my emphasis)263  
Second, it is important to appreciate the distinctions that can be made between 
Hume’s models of the vivification of our ideas by their natural relations to present 
impressions.  On my reading, Hume employs two distinguishable models of the 
vivification of ideas by their natural relations to present impressions in the Treatise.
264
  
These correspond roughly to the two ways of speaking of the mind: that is, either 
‘vulgarly’ as a subject of perceptions which it forms (e.g. 1.2.6.7, 3.1.1.2; SBN 67, 456), 
or ‘philosophically’ as a “bundle or collection of different perceptions” and nothing else 
beside these “successive perceptions…that constitute the mind.” (1.4.6.4; SBN 253, my 
emphasis)  On the model of vivacity transfer which utilizes the “philosophical” 
conception of the mind
265
, the “transfer” of vivacity between perceptions is conceived in 
terms similar to conductance of electricity between two terminals.  Natural relations of 
ideas on this model passively “convey”266 or “communicate” (1.3.8.2; SBN 98) vivacity 
to connected ideas by functioning as ‘paths of least resistance’ which promote the 
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 It is, moreover, good that nature has made custom and the cognitive ease it brings with it, rather than the 
“laborious deductions of the understanding”, the governing principle of our thought and action, since we 
often have to act without the luxury of profound deliberation and reasoning. (EHU 5.22; SBN 55)  This is a 
claim Hume makes repeatedly in different forms in many different places. (cf. T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187, EHU 
5.2, 6, 21; SBN 41-2, 44-5, 54-5) 
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 A related distinction is drawn, for instance, by Justin Broakes, though Broakes ultimately characterizes 
the heart of what I will call the “exertion” model in terms of the mind’s “attitude” toward the idea it 
conceives, rather than the “force” or “vigor” with which it conceives it. (“Hume, Belief, and Personal 
Identity,” in Reading Hume on Human Understanding, ed. Peter Millican (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 
187-210, esp. 187-197)  
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 I do not mean to imply that the model itself is “philosophical” in any way.  Indeed, neither model is 
philosophical in the sense that both seem to employ dispositional terms—such as “strength”, “ease”, 
“transfer”, “communication”, “conveyance”—which require a deeper analysis in terms of impressions, 
ideas and their relations.    
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 e.g. 1.3.8.4, 1.3.12.25, 1.4.2.21, 2.1.11.5, 2.1.11.8; SBN 100, 142, 208, 318, 320. 
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“smooth passage”267 or flow of vivacity between perceptions in the mind: “The vividness 
of the first conception diffuses itself along the relations, and is convey’d, as by so many 
pipes or canals, to every idea that has any communication with the primary one.” 
(1.3.10.7; SBN 122, my emphasis)  Let us call this Hume’s “conductance model” of 
vivacity transfer.
268
 
On the model that employs the “vulgar” conception of the mind, Hume tends to 
speak of vivacity as a property of both the mind and its perceptions, but not as something 
(passively) “transferred” or “conveyed” or conducted between perceptions.  On this 
model, the vivacity of its ideas is rather a product of the force or energy or “vigour” with 
which the mind forms or conceives its ideas:  
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 e.g. 1.4.2.34-40 passim, 1.4.3.4, 1.4.6.6, 8, 2.1.10.12, 2.2.2.16, 2.3.7.5; SBN 204-8, 220, 254, 256, 316, 
340, 429. 
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 As I note here, Hume’s own explicit account of this model is cast in the terms of hydraulics: vivacity is 
conveyed along relations as along “so many pipes and canals”. (1.3.10.7; SBN 122; cf. 1.4.1.10, 2.2.9.14; 
SBN 185, 386) Thus, Francis W. Dauer has fittingly called this model the “hydraulic model” of vivacity 
transfer. (“Force and Vivacity in the Treatise and the Enquiry,” Hume Studies 25.1/2 (1999): 83-100, 92.)  
The connection of this model to explanations of the operations of the mind in terms of the “flow” of 
Cartesian animal spirits is evident. (cf. John Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 209-19) However, I believe conductance to be a more appropriate 
metaphor: for instance, in keeping with this metaphor, on Hume’s account, the resistance of the 
imagination in its transitions also generates heat. (1.4.7.8; SBN 268, cf. 1.4.7.14; SBN 272)  (Indeed, the 
conductance of electricity is often accounted for by what is called the “hydraulic analogy” precisely 
because of the relative difficulty of explaining the behavior of electric current across a conductor.) For an 
interesting discussion of the relationship between Hume’s hydraulic model and the hydraulic theory of his 
contemporaries, see Robert Feinstein, “Some New Thoughts on David Hume”, Second Order 5.1 (1976): 
44-50.  However, Dauer argues that in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume changes his 
view to something like the “exertion” model I outline below.  (“Force and Vivacity” 95-6; cf. EHU 5.14, 
20; SBN 50-1, 54) In the following discussion, I hope it will become evident that this second model is 
already present in the Treatise, and that the two accounts are the product of Hume’s own (natural) 
vacillation between his own doctrine of the self as merely a heap of perceptions, and that of the “vulgar” 
which takes the mind to be a subject of its perceptions, rather than any significant change in doctrine  
Indeed, in the first Enquiry, where the Treatise doctrine of the self is not discussed, it is natural that Hume 
there employs the exertion model.  (Catherine Kemp argues for a similar conclusion regarding the 
differences between the accounts in the Treatise and first Enquiry on different grounds in, “Two Meanings 
of the Term “Idea”: Acts and Contents in Hume’s Treatise,” Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000): 
675-90, 683-7.) 
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All the operations of the mind depend in a great measure on its disposition, 
when it performs them; and according as the spirits are more or less elevated, 
and the attention more or less fix’d, the action will always have more or less 
vigour and vivacity.  When therefore any object is presented, which elevates and 
enlivens the thought, every action, to which the mind applies itself, will be more 
strong and vivid, as long as that disposition continues. Now ‘tis evident the 
continuance of the disposition depends entirely on the object, about which the 
mind is employ’d; and that any new object naturally gives a new direction to the 
spirits and changes the disposition; as on the contrary, when the mind fixes 
constantly on the same object, or passes easily and insensibly along related 
objects, the disposition has a much longer duration.  Hence it happens, that when 
the mind is once inliven’d by a present impression, it proceeds to form a more 
lively idea of the related object, by a natural transition of the disposition from 
the one to the other.  The change of the objects is so easy, that the mind is scarce 
sensible of it, but applies itself to the conception of the related idea with all the 
force and vivacity it [i.e. the mind] acquir’d from the present impression. 
(1.3.8.2; SBN 99, my emphasis) 
On this model—which I will call the “exertion model” of vivification—the mind is 
endowed with a certain “force” or “vigour” by the vivacity of a present impression, 
putting it in an “elevated” or “enlivened” or “envigorated” disposition, which force and 
vivacity the mind then applies to or “exerts” in its subsequent operations, such as the 
conception of other related ideas.
269
  Where the shift from its conception of one 
perception to that of another is “easy”, the mind retains more of its “force” to employ in 
the latter operation.  It is in this context, I argue, that we must understand Hume’s claim, 
both in the Treatise and first Enquiry, that belief is an “act of the mind, which renders 
realities more present to us than fictions”270 or the “peculiar manner of conceiving” an 
idea—that is, in the same lively and vigorous way it conceives impressions of sense and 
memory. (1.3.7.4; SBN 96, EHU 5.12; SBN 49) As Hume describes the vivification of 
ideas in T 1.4.3, experience and habit, “conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make 
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 Hume himself uses this language of exertion when describing perception: “The mind can never exert 
itself in any action, which we may not comprehend under the term of perception.” (T 3.1.1.2; SBN 456) 
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 1.3.7.7; SBN 629; cf. 1.3.7.5n; SBN 97n, 1.3.9.13; SBN 114, 1.3.9.17; SBN 116, EHU 5.12; SBN 48. 
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me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not 
attended with the same advantages.” (1.4.7.3; SBN 265, my emphasis)  
Though these models are distinguishable, they are not always distinguished 
clearly by Hume, and he sometimes runs the two together.
271
  As I will argue in further 
detail below, it is only on the exertion model of vivification that Hume’s talk of the 
“ease” and “effortlessness” of thought, and of the “strength” of the mind makes sense.  
Indeed, Hume implies throughout the Treatise that the mind is also endowed with its own 
native stock of ‘strength’ or ‘force’, which varies from individual to individual.272  But as 
Hume claims in the passage above, this strength, whether acquired from a present 
impression or innate, is naturally limited: “The mind, as well as the body, seems to be 
endow’d with a certain precise degree of force and activity, which it never employs in 
one action, but at the expence [sic] of all the rest” (1.4.1.11; SBN 186)273  Natural 
relations of ideas on this “exertion” model function serve to preserve vivacity, not by 
promoting the “smooth passage” of ideas in the mind as on the conductance model, but 
by enabling what Annette Baier has aptly called the “conservation of mental effort”274: 
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 On my reading, this is not ultimately a great problem if we keep in mind Hume’s occurrence theory of 
belief—however an idea becomes vivacious, its vivacity is ultimately a certain feeling or sentiment. (See 
Michael Gorman, “Hume’s Theory of Belief”, Hume Studies 14.1 (1993): 89-102, 94-5, for an attempt to 
reconcile what he calls Hume’s “manner of conception” theory (which Gorman takes to encompass parts of 
both models of vivacity transfer outlined above) with Hume’s “feeling theory” of belief.) 
272Hume’s discussion of the “reason” of animals” in the first Enquiry occasions his most detailed 
reflections relevant to this point.  (EHU 9.5n; SBN 107n) In the Treatise, Hume’s talk of the “weak minds” 
of ancient and modern philosophers (e.g., 1.4.3.11; SBN 224-5, 1.4.4.1; SBN 225) which results in their 
inability to free their systems completely from “vulgar”, “unphilosophical” principles. Elsewhere Hume 
talks of certain human beings as possessed of a relatively great degree of “strength of mind”.  (1.4.7.14; 
SBN 272, EHU 1.10; SBN 11, “The Sceptic” EMPL 168)   
273
 As on the Stoic picture, the “strength” of the soul is conceived frequently as analogous to that of the 
body. (cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.27-31, especially 4.30-1, Diogenes Laertius, Lives, ‘Zeno’ 
7.115; on Bacon’s place in this tradition, see Sorana Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind 28)       
274
 A Progress of Sentiments 126, my emphasis. 
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where an idea is related to an impression by resemblance, contiguity or causation, the 
“ease” or effortlessness (as opposed to the merely “smoothness”) of the formation of that 
related idea allows the mind to apply more of its (limited) vivacity and force to its 
conception.
275
  
In the case of causal reasoning, the vivacity-preserving “ease” of the mind’s 
transition between ideas is the product of the mental custom that results from the constant 
conjunction of two objects in experience.  Hume accounts for the “ease” of causal 
relations in the same terms he employs in his T 2.3.5 treatment of the “effects of custom”, 
sketched in the previous chapter.  The mind, having repeatedly perceived an object B 
after perceiving an object A becomes accustomed to conceiving object B upon perceiving 
object A, and as a result of this habit, expends less of its force and vigor in its operation, 
yielding, ceteris paribus, a livelier conception or idea of B—it produces a “facility” and 
“ease”, overcoming the “unpliableness in the faculties” and the “difficulty of the spirit’s 
moving in their new direction.” (2.3.5.2; SBN 422-3; cf. 1.4.2.41; SBN 208) The second 
effect of custom is to give the mind a positive “determination” or tendency toward 
conceiving causally related ideas.  As Hume puts it again in T 1.4, clearly foreshadowing 
his account of the effects of custom in T 2.3.5, this relation of ideas “causes a smooth [or 
‘easy’] passage from the impression to the idea, and even gives a propensity to that 
passage.” (1.4.2.41; SBN 208, my emphasis) As Hume put it in T 2.3.5, the effect of 
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 On Hume’s T 1.3 overall account of belief, mental “facility” or “ease” can be achieved in two primary 
areas of our mental life—either 1) in “bare” conception of any object, or 2) in the movement between 
objects—though I will only discuss the latter.  The ease with which any object is conceived barely (i.e. not 
as related to some other object) is also the result of custom. (1.3.9.16; SBN 116, 2.3.5.1-3; SBN 422-3) As 
Hume noted in T 2.3.5, when an idea or object is novel, there is a certain “difficulty of the spirit’s moving 
in their new direction” and an initial “unpliableness in the faculties”. (2.3.5.2; SBN 422-3, my emphasis)  
The repeated conception of the same idea diminishes this difficulty or unpliableness. 
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custom on the imagination is a “facility…in the conception of any object; and afterwards 
a tendency or inclination” towards it. (2.3.5.1; SBN 422, Hume’s emphasis)276  
  Although, as I have already noted, the main effect of these relations and habits, 
when “parallel” to causation (1.3.9.12; SBN 112), is to enhance belief by producing an 
“easier and more natural movement” than that which the customary conjunction of 
causation alone produces (1.3.9.8-12; SBN 110-13, my emphasis), as I also noted, where 
there is a “want of [them] in any great degree”, that lack is “able almost entirely to 
destroy” causal beliefs:  “As belief is an act of the mind arising from custom, ‘tis not 
strange the want of [such parallel relations] shou’d overthrow what custom has 
establish’d, and diminish the force of the idea as much as that latter principle encreases 
it.” (1.3.9.13; SBN 114, my emphasis) “’[T]is not strange” that such relations should 
affect the strength of custom-based causal relations, because all natural relations rely on 
the “ease” and “propensity” of the mental transition for the vivification of related ideas  
(cf. 1.4.2.41; SBN 208)
277
, these propensities may often be at odds with one another.  In 
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 This facility and ease, and the principles of association and the “natural” introduction of related ideas 
was explained by the Cartesians and Locke in terms of the wearing of channels in the brain by the repeated 
flow of animal spirits.  Hume adopts this idiom to explain association of ideas in particular (1.2.5.20; SBN 
60-1) and, in T 2.3.5 to explain the influence of custom generally.  (See also, 1.4.1.10; SBN 185)  Locke, in 
a section of the Essay entitled “Of the Association of Ideas”, talks of “intellectual Habits, and of the tying 
together of Ideas” in terms of “ease” and “naturalness” similar to Hume’s. (Essay 2.33.6, my emphasis)  
Hume was also largely influenced by Malebranche and the Cartesians on this point, though he surely 
viewed the idiom of “animal spirits” and “brain traces” merely as a useful heuristic device for illustrating 
his account.  (See John Wright, The Skeptical Realism of David Hume 215-9) 
277
 Whether or not Hume intends to explain this “ease” and “propensity” of the other natural relations of 
ideas to custom is unclear.  On the surface, it would seem that on Hume’s account, the ‘ease’ with which 
the mind moves between ideas related by contiguity and resemblance (the ground of their status as “natural 
relations” of ideas) is inexplicable beyond our plain experience of it.  There is some question, however, as 
to whether the “ease” of these two natural relations of ideas is in fact explanatorily basic, and more 
specifically, whether it is the result of custom.  Though Hume never spells this out explicitly, it is plausible 
that relations of contiguity and resemblance are also the result of custom on his theory, but unlike causal 
relations, they are extremely diffuse customs which guide the mind in a “loose” rather than “fixed” manner 
to any one of several objects we have experienced to be contiguous to or to resemble the original object.  
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order to vivify a related idea, a natural relation must actually produce the “easy” and 
“facile” transition from impression to idea.  This is precisely the force of Hume’s oft-
repeated claim that the “very nature and essence of [natural] relation is to connect our 
ideas with each other, and upon the appearance of one, to facilitate the transition to its 
correlative.” (1.4.2.34; SBN 204, my emphasis)278 Where this facile transition does not 
result, there is strictly speaking no (natural) relation of ideas, and, more importantly, no 
resulting belief.  In Book II, Hume, in a more relaxed idiom, distinguishes the relation 
itself from its actual “influence, in causing a transition of the imagination” from one 
perception to another.
279
  Speaking in this idiom in the case of causation, we may say that 
the influence of a relation (as distinct from the relation itself) is necessary for causal 
reasoning to result in belief.  But as I noted above, the relations of contiguity and 
resemblance (as well as the “artificial” customs produced by education) also have 
“influence” of their own, wherever the influence of causation is counteracted by that of 
some other principle (including by the influence of contrary customs), so too may causal 
beliefs be diminished or even eliminated despite the perfection of the causal relation 
                                                                                                                                                              
For instance, the objects related in experience by contiguity to any one object in the same degree are often 
innumerable, and so the mind feels no such strong determination to call up any one of these object in 
particular on any given occasion. (cf. 1.3.9.6; SBN 109-110)  In a relation of causation, two and only two 
objects are conjoined and so the mind feels a strong determination to call up the effect on the appearance of 
the cause.  That contiguity is founded on custom on Hume’s theory is a claim made by Janet Broughton, for 
example. (“Impressions and Ideas,” in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise, ed. Saul L. Traiger 
(Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2006):43-58, 50. cf. T 1.1.4.2; SBN 11, which will be discussed in more 
detail below.) I find Broughton’s claim plausible, though such questions do not materially affect my 
argument.  
278
 See, e.g., 1.3.8.3, 1.4.3.3, 1.4.6.16; SBN 99, 220, 260; see also, 2.1.5.10n, 2.1.9.4, 2.1.9.13,  2.2.4.8-13, 
2.2.8.14, 3.2.3.10n; SBN 289n, 305, 309, 355-7, 378, 510n.     
279
 2.2.2.16; SBN 339-40, my emphasis. See 1.4.3.3; SBN 220 for a similar ambivalence between ease 
being the “effect” of a natural relation or its very “essence”.  Perhaps, Hume would consider a natural 
relation in abstraction from its “influence” to be what he elsewhere calls a “philosophical relation”. (cf. 
1.1.5.9, 1.3.6.15; SBN 15, 94)  Indeed, on Hume’s account, all three natural relations are also philosophical 
relations—that is, a quality “which makes objects admit of comparison” upon reflection. (1.1.5.2; SBN 14)  
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(again, considered in abstraction from its “influence”).280  It is thus a consequence of this 
“epistemology of ease” not only that our strongest beliefs are those conceived with the 
least mental “effort”, but also that the “easiest” movement of the imagination is not 
necessarily one traced out purely by perfectly certain causal relations.  The influence of 
these other relations (and habits) on the mind may diminish or even destroy causal beliefs 
by thwarting the “easy” and “facile” transition which a customary conjunction of ideas, 
in itself, ought to produce. 
On the ‘exertion model’ of vivification, these contrary influences are said to tax 
the ‘strength’ or ‘force’ of the mind in conceiving its ideas, thus diminishing the vivacity 
of those related ideas which constitute our beliefs.  Indeed, Hume characterizes such 
contrary influences in precisely these terms—that is, as causes of mental “effort” or 
“exertion”281, “labour” or “exercise”282, or a “study” or “stretch” or “straining” of 
thought.
283
 All of these have a diminishing effect on belief by requiring the mind to 
expend a portion of the limited “force” and “strength” it would have otherwise used to 
conceive related ideas vividly.  As Hume puts it in T 2.3.8, such forms of difficulty 
diminish the vivacity of our beliefs by “weakening” the imagination. (2.3.8.10; SBN 436)  
Accordingly, a “strong mind” or imagination on this picture is on the other hand one 
which has force enough to oppose these contrary and ‘unphilosophical’ influences on the 
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 The same is true of the “influence” of other forms of custom.  Indeed, “education” too is the result of the 
influence of custom, and so can often overthrow the authority even of our reasonings from causation for 
precisely the same reason, though it is not “recogniz’d by philosophers” as a legitimate source of belief. 
(1.3.9.17-19; SBN 116-17)  That this is possible, Hume argues, demonstrates the power of his hypothesis 
concerning belief—that it is the result of the natural and easy introduction of an idea in the mind, whatever 
the source of that introduction may be.   
281
 cf. 1.4.1.11, 1.4.3.5, 1.4.6.6, 2.2.9.14, 2.2.12.8, 2.3.4.9, 2.3.8.12, 3.1.1.2; SBN 185, 221, 254, 386, 398, 
422, 437, 456. 
282
 cf. 1.3.13.17, 1.4.2.33, 2.3.10.4, 6; SBN 153, 203, 449, 451. 
283
 cf. 1.3.15.11, 1.4.1.11, 1.4.2.52, 1.4.6.22, 1.4.7.9, 2.3.10.3; SBN 175, 185-6, 214-5, 263, 269, 449. 
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mind, and persist “firmly” in its vivid attention to the objects of causal beliefs, however 
psychologically distant these objects may be.
284
 
   
3.9 The Effects of Imaginative Opposition and “Distance” on Belief in T 1.3-4 
The para-causal “influences” on the mind discussed above are first treated in 
Treatise, Book I and come primarily to the fore in the later sections of T 1.3, and in T 1.4.  
In contrast to these sections of Treatise, Book I, most of the earlier sections of T 1.3 are 
concerned with an examination of the anatomy of what we may call a “simple” causal 
belief—a single idea, related directly to a present impression by causation.  In these 
sections, Hume proceeds like the careful scientist of human nature in his anatomical 
theater dissecting an ideal specimen of that relation.  He first isolates the essential, atomic 
elements of the mechanism of causal belief: 1) the present impression, 2) the customary 
transition between it and a related idea, and 3) the related idea itself.  He then strips away 
each, showing in turn how the phenomenon in question fails to be produced in order to 
prove that each element is a necessary condition, finally concluding that jointly they are 
the necessary and sufficient causes of that phenomenon.
285
 (1.3.8.8-12; SBN 101-3; cf. 
1.3.2.5, 12; SBN 75, 77)  
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And, though I cannot argue the claim in any detail here, on my reading, it would not be an exaggeration 
to characterize T 1.4 in particular as a detailed investigation of the effects of feelings of imaginative facility 
and opposition generated by these influences, and the primacy of the former—imaginative facility—in 
determining the force the majority not only of our “vulgar”, pre-critical beliefs (those beliefs that govern us 
in “common life”, such as our belief in external objects that have an independent and continued existence) 
but also of many of the core principles of the ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ philosophies as Hume characterizes 
them. (cf. 1.4.2.37; SBN 205-6, 1.4.3.5; SBN 221) 
285
 This is precisely Hume’s procedure, for example, both in the first five of his “experiments” to confirm 
his account of the “indirect” passions of pride, humility, love and hatred in T 2.2.2 (2.2.2.5-13; SBN 333-
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However, causal relations among objects—both in philosophical reasoning and in 
our reasonings in common life—are not so simple, nor is their influence on the mind so 
clinically isolated from the influence of other perceptions, mental customs and relations 
of ideas.  In the later sections of T 1.3 and in T 1.4, Hume brings causal reasoning out of 
the anatomist’s theater and examines the complexity of the ‘unphilosophical’ influences 
on the vivacity of our causal beliefs.  On the more detailed picture that emerges from 
these sections, the vivacity of an individual’s causal beliefs is a complex function of three 
isolable variables:  
1) Input Vivacity: the “original force” (1.3.13.2; SBN 144) or vivacity of 
the lively perception (e.g. a present impression of sense or a lively idea 
of memory) on which a causal argument is ultimately based, and which 
first invigorates the mind.  
2) Imaginative Effort: the relative imaginative difficulty the mind 
encounters in moving from this input to the ‘conclusion’ of an 
argument.  This variable is itself a complex, nested function of two 
isolable sub-variables:  
2a. Argumentative ‘Distance’: the overall “distance” to which a causal 
argument carries a chain of causes and effects from any present, lively 
perception to its conclusion, and  
                                                                                                                                                              
38), and in his account of the necessary conditions of justice in T 3.2.2 and EPM 3. (cf. 3.2.2.5-6, 15-20; 
SBN 487-8, 493- 96, EPM 3.2-20, SBN 183-92) 
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2b. Internal Argumentative Coherence: The relative internal coherence or 
unity of the argumentative chain (i.e. the strength of the individual 
relations that compose it).  
3) Strength of the Mind: The relative innate “strength” or “firmness” of an 
individual imagination.  
What I have called ‘psychological distance’ plays a role in determining in large 
measure both variables (1) and (2).  Regarding Hume’s discussion of variable (1) in T 
1.3-4, the input vivacity of any argument is the vivacity of the perception (whether 
impression or lively idea) on which that argument is “founded”, and variations in the 
psychological distance of the object of the lively founding perception from oneself in 
large part determines this founding vivacity: “conviction…diminishes in proportion to the 
efforts which the imagination makes to enter into the reasoning…” (1.4.1.11; SBN 186, 
my emphasis; cf. 1.3.12.20; SBN 139) and the degree of effort is determined by the 
psychological distance the mind must travel from our present situation in order to “enter 
into” an argument. In cases where an argument is founded directly on an impression of 
present sensation, there is no such psychological distance to overcome. However, this is 
not the case where the founding perception of an argument is, for instance, and 
impression of memory.  Because the vivacity of an idea of memory diminishes in 
proportion to the temporal distance of the object which it represents, all other things 
being equal, the vivacity of the resulting belief will vary according to the spatiotemporal 
distance of the object of that founding impression of memory from the present: “The 
argument, which we found on any matter of fact we remember, is more or less 
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convincing, according as the fact is recent or remote…”286 (1.3.13.1; SBN 143, my 
emphasis)  Another cause of variations in input vivacity is the “distance” in resemblance 
between the object of a impression and the “premise” of a causal argument in analogical 
reasoning.  Where a natural relation of causation between two kinds of objects, a cause X 
and an effect Y, has been established in the mind, a present impression of an object 
similar to X (or X’) may still prompt the mind to infer idea Y, but the vivacity of the idea 
of Y will vary in proportion to the “distance” of the resemblance between X and X’. 
(1.3.12.25; SBN 142)
287
  Hume does discuss the factors which determine variable (1) in T 
2.3.7, and notes their effects on the passions.
288
  However, much more important for our 
purposes is variable (2) and my discussion will focus on it.         
The contrary influences or sources of imaginative difficulty or “labour”—
variables (2a-b)—require the mind (on the exertion model of the vivification of ideas) to 
                                                     
286
The effects of this form of unphilosophical probability on the will and passions is discussed briefly at T 
2.3.6.5. (SBN 426) I omit from my discussion the second form of unphilosophical probability Hume 
discusses in T 1.3.13—what he characterizes as the staleness of a mental custom: the efficacy of a causal 
connection we draw between two objects decreases over time, whereas a recent conjunction “preserves 
better the original force” (or what I have called “input vivacity”) from impression to idea. (1.3.13.2; SBN 
144)  Here psychological distance is also at play, but for simplicity’s sake I omit discussion of it—indeed, 
Hume does not discuss this form of unphilosophical probability again, to my knowledge.   
287
 In T 1.4, Hume also suggests that input vivacity is determined by what Hume calls the “posture of the 
mind”—whether it is ‘easy’ or ‘uneasy’ (1.4.1.10; SBN 185) in forming ideas of the objects out of which 
any argument is constructed. For instance, where we reason about the morality of an action or about an 
event in history, the objects from which we build our argument are the familiar objects of common life: as 
such, these objects are “enter’d into with facility” (2.3.10.10; SBN 452) and the mind maintains an “easy” 
posture.  On the other hand, the object or observation on which a causal argument is founded in 
metaphysics or in other “abstruse” sciences, may be “remote from vulgar conception”. (1.2.1.1; SBN 26, 
my emphasis; cf. EHU 7.24; SBN 72, NHR 1.8) Indeed, elsewhere, Hume uses the term “remote” 
reasoning as a synonym for “abstruse” reasoning. (T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268, EHU 1.12; SBN 12, 8.35; SBN 
102, EPM 5.17; SBN 219) “Refin’d or elaborate reasoning” constitutes a “remote views of things”. 
(1.4.7.7; SBN 268)  Thus, the philosopher lives “remote from communication with mankind” because he is 
“wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension”. (EHU 1.5; SBN 8, my 
emphasis; cf. 1.9; SBN 10)   Psychological distance here is parsed by Hume in terms of the distance 
between the resemblance of the “posture” or “disposition” of the mind in an argument, and that “relaxed” 
posture it takes in common life and everyday “vulgar” reasoning. (1.4.1.11; SBN 186; cf. 1.3.8.2, 1.4.2.32, 
39; SBN 98-99, 202-3, 205) 
288
 I discuss this aspect of T 2.3.7 in a later note. (See note 305)  
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expend greater amounts of its limited “strength” in its operations.  Accordingly, Hume 
writes in regard to these variables: 
’[T]is certainly true, that any reasoning is always the more convincing, [(2b):] 
the more single and united it is to the eye, and the less exercise it gives to the 
imagination to collect all its parts, and [(2a):] run from them to the correlative 
idea, which forms the conclusion.  The labour of the thought disturbs the 
regular progress of the sentiments…The idea strikes not on us with such 
vivacity; and consequently has no such influence on the passions and 
imagination.” (1.3.13.17; SBN 153, my emphasis) 
The effects of these forms of imaginative difficulty on our causal beliefs come to the fore 
in the later sections of T 1.3 and in T 1.4, and I will briefly treat Hume’s discussion of 
them here.
289
               
As in the case of variable (1), these variables are also determined by 
psychological distance.  In the case of variable (2a), one main form this distance takes is 
the “length” of an argument—its “number of steps” or the number of “links” or relations 
of ideas. The “longer” the chain, Hume tells us, the more even proof degenerates into 
probability by the difficulty the mind has in preserving the vivacity of the initial 
impression through all of the “steps” of reasoning: 
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 Hume’s account of the effects of “distance” and mental “difficulty” and the “labour of the thought” they 
occasion on belief, moreover, becomes an integral part of his T 1.4.1 explanation of how we maintain any 
belief in the face of strong skeptical arguments concerning the reliability and strength of our understanding, 
even in demonstrative reasoning. At T 1.3.13.17, Hume refers (cf. 1.3.13.17n; SBN 153n) to his application 
of his account of imaginative difficulty to his account of “scepticism with regard to reason” in T 1.4.1. 
(1.4.1.9; SBN 184-5)  Such skeptical arguments undermine themselves by their own intricacy and 
difficulty, as well as the “distance” to which they must be carried.  And adding a further complication to his 
account of argumentative “distance” (one which I will have occasion to discuss in further detail later in this 
chapter), Hume here parses “distance” not only in terms of the “length” of the chain of reasoning involved, 
but also in terms of its lack of resemblance to—or what he elsewhere calls its “remoteness” from—the 
concerns and reasonings of “common life”. And like the other form of psychological distance, that which 
characterizes abstruse philosophical arguments taxes the strength of the mind, because it requires “a study 
and effort of thought” which “disturbs the operation of our sentiments, on which the belief depends.”  
(1.4.1.11; SBN 185) 
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‘Tis certain, that when an inference is drawn immediately from an object, 
without any intermediate cause or effect, the conviction is much stronger, and 
the perswasion [sic] more lively, than when the imagination is carry’d thro’ a 
long chain of connected arguments, however infallible the connexion of each 
link may be esteem’d.  ‘Tis from the original impression, that the vivacity of all 
the ideas is deriv’d, by means of the customary transition of the imagination; 
and ‘tis evident this vivacity must gradually decay in proportion to the distance, 
and must lose somewhat in each transition. Sometimes this distance has a 
greater influence than even contrary experiments wou’d have; and a man may 
receive a more lively conviction from a probable reason, which is close and 
immediate, than from a long chain of consequences, tho’ just and conclusive.290 
(1.3.13.4; SBN 144) 
Here Hume stipulates that the causal relation between each idea in the chain is 
“infallible” or “just and conclusive”—in effect, holding constant variable (2b), internal 
argumentative coherence, as in “proof”, so that he can isolate the effect of variable (2a), 
the absolute “length” or “distance” of that chain on belief.         
Moreover, argumentative “distance” may also be parsed in terms the “closeness” 
or “remoteness” of the resemblance between the conclusion of any argument and the 
present impression from which that conclusion draws its vivacity.  In T 2.3.7, Hume will 
note that a man cares far less for his condition thirty years from now, than for what will 
happen to him tomorrow because of the effects of the temporal distance of that condition 
from the present on belief.  (2.3.7.3; SBN 428-9)  But Hume explains the “universal 
carelessness and stupidity of men with regard to a future state”—that is, why the 
“vulgar”, though they ‘have no formal principles of infidelity” are yet “really infidels in 
their heart” (1.3.9.13; SBN 114, my emphasis)—as a result of the “remoteness” of the 
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 See also T 1.3.5.7n (SBN 97n) and EHU 7.1-2 (SBN 60-1). 
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resemblance of our future state to our present condition in common life rather than to its 
temporal distance (though that certainly must also play a role
291
). 
A future state is so far remov’d from our comprehension, and we have so 
obscure an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after the dissolution of 
the body, that all the reasons we can invent, however strong in themselves, and 
however much assisted by education, are never able with slow imaginations to 
surmount this difficulty, or bestow sufficient authority and force on the idea.  I 
rather choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea we form of our future 
condition, deriv’d from its want of resemblance to the present life, than to that 
deriv’d from its remoteness [i.e. in time].  For I observe, that men are every 
where concern’d about what may happen after their death, provided it regard 
this world; and that there are few to whom their name, their family, their friends, 
and their country are in any period of time entirely indifferent. (1.3.9.13; SBN 
114, my emphasis)
292
 
Indeed, where any argument carries the mind a great “distance” (construed here in terms 
of resemblance) away from the familiar, concrete objects of common life, the vivacity of 
its conclusion is weaker in proportion to the degree to which that resemblance decays.   
In the Treatise, Hume conceives the second form of imaginative difficulty—
variable (2b), the relative internal argumentative coherence (the relative unity of the 
individual relations that compose the “links” of any argument) equally broadly, in terms 
of all three relations of ideas.  Holding the “distance” or “length” of an argument constant 
(i.e. the absolute number of its causal links), the conviction that argument produces will 
vary according to relative “difficulty” with which the mind moves over these causal links, 
from one idea to another.  In T 1.3, this relative difficulty is presented mainly as a 
function of the relative ‘distance’ of the resemblance between the objects which make up 
the links of that argument.  (Differences in relations of contiguity also play a role here, 
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 cf. Hume’s unpublished essay, “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” EMPL 592. 
292
 As opposed to these vulgar reasoners with “slow imaginations”, people of quick, strong minds are able 
to instill in themselves a belief in a future life by means of “repeated meditation.” (1.3.9.14; SBN 114-5)   
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though I will reserve discussion of this feature of Hume’s account for my treatment of T 
2.3.7 below.)  For instance, the “parallel influence” of resemblance on causal reasoning at 
T 1.3.9.10 explains why natural philosophers so strongly believe in the a priority of 
Newton’s third law of motion: the extremely close “resemblance betwixt the cause and 
the effect”—that is, the resemblance between the “equal and opposite” motion of each to 
the two bodies in the elastic collision—is “here united to experience, and binds the 
objects in the closest and most intimate manner to each other, so as to make us imagine 
them to be absolutely inseparable.” (1.3.9.10; SBN 111-12, my emphasis) Similarly, our 
firm belief in the testimony of historians, despite our spatiotemporal distance—that is, 
variable (2a), the “length of the transition” of the imagination—from the present to the 
past fact is an example of the effects of this form of relative imaginative difficulty.  In 
some cases, “tho’ the links are innumerable, that connect any original fact with the 
present impression, which is the foundation of belief”, the strong causal relation between 
the initial report of ancient eye-witness historian and our reading of that report is 
underwritten by the “fidelity of printers and copists [sic]” (i.e. by the perfection of the 
causal links of the chain grounded in the great probability of the accuracy of their 
transmission
293
) but is additionally aided by the fact that the links are “all of the same 
kind…” (1.3.13.6; SBN 146) That is, as what we may call the ‘medium of transmission’ 
is not only very reliable, but relatively unvaried through time, the causal relations which 
make up that argument themselves strongly resemble one another and so conserve the 
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 Hume is particularly attentive to questions of testimony and our belief in it in the first Enquiry 
(particularly in relation to the evidence of miracles in EHU 10). On testimony and its relation to belief in 
general, see T 1.3.9.5; SBN 112-3, EHU 5.7, 10.5-8; SBN 45-6, 111-13. 
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strength or force of the mind for a more vivid conception of the “conclusion” (or ultimate 
related idea):  
[T]he mind runs easily along them, jumps from one part to another with 
facility…By this means [i.e. by the resemblance of the links] a long chain of 
argument, has as little effect in diminishing the original vivacity, as a much 
shorter wou’d have, if compos’d of parts, which were different from each other, 
and of which each requir’d a distinct consideration. (1.3.13.6; SBN 146, my 
emphasis) 
This phenomenon can, again, be attributed to the natural relation of resemblance running 
parallel to that of causation: despite the great argumentative distance, the influence of 
resemblance in forwarding our ideas parallels that of causation and so facilitates belief 
enough to counter the diminishing effect of great spatiotemporal distance.  On the other 
hand, our conviction regarding the same events would be diminished not merely in cases 
where it is founded on unreliable or conjectural evidence (e.g. a historian’s uncertain 
conjectures, or by oral tradition and folk-lore (cf. NHR 1.8)), but also in cases where 
there is greater variety (non-resemblance) in those sources.
294
  
 So far I have outlined the factors which determine the relative vivacity of an 
individual’s causal beliefs.  However, as we have discussed throughout this chapter, 
Hume’s theory introduces another variable that accounts for differences among 
individuals— (3) what Hume calls in T 1.3.13 the relative “strength” and “firmness” of 
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 Hume provides us a nice illustration of both forms of imaginative difficulty in his discussion of the 
differences between geometrical and moral arguments at the beginning of EHU 7: “One may 
safely…affirm, that, if we consider these sciences [i.e. geometrical and moral sciences] in a proper light, 
their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate each other, and reduce both of them to a state of 
equality.  If the mind, with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must 
carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of reasoning, and compare ideas much wider of each 
other, in order to reach the abstruser truths of that science.  And if moral ideas are apt, without extreme 
care, to fall into obscurity and confusion, the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions, and 
the intermediate steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity 
and number.” (cf. EHU 7.2; SBN 60-1, my emphasis) 
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the imagination of each individual, that native “force” it has to persist “firmly” in tracing 
out causal relations and conceiving related vivaciously despite the ‘opposition’ of other 
natural relations of ideas.
295
  On Hume’s exertion model, the mind draws its “force” in 
part from the vivacity of present impressions. But, as he again implies in T 1.3.13, the 
mind has its own strength or force which varies from individual to individual: an 
argument which is carried out to any great “distance”, Hume writes, “seldom…produces 
any conviction”; rather, “one must have a very strong and firm imagination to preserve 
the evidence to the end, where it passes thro’ so many stages.” (1.3.13.3; SBN 144, my 
emphasis)  Every mind has ‘strength’ in absolute terms, but Hume is clear that some 
minds have, comparatively speaking, greater ‘strength’ than others, and so are ‘strong 
minds’.   
          
3.10 “Distance”, Relation, and the Strength of Motivating Passions in the 
Treatise 
    In T 2.3.7, Hume brings to bear the very same complex function for explaining 
the relative vivacity of our causal beliefs he first developed in T 1.3.13 on his theory of 
motivation.  In doing so, he takes his discussion of the causes of the vivacity of our 
causal beliefs farther out of the anatomist’s closet and draws out further the connection 
between his T 1 theory of belief and T 2 theory of motivation he first sketched in T 
1.3.10.  As I have already noted, Hume brings explicitly to the fore in T 2.3.7 a particular 
cause of imaginative difficulty or “effort” or the expending of the “strength” of the 
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 Similarly, in T 1.4.1, the relative “constancy”, “strength” or “weakness” of our own individual mental 
powers. (cf. 1.4.1.1; SBN 180; cf. 1.4.1.5-6; SBN 181-3) 
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mind—the spatiotemporal distance of the object of a belief—and brings it to bear on his 
account of motivation by investigating its effects on hedonic belief. The general question 
he takes up in T 2.3.7 is “why every thing contiguous to us, either in space or time, 
shou’d be conceiv’d with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object, in 
its influence on the imagination.” (2.3.7.1; SBN 427)  And, as we might expect, his 
explanation of this phenomenon involves in examination a variables (1), (2a) and (2b) on 
the vivacity of our ideas.  Importantly, it is in T 2.3.7 that we get Hume’s most detailed 
account of why the contrary “influences” on the mind of para-causal natural relations—
variables (2a) and (2b), particularly spatiotemporal contiguity—diminish belief, and as 
we would now expect, sources of imaginative difficulty and “effort” which draw down 
the strength of the imagination play the fundamental roles in that explanation: “The fewer 
steps we make to arrive at them object, and the smoother the road is, this diminution of 
vivacity is less sensibly felt, but still may be observ’d more or less in proportion to the 
degrees of distance and difficulty.” (2.3.7.2; SBN 428, final emphasis mine)   
 Moreover, Hume not only expands his explanation of the causes of the vivacity 
of our causal beliefs by examining more closely the effects of spatiotemporal situation of 
objects on the imagination and passions, but also deepens his earlier model by explaining 
how the self plays the key role in bringing about the effects on the vivacity of our ideas 
Hume only describes in T 1.3.
296
  However, the conception of the ‘self’ Hume presents in 
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 Some commentators on Book I take the effects of “psychological distance” (our variable (2a)) on 
probable reasoning to be an unexplained empirical observation by Hume. (e.g. Robert Fogelin, Hume's 
Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature 178-9n6, and Hume’s Skeptical Crisis: A Textual Study 32).  
Louis E. Loeb, on the other hand, appreciates that “Hume intends his associationist principle governing the 
degradation of vivacity to explain this general empirical phenomenon”, which he couches, as I have, in 
terms of “argumentative distance”, and in terms of “psychological distance” more generally.  (Stability and 
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T 2.3.7 is much narrower than that he employs elsewhere in the Treatise.  It is not the 
abstract idea of ‘self’ presented in Treatise, Book I as a “system of different perceptions” 
united diachronically by relations of causation, but the present embodied self, a ‘bundle’ 
composed of impressions of outer and inner present sense, minus the lively ideas of past 
and future objects that causal reasoning calls to mind. (cf. 1.4.7.3; SBN 265) Hume calls 
this the “present situation” of the self, one’s present passions and sense impressions both 
of his body and its immediate surroundings.
297
         
To utilize the Newtonian metaphor Hume himself employs in the Treatise, if the 
principles of association are “a kind of attraction” in the mental world analogous to the 
force of gravity in the physical (1.1.4.6; SBN 12-3, 2.1.5.10; SBN 289), our ideas have 
“centers of gravity” of sorts.  In general, the strongest of these is the lively perception of 
the present situation of oneself
298
:   
‘Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately 
present with us, and that our consciousness gives so lively a conception of our 
own person, that ‘tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular 
go beyond it.  Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be 
conceiv’d with a like vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing 
principles; and tho’ this relation shou’d not be so strong as that of causation, it 
must still have a considerable influence.  Resemblance and contiguity are 
relations not to be neglected… (2.1.11.4; SBN 317, my emphasis; cf. 2.2.2.15, 
2.2.4.7; SBN 339, 354) 
Thus, when we do turn our attention from ourselves, “’tis natural,” Hume tells us, “for us 
to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us or resemble us”. (2.2.2.17; 
                                                                                                                                                              
Justification 112, cf. 112-138 passim) Though Loeb declines to investigate Hume’s associationist account 
of this phenomenon, I argue that the explanation of these effects is offered in T 2.3.7. 
297
 On this and other points of difference between the ‘self’ as it appears in T 1.4.6 and in T 2.3.7, see 
Marina Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self in Hume’s Treatise (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 195-8.   
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 We will have occasion to discuss the other such “centers of ideational gravity” in the following chapter. 
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SBN 340-1) The reason for this, as Hume tells us explicitly in the passage quoted above 
and in T 2.3.7 (2.3.7.1-3; SBN 427-8), is the vivacity of these objects, which they derive 
from their close relationship to the vivacious idea of ourselves.  Hume here repeats his 
claim that “[o]urself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must 
partake of that quality.” (2.3.7.1; SBN 427)299 The attention of the imagination naturally 
“gravitates” towards lively ideas: thus, it has a general propensity to move from ideas of 
psychologically “remote” objects to those “contiguous” to us, the former being for that 
reason less vivacious than the latter. (cf. 2.2.2.20-1; SBN 342-3)
300
 
Accordingly, as the influence of any object on the will and passions is 
proportionate to its vivacity, objects contiguous to ourselves in space and time have a 
superior influence on our will and passions, ceteris paribus, than objects more “remote”: 
Here then we are to consider two kinds of objects, the contiguous and remote; of 
which the former, by means of their relation to ourselves, approach an 
impression in force and vivacity…This is their effect on the imagination.  If my 
reasoning [i.e. in T 2.3.6] be just, they must have a proportionable effect on the 
will and passions.  Contiguous objects must have an influence much superior to 
the distant and remote. (2.3.7.3; SBN 428) 
Hume’s account of why this is the case at times mixes elements of his conductance and 
exertion models of the vivification of our ideas, but employs mainly the latter. In 
particular, it is because hedonic objects contiguous to us in space in time are more easily 
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 In this way, it is clear how Hume can account for the first three sources of “unphilosophical probability” 
he explicitly discusses in T 1.3.13—in these cases the vivacity of an idea which constitutes the belief 
founded on such probability draws its vivacity (and so its influence on our conduct) from its contiguity to 
the idea of self.   
300
 We might note here that resemblance will also affect the transitions of the imagination by vivifying 
those objects (i.e. human beings) which resemble ourselves, and of these, vivifying more those which bear 
a closer resemblance to us.  This is, in fact, Hume’s explanation of our natural tendency to sympathize with 
others in proportion to our resemblance and contiguity to them. (2.1.11.5-6; SBN 318, 2.2.4.6-7; SBN 354, 
2.2.7.4; SBN 370, 3.3.1.15; SBN 581)  Hume makes the same point in regard to causation, of which blood 
relation, for instance, is a species—thus, we love and sympathize more easily with our relatives than with 
others, ceteris paribus. (cf. 2.2.4.2; SBN 351-2)     
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conceived that they have a greater degree of vivacity and so a greater influence on the 
will than remote objects. 
Hume explains why objects contiguous to us are particularly vivacious by 
detailing a few other natural “propensities” or customs of the imagination, compliance 
with which constitutes an “easier” transition of the imagination.      
‘Tis obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the points of space 
and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of 
them from the passions and senses, that however it may turn its attention to 
foreign and remote object, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the 
present. (2.3.7.2; SBN 427-8) 
Earlier, at T 1.1.4, Hume told us that as our senses “in changing their objects, are 
necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, 
the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along 
the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects.” (1.1.4.2; SBN 11)  This habit of the 
imagination plays an important role in T 2.3.7 in explaining why objects that lie 
spatiotemporally remote from us are not the primary objects of our attention: 
’Tis also remarkable, that in the conception of those objects, which we regard as 
real and existent [i.e. those objects which causal reasoning “paints out” to us is 
its “second system of realities”], we take them in their proper order and 
situation, and never leap from one object to another, which is distant from it, 
without running over, at least in a cursory manner, all those objects, which are 
interpos’d betwixt them. (2.3.7.2; SBN 428, my emphasis)  
Because our sensation of objects proceeds according to their spatiotemporal order and 
situation, the imagination develops a habit or custom of doing the same—that is, the 
imagination is always distance-aware.  This, of course, is not to say that every “link” in 
the causal sequence of nature between the present and any future (hedonic) object is 
present to consciousness: as Hume notes, “past experience, on which all our judgments 
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concerning causes and effects depend, operate on our mind in such an insensible manner 
as never to be taken notice of, and may even in some measure be unknown to us.” 
(1.3.8.13; SBN 103; cf. EHU 4.8; SBN 28-9) It is rather a cursory scanning or “running 
over” of the ideas interposed between ourselves and any object, which scanning, Hume 
implies, takes more effort the more distant an object is because our imagination must 
exert force in escaping what we may call, in keeping with Hume’s Newtonian analogy, 
the “gravity well” of the self:  
When we reflect, therefore on any object distant from ourselves, we are oblig’d 
not only to reach it at first by passing thro’ all the intermediate space betwixt 
ourselves and the object, but also to renew our progress every moment; being 
every moment recall’d to the consideration of ourselves and our present 
situation.  (2.3.7.2; SBN 428, my emphasis) 
Those lively present impressions which constitute our selves, and those related ideas to 
which causal reasoning “casts our view” away from our selves are in competition for the 
mind’s attention.  Thus, the progressive ‘scanning’ that transfers vivacity from ourselves 
to any relatively distant object is subject to more “interruptions”—because of their 
superior vivacity; our attention is repeatedly “pulled” back to those vivacious objects 
which are more immediately contiguous to us.  For instance, vivacious present 
impressions of sense—those that compose the “present situation” of the self—continually 
impinge on the mind, and interrupt that chain of reasoning which carries us away from 
the present to the future.  Again employing the exertion model of vivification, Hume 
writes, “‘Tis easily conceiv’d, that this interruption must weaken the idea by breaking the 
action of the mind, and hindering the conception from being so intense and continu’d, as 
when we reflect on a nearer object.” (2.3.7.3; SBN 428, my emphasis) 
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However, as I noted earlier in my discussion of T 1.3-4, it is not only the absolute 
number of “steps we make to arrive at the object” (variable (2a)) that is inversely 
proportional to the vivacity of the distant object: holding the distance of any two 
arguments or objects constant, differences in the vivacity of their conclusions will be 
attributable to differences in the relative difficulty with which the imagination moves 
over the ideas interposed between a present impression and the conclusion (variable (2b), 
or what I called earlier ‘internal argumentative coherence’). (2.3.7.2; SBN 428)301  
As I also noted earlier Hume discusses the effects of this form of imaginative 
difficulty on the vivacity of ideas in T 1.3 mainly as a function of the resemblance of the 
objects that make up the “links” of a chain of causal reasoning.  In T 2.3.7, however, the 
relative internal argumentative coherence of a piece of causal reasoning is treated mainly 
as a function of the relations of contiguity between these links.  Of course, on Hume’s 
account, contiguity is an essential part of causal relations: all causes and effects are 
necessarily contiguous in time (and, in the case of extended objects, in space as well).  
For this reason, questions of the effects of the spatiotemporal distance between these 
links may seem to be rendered irrelevant.  However, the natural relation of 
spatiotemporal contiguity is a far more complex relation than that of resemblance, for 
contiguity relations are analyzable into spatial and temporal relations, each of which have 
their own effects on the mind due to the properties unique to space and time Hume 
elaborates in T 1.2.   
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Thus, Hume turns in T 2.3.7 to these different properties unique to space and time 
in order to explain a removal in space generally has less of a weakening effect on the will 
and passions than a removal in time.  Both space and time consist of (ultimately 
indivisible) “parts”, but the parts of space can “co-exist” while those of time cannot. (cf. 
1.2.2.4, 1.2.3.8, 2.3.7.5; SBN 31, 35-6, 429-30)  (To put this point in the terms we have 
been using, a distance in space is more “internally coherent” than an equal distance in 
time.) What is more, the parts of time must exist separately, as time itself is necessarily a 
succession of discrete parts (cf. 1.2.2.4; SBN 31), while the parts of space are “capable of 
being at once present to the sight or feeling.” (2.3.7.5; SBN 429) Again the unity of space 
in the imagination facilitates its movement through that medium, but renders its passage 
through time more difficult:   
The parts of extension being susceptible of an union to the senses, acquire an 
union in the fancy; and as the appearance of one part excludes not the other, the 
transition or passage of the thought thro’ the contiguous parts is by that means 
render’d more smooth and easy.  On the other hand, the incompatibility of the 
parts of time in their real existence separates them in the imagination, and makes 
it more difficult for that faculty to trace any long succession or series of events.  
Every part must appear single and alone, nor can regularly have entrance into 
the fancy without banishing what is suppos’d to have been immediately 
precedent. (2.3.7.5; SBN 429) 
The movement of the imagination through time in this respect is more difficult than its 
movement through space, because the “interruption” of the action of the mind is greater.  
Accordingly, objects distant in time are conceived with even less vivacity than those 
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“equally distant”302 in space, despite the equality of the absolute distance.  Accordingly, 
such objects have a proportionately weaker influence on our will and passions. 
Finally, while distance in time generally has a greater weakening effect on our 
passions than distance in space, Hume argues that a distance in past time has a greater 
weakening effect on the imagination and passions than an equal distance in future time.  
(Of course, as Hume notes, as any action of mind or body cannot affect the past, the 
effect of distance in past time is irrelevant to the examination of the effects of vivacity on 
the will, but not to its effects on our passions.
303
 (2.3.7.6; SBN 430)) Hume again 
explains this phenomenon by means of two “propensities” of the imagination.  The first is 
that which we discussed above—that “propensity to a gradual progression thro’ the points 
of space and time”. (2.3.7.7; SBN 430)  The second propensity is related to this first: 
given that time, unlike space, has not only quantity but also a ‘direction of flow’, the 
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 2.3.7.5; SBN 430. It is not clear how a distance in time can be “equal to” a distance in space, nor does 
Hume clarify what he might mean by an “equal distance” in this sense. (Hume, perhaps, would explain this 
“equality” in terms of our experience of the typical time it takes to traverse distances in space.) 
303
 Again, only future objects have an effect on the will at all, so in regards to the effects of past objects 
(qua past) on the will, the question is irrelevant.  But, it is appropriate here to deal with a criticism often 
raised against Hume’s claim that we conceive future objects more vividly than past objects because of these 
natural propensities.  It is objected that a) since ideas of future objects must be (lively) ideas, while ideas of 
past objects may be vivid impressions of the memory, and b) impressions are by definition livelier than 
even lively ideas, it would seem that Hume’s claim here that ideas of future objects are more vivid is 
inconsistent.  (See Walter Hipple, The Beautiful 42, and Justine Noel, “Space, Time and the Sublime in 
Hume’s ‘Treatise’”, where Noel calls Hume’s point “clearly unacceptable.”)  This objection, however, 
completely misses Hume’s point.  Of course, in the section directly preceding this one, T 2.3.6, Hume 
admits the effect of the vivacity of the perceptions (impressions) of memory on the passions, in particular 
how any future object that resembles one of which we have had past experience is vivified by that 
connection of resemblance. (2.3.6.5; SBN 426) But, Hume’s point in T 2.3.7 is simply that all other things 
being equal, ideas of future objects are conceived with more vivacity than ideas of past objects of an equal 
absolute distance from the present. Of course, where our perception of a past object is an impression or 
lively idea of memory and not merely an idea of a past object, all other things are not equal.  Not all of our 
perceptions of the past are memories—I can form “an idea of [ancient] Rome, which I neither see nor 
remember; but which is connected with such impressions as I remember…” by causation. (1.3.9.4; SBN 
108, my emphasis) This is completely consistent with the claim that impressions of memory are more 
vivacious than our ideas of future objects, and so have a greater influence on our (non-motivating) 
passions, for not all ideas of past objects are impressions of memory.   
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imagination develops a propensity to “follow the succession of time in placing our ideas.” 
(2.3.7.7; SBN 430)   
Accordingly, Hume details here the effect of the other spatiotemporal element of 
the ‘essence’ of a causal relation—its temporal asymmetry:  an effect necessarily 
succeeds the cause in time.  This directionality of time, Hume implies, trains the 
imagination to move more naturally toward the future.  This is made clear in Hume’s 
example here—historical narration.304  The order historians feel compelled to follow in 
their narrations, he tells us, is a prime example of the force of this propensity: “nothing 
but an absolute necessity can oblige an historian to break the order of time, and in his 
narration give the precedence to an event, which was in reality posterior” to some other 
event. (2.3.7.7; SBN 430, Hume’s emphasis) The succession of certain objects in time is 
constantly experienced, giving rise to a propensity in the mind to move more easily in the 
same direction as what Hume refers to as the “stream of time”. (2.3.7.8; SBN 431)   
As he noted in T 2.3.7.1, the “present situation” of a person is always the situation 
of the imagination—that set of objects or perceptions immediately contiguous to 
ourselves in space and time, which objects, being thereby the most vivacious, have a 
firmer and more permanent grasp on our attention.  Here, Hume writes, “the present 
situation of the person is always that of the imagination, and that ‘tis from thence we 
proceed to the conception of any distant object.” (2.3.7.8; SBN 430, my emphasis)  In 
order to conceive of objects distant in the past, we must progress through time against its 
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 Indeed, the reasoning of historians for Hume is, like most philosophical reasoning, simply another 
species of causal reasoning.  The “inference from cause to effect” is the essence of “all our reasonings in 
the conduct of life: On this is founded all our belief in history: And from hence is derived all philosophy, 
excepting only geometry and arithmetic.” (Abs. §10; SBN 650) 
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“natural flow”, that is, “in opposition to the natural course of the succession.” (2.3.7.8; 
SBN 430, my emphasis)  However, when we conceive of objects distant in the future, 
“our fancy flows along the stream of time” along an “easy progression” of ideas—“easy” 
because it complies with the natural propensity or habit of the imagination to trace its 
ideas along the succession of time:  
This easy progression of ideas favours the imagination, and makes it conceive 
its object in a stronger and fuller light, than when we are continually oppos’d in 
our passage, and are oblig’d to overcome the difficulties arising from the natural 
propensity of the fancy.” (2.3.7.8; SBN 431, second emphasis mine)   
As the idea of a future object, ceteris paribus, is naturally conceived with greater vivacity 
than an object equally distant in the past, it has a proportionally greater effect on the 
passions, despite the equality of its temporal distance from the present.
305
     
                                                     
305
 As I noted earlier in my discussion of Hume’s account of psychological distance in T 1.3, Hume does 
discuss variable (1)—the “input vivacity” of any piece of causal reasoning— in closing out his discussion 
of the effects of spatiotemporal relations on the vivacity of our hedonic beliefs.  Since this is not as 
important for my discussion here (indeed, Hume omits any discussion of this variable in T 2.3.8), I will 
only briefly summarize Hume’s point here, and indicate its importance for an understanding of the re-
situation of the imagination in that “extensive sympathy” which constitutes our moral sense.   
In T 1.3, Hume’s discussion of this variable centered on the temporal distance of the objects of 
memory from our present situation—in T 2.3.7, Hume extends his discussion of this variable to objects in 
the “second system of realities”, those that are not the object of impressions of sense or ideas of memory.  
(1.3.9.3; SBN 107-8) Despite the equality in the absolute distance, the natural propensity of the imagination 
to follow the flow of time in changing its ideas influences the movement of the imagination not only when 
it remains “fix’d” in its “present situation”, but also in cases where it “changes its situation, and places us 
in different periods of time.” (2.3.7.9; SBN 431, my emphasis)  We can abstract ourselves from our 
“present situation” and place ourselves in other points in the future or past.  This point is implicitly raised 
in Hume’s comments on historical narration earlier in the T 2.3.7: the historian follows the natural 
progression of time in his narrations in order to comply with natural “propensities” of the imagination, but 
only after he has first “situated” himself in the past in order to move “naturally” and easily from past 
toward the present. (Hume offered us an illustration of this re-situation of the historian’s imagination in T 
1.3.9. (1.3.9.4; SBN 108; cf. EHU 3.10))  Though the historian’s narrative proceeds ‘easily’ in compliance 
with the flow of time, there is considerable imaginative difficulty in the reader’s initial ‘re-situation’ of his 
or her imagination in the past.   
The psychological underpinnings of this rather abstruse explanation of the imaginative difficulties 
faced by the reader of history in changing his imagination’s situation also bear directly on an understanding 
of Hume’s account of the imaginative difficulties associated with that “extensive sympathy” necessary for 
disinterested and interpersonally stable evaluations of the characters of others.  As in the reading of history, 
extensive sympathy requires that “[o]ur fancy…changes its situation” (3.3.1.26; SBN 598, my emphasis), 
an ecstatic “loosening” and re-situating of the imagination which “takes us so far out of ourselves, as to 
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In this way, T 2.3.7 provides us with the deeper psychological framework in 
which to understand Hume’s Book I’s epistemology of ease.  Causal reasoning is 
grounded in a natural mental “propensity” or habit, and easy motion of the mind that 
propensity or habit enables determines the direction of our causal reasoning and (in part) 
the vivacity of our causal beliefs.  However, the other natural relations of resemblance 
and contiguity are founded on “propensities” of the mind which causation either complies 
with or opposes, which compliance or opposition renders the motion of the mind in 
causal reasoning either easier or more effortful, either conserving or taxing the “strength” 
of the mind, and so either augmenting or diminishing causal belief.  Again utilizing the 
Newtonian analogy, we may say that considering such relations in abstraction from these 
propensities (as Hume does in the early sections of T 1.3, for instance), causal reasoning 
sets the imagination in a sort of inertial motion (cf. 1.4.2.22; SBN 198): the “force” 
imparted to the mind by a present impression moves the mind across related ideas 
without needed to impart more “force” to them.   The mind in motion will remain in a 
motion which is “easy” and “effortless”, and which does not significantly tax its strength.  
However, the mental transitions involved in causal reasoning does not occur in the 
vacuum of deep space, but in the atmosphere of bodies each endowed with a gravitational 
force—most importantly, the self and the vivacious present impressions of sense and 
                                                                                                                                                              
give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own 
advantage or loss” (3.3.1.18, 11; SBN 583, 579), and by which “we enter…into sentiments, which no way 
belong to us…” (3.3.1.26; SBN 598)  As in the case of history, this re-situation requires a “great effort of 
imagination”. (2.2.9.14; SBN 386, my emphasis)  Indeed, Hume argues in an essay composed shortly after 
the publication of the Treatise that the study of history strengthens our ability to judge disinterestedly of the 
characters of others because it vividly portrays those characters at a sufficient psychological distance from 
ourselves, naturally removing considerations of interest from that evaluation.  (“Of the Study of History,” 
EMPL 567-8) 
209 
 
 
 
memory (and those lively ideas closely related to such impressions) that constitute its 
most vivid parts.  When the mind moves through the “second system of realities” painted 
out to us by causal reasoning, its movement is affected not only by the properties of the 
media through which it moves—space and time—but it’s movement is given a 
directionality by the gravitation force exerted on the attention of the mind by the self and 
the lively perceptions that make up its “present situation”.   
T 2.3.7 is in large part a direct, expanded explanation of variables (2a-b) of the 
function which determines the vivacity of our beliefs on Hume’s T 1.3 account.  And, for 
this reason, as I argued earlier, it is also an indirect explanation of variable (3), the nature 
and function of the relative “strength and firmness” of an individual’s imagination—its 
ability to overcome, resist or otherwise “correct for” these unphilosophical influences on 
causal reasoning.  Where an individual mind possesses a great degree of this relative 
“strength” is the ground of the virtue of “strength of mind” or “constancy”, a virtue 
“useful to oneself”.   
  
3.11 Hume’s ‘Epistemology of Ease’: Custom and the Cultivation of the 
“Strength” of the Mind 
Two important questions remain regarding Hume’s account of the “strength” of 
the mind. First, at the beginning of my account of T 2.3.7, I noted that an elaboration of 
the central role played by imaginative customs, and of their effects on the relative ‘ease’ 
and ‘difficulty’ the imagination encounters in its operations, would bear significantly on 
the question of whether or not the “strength” of the imagination can be cultivated to some 
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degree.  In the following chapter, I will attempt to account for what I take to be the 
mechanics of the development of this “strength” as it is suggested by Hume’s account of 
the effects of great psychological distance and imaginative difficulty on the imagination 
and passions in T 2.3.8.  In order to conclude this chapter and set the stage for the next, I 
will outline briefly the shape an account of the cultivation of this “strength” must take—
the conditions under which this cultivation would occur, if it were possible—on Hume’s 
account, and why T 2.3.8 is that section of the Treatise which bears most directly on this 
question.  
As I suggested above, central to a Humean answer to this question is the crucial 
role played by imaginative custom on Hume’s ‘exertion model’ of belief formation and 
vivification. In this chapter, I highlighted 1) the role of imaginative ease in determining 
the vivacity of our ideas on that model (and so its role in ultimately determining the 
strength of our motives), and 2) the central role imaginative customs play as a source of 
that vivacity-preserving ease.  On that account, imaginative customs serve to conserve the 
“strength” of the imagination, such that all other things being equal, the mind conceives 
its ideas with more vivacity and force.  And as in the possession of any form of greater 
relative strength, stronger minds will perform what would be more difficult operations for 
other minds with greater “ease” and “facility”, and with less “effort” and “exertion”, the 
primary source of such effort and opposition here being the “unphilosophical” influence 
of “psychological distance” in general, and of para-causal relations of ideas, in particular.  
Consequently, stronger minds will conceive more vividly those “distant” and general 
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objects which organize their pursuit of their greater good, giving them relatively stronger 
motives with which to adhere to these ends.   
The central role custom plays in Hume’s account of the vivification of our ideas, 
moreover, has clear implications for the question of the possibility of the cultivation of 
the “strength” of the mind.  Given that custom and its effects on the mind are at the heart 
of the exertion model of belief formation and vivification, it follows that the ‘strength’ of 
the imagination can be cultivated to some degree by custom.  On my reading, the 
question of the possibility of this cultivation is thus structurally parallel to the question of 
the cultivation of the predominance of a passion that occupied us in the previous chapter.  
As we noted there, passions may gradually increase not only in their absolute strength by 
repeated exercise, but more importantly their relative strength by repeatedly overcoming 
the opposition of contrary passions.  However, such passions must have a source of 
predominance independent of custom in order to activate the effects of that principle—
that is, as we put it in the previous chapter, custom is a ‘secondary’ cause of strength, one 
whose operation depends on the prior operation of other strengthening mechanisms of 
human nature.  So too, I argue, can the imagination gradually cultivate its strength by 
custom, where it is antecedently determined to proceed firmly in its causal reasoning in 
opposition to contrary (and ‘unphilosophical’) influences of para-causal relations of 
ideas, and other forms of psychological distance.
306
  But, as in the case of the passions, 
                                                     
306
At least in this important way, what I call Hume’s “exertion model” of belief is a variant of what is 
called the “strength model” of self-control.  On that model, the mind “has one limited stock of some 
resource that resembles energy or strength, which it expends whenever it actively changes, overrides, or 
otherwise regulates responses.” (B.J. Schmeichel, K.D. Vohs, R.F. Baumesiter, “Intellectual Performance 
and Ego Depletion: Role of the Self in Logical Reasoning and Other Information Processing,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 85.1 (2003): 33-46, 33; cf. Richard Holton, “How is Strength of Will 
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this process of custom-formation presupposes the antecedent strength of that principle 
which is to be further strengthened by that mechanism—that is, there must be some 
mechanism in human nature other than custom by which the imaginative is antecedently 
determined to run counter to r its unphilosophical propensities in its conception of 
psychologically distant objects.  Put differently, there must be some other principle of 
human nature that gives our ideas of psychologically distant objects influence on our 
imagination and passions beside that vivacity of ideas fostered by ‘imaginative ease’.307   
In the following chapter, I will argue that Hume’s account of the limits of the 
power of imaginative ease over the imagination and passions may be found in T 2.3.8.  
This section, though one of the more neglected parts of the Treatise, is nevertheless 
remarkable in that it is, with T 2.3.10,  the only place in the Treatise where the “principle 
of imaginative ease” so important to Hume’s account of the causal reasoning and belief 
does not function as the predominant principle of the mind.  More importantly, it is the 
only place in the Treatise, as far as I can tell, that Hume gives us an explicit account of 
                                                                                                                                                              
Possible?,” in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, eds. S. Stroud and C. Tappolet (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2003): 39-67) Such “strength”, on this model, is akin to muscular strength—it is naturally 
limited, but can be developed by exercise.  I will argue in the following chapter that the same is true of 
Humean “strength” of the imagination. 
307
 Thus, the primacy of imaginative facility in determining the strength of our beliefs, and ultimately our 
passions, must be limited if a coherent Humean account of the cultivation of this “strength” is to be 
possible. (I will argue in the following chapter that the influence of imaginative facility on belief is so 
limited by a fundamental principle of human nature that has rarely received attention in Hume scholarship.)  
This point is not always appreciated. For instance, despite his appreciation of the centrality of what he calls 
the “primacy of facility affect” in Hume’s ‘science of man’, Wayne Waxman completely overlooks the 
limitations Hume puts on that principle.  Though Waxman appreciates the importance of T 2.3.5’s 
discussion of the pleasure of ‘facility-affect’ in arguing his point, he disregards completely Hume’s T 2.3.4 
discussion of mind’s pursuit of goods in which it is “opposed” by the propensities of the imagination or by 
physical obstacles (cf. 2.3.4.8; SBN 421-2). (cf. “The Point of Hume’s Skepticism With Regard to Reason” 
249-50)  Christine Battersby, however, does appreciate the role the passions often play here in determining 
the imagination to move in certain ways, but does not develop the point at any length. (“Hume, Newton, 
and ‘The Hill Called Difficulty’” 41-3).  I take my account in the following chapter to develop more fully 
several insightful points Battersby raises.  
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the way in which the mind is prompted to resist or proceed in opposition to the influence 
of unphilosophical probability which has such important effects on the strength of our 
passions. Accordingly, it will be my aim in the following chapter to show the limits of the 
power of imaginative ease over the passions on Hume’s account as they are treated in T 
2.3.8, and the implications of that treatment not only for an account of the cultivation of 
the “strength” of the mind, but also for a coherent Humean account of strong, calm 
passions. 
As I noted at the beginning of the chapter, a second remaining important issue 
concerns the problematic causal role Hume seems to attribute to the “strength” of the 
mind on his theory of motivation.  This issue arises as a result of the fact that, on Hume’s 
account, the “strength” of the mind, like any power, is properly speaking not a quality 
which exists “in” any mind.  As I explained above, we judge a mind to be “strong” on the 
basis of our experience of its relevant effects (here, the resistance of unphilosophical 
influences on its causal reasoning, and so ultimately on the strength and violence of our 
passions): where an individual (including oneself) successfully and constantly resists 
these influences (i.e. where an individual regulates his beliefs, and successfully resists 
temptation in pursuit of a greater good), this conjunction produces in us by habit a 
determination of the mind to infer these effects in the appropriate circumstance.   Again, 
on Hume’s famous account, the perception of this “strength” is simply the perception of 
this feeling of determination of the mind of an observer (including the individual himself, 
as an observer of his own mind) to expect these effects from that mind in the appropriate 
situations, and so our idea of this “strength” is imply the idea of this feeling of 
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determination.   However, in explaining how this feeling of the determination of the mind 
is the basis on which we attribute “strength” either to our own minds or to the minds of 
others, we do not explain the causal role it plays, if any, in producing these effects.   
However, Hume clearly speaks the “strength” of the mind as such a cause, and 
takes it somehow to explain these effects.  As I noted throughout this chapter, in order to 
resist the influence of unphilosophical probability, Hume writes “one must have a very 
strong and firm imagination”. (1.3.13.3; SBN 144)  Similarly, he writes of this “strength” 
in its role of regulating our passions: “One considerable cause [of the failure of many in 
pursuit of happiness] is the want of strength of mind, which might enable them to resist 
the temptation of present ease or pleasure, and carry them forward in the search of more 
distant profit and enjoyment.” (EPM 6.15; SBN 239, my emphasis; cf. EPM 4.1; SBN 
205)
308
  It is not plausible to read Hume in these passages as being taken in by the same 
sort of ‘vulgar’ errors he so clearly and famously criticizes: that is, either as committing 
an illicit and ‘vulgar’ projection of the sort he explicitly condemns, or as offering a 
vacuous and circular explanation which attempts to explain an object’s effects by citing a 
‘power’ the possession of which cannot be determined independently of one’s 
observation of its effects.   Accordingly, the strength of the mind must be in some way 
part of the causal picture that explains (in some non-vacuous way) the mind’s 
“resistance” to these unphilosophical influences.   
As in the case of the first issue raised above, I will argue in the following chapter 
that T 2.3.8 provides us with resources to address this crucial question.  As I will show in 
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 Hume’s claim is more ambiguous at T 2.3.3.10, where he writes simply that the “strength of mind 
implies the prevalence of the calm passions over the violent.” (SBN 418, my emphasis) 
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my account of that section, the “strength” of the mind does have its own part in Hume’s 
causal account of the mind’s opposition to its unphilosophical propensities: our appraisals 
of our the strength of our mind, the judgments we form concerning the likelihood we will 
overcome opposition in particular circumstances, give rise to passions—in particular, the 
“elevating” passion of pride or magnanimity—which are in turn the causes of the mind’s 
opposing these propensities. 
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Chapter 4: The Imagination and the Passions (II): the Influence of the Passions 
on the Imagination, and the Limits of Hume’s “Epistemology of Ease”  
According to Hume’s Treatise, Book I “epistemology of ease” outlined in the 
previous chapter, our strongest beliefs are those which the imagination conceives most 
easily or with the most facility—that is, with the least cognitive ‘effort’.  As I also noted 
in the last chapter, however, this facility-seeking of the imagination and its influence on 
the passions must be limited if Hume is to account coherently for the cultivation of that 
“strength” of the imagination which is the basis for our ability to resist the solicitations of 
present desire—strength which, when possessed in a great degree, constitutes the virtue 
of “strength of mind” or constancy.  In this chapter, I will argue that the primacy of 
imaginative facility in determining the influence our beliefs have on our motives and 
passions is so limited on Hume’s account, and that T 2.3.8 contains important doctrines 
which contribute to an understanding of this limitation, many of which Hume first 
develops elsewhere in the Treatise.  As I noted above, T 2.3.8 is a remarkable section of 
the Treatise precisely because it is one of the few which contributes to an account of this 
limitation.  On my reading, Hume’s account of this limitation rests ultimately on a 
commonly neglected, but absolutely central principle of Hume’s ‘science of man’—a 
principle I will call Hume’s “Principle of Agitation-Seeking”.  This principle grounds 
much of Hume’s integration of his Treatise, Book I theory of belief into his T 2.3 theory 
motivation—in particular, his account of the mutual influence of the imagination and the 
passions which underlies his account of the development and exercise of strength of 
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mind, and so his account of the “prevalence” of ‘the calm passions’ to which this strength 
gives rise.   
In addition, I aim to show how the principles Hume brings to bear in T 2.3.8 
address the second question I raised at the end of the previous chapter, regarding the non-
vacuous explanatory role the “strength” of the mind plays on Hume’s account of this 
prevalence of ‘the calm passions’.  As I indicated there, I take Hume’s answer to this 
issue to lie in the role he attributes to the passions that follow on one’s assessment of his 
strength and the change in the “temper” or “disposition” of the mind to which the 
production of  these passions give rise.  Accordingly, I aim to show how what Hume calls 
a “change in temper” or “disposition” (2.3.8.13; SBN 438; cf. 2.3.3.10; SBN 418)—the 
remaining elemental mechanism of Hume’s T 2.3.4-8 “climatology” of human 
motivation—accounts for the explanatory role the strength of our mind plays in his 
account of the prevalence of the calm passions over the violent. 
Accordingly, my first aim in this chapter is to account for the nature of Hume’s 
“Principle of Agitation-Seeking”.  Next, I proceed to show how this principle underlies 
three important features of Hume’s account of the mutual influence of the imagination 
and passions which are crucial to understanding Hume’s account of the development of 
strength of mind: 1) his theory of sublimity and its effects on the imagination and 
passions, 2) his account of the effects of imaginative difficulty and facility on the strength 
and violence of the passions, and 3) the primacy of the operations of the passions over the 
operations of the imagination.  Finally, in the remainder of the chapter, I will show how 
Hume’s T 2.3.8 account of the relative strength of motivating passions for “distant” 
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goods—including those supremely valuable ends treated in the previous chapter—draws 
on all three of these features, and how we can glean from that section the crucial elements 
of a coherent Humean accounts both of the cultivation of “strength of mind”, as well as 
of the strengthening of ‘the calm passions’.  As I will show, these accounts will rely on 
all of the primary mechanisms of Hume’s “climatology” treated in this dissertation—in 
particular the influence of the passional “temper” or “disposition”.  
 
4.1 Hume’s Principle of Mental Agitation-Seeking  
Throughout his works, Hume tells us that it is a general property of the mind to 
seek “agitation”, whether by the vivacity of its ideas, or by the “ardour” of its passions, or 
by both, and that the mind naturally finds this agitation pleasurable in itself.  Hume’s 
formulations of this principle are numerous.  Its fullest statements are contained in 
Hume’s paeans to the power of sympathy and its pleasures.  On Hume’s well-known 
account, sympathy functions as the “soul” or “animating principle” of our passions—our 
passions “languish” when they are not seconded by others in sympathy: 
Every pleasure languishes when enjoy’d apart from company, and every pain 
becomes more cruel and intolerable.  Whatever other passions we may be 
actuated by; pride ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or 
animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor wou’d they have any force, 
were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others.  Let all 
the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man: Let all 
the sun rise and set at his command: The sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and 
the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him: He 
will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least, with whom he 
may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy. 
(2.2.5.15; SBN 362-3) 
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The pleasure and pain which constitute our happiness and misery, Hume clearly implies, 
can only be maintained within their just bounds by sympathy with others, particularly our 
happiness and pleasure: our pains are softened by the compassion of others, and our 
pleasures can only be propped up to their just pitch by being re-animated in our own 
mind by a “reflection”, “rebound” or “reverberation” in the minds of others.  However, 
human beings naturally desire the company of others not only because of the effects of 
sympathy, but because sympathy is in itself is a source of pleasure.  In what is perhaps 
the clearest statement of this general tendency of the mind to seek “agitation”, Hume 
explains in T 2.2.4 the pleasure we take in company, even of strangers, in terms of these 
intrinsic pleasures of sympathy:  
Those, who take a pleasure in declaiming against human nature, have observ’d, 
that man is altogether insufficient to support himself; and that when you loosen 
all the holds, which he has of external objects, he immediately drops down into 
the deepest melancholy and despair.  From this, say they, proceeds that 
continual search after amusement and gaming, in hunting, in business; by which 
we endeavour to forget ourselves, and excite our spirits from the languid state, 
into which they fall, when not sustain’d by some brisk and lively emotion.  To 
this method of thinking I so far agree, that I own the mind insufficient, it itself, 
to its own entertainment, and that it naturally seeks after foreign objects, which 
may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits.  On the appearance of 
such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with a new 
tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he 
cannot command in his solitary and calm moments.  Hence company is naturally 
so rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all objects, viz. a rational and thinking 
being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind; makes 
us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us see, in the very 
instant of their production, all the emotions, which are caus’d by any object.  
Every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that of a passion, because such an 
idea becomes a kind of passion, and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, 
than any other image or conception. (2.2.4.4; SBN 352-3, my emphasis; cf. 
2.2.5.15; SBN 362-3, 3.2.1.12; SBN 482) 
220 
 
 
 
Company is in itself pleasurable because it “agitates” the mind with lively perceptions—
both with lively ideas and, more importantly, passions—which agitation the mind 
naturally seeks.  Let us call this principle of human nature, the absolute centrality of 
which to Hume’s system is not often appreciated, his Principle of Agitation-Seeking or 
PAS.
309
   
Accordingly, we find throughout the Treatise applications of this general 
principle to both principles of the mind—the imagination and the passions.  Primary 
forms of agitation the imagination finds pleasurable are the vivacity and novelty of its 
ideas:   
By the vivacity of the idea we interest the fancy, and produce, tho’ in a lesser 
degree, the same pleasure, which arises from a moderate passion. (2.3.10.12; 
SBN 453, my emphasis)   
[W]onder, surprize, and all of the emotions, which arise from novelty [are in 
themselves] very agreeable, like every thing, which enlivens the mind to a 
moderate degree. (2.3.5.2; SBN 423, my emphasis)  
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 Although the importance of this principle to Hume’s account of beauty and sublimity is generally noted 
by those commentators who take Hume’s “aesthetics” as their subject (cf. Walter Hipple, The Beautiful, the 
Sublime, and the Picturesque 43, and Peter Jones, Hume’s Sentiments and ‘Art and Moderation’), the wider 
importance of this principle to Hume’s system seems to have been obscured, likely by the casual way in 
which Hume often raises it. For instance, in its main Treatise statement at T 2.2.4 quoted above, this 
principle is invoked seemingly ad hoc to explain why company, even of strangers, is in itself agreeable. 
Pall Ardal recognizes that “Hume thinks…that our passions may become too calm” and that it is “probable 
that Hume is suggesting [in T 2.3.4] that it is sometimes desirable that the mind should ‘preserve its 
ardour’.” (Passion and Value 101)  A more notable exception to the general neglect of this principle, 
however, is Eugene Rotwein, who appreciates its significance for Hume’s “economic psychology”, in 
particular his account of the motivation to labor.  (“Introduction,” in David Hume: Writings on Economics, 
ed. Eugene Rotwein (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970),  ix-cxi: xxxii-xlvii, especially xlvii-
ix) See “Of Interest”, EMPL 300-1, “Of Refinement in the Arts”, EMPL 270; cf. “The Epicurean”, EMPL 
140) See also Neil McArthur, David Hume's Political Theory: Law, Commerce, and the Constitution of 
Government (Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 24-30.  The most useful, and the most 
extensive, treatment of the importance of this principle in Hume’s system is perhaps Andrew S. 
Cunningham, “Hume’s Vitalism and Its Implications,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15.1 
(2007): 59-73.  However, though Cunningham rightly treats this principle as a function of Hume’s “bundle 
theory” of the mind, he wrongly, in my view, describes it primarily as a desire to increase the absolute 
number of perceptions rather than their ‘agitation’ or liveliness. 
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Belief must please the imagination by means of the force and vivacity which 
attends it; since every idea, which has force and vivacity, is found to be 
agreeable to that faculty. (1.3.10.7; SBN 122, my emphasis)  
Similarly, the mind finds the “ardour” and invigoration of the passions naturally 
pleasurable:  
The mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes; and in order to preserve 
its ardour, must be every moment supported by a new flow of passion. (2.3.4.8; 
SBN 421-2) 
[A]ll the passions avoid as much as possible…[any] considerable diminution. 
(2.2.3.10; SBN 351) 
In the common affairs of life, where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity 
of the subject, nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and ‘tis 
only in dramatic performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give 
pleasure.  In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the 
idea; and the passion, being soften’d by the want of belief in the subject, has no 
more than the agreeable affect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention. 
(1.3.9.15; SBN 115, my emphasis) 
Whatever supports and fills the passions is agreeable to us; as on the contrary, 
what weakens and infeebles them is uneasy. (2.3.8.6; SBN 434) 
[L]ife, without passion, must be altogether insipid and tiresome. (EPM 9.21; 
SBN 281)   
Indeed, the mind sometimes finds such agitation naturally pleasurable even in cases 
where the hedonic charge of the sensation is painful in some respect: 
Human life is so tiresome a scene, and men generally are of such indolent 
dispositions, that whatever amuses them, tho’ by a passion mixt with pain, does 
in the main give them sensible pleasure. (2.3.10.10; SBN 452, my emphasis)
310
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 This particular point is emphasized by Dubos, who is likely one of Hume’s main sources for this 
principle. (Critical Reflections 8-9) As Dubos wrote in his widely influential Reflexions critiques sur la 
poesie et sur le peinture (1719): “The soul hath its wants so less than the body; and one of the greatest 
wants of man is to have his mind incessantly occupied.  The heaviness which quickly attends the inactivity 
of the mind, is a situation so very disagreeable to man, that he frequently chuses to expose himself to the 
most painful exercises, rather than be troubled with it.” (Critical Reflections on Poetry and Painting, I:5; 
cf. I:4-9)  On Dubos’ wider influence on Hume, see Peter Jones, “Hume’s Literary and Aesthetic Theory”, 
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The centrality of the PAS to Hume’s system of the mind is surely a product of the 
foundational importance that system attributes to impressions of reflection—passions, 
emotions, sentiments—to his entire system: belief, its influence on the passions, and the 
influence of the passions on action are all in large part determined by (and so accounted 
for by Hume in terms of) the impressions of reflection—the emotion—they generate.  On 
Hume’s account, just as each of the passions has a hedonic charge, so too does “[e]ach of 
the…operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or 
disagreeable” (3.3.1.28; SBN 590), and so each can become the object of a sort of mental 
desire or aversion.  To say that the mind “seeks” or “desires” agitation, however, is not 
necessarily to attribute to human beings an ever-present conscious desire for such 
agitation, though such a desire is often a conscious one.
311
  Rather, as I will show in more 
detail below, the PAS is more basically a way of accounting in shorthand for what Hume 
deems general “propensities” of the passions and imagination either to attend to certain 
perceptions over others, or to vary its perceptions in certain observable ways—in ways 
that either “enliven” or “agitate” the mind, or preserve this agitation over its variations.   
Given Hume’s own wide reading, and the great variety of sources in which he 
would have found versions of this principle, the origins of the Humean PAS were surely 
diverse.  Indeed, the breadth of sources in which Hume found this principle surely would 
have confirmed its status in his mind as a fundamental principle of the science of human 
nature. However, it is in Pascal’s Pensées (1670) that this propensity to seek 
                                                                                                                                                              
in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David F. Norton, 1
st
 ed. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), and Hume’s Sentiments 93-106. 
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 As Hume puts it, the mind only “in a manner” ‘seeks’ such agitation. (2.3.8.5, 9; SBN 434, 435) 
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divertissement and agitation to remedy the ennui of the human condition is elevated to 
one of the fundamental principles of human nature.
312
  Hume certainly counts Pascal 
among those who, he says, “take pleasure in declaiming against human nature” in 
emphasizing the centrality of that principle. (2.2.4.4; SBN 352; cf. 2.3.10.9-10; SBN 
452)
313
  Surely also among Hume’s primary sources are those critics Hume read before 
completing the Treatise who are influenced by Pascal’s elevation of this principle—
Joseph Addison, the Abbé Dubos and, perhaps, Bernard Fontenelle
314
, critics who are 
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 As Reinhard C. Kuhn notes, it is only with the advent of Christianity that the notion of ennui “assumed a 
dominant role in the history of Western thought” (The Demon of Noontide: Ennui in Western Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 36; cf. 39-40, 376), and, Kuhn argues, Pascal is the Christian 
thinker in particular, who, in making the drive for divertissement and agitation the fundamental principle of 
human nature generally, opens up room for the adoption of that principle by secular theorists. (See also 
Elizabeth S. Goodstein, Experience without Qualities: Boredom and Modernity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 36-7.)   
313
 In his Pensées, Pascal laments the tendency of human beings to seek out divertissement and occupation 
as a remedy to the ennui, hollowness, and restlessness characteristic of the post-lapsarian human condition.  
See Pascal on ennui and divertissement, at Pensées §136. (I cite the section number as it appears in the 
translation of Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin, 1966).) Pascal is surely influenced by Montaigne’s 
remarks on diversion (Essays I:41 (285), II:12 (622), III:4 (941), 8 (1051)), though Montaigne recommends 
rather than condemns it.  Malebranche, another Augustinian who greatly influenced Hume, also writes of 
the human need to seek novelty.  (Search After Truth, ‘Preface’ xx-xxi, 5.7, 8 (LO 383-4, 86-7))  For more 
on Hume’s likely debt to Malebranche on this point, again, see Éléonore La Jallé, “Hume, Malebranche, 
and the Self-Justification of the Passions.” 
314
 In his essay “Of Tragedy”, Hume cites the Abbé Dubos’ Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and 
Music, and Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle’s Reflexions sur la poetique as sources for this very principle.  
Dubos’s work is noted in Hume’s early ‘memoranda’ (cf. II §§2-3; see, E.C. Mossner, "Hume's Early 
Memoranda, 1729-1740: The Complete Text." Journal of the History of Ideas 9.4 (1948): 492-518, 500) 
and Fontenelle’s explanation of the pleasures of tragedy is adopted by Hume in the Treatise. (cf. 1.3.9.15; 
SBN 115; 1.3.10.10; SBN 630-1, Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, “Reflections on the Poetic Art” [1742], 
in Dramatic Essays of the Neoclassic Age, eds. Henry Hitch Adams and Baxter Hathaway (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1950): 281-296)  As Earl R. Wasserman  notes, “this doctrine [what I have 
called the PAS] was best known to the later English critics through Dubos and Fontenelle.” (“The Pleasures 
of Tragedy,” ELH 14.4 (1947): 283-307, 290) Wasserman traces its proximate philosophical origins to 
Descartes’ Passions of the Soul (cf. §94) and to Hobbes (“Pleasures of Tragedy” 287ff.), but the principle 
ultimately derives from Lucretius’s famous passage on the pleasure we take in watching a tempest-tossed 
ship from a position of safety (De Rerum Natura II.1-4), which Hume discusses in T 3.3.2. (3.3.2.5; SBN 
594-5) cf. Jennifer Herdt, Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press: 1997), chapter 3, and Peter Jones, Hume’s Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French 
Context (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1982), and “Hume’s Literary and Aesthetic Theory,” in 
Cambridge Companion to Hume (1
st
 ed.) 255-80.  See also Rapin: poetry “labors to move the passions, all 
whose motions are delightful, because nothing is more sweet to the soul than agitation; it pleases itself in 
changing the objects to satisfy the immensity of its desires.” (Reflections on Aristotle’s Treatise of Poesie in 
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primarily responsible for fostering in British criticism the central principle that art pleases 
in large part by the “agitation” of the mind, which agitation is naturally pleasurable 
because it relieves ennui.  Indeed, given the vast sources on which Hume drew, and, in 
particular, given his own derision of the Augustinian appraisal of human nature, Hume’s 
adoption of the PAS is a particularly good example of what Aaron Garrett aptly describes 
as Hume’s scientific open-mindedness and “eclecticism”.315  
However, as I will discuss in more detail below, Hume most often qualifies the 
PAS as stated above: though the mind will prefer any agitation, even if it is to some 
degree painful
316
, over none at all, in normal circumstances it prefers a moderate 
                                                                                                                                                              
General, in The Whole Critical Works of Monsieur Rapin, 2 vols., trans. Basil Kennet (London, 1716), 
II:141, my emphasis)   
315
 See also Aaron Garrett, “Introduction: the Eclecticism of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy”, in The 
Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2014), 1-27, on 
‘eclecticism’ as a fruitful way of characterizing the philosophical approaches of many of the philosophers 
of the eighteenth century. 
316
 This principle perhaps is most clearly illustrated in Hume’s scattered account of the passions of 
melancholy and despair. In the passage quoted above from T 2.2.4, Hume told us that “melancholy and 
despair” are passions which result from the mind having no objects or lively ideas with which it might 
entertain itself: that is, “when you loosen all the holds, which he has of external objects, he immediately 
drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair.” (2.2.4.4; SBN 352-3)  This is the basis for Hume’s 
argument in T 2.3.4, that “despair, tho’ contrary to security, has a like influence,” in greatly diminishing the 
passions (2.3.4.8; SBN 421-2), because, like enjoyment or possession of an object, it greatly diminishes or 
even eliminates our desire for that object: desiring objects that are impossible to obtain gives rise to the 
same diminishment of the passions as entire possession.  As he puts it in the ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise, 
“nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we 
are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes.” 
(§9; SBN xvii-xviii)  However, this is also precisely why “melancholy and despair” have a tendency to 
“feed” themselves by dwelling on this impossibility: they do so in order to provide some agitation to the 
mind.  Thus, the very impossibility of the fulfillment of any desire (and its diminishment or elimination of 
the agitation of that desire) becomes itself the ground of a passion (and so a source of agitation), and by 
that means a sort of pleasure. This forcefully illustrates the PAS: not only would we rather be moved and 
agitated by a painful passion, than no passion at all, but we will purposefully feed a painful passion with 
“desponding reflections” in order to support it. (1.4.7.1; SBN 264, cf. Hume’s “Letter to a Physician,”  
Letters I:18)  See also “Of Tragedy”: “You may weaken by degrees weaken a real sorrow, till it totally 
disappears; yet in none of its gradations will it ever give pleasure; except perhaps, by accident, to a man 
sunk under lethargic indolence, whom it rouzes from that languid state.” (EMPL 221, my emphasis)  
Again, Hume’s primary source here is likely Dubos, who he cites on this point in that essay. (EMPL 217) 
Montaigne also maintains something like this point regarding despair and melancholy in particular (Essays 
II.20 (“We Taste Nothing Pure”), III:86), citing Ovid and Seneca.   
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agitation to a violent one.  As is evident in several of the statements of the PAS quoted 
above, the mind finds agitation agreeable primarily when it enlivens the mind to a 
moderate degree. (e.g. 2.3.5.2-4; SBN 423-4, 2.3.10.12; SBN 453)  The mind, like the 
body, has a natural repugnance to violent agitation, whether it results from the violent 
fluctuation of the imagination or passions (2.3.9.26-30, 2.3.10.12; SBN 446-7, 453) or the 
violent opposition to our imagination or passions from internal or external obstacles. 
(1.4.2.37; SBN 205-6, 2.2.8.18; SBN 379)
317
 Thus, Hume’s “Sceptic” argues in regard to 
the passions, “[t]o be happy, the passion must neither be too violent nor too remiss. In the 
first case, the mind is in a perpetual hurry and tumult; in the second, it sinks into a 
disagreeable indolence and lethargy.” (EMPL 167)  Indeed, the desirability of the 
moderation of the passions, both for the intrinsic pleasantness of such moderation as well 
as for its positive consequences for our happiness, is constant theme in Hume’s thought, 
particularly his essays.
318
 Thus, although the mind naturally seeks agitation and variation, 
it also prefers the moderate agitation that results in large part from the relative coherence 
or stability of its variation. Accordingly, Hume more commonly endorses what we may 
call a “Principle of Moderate Agitation-Seeking” (hereafter, PMAS).  
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 A particularly clear example of this is the natural repugnance the imagination and passions have to great 
uncertainty and the mental “fluctuation” and lack of fixity it generates.  (cf. 2.3.9.27, 29-30, 2.3.10.12; 
SBN 446-7, 453) The mind’s natural repugnance to violent agitation may be a result of what Hume deems 
elsewhere the mind’s natural inertia—its tendency to persist in any motion once initiated. (1.2.4.24; SBN 
48-9, 1.3.13.9-10; SBN 147-9, 1.4.2.22; SBN 198)    
318
 On this point, see, for example, Peter Jones, “Art and Moderation in Hume’s Essays,” in McGill Hume 
Studies, eds. D.F. Norton, N. Capaldi and E. Robison (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1979): 161-80, and 
Hume’s Sentiments 154, and John Immerwahr, “Hume on Tranquilizing the Passions” esp. 298, 302.  The 
intrinsic pleasantness of the moderation of the passions is, for instance, the subject of Hume’s essay “Of the 
Delicacy of Taste and Passion” (EMPL 3-8), an essay which serves as a kind of thematic introduction to 
Hume’s essays of 1741.    
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4.2 The Role of the PMAS in Hume’s ‘Science of Man’ (I): Hume’s Theory of 
Sublimity  
As I will also note in more detail below, Hume, like many of those from whom he 
drew the PMAS, employs that principle as an integral part of his aesthetic theory, both in 
the Treatise and elsewhere, where it works alongside his theory of sympathy (though, not 
always in perfect harmony
319
) to explain our emotional responses both to certain types of 
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 Though a detailed examination of Hume’s theory of beauty (as distinct from sublimity, which will be 
discussed below) and its relation to its predecessors is beyond the scope of this paper, it is instructive to see 
what role the PMAS played in Hume’s own account of the origins of aesthetic pleasure, and how he 
ultimately integrates the role of the PMAS with that of sympathy and utility in this account.  As I will note 
below, like Addison before him, Hume employs the PMAS in explaining the beauty we ascribe to novel 
objects: (a moderate) novelty causes a moderate mental agitation of imaginative or conceptual difficulty, 
which agitation constitutes the naturally pleasing sentiment of “surprise”.  (2.1.8.6, 2.3.5.2; SBN 301, 423) 
The pleasure of poetic eloquence on his account is also attributable in large part to the PMAS—though 
such fictions are not attended with belief and so have no effect on the passions, their “sensible effect on the 
fancy” and the “agitation of the mind” or the “vehemence of thought and sentiment” which attends them is 
naturally pleasurable. (1.3.10.10; SBN 630-1)  In addition, in the first Enquiry, Hume employs the PMAS 
to explain why an epic poem cannot treat any great length of time in its narration.  As it is the job of the 
poet to delineate “more distinctly those minute circumstances” that enliven the imagination, were the poet 
to draw out such detailed painting to any great length, “[t]he reader’s imagination, enflamed with such a 
series of poetical descriptions, and his passions, agitated by a continual sympathy with the actors, must flag 
long before the period of the narration, and must sink into lassitude and disgust, from the repeated violence 
of the same movements.” (EHU 3.11, my emphasis) 
However, Hume does not directly employ the PMAS as the general basis of his explanations of the 
main sources of our sentiments of beauty.  As in the case of moral beauty, our sentiments of aesthetic 
beauty are the result of the immediate agreeableness or utility of objects. (cf. 3.3.5.6: SBN 617)  In the 
former case, the pleasure we take in the sight of a beautiful object is to be explained by the “primary 
constitution of nature”— the “order and construction of parts” of some objects have an explanatorily basic 
power to produce pleasure in us. (T 2.1.8.2; SBN 299; cf. EPM 1.9; SBN 173)  But most of our sentiments 
of beauty are derived from the latter source, considerations of utility: by means of causal knowledge and 
general rules, our imagination is conveyed from the idea of any object to the pleasure it will generally bring 
its possessor or anyone else affected by it, whatever the actual utility (or disutility) of the object may be to 
any actual human being. (T 2.1.8.2, 2.2.5.16-20, 2.3.10.5, 3.3.1.8, 20, 23, 3.3.5.2-4; SBN 298-9, 363-5, 
450, 576-7, 584, 586-7, 614-5, EPM 5.1, 6.28; SBN 212-13, 245)  A beautiful object primarily pleases, 
then, not by the pleasure the mind feels in the agitation of its own operations (although as we have shown 
Hume thinks the agitation of sympathy is often in itself pleasurable), but in the sympathetically-
communicated (calm, or moderate) sentiment of pleasure.  Conversely, a deformed (harmful) object pains 
us by means of producing in us a (calm, or moderate) sentiment of pain.   
On my reading, it is Hume’s attempt to account of the “unaccountable pleasure” of tragedy that 
ultimately brought him to the conclusion that sympathy must have primacy over the PMAS in his aesthetic 
theory. In the Treatise, Hume initially explains the pleasure we take in the “disagreeable” passions depicted 
in epic and tragedy in terms of the PMAS (following Fontenelle’s own PMAS-based explanation): because 
our want of belief in the reality of the subject of our sympathy moderates the “mental agitation” of such 
disagreeable passions enough to make them pleasurable.  (1.3.9.15; SBN 115; 1.3.10.10; SBN 630-1) But 
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beauty, and more importantly, to “greatness” in objects.  I will discuss the latter in some 
detail here because of its importance to Hume’s T 2.3 account of motivation.   
Hume’s theory of sublimity as it is presented in the Treatise—particularly in T 
2.3.8—is an important part of the early eighteenth-century attempt to fashion an account 
of what is called the ‘aesthetic’, as opposed to the ‘rhetorical’ sublime.  In classical 
rhetoric, the “sublime” or “elevated” (hypsos) is one of the levels of “style” (lexis), the 
purpose of which is to move an audience by manipulating their passions and imagination, 
accomplishing this by the expression of lofty or grand thoughts in fittingly “ornamented” 
and lofty diction and figure, the use of which is codified in rules of composition.
320
  
However, Longinus, in what is perhaps the most well-known and influential treatment of 
the “elevated” style, Peri Hypsous—a work which Hume read eagerly as a young 
                                                                                                                                                              
as Hume must have surely realized by the time he composed “Of Tragedy” (1757) in which he rejects this 
account (“Of Tragedy”, EMPL 217-9), such an explanation is inconsistent with the role he attributes to 
sympathy in producing our utility-based judgments not only of beauty and deformity, but of virtue and vice.  
As I noted above, our judgments of aesthetic and moral deformity are painful sentiments resulting from 
sympathy with imagined pain, even though this pain is moderated by the diminished vivacity resulting from 
the “psychological distance” of the object of our extensive sympathy, as in tragedy, or even in history. (cf. 
3.3.1.14-18; SBN 580-4)  If such moderated sympathy was always in itself pleasurable, Hume could not 
use the PMAS to explain both the pleasures of tragedy and the (necessarily painful) pains that constitute 
evaluations of aesthetic and moral deformity.  In “Of Tragedy,” Hume admits that sympathy with 
disagreeable passions, however moderated by fiction, still gives rise to a sentiment with a painful hedonic 
charge, and so cannot give pleasure in most cases. (Compare Hume’s own criticism of the “hinge” of 
Smith’s system—the thesis that all forms of sympathy are agreeable, one which Hume seems to endorse to 
some degree in T 2.2.4.  If this were true, objects Hume, “[a]n Hospital would be a more entertaining Place 
than a Ball.” (‘To Adam Smith’, July 1759, Letters I:313))  (It must be noted, Hume does not completely 
abandon the importance of the PMAS even here—there are still extreme circumstances in which any 
agitation gives pleasure: “You may weaken by degrees weaken a real sorrow, till it totally disappears; yet 
in none of its gradations will it ever give pleasure; except perhaps, by accident, to a man sunk under 
lethargic indolence, whom it rouzes from that languid state.” (EMPL 221, my emphasis))  The pleasure of 
tragedy, rather, is to be explained by means of the PMAS in terms of the pleasure of the mental agitation of 
eloquence, which “swallows up” the moderated sentiments of pain raised by sympathy with the characters, 
and converts them into the movement of the former, pleasurable and predominant passion.  In what 
follows, I will have occasion to note another example of this tension between sympathy and the PMAS in 
Hume’s system. 
320
 See, e.g. D.A. Russell, “Introduction,” xxxiv-viii. 
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man
321—deals not only with the more formal features of speech that contribute to 
“elevation”, but also with the importance of the grandeur of what is expressed in speech 
and its emotional impact on the audience for achieving true sublimity.  In fact, true 
“elevation of thought” could be expressed, to use one of Longinus’ famous and 
influential examples (one cited with great enthusiasm in the second Enquiry by Hume), 
even in the noble silence of Ajax in the Odyssey.
322
 In this way, Longinus himself pointed 
to the separation of the concept of “elevation” and “grandeur” in speech from its 
traditional basis in the classical rules governing composition.  
Accordingly, in 1674, Nicholas Boileau-Despréaux could write in the preface to 
his famous and influential translation of Longinus’ work (Traité du sublime), that “the 
Sublime”, a great thought or sentiment which arouses the passion of wonder or 
admiration in an audience, is conceptually distinct from the “Sublime Stile” which is a 
function of the application of formal rules of diction and composition
323
:  
…[B]y the Sublime he [Longinus] does not mean what the Orators call the 
Sublime Stile, but something extraordinary and marvellous that strikes us in a 
Discourse and makes it elevate, ravish and transport us.  The Sublime Stile 
requires always great Words, but the Sublime may be found in a Thought only, 
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 Hume’s earliest extant letter shows that he was reading Longinus enthusiastically in 1727: “…I read 
some of Longinus already & I am mightily delighted w
t 
him; I think he does really answer the Character of 
being the great Sublime he describes, he delivers his precepts w
t
 such force as if he were enchanted w
t
 the 
Subject.”  Indeed, it may be that Hume was reading Longinus in Boileau’s translation, since he echoes 
Boileau’s well-known assessment that Longinus is himself a sublime writer: Hume writes, Longinus “is 
himself an Author that may…be cited for an Example to his own Rules by any who shall be so adventurous 
as to write upon his Subject.” (Letters I:11)  However, Pope however had also made the same assessment in 
his Essay on Criticism (published anonymously in 1711), and Hume may be equally echoing Pope. 
(Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism (London, 1711), ll.675-80) 
322
 Longinus, Peri Hypsous 9.2. Hume writes that Ajax’s silence “…expresses more noble disdain and 
resolute indignation, than any language can convey.” (EPM 7.4; SBN 252, my emphasis) cf. Homer, 
Odyssey XI.543ff. 
323
 A point captured nicely in Boileau’s use of the qualification “the Sublime in a Discourse”. (Reflexion X, 
Posthumous Works 58; my emphasis) 
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or in a Figure or Turn of Expression.  A Thing may be in the Sublime Stile, and 
yet not be Sublime, that is, have nothing extraordinary nor surprising in it.
324
 
On Boileau’s analysis—especially in his tenth ‘Reflexion’ on Longinus—not only were 
the rhetorical sublime and the “sublime of content and spirit”325 fundamentally distinct, 
but the latter was more truly “the sublime.”  Boileau’s emphasis on this distinction, 
moreover, initiated the wider development of theories of sublimity primarily as a 
subjective, psychological response rather than as a product of formal rules of composition 
and diction, one that could be produced not only by art, but by nature as well.  Thus, 
Boileau’s translation and analysis of Longinus, which was hugely influential in 
England
326, was instrumental in the development of sublimity as an “aesthetic” 
phenomenon that transcends the bounds of discussions of rhetoric style.  Though Boileau 
emphasizes this distinction between “the Sublime” and the “sublime Stile”, his 
commentary, like Longinus’ treatise, nevertheless treats sublimity primarily as a 
phenomenon of discourse and literature.
327
  However, both Boileau and Longinus had 
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 The Works of Monsieur Boileau Despréaux, trans. John Ozell and Pierre Desmaizeaux (London: E. 
Sanger and E. Curll, 1711), II:7.  See also Boileau’s Reflexion X, also cited by Hume in the second 
Enquiry. (EPM 7.7; SBN 252-3)  In that Reflexion, Boileau emphasizes the distinction between “the 
Sublime” and “Sublime Stile” in reference to the Fiat Lux, which for Boileau was a prime example of true 
sublimity, despite its clear simplicity of style. Boileau writes, “…the Sublime is not properly a Thing to be 
prov’d and demonstrated; but that it is a certain Marvellousness which seizes us, strikes us, and makes it 
self be felt; thus it being impossible for any body to hear these Words pronounc’d somewhat Majestically, 
LET THERE BE LIGHT, &c. but he must at the same time feel a certain Elevation of Soul which pleases 
him, ‘tis no longer a Question, whether there be the Sublime in those Words, since there indubitably is.” 
(Posthumous Works of Monsieur Boileau (London: E. Curll, 1713), 55; cf. 58-9) (Reflexions 10-12 were 
first published in 1711 in Boileau’s Ouvres Completes and translated into English in 1713.)  
325
 To use Samuel Monk’s terms. (The Sublime 31) 
326
 See Samuel Monk, The Sublime, 29-42 (especially 29-32) on the pivotal influence of Boileau on the 
eighteenth-century conception of the “sublime”.  Boileau’s translation and commentary was just as much a 
treatise on criticism in its own right, as was his later Reflexions on Longinus which Hume cites in the 
second Enquiry.   
327
 See e.g., Longinus, Peri Hypsous 1.3, 36.1-2. For Boileau, see, e.g., Reflexion 12, where Boileau 
attempts a definition of the sublime, which he thinks is absent from Longinus’ work: “The Sublime is a 
certain Strength of Discourse, proper to elevate and ravish the Soul, which proceeds  either from Grandeur 
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hinted that this emotional response was in fact a manifestation of a much broader, 
emotional and cognitive response human beings have to ‘grandeur’ in all its forms, moral 
and natural, whether communicated in discourse or not.  In this way, Longinus and 
Boileau set the stage for John Dennis, Shaftesbury and Addison’s emphasis on the 
sublime of the natural world.
328
   
 Hume treats the rhetorical sublime in his essay “Of Eloquence” (1741)329, but it is 
in the Treatise, that Hume sketches out a theory of the aesthetic sublime.  Indeed, T 2.3.8, 
which I will treat in more detail in the following chapter, is widely considered to be one 
of the notable early eighteenth-century efforts to flesh out a fuller theory of the aesthetic 
sublime—the sublime as a psychological response to “greatness”, not only in other forms 
of art, but in the natural and moral realms as well. Accordingly, T 2.3.8 is widely 
considered to be the locus classicus for Hume’s treatment of the ‘natural sublime’. 330  
                                                                                                                                                              
of Thought, and Nobleness of Sentiment, or from Magnificence in Words, or harmonious, lively and 
animated Turn of Expression, that is from one of these Things regarded separately, or, which is the perfect 
Sublime, from all these Things together.” (Posthumous Works 76; my emphasis)    
328
 cf. Marjorie Hope Nicholson, Mountain Doom, Mountain Glory: the Development of the Aesthetics of 
the Infinite (Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1959) 
329
 “Of Eloquence” is thoroughly influenced by Longinus’ Peri Hypsous. (cf. EMPL 100, 104) Like 
Longinus, Hume takes Demonsthenes as the paradigm of the sublime orator.  And like Boileau, Hume, in 
that essay, focuses on the “sublime of content and spirit”—the orator’s manipulation of the imagination and 
passions of an audience, Longinus’ first two “fonts” of sublimity in a discourse (Peri Hypsous 8.1)—rather 
than on the effects wrought by composition and style and the technical rules which codify them. 
330
 See in particular, Dale Jacquette, Hume’s Critique of Infinity (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 307-33, especially, 
315-25, Justine Noel, “Space, Time and the Sublime in Hume’s ‘Treatise’”, Walter Hipple, Jr., The 
Beautiful, the Sublime and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory 42-44, Martin 
Kallich, The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory in Eighteenth-Century England (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1970), 83-4, and Teddy Brunius, David Hume on Criticism (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 
1952), 120-121.  See also Claudia Schmidt, David Hume: Reason in History (University Park: Penn State 
University Press, 2003), 190, 319-21, Mary Warnock, Imagination (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1976), 38-41, and Emily Brady, The Sublime in Modern Philosophy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 37,who treat T 2.3.8 mainly as a source for Hume’s aesthetics of sublimity.  A 
notable exception to the general neglect of those not interested more narrowly in Hume’s aesthetics are 
Donald Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life 116-30, who draws interesting conclusions from T 
2.3.7-8 regarding the relationship between Hume’s treatments of time in Books I and II of the Treatise. 
Livingston, however, fails to apply these insights to an analysis of T 2.3’s theory of motivation, and 
231 
 
 
 
     However, two features of Hume’s general Treatise theory of the aesthetic sublime 
commonly overlooked by commentators on Hume’s aesthetics must be noted.  First, 
Hume does not propose in T 2.3.8 a general theory of sublimity, as is sometimes claimed, 
but rather extends the general theory of sublimity he sketches elsewhere in the Treatise as 
a pleasing compound of perceptual emotions that attends our conception of objects which 
possess greatness in magnitude to other forms of “greatness” by association.331  Second, 
and more importantly, to my knowledge no commentator has ever seriously raised the 
question of what role Hume’s account of sublimity plays in the theory of motivation and 
deliberation in which it is clearly situated, and in which it plays so crucial a role.  In 
recent literature, far more attention has been given to Hume’s concept of the moral 
sublime, particularly his T 3.3.2 and EPM 7 treatments of the “sublime passions” (EPM 
7.26; SBN 259)—those forms of magnanimity or “greatness of mind” which form the 
class of sublime or “heroic” virtues (EPM 7.4-29; SBN 250-60; T 3.3.2.13; SBN 599-
600)—as a form of sublimity distinct from the Humean natural sublime.332  However, 
although Hume’s psychological account of sublimity in T 2.3.8 was certainly influential 
                                                                                                                                                              
laments the lack of scholarly attention to T 2.3.7-8, but only in light of the fact that he reads them as being 
“by far the most important [sections of the Treatise] for understanding Hume’s view on the nature of time.” 
(112)  
331
 Commentators tend to overlook Hume’s discussion of the psychological effects of “greatness” outside of 
T 2.3.8 altogether.  Thus, to reference a recent reading, Emily Brady is right to claim that Hume maintained 
in T 2.3.8 an account of the “temporal sublime”, but wrong to claim on those grounds Hume “lacked a 
theory of the sublime as such”. (The Sublime in Early Modern Philosophy 37) 
332
 On Hume’s notion of the “moral sublime” as distinct from the natural sublime, see Eugenio Lecaldano, 
“Hume’s Sentimentalism and the Moral Sublime,” in Hume Readings, eds. Lorenzo Greco and Alessio 
Vaccari (Rome: Edizioni Di Storia e Letteratura, 2012) 179-92, Karen Valihora, “The Silence of Ajax: 
Hume’s Moral Sublime”, in Jane Austen’s ‘Oughts’: Judgment After Locke and Shaftesbury (Newark, DE: 
University of Delaware Press, 2010): 108-35, and Elizabeth Neill, “Hume’s Moral Sublime”, British 
Journal of Aesthetics 37.3 (1997): 246-258.  Neill, however, hints at the ‘moral’ significance of Hume’s 
account of the natural sublime in this sense.  (“Hume’s Moral Sublime” 246, 253-5)  
232 
 
 
 
in the development of theories of sublimity as a general psychological phenomenon
333
, 
sublimity is in T 2.3.8 primarily a phenomenon of moral significance, not in the stricter 
sense of concerning “greatness” or sublimity in passions as virtuous character traits334, 
but in the broader sense that it plays an integral role in the wider context of the theory of 
deliberation and motivation Hume elaborates in T 2.3.
335
  My main aim in treating 
Hume’s theory of sublimity is to show how his extension of his theory of sublimity and 
                                                     
333As Samuel Monk puts it in his classic account of this engagement, despite the brevity of Hume’s T 2.3.8 
remarks on the sublime, “they are none the less new departures, for they are concerned in the main not with 
the object qua object, but with the experiences of the mind that perceives the object.” (The Sublime 65) On 
Monk’s account, “Hume it was who gave the signal that the time had come to adopt a psychological 
method, and this step once taken, the sublime came into the sphere of the aesthetic.” (The Sublime 112)  
Martin Kallich makes a similar claim for Hume’s importance: “It is Hume who begins clearly the 
application of psychology to the discussion of sublime…Indeed, it is difficult to assess accurately the 
enormous debts owed to Hume by his numerous horde of literary followers, Scottish and English.” (“The 
Associationist Criticism of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume,” Studies in Philology 54.4 (1946): 644-67, 
659)   
334As such, sublimity becomes, on Hume’s theory, a source of the approval of certain virtues—those 
“qualities which form the great man” (3.3.4.3; SBN 608, Hume’s emphasis; cf. 3.3.2.13-15; SBN 599-
601)—a source of pleasure independent of considerations of their utility, and so one which may therefore 
even be at odds with those considerations, as in the case of the heroic, martial courage of a conqueror.  It is 
this sentiment of sublimity that, in part, gives “great” men their “peculiar lustre” and their “dazling” 
character apart from considerations of either the actual or general utility of their characters, particularly to 
others. (EPM 7.11; SBN 254)   
“Considerable” objects please not because of their utility primarily (that is, not because they 
occasion a pleasurable sentiment communicated by sympathy) but because it presents us with a multitude of 
sympathetic emotions, which multitude is intrinsically pleasant according to the PMAS. Sublimity is in this 
sense the product of what Hume calls in the second Enquiry, “the force of many sympathies.” (EPM 9.11; 
SBN 276) 
335
 Though I cannot treat the point in any detail in this dissertation, in this way, Hume’s theory is firmly 
aligned with that of Shaftesbury. Indeed, as Walter Hipple and Peter de Bolla have pointed out, on the most 
common narrative of eighteenth-century theories of the sublime (including Monk’s seminal treatment), the 
most important “development” is that which takes the sublime from a property of the object to one of the 
subject—that is “toward the subjectivism of Kant.” (Monk, The Sublime 4, de Bolla, The Discourse of the 
Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 33) Both 
object to Monk’s view.  The objection of Ashfield and deBolla is particularly relevant to our purposes.  As 
they note, on the common reading, the eighteenth-century British theories are merely a prelude to Kant: the 
“story ends, then, with a proclamation of the aesthetic realm as in some sense autonomous; constructed on 
rules internal to it, generating affective responses according to its own logic, and generally distinct from all 
other realms of experience.” (2) However, British thinkers make a “consistent refusal to relinquish the 
interconnections between aesthetic judgments and ethical conduct.” (Andrew Ashfield and Peter de Bolla, 
“Introduction”, in The Sublime: a Reader in British Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Theory, ed. Andrew 
Ashfield and Peter de Bolla (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-16: 3-6) 
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of its ‘moral’ effect in T 2.3.8 bears on his theory of motivation, and the role of the 
PMAS in underwriting this connection.   
The sentiment of sublimity or admiration arises from our perception of any form 
of natural greatness, and in the case of great objects is primarily the product of the 
emotional agitation and activity of the imagination.  In order to explain our admiration of 
“great” objects, Hume relies on what he calls his “new discovery336 of an impression, that 
secretly attends every idea” (2.2.8.7; SBN 375): “I believe it may safely be establish’d for 
a general maxim, that no object is presented to the senses, nor image form’d in the fancy, 
but what is accompany’d with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion’d to it.” 
(2.2.8.4; SBN 373)  Our ideas of great objects, are attended by emotions that are 
proportionally great, and this great emotion, Hume reasons, must be a “compound” 
emotion:  
For to instance only in the cases of extension and number; ‘tis evident, that any 
very bulky object, such as the ocean, an extended plain, a vast chain of 
mountains, a wide forest; or any very numerous collection of objects, such as an 
army, a fleet, a crowd, excite in the mind a sensible emotion; and that the 
admiration, which arises on the appearance of such objects, is one of the most 
lively pleasures, which human nature is capable of enjoying.  Now as this 
admiration encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of the objects, 
we may conclude, according to our foregoing principles, that ’tis a compound 
effect, proceeding from the conjunction of the several effects, which arise from 
each part of the cause. Every part, then, of extension, and every unite [sic] of 
number has a separate emotion attending it, when conceiv’d by the mind; and 
                                                     
336
 The theoretical necessity of postulating such emotions seems to be their being necessary to explain the 
operation of “comparison” (that ‘original’ mechanism of human nature described in more detail in Chapter 
2) on “ideas and objects” as opposed to “passions and sensations”. (2.2.8.3; SBN 372)  For example, where 
a miniature horse stands next to a Clydesdale, comparison will operate and affect our judgment of size—the 
pony will seem to shrink in the presence of the Clydesdale, and the Clydesdale to grow larger.  However, as 
the images of either will be equally extended on the retina whether or not the other animal is present, 
ceteris paribus, the effects of comparison cannot be attributed to any change in the presentation of the 
objects to sense.  It must be a product of some impressions of reflection, or emotions, which attend ideas, 
and the operation of comparison on these.  Presumably, Hume would also argue that our experience of 
sublimity gives us some ground in addition to this theoretical necessity for postulating such emotions.   
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tho’ that emotion be not always agreeable, yet by its conjunction with others, 
and by its agitating the spirits to a just pitch, it contributes to the production of 
admiration, which is always agreeable.  (2.2.8.4; SBN 373-4, my emphasis) 
Here, Hume explicitly employs his seventh rule “by which to judge of causes and 
effects”: “When any object encreases or diminishes with the encrease or diminution of its 
cause, ‘tis to be regarded as a compounded effect, deriv’d for the union of the several 
different effects, which arise from the several different parts of the cause.” (1.3.15.9; 
SBN 174)  Admiration, then, because it increases and decreases in proportion to the 
relative “greatness” of the object, must consist in an aggregate or compound of these 
perceptual emotions which attend every simple idea that composes the complex idea of 
any great object.
337
  It is, more importantly, a pleasant emotion, per Hume’s PMAS: 
admiration by “agitating the spirits to a just pitch” is naturally agreeable to the mind.338   
                                                     
337
 Elsewhere, Hume seems to equate a “sublime idea” with a “compounded” one. (EHU 2.6; SBN 19) It is 
important to note, however, that the direct proportionality is something we infer not something we can 
directly perceive by introspection, because size or quantity are themselves only judged by inference, as I 
will discuss in a footnote below.  The Humean mechanism of comparison as well as general rules seems to 
play fundamental roles here. (cf. 1.3.12.24; SBN 141-2, 2.2.8.2-4; SBN 372-4)  
338
 Early and mid-eighteenth-century theories of sublimity, such as Addison’s and Gerard’s, often 
distinguished between the sublime of natural objects, which we experience directly in perception, and the 
sublimity of objects imitated in art—the latter, for instance, in Gerard, was the function of association. (An 
Essay on Taste 22-4) In Hume, however, all sublime experience is a function of the associative activity of 
the imagination.  Though Hume’s Treatise theory of “natural” sublimity—our emotional response to the 
perception (or conception) of objects of great spatiotemporal magnitude—is sketchy, he does make it clear 
in the Treatise that such a “compound effect” arising from the perception of great objects cannot be the 
result of immediate sensation, must be the result of experience and causal reasoning.  The principles of 
optics show us that whether we are “cooped up in the narrowest court or chamber”, or “standing on the top 
of a high promontory” gazing at the ocean, we are presented with a visual field composed of the same 
number of pointal impressions or minima visibilia.  (1.3.9.11; SBN 112, following Berkeley (New Theory 
of Vision 82, Principles 127-32).  For Hume’s denial of the infinite divisibility of space, and his insistence 
on the existence of minima sensibilia, see, e.g., 1.2.1.3-4, 1.2.2.9, 1.2.3.4, 1.2.3.15, 1.4.4.8; SBN 27-8, 32, 
34, 38-9, 228) Consequently, from sensation alone we cannot conclude anything about the relative 
magnitude of the ocean viewed from a high promontory or the wall of our small study.  It is rather by a 
judgment that we infer the greatness of an object or its distance from ourselves: that is, we “draw an 
inference from the sight” of the object and “confound” the judgment with the sensation itself. (1.3.9.11; 
SBN 112; cf. T 1.4.2.9; SBN 191, Berkeley, New Theory of Vision §3) However, Hume never directly 
explains the nature of these inferences (and, moreover, never seems to have worked out a coherent theory 
of our judgments of distance and spatial magnitude).  For instance, he is more concerned in his treatment of 
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However, Hume also extends the pleasing sentiment of sublimity occasioned by 
“greatness” in spatial and quantitative magnitude to other forms of non-natural 
“greatness”: if the production of admiration by a compound emotional effect “be allow’d 
with respect to extension and number, we can make no difficulty with respect to virtue 
and vice, wit and folly, riches and poverty, happiness and misery, and other objects of 
that kind, which are always attended with an evident emotion”.339 (2.2.8.4; SBN 373-4, 
my emphasis)  (Many of the consequential goods Hume lists here are those “weighty” 
and “considerable” (because supremely valuable) goods I argued Hume tool to be the 
“grand” and “distant” ends of all of our projects and pursuits.  Later in this chapter, I will 
elaborate the effects of their sublimity on our passions and motives.)  Why this extension 
of his theory of a compound emotion causes “no difficulty” is not made explicit by 
                                                                                                                                                              
space in T 1.2 with the origins of our idea of spatial extension than the means by which we judge of spatial 
magnitude or distance. (cf. 1.2.3.4; SBN 34) All Hume ultimately tells us is that it is “only by experience 
that [one] infers the greatness of the object from some peculiar qualities of the image.” (1.3.9.11; SBN 112) 
Hume may have in mind here the Berkelean qualities of ‘faintness’ and ‘confusion’, but gives no hint that 
he adopts Berkeley’s theory of vision-touch coordination. Indeed, Hume argues at one point that the 
distance between two bodies is discerned by perception of the angles the “rays of light flowing from them, 
form with each other” along with the perception of “the motion that is requir’d in the eye, in its passage 
from one to the other; and the different parts of the organs, which are affected by them.” (1.2.5.12; SBN 
58) However, he repudiates this explanation in his “Appendix” (§22; SBN 636)—as these angles are not 
perceived by us, they “can never discover the distance”.  On this point, he sides with Berkeley (New Theory 
of Vision §§3-17) over the Cartesians. (e.g. Malebranche, Search LO 43-7) A Humean account of our 
judgments of distance and magnitude would be particularly useful for an understanding of his moral theory 
as well: Hume uses our “corrective” judgments of perception of distance and magnitude analogous to our 
properly moral judgments of virtue and vice. 
Hume’s account of magnitude perception, it seems, has not been investigated in any significant 
detail in the literature. (For a notable exception, see Edward Slowik, “Hume’s and the Perception of Spatial 
Magnitude”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34.3 (2004): 355-373.)  Of course, for Hume, extended 
objects are composites of minimal visible points, and it is tempting to think of our judgments of spatial 
magnitude to be the product of what Edward Slowik has called “perceptual addition” of such points: the 
more minima visibilia a perception contains, the larger we judge it to be (and the larger it is).  Hume seems 
to deem this a “just” method of accounting for the equality of two objects in length, for instance, but deems 
it “useless” as means of actually determining that equality. (T 1.2.4.18-9; SBN 45-6) The mind, Hume 
argues, never directly counts minimia in this way, and in any case, this method would only work for two 
objects already judged to be at an equal distance from us in our visual field. 
339
 cf. Joseph Priestley, A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (London: J. Johnson, 1777), 157. 
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Hume.  But as Hume implies a few sections later in a related passage in T 2.2.10, 
“objects of that kind” are what he calls objects of great “consequence” or great “moment” 
in human life, as I noted in the previous chapter: “It has already been observ’d [in the 
passage from T 2.2.8 quoted above], that almost every kind of idea is attended with some 
emotion, even the ideas of number and extension, much more those of such objects as are 
esteem’d of consequence in life, and fix our attention”— objects such as riches, Hume’s 
own example in this passage. (2.2.10.9; SBN 393, my emphasis)   
We may attribute an attending compound emotion “much more” to such objects 
presumably because our conception of such “momentous” objects is not only ‘great’, but 
hedonically charged as well.  The basis of the “consequence” or “weight” of objects like 
virtue and riches is the multitude or compound of sympathetic emotions, pleasurable or 
painful, the mere contemplation of such objects stirs in us, and it is here that sympathy 
works in tandem with the PMAS to explain this phenomenon. As Hume tells us in his 
account of virtuous “natural abilities” in T 3.3.4, the pleasure of this compound emotion, 
grounded in the PMAS, accounts in part (that is, in addition to considerations of utility) 
for our approval of men of natural parts: 
…I must observe, that, perhaps, one source of the esteem and affection which 
attends them [i.e. the natural abilities], is deriv’d from the importance and 
weight, which they bestow on the person possess’d of them.  He becomes of 
greater consequence in life.  His resolutions and actions affect a greater number 
of his fellow-creatures.  Both his friendship and enmity are of moment.  And ‘tis 
easy to observe, that whoever is elevated, after this manner, above the rest of 
mankind, must excite in us the sentiments of esteem and approbation.  Whatever 
is important engages our attention, fixes our thought, and is contemplated with 
satisfaction.  The histories of kingdoms are more interesting than domestic 
stories: The histories of great empires more than those of small cities and 
principalities: And the histories of wars and revolutions more than those of 
peace and order.  We sympathize with the persons that suffer, in all the various 
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sentiments which belong to their fortunes.  The mind is occupy’d by the 
multitude of the objects, and by the strong passions, that display themselves.  
And this occupation or agitation of the mind is commonly agreeable and 
amusing.  (3.3.4.14; SBN 613-4, last two emphases mine) 
As Hume clearly suggests here, a man becomes “considerable” and “weighty”, and so 
“elevated”, by the sheer scope of their power and influence, which is manifested in the 
multitude of relations of causation that exist between his natural abilities and the 
meaningful effects his actions have on others—the “good and ill of multitudes are 
connected with their actions”. (3.3.4.14; SBN 613-4)340 These relations convey our minds 
to those myriad effects, while the resulting sympathy with the vast number of people 
affected stirs a multitude of emotions in us.
341
  In a passage in T 3.3.5, Hume refers back 
explicitly to the T 3.3.4 passage above, in order to deepen his earlier T 2.2.5 explanation 
of our “esteem for the rich and powerful” in terms of a sympathy with the pleasure of 
their possessors:  
[W]here the riches or power are very great, and render the person considerable 
and important in the world, the esteem attending them, may, in part, be ascrib’d 
to another source [i.e. other than a sympathy with their possessors (cf. T 2.2.5; 
SBN 357-65)].…viz. their interesting the mind by a prospect of the multitude, 
and importance of their consequences: Tho’, in order to account for the 
operation of this principle, we must also have recourse to sympathy; as we have 
observ’d in the preceding section.” (3.3.5.5; SBN 616-7, my emphasis)   
                                                     
340
 It is interesting to note that both the natural and (what I have called, more broadly) the moral sublime 
are the product of associative inference.  Hume never works out a full account of how we judge magnitude 
and distance, but what is clear, is that these determinations are not immediate impressions of sense, but 
inferences from “peculiar qualities of the image” presented to the mind. (1.3.9.11; SBN 112)  The “ideas” 
of each part of extension or number are not copied one-for-one from those simple sense impressions which 
compose a complex impression.  As Hume argues, following Berkeley, the same number of minima 
visibilia compose every impression of sight—magnitude, then, must be inferred.  In this way, “greatness” 
in spatial magnitude is no more directly “perceived” than moral “greatness”, putting, in true Humean 
fashion, the moral on a par with the natural.   
341
 Thus, the “lustre” of Alexander’s character surely results in large part from the efficacy of his conquest 
of the world—his greatness of mind enabled him to turn all he encountered into his subjects. (3.3.2.12; 
SBN 599) cf. Baillie, An Essay on the Sublime 18-9.   
238 
 
 
 
In the case of very great riches or power, there is another, distinct operation of sympathy, 
focused not on the rich man’s own enjoyment of his own riches (which is the primary 
source of our “esteem for the rich and powerful”), but on the multitude and moment of 
the effects of his power.  In other words, as in the case of qualities of a great man, the 
ideas of “considerable” and “weighty” objects—objects like virtue, happiness, and 
riches—produce in us a pleasurable sentiment of sublimity by stirring in us a perceptible 
emotion compounded of a multitude of ideas emotionally charged by sympathy.
342
 
However, we also find in Hume’s account of the PMAS-based effects of 
“considerable” objects on our imagination a prime example of the tension between the 
PMAS and his sympathy-based theory of utility in his moral and aesthetic theories to 
which I alluded earlier.  Where a “considerable” idea strikes us with a multitude of 
“agreeable images” and emotions, a doubly agreeable sentiment arises in us—the PMAS-
based pleasure that arises from the multitude of images and passions is added to the 
agreeableness or pleasantness of the emotions themselves.  To use Hume’s own example, 
when we contemplate a man of great natural abilities, the “considerable” consequences of 
these abilities on his felicity “strike” the imagination and give rise to a pleasing sentiment 
which forms the basis of our approval of his character: 
Where his natural talents and acquired abilities give us the prospect of elevation, 
advancement, a figure in life, prosperous success, a steady command over 
fortune, and the execution of great or advantageous undertakings; we are struck 
with such agreeable images, and feel a complacency and regard immediately 
arise towards him.  The ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, prosperity, are 
connected with every circumstance of his character, and diffuse over our minds 
                                                     
342
 Here Hume certainly influences Archbald Alison’s own account of sublimity as the product of a “train” 
of emotionally charged ideas. (Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (Dublin, 1791), 102-6) 
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a pleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity. (EPM 6.3; SBN 234, my 
emphasis) 
The multitude of these consequences gives us a pleasure that is added to the pleasure of 
our sympathy with the happiness these abilities will confer on their possessor.  The 
tension, however, becomes clear when we take the opposing case.  An idea of the events 
of September 11, 2001, for instance, is a ‘considerable’, ‘weighty’ and ‘great’ idea, which 
will certainly produce a compound emotional effect in one who contemplates it.  Per the 
PMAS, this emotional agitation ought to be naturally pleasurable.  However, the 
multitude of emotions sympathetically conveyed and compounded are surely in the main 
painful.  Hume illustrates this point nicely in the same section of the second Enquiry with 
the example of abject poverty—another one of Hume’s Treatise examples of ‘weighty’ or 
‘momentous’ ideas (2.2.8.4; SBN 373-4): “…when a poor man appears, the disagreeable 
images of want, penury, hard labour, dirty furniture, coarse or ragged clothes, nauseous 
meat and distasteful liquor, immediately strike our fancy.” (EPM 6.33; SBN 248) In both 
cases, we are “struck” with a multitude of painful sentiments which would explain not 
merely our aversion to poverty, but also the subsequent production of many of the pain-
based resembling passions such sentiments surely cause, such as hatred, anger, pity or, in 
the case of poverty, contempt.    
One way Hume seems to reconcile this tension is by differentiating the role the 
PMAS-based pleasure we take in contemplating for “considerable” or “weighty” objects 
plays in generating a desire for such objects, from the ability of that compounded 
(pleasurable) emotion simply to “fix the attention” or “interest the mind” or imagination 
in an idea or object. (2.3.10.6; SBN 451; cf. 2.2.8.3; SBN 373, 2.2.10.9; SBN 393)  
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(Indeed, Hume sometimes talks of the fixing of the attention in terms of desire of the 
imagination for the pleasure of that fixity. (2.3.10.12; SBN 453)) It is by means of this 
sentiment of sublimity, by whatever views it is generated, that these “great”, 
“considerable” and “weighty” objects become what I called in the last chapter “centers of 
ideational gravity”—indeed, ones that can compete with the vivacious idea of self (as it is 
conceived in T 2.3.7), and so with those contiguous objects which are “supported” by 
their close relation to self.  Hume makes this clear throughout Book II: 
’Tis a quality of human nature…that the imagination naturally turns to whatever 
is important and considerable; and where two objects are presented to it, a small 
and a great one, usually leaves the former, and dwells entirely upon the latter. 
(2.1.9.13; SBN 308, emphasis) 
 [T]he very same reason, which determines the imagination to pass from remote 
to contiguous objects [i.e. their superior vivacity and attention-fixing power], 
with more facility than from contiguous to remote, causes it likewise to change 
with more ease, the less for the greater, than the greater for the less.  What has 
the greatest influence is most taken notice of; and whatever is most taken notice 
of, presents itself most readily to the imagination.  We are more apt to over-look 
in any subject, what is trivial, than what appears of considerable moment; but 
especially if the latter takes the precedence, and first engages our attention. 
(2.2.2.20; SBN 342, my emphasis)
343
 
Again, the common feature of both types of object that bestows on them their “gravity” is 
not the pleasure that attends their conception, but their ability to attract and fix our 
attention: whether vivacity is ‘transferred’ to the ideas of such objects by relations of 
ideas from a present impression, or such ideas fix the mind by means of a compound 
emotional effect, in either case is, on Hume’s theory, it is an impression of reflection, and 
                                                     
343
 General rules or ‘prejudices’ also govern these transitions of the imagination.  (cf. 2.1.9.13; SBN 308-9)  
For instance, we are often drawn often to what typically would be more “considerable”, though in reality it 
is not so.  Thus, we are apt to consider a husband the more “considerable” member of a family, and so 
make it a custom to give the children his name, even in cases where the wife and mother is “possest of a 
superior spirit and genius” and so, in fact, the more considerable parent.  (2.1.9.13; SBN 309) 
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“emotion” or feeling which attends the conception of any idea that gives it “influence” on 
our imagination and, consequently, our passions. (cf. 2.2.8.3; SBN 372-3) Recall that 
passions such as admiration and surprise, on Hume’s account, tend to “spread 
[themselves] over the whole soul”, and so vivify and enliven the ideas of their objects.344 
(1.3.10.4; SBN 120; cf. 1.2.1.1; SBN 26) It is by means of the compound emotion that 
attends “great” objects that they become “centers of ideational gravity” that compete with 
the self, and those objects psychologically contiguous to it, for the mind’s attention.  
Accordingly, as a source of vivacity, the greatness or “considerable’ influence or 
“moment” of an object also affects the passions which attend it.  As Hume noted in T 
2.3.6-7, our vivacious ideas of psychologically contiguous hedonic objects are, ceteris 
paribus, attended with stronger and more violent passions; so too, “the degree of any 
passion depends upon the nature of its object”, and a passion which has an object which 
is “considerable in our eyes, fills and possesses the mind much more than one” than one 
raised by objects we “esteem of less consequence.” (2.2.2.24; SBN 344, my emphasis)  
Accordingly, we must distinguish between “considerable” and “weighty” objects which 
fix the attention and give rise to desire (and other pleasure-based passions), and those 
which fix the attention, but give rise to aversion (and other pain-based passions).  This 
distinction, as I will show below, will become important for an understanding of T 2.3.8. 
 
                                                     
344
 As I will note again below, Hume is also clearly drawing on the early modern (particularly Cartesian) 
account of wonder as an emotion which functions to direct our attention.  Malebranche in particular, 
assigns a central place to the passions of wonder and admiration in the cultivation of the power of attention. 
(See, e.g., Search LO 278-9, 375-97.)  
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4.3 The Role of the PMAS in Hume’s ‘Science of Man’ (II): the Mutual 
Influence of the Passions and Imagination 
The second important role the PMAS plays in Hume’s ‘science of man’ is as a 
regulative principle of human nature, which not only explains why the mind finds 
moderate agitation pleasurable, but also governs the operations of the mind in such a way 
as to maintain this moderate level of agitation, and to avoid those perceptions or 
transitions between perceptions (whether of the passions or imagination) which render 
the agitation of the mind either too violent or too languid. The PMAS regulates the mind, 
in particular, by dictating a balance or ‘mixture’ of facility and difficulty, or compliance 
and opposition in its operations.  The dominion of this principle over all of human nature 
(the mind and body) in this respect is evident throughout Hume’s writings, and is 
essential in particular to Hume’s conception of human happiness as what Hume calls a 
“judicious mixture” of “ease” and “difficulty” of various kinds: as he puts it, “nature has 
pointed out” such a “mixed kind of life as the most suitable to the human race.” (EHU 
1.6; SBN 9)
345
  This pleasurable balancing of facility and opposition is often explicitly 
characterized by Hume as a balanced “mixture” of easy and difficult “ingredients”, such 
as the easy pleasures of leisure and society and the “care” and “application” of business, 
the ease of common life and the effort of philosophical reflection, and easy and 
“abstruse” reflection and thought.  The need for such a mixture is particularly clear in his 
                                                     
345
 (cf. EHU 1, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” EMPL 269-70, “The Sceptic” 159-60, 167.  This point is 
forcefully illustrated in Hume’s depiction of his skeptical ‘crisis’ in T 1.4.7)  
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scattered explicit statements regarding human happiness in his Essays as a balanced 
“mixture” of such “ingredients”.346   
Though ‘balanced mixture’ perhaps implies a stasis, it is clear even in these 
passages that on Hume’s account the PMAS also tends to dictate a dynamic, self-
regulating bipolar movement between facility and opposition of various sorts, that is 
between “ease” and “difficulty”: where facility becomes too great, it palls the agitation of 
the mind, giving rise (per the PMAS) to uneasiness, and a concomitant desire of the mind 
to exert itself and to seek out difficulty in order to enliven itself with the agitation that 
arises from that exertion and labor.  On the other hand, when opposition and difficulty 
become too great, the mind flags, and seeks facility in its operations in order to restore its 
vigor and agitation to a pleasurable, moderate state.
347
 Thus, both facility and opposition, 
when too great, naturally occasion uneasiness and aversion, but when moderate, give rise 
to pleasure and desire. 
As I will note in further detail below, facility and difficulty carry out their 
function of maintaining the moderate agitation of the mind in several distinct ways.  In 
general, however, facility and difficulty—whether in the operations of the passions, 
imagination, or the body—perform their integral role in maintaining this agitation by 
                                                     
346cf. “Of Refinement in the Arts”, EMPL 269-70, “The Sceptic”, EMPL 160.  See also Hume’s letter to a 
physician (Letters I:12-8), as well as his letter of December 1762, ‘To the Comtesse de Boufflers’. (Letters 
I:487)  
347
 Indeed, this movement between “ease” and “difficulty” is illustrated nicely by the exchange between 
Hume’s “Epicurean” and “Stoic”, and is stated explicitly in the observations of the “Sceptic” on that 
exchange. (“The Sceptic”, EMPL 160; cf. “The Platonist”, EMPL 155, Dubos., Critical Reflections 8-9) It 
also has clear roots in early modern anatomical theories of the brain and nerves, which clearly informs 
Hume’s own reflections on his early spiritual disorder.  (cf. Letters I:16ff., George Cheyne, An Essay on 
Health and Long Life 152ff.) See also “Of Tragedy”: “Difficulties encrease passions of every kind; and by 
rouzing our attention, and exciting our active powers, they produce an emotion, which nourishes the 
prevailing affection.” (EMPL 221)  However, “[t]oo much difficulty renders us indifferent” to an object. 
(225) 
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means of their respective emotional effects, as Hume notes particularly in T 2.3.4-5.  
Facility, whether in the conception of an object, the victory of a passion in combat, or in a 
bodily action,  “orders” the spirits and so calms and tranquilizes their agitation, whereas 
difficulty “puts the spirits in agitation” or “ferment” and “excites” them, giving them a 
more violent motion. (2.3.5.2-3; SBN 423) Thus, an action of mind or body that is 
difficult and painful may eventually give pleasure as that difficulty is eased by custom: 
custom moderates the mental or bodily difficulty or opposition that would have otherwise 
magnified that pain by the MPP, and gradually produces a facility which is in itself 
pleasurable. (2.3.5.2-3; SBN 423)  However, as Hume points out, as this bodily or mental 
agitation is often the primary basis of our pleasure in and so desire for certain objects, 
such object may become disagreeable by too frequent repetition, particularly objects 
whose pleasure depends on such “agitation” of the spirits, such as music, sex, or “good 
cheer”. (2.3.5.4; SBN 423-4)348  Thus, facility “when it is too great” renders “the actions 
of the mind so faint and languid, that they are no longer able to interest and support” the 
mind in its interest in or pursuit of an object.  Where a spirit-rousing pleasure is too 
frequently indulged, custom can pall the pleasurable agitation on which our desire for that 
object is founded, and turn it into an object of aversion where it cannot be “quicken’d” by 
some other form of agitation (e.g., either by its “rebound” in our minds by sympathy with 
others, or by some novelty or variation in the pleasure itself).  And even these enlivening 
or “quickening” mechanisms can lose their efficacy by too frequent use.349  In this case, 
                                                     
348
 cf. 2.2.11.6; SBN 396, “The Epicurean”, EMPL 138-45. 
349
 This is a major theme in Hume’s four essays on happiness.  cf. “The Epicurean”, EMPL 141-2, “The 
Stoic”, EMPL 150, “The Platonist”, EMPL 156, “The Sceptic”, EMPL 167 
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as the agitation of the mind becomes too faint, the mind seeks forms of difficulty and 
opposition in order to “preserve its ardour” and “support itself with a new flow of 
passion”. (2.3.4.8; SBN 421-2, my emphasis)   
 
4.4 The PMAS and the Effects of Imaginative Opposition and Facility on the 
Passions 
More important for my purposes in elaborating Hume’s argument in T 2.3.8 and 
its contribution to an understanding of strong, calm passions, are the roles played by the 
emotional effects of imaginative facility and difficulty in maintaining the moderate 
agitation of the mind.  The PMAS explains the pleasure we take in moderate forms of 
facility and difficulty of any kind, and the pain or uneasiness that accompanies them in 
their extremes, and these pleasures and pains, whether occurrent or in prospect, are the 
basis of desires for and aversions to facility or difficulty which regulate the flow of 
perceptions in the mind.   As I hope to have shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the effects of 
imaginative facility and difficulty on the passions is, in general, a primary subject of T 
2.3.4-7.  What is more, I hope to show in what follows that it is extremely fruitful to read 
T 2.3.4-10 at a general level as Hume’s account of the roles played by imaginative 
opposition and facility in an account of human motivation and the production of the 
passions.
350
 On my reading, imaginative facility and difficulty play three distinct roles in 
                                                     
350
 I will make clear how T 2.3.4-6 fit into this general program below.  T 2.3.9 is primarily an investigation 
of the effects of the uncertainty (cf. 1.3.11-2; SBN 124-42, 2.3.4.7; SBN 421) on our imagination and 
passions (e.g. in the generation of hope and fear, and a violent curiosity that arises from uncertainty or the 
painful fluctuation and wavering of our imagination (2.3.9.26-30; SBN 446-7, 2.3.10.11-12; SBN 453-4)), 
and T 2.3.8 and 10 an investigation of the effects of imaginative opposition and exertion in exciting desires 
for psychologically distant objects and a love of difficult truth. (2.3.10.1-10; SBN 448-52) I will also 
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these sections in helping the mind maintain its moderate agitation as dictated by the 
PMAS, and my aim here is to distinguish these roles and bring their effects on the 
passions to light.   
The first, and most basic role of imaginative facility and difficulty, is what I will 
call their formative function—their role in the formation or production of new motivating 
passions of a certain strength and violence.  When we approach T 2.3.4-10 as a general 
investigation of the effects of imaginative facility and difficulty on the passions, the 
primary subject of T 2.3.7 may then be viewed as the effects of this formative 
imaginative facility and difficulty on the strength and violence of passions.  As Hume 
argues in that section of the Treatise, (formative) imaginative facility aids, while 
(formative) imaginative difficulty inhibits, the vivification of our ideas of objects.  As 
Hume argued in T 1.3.10, and again in T 2.3.6, this belief, or the vivacity of our ideas, is 
a necessary condition of the production of passions for those objects:  
This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the 
calm as well as the violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any 
considerable influence upon either of them.  ‘Tis too weak to take hold of the 
mind, or be attended with emotion. (2.3.6.10; SBN 427, my emphasis) 
The passions only respond to objects which fix our attention or “take hold of the mind”—
objects which we believe exist or will exist.  In addition, the object of a (hedonic) belief 
must also have a causal connection to pleasure or pain.  In this case, a belief becomes a 
                                                                                                                                                              
discuss these two sections in more detail below.  Indeed, appreciating this point helps make greater sense of 
Hume’s way of proceeding in T 2.3.4-10.  On the reading of T 2.3 I have presented in the previous two 
chapters, Hume’s argument may seem to proceed out of order in one obvious way: he begins in T 2.3.4-5 
with an account of the effects of different forms of opposition and facility on our passions and motives, 
effects which presuppose the antecedent strength of the passions affected, and only then proceeds in T 
2.3.6-7 to discuss the primary cause of that antecedent strength—the relative vivacity of our ideas of 
hedonic objects.  However, when we appreciate the centrality of the effects of imaginative facility and 
difficulty in all their forms on the strength and violence of our passions, it becomes natural to read T 2.3.4-
7 as a careful treatment of these effects. 
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hedonic belief which gives rise to a passion of a degree of strength and violence 
proportional not only to the weight of its hedonic impact, but also to its vivacity.  In their 
formative function, imaginative facility and difficulty affect the strength and violence of 
passions by affecting (fostering or inhibiting, respectively) the vivacity of our hedonic 
beliefs.
351
  I treated this function of imaginative facility as Hume accounts for it in T 2.3.7 
in the previous chapter.  
                                                     
351
 The difference between formative and non-formative imaginative facility and difficulty ultimately relies 
on Hume’s distinction between the vivacity of ideas which constitutes belief and other impressions of 
reflection which arise from other operations of the imagination beside the bare conception of its ideas.  For 
instance, Hume claims that the agitation and fluctuation of doubt and uncertainty between two or more 
ideas is an emotion distinguishable from the agitation or vehemence of the conception of any single idea at 
T App. §4 (SBN 625-6)—we can discern those emotions of imaginative activity which are “distinct and 
separate from the conception” of an idea, from those which “modify” that conception itself.  As Hume puts 
it, vivacious ideas are “different to the feeling; but there is no distinct or separate impression attending 
them.” On my reading, Hume’s failure to explain the relationship between the feelings which attend the 
conception of lively ideas (beliefs) is a serious source of confusion for anyone trying to decipher Hume’s 
account of the relationship between vivacity, as an emotion, and the violence and strength of passions.   
On my reading, it is particularly puzzling for Hume’s theory of motivation that although vivacity 
is an impression of reflection, Hume does not attribute the violence-increasing effects of the vivacity of 
causal belief on the passions to the operation of the MPP, especially in light of what I have called Hume’s 
“exertion model” of vivacity transfer.  While the “agitation” produced by the exertion or “efforts” of the 
mind in overcoming sources of difficulty in the transitions of the imagination between its ideas is 
convertible into the predominant passion by the MPP, the “effort” or “force” with which the imagination 
conceives any individual idea is not. 
The puzzle is magnified by Hume’s silence on the criterion he employs to determine which 
emotions and forms of mental agitation can serve as fodder for the MPP.  Hume begins T 2.3.6—his 
discussion of these effects of the vivacity of our ideas on the passions—by explicitly declining to attribute 
these effects to the operation of the MPP:  
Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent 
[and more forceful]; Whether this proceeds from the principle above-mention’d, that any 
attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant, I shall not determine.  ‘Tis sufficient 
for my present purpose, that we have many instances to confirm this influence of the imagination 
upon the passions.” (2.3.6.1; SBN 424, Hume’s emphasis)  
In other words, the proportional relationship between vivacity and the passions is to be taken as an 
observable fact in need of no deeper analysis—the more vivacious an idea is, the stronger and more violent 
the passion that is raised.  However, that Hume feels compelled here to decline explaining this effect of 
vivacity in terms of the operation of the MPP in the first place shows that this explanation is at least a 
natural one. And the naturalness of this potential explanation can be accounted for by Hume’s answer to the 
question of what distinguishes belief from mere conception of an idea—a question, Hume tells is, that has 
heretofore gone “unthought of by philosophers.” (Abs. §17; cf. 1.3.7.5n; SBN 96-7) As I noted above, on 
Hume’s theory, belief is not a function of the representational content of an idea, nor of something in the 
“parts and composition” of our idea of an object, but in the manner in which we conceive it. (cf. 1.3.7.1-5; 
SBN 94-6, EHU 5.8, 10-22) More specifically, it is a function of the “feeling” or “sensation” of the 
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The formative roles imaginative facility and difficulty play are, however, 
importantly different from what I will call their non-formative roles, which I will call 
their originative and their alterative roles. I will treat both of these in more detail below.   
In their non-formative roles, imaginative ease and difficulty have an effect on the 
passions not by their influence in formation of hedonic beliefs, but by means of their 
inherent emotional effects.  First, where some object fixes our attention (e.g. by the 
facility with which it conceived), but is in itself hedonically neutral, the prospective 
pleasures or pains of any additional imaginative ease and exertion it will occasion may 
make this otherwise hedonically indifferent object into an object of desire or aversion.  
Let us call this role of imaginative facility and difficulty its originative function: 
imaginative facility and opposition, or more importantly, the prospect of such facility or 
difficulty, in such cases have the power to originate or cause passions for objects which 
promise such facility and difficulty by means of their intrinsic pleasantness or painfulness 
without the interposition of any other perceptions of pleasure or pain.   
Indeed, the regulative role of the PMAS surely underlies Hume’s scattered and 
seemingly contradictory claims regarding the desires and aversions that arise solely or in 
large part from the pleasures and pains of imaginative facility and difficulty.  For 
instance, Hume notes, a custom-induced facility to conceive an object can give rise to a 
                                                                                                                                                              
“additional force and vivacity” such an idea possesses in relation to other ideas. (1.3.7.5; SBN 96)  
Accordingly, belief, Hume tells us, is thus more a function of the affective or “sensitive”, rather than the 
“cogitative part of our natures”. (1.4.1.8; SBN 183; cf. 1.3.8.12; SBN 103)  In this case, it may naturally be 
thought that as an emotion or sensation, vivacity may strengthen passions via the MPP—that is by 
increasing the stock of emotions in the mind, which emotions in turn may serve as fodder to be “swallow’d 
up” by a predominant passion.  Indeed, Hume often characterizes the vivacity of an idea in terms of the 
“violence” of its conception (cf. 1.3.8.16, 1.3.10.10; SBN 106, 631)  Just why such emotions are not 
convertible into the passions they raise is never explained by Hume.        
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desire for that object because that facility is the source of pleasure, and this effect of 
custom becomes an integral part of his explanation of the first and “most natural” artifice 
of justice—present possession: “Such is the effect of custom, that it not only reconciles 
us to any thing we have long enjoy’d, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us 
prefer it to other objects, which may be more valuable, but are less known to us.” 
(3.2.3.4; SBN 503, my emphasis)
352
  However, Hume also notes that such familiarity can 
also have the opposite effect: it is “a quality observable in human nature…that every 
thing, which is often presented, and to which we have been long accustom’d, loses its 
value in our eyes, and is in a little time despis’d and neglected”—those objects that have 
“become familiar by custom, give us little satisfaction…” (2.1.6.4; SBN 291, my 
emphasis)
353
 As the PMAS dictates, where the calming effect of facility on the mind 
produced by custom becomes too great, the agitation of the mind is palled, resulting in an 
aversion to the very objects we initially desired mainly on the grounds of the pleasure of 
conceptual facility.  
As I indicated above, Hume would have found particular inspiration for his 
account of the PMAS’ grounding of what I have called the ‘originative’ role such 
operations play in early eighteenth-century aesthetic theory.  What is more, it would be 
                                                     
352
cf. Addison, Spectator 447 (VI:240-5), the subject of which is the “wonderful Efficacy” of custom “in 
making every thing pleasant to us.” Similarly, the pleasure of facility accounts for the friendships we have 
with those related to us in some way, by blood (cf. 2.2.4.2; SBN 352) or acquaintance (cf. 2.2.4.3; SBN 
352), merely “because we enter easily and familiarly into his sentiments and conceptions: Nothing is 
strange or new to us…” (DP 3.4, my emphasis)  Our desire to converse with them is often based solely on 
this “ease…which attends our intercourse and commerce”. (DP 3.5; cf. T 2.2.9.20; SBN 389)   
353
 In the T 2.1.6.4 passage just cited, Hume notes that this is a phenomenon “which we shall endeavour to 
explain afterwards”—the Nortons argue (correctly in my opinion) that Hume’s reference is to T 2.3.5.  See 
also DP 2.19-20.  (Indeed, other artifices of justice which follow upon present possession and which foster 
wider trade of goods seem to be motivated in large part by desire for novel goods. (cf. “Of Money”, EMPL 
291))   
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hard to overstate the importance of the PMAS in mid- to late-eighteenth-century critical 
theory in particular, and, though I cannot argue the point adequately here, this importance 
is due in no small part to Hume’s Treatise.  What I have called the “mixture” or 
“balancing” of facility and difficulty in the operations of the imagination becomes one of 
the fundamental principles by which aesthetic pleasure is to be explained throughout the 
eighteenth century.
354
  The importance of the PMAS’s influence on the imagination is 
                                                     
354
 The clearest example of Hume’s own influence on aesthetic theory on this point is perhaps Alexander 
Gerard’s An Essay on Taste (1757)—a work which Hume helped to see through the press, and which is 
deeply indebted to Treatise 2.3.4-8 in particular.  (cf. Letters I:308, ‘To William Robertson’ May 1759, and 
Nichols, Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth Century, 6 Vols. (London, 1812): II:326n)  Hume and Adam 
Smith were on the Edinburgh Select Society committee that awarded Gerard a prize for this work in 1756. 
(cf. Letters I:219-21, ‘To Allan Ramsay’ April or May 1755)  Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say 
that Gerard is the foremost early student of Treatise, Book II, the reasonings of which figure prominently in 
his works, An Essay on Taste and An Essay on Genius.  Gerard, along with Thomas Reid and others, was a 
member of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, which in its early years took Hume’s Treatise as a primary 
topic of discussion and debate. (See H. Lewis Ulman, The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society: 
1758-1773 (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 50-7.)  
Though I cannot take note of all of them here, numerous other authors can be cited. See Baillie, An 
Essay on the Sublime (London: R. Dodsley, 1747), 9-12, William Hogarth, Analysis of Beauty [1753] 
(London, 1772), 24.  A particularly clear example is Joshua Reynolds’s eighth discourse on art (1778), in 
which he explains the “foundation” of beauty in the mind:  
Variety re-animates the attention, which is apt to languish under a continual sameness.  Novelty 
makes a more forcible impression on the mind, than can be made by the representation of what 
we have often seen before; and contrasts rouse the power of comparison by opposition.  All this 
is obvious; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered, that the mind, though an active 
principle, has likewise a disposition to indolence; and though it loves exercise, loves it only to a 
certain degree, beyond which it is very unwilling to be led, or driven; the pursuit of novelty and 
variety may be carried to excess.  When variety entirely destroys the pleasure proceeding from 
uniformity and repetition, and when novelty counteracts and shuts out the pleasure arising from 
old habits and customs, they oppose too much the indolence of our disposition: the mind 
therefore can bear with pleasure but a small portion of novelty at a time…And affection to old 
habits and customs I take to the predominant disposition of the mind, and novelty comes as an 
exception: where all is novelty, the attention, the exercise of the mind is too violent.  Contrast, in 
the same manner, when it exceeds certain limits, is as disagreeable as a violent and perpetual 
opposition; it gives to the senses, in their progress, a more sudden change than they can bear 
with pleasure. (Discourses [1778], ed. Pat Rogers (New York: Penguin Classics, 1992), 206) 
Thus, excessive variety and contrast “when it exceeds certain limits, it is as disagreeable as a violent and 
perpetual opposition; it gives to the senses, in their progress, a more sudden change than they can bear with 
pleasure.”  It is for this reason that variety or contrasts, although they “contribute to the perfection of Art, 
when kept within certain bounds, if they are carried to excess, [they] become defects, and require 
correction.” See also David Hartley, Observations on Man (London, 1749), §95 passim, Edmund Burke, A 
Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful [1757] (London: R. & J. 
Dodsley, 1759), 254ff., and Henry Home, Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism,2 vols., ed. Peter Jones 
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particularly clear, for instance, in Addison’s Spectator account of the sources of the 
“pleasures of the imagination” that constitute aesthetic taste.  We find the exercise of the 
imagination in aesthetic contemplation generally pleasurable precisely because such 
contemplation gives rise to moderate mental labor and agitation (labor ‘balanced’ or 
tempered with ease) which the mind finds naturally pleasurable: 
[Such pleasures] do not require such a bent of thought as is necessary to our 
more serious employments, nor at the same time, suffer the mind to sink into 
that negligence and remissness, which are apt to accompany our more sensual 
delights, but, like a gentle exercise of the faculties, awaken them from sloth and 
idleness, without putting them upon any labour or difficulty.”355  
                                                                                                                                                              
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), I:222 (cf. I:223-6). Indeed, Kames appeals to what we have noted to be 
Hume’s claim that the inconstancy of the fancy and passions—their need for constant variation—is to be 
moderated by the unity the principles of association impose upon their operation to explain the pleasure 
that arises from “uniformity amidst variety.” (cf. Elements of Criticism I: 216-26)  For later French 
expressions of the PMAS, see Montesquieu’s “Essay on Taste” (originally written for the seventh volume 
of the 1757 edition of D’Alembert and Diderot’s Encyclopédie).  This essay was also published (along with 
essays by Voltaire and D’Alembert) with the second edition of Gerard’s An Essay on Taste. (London: A. 
Millar, 1759), 245-98. See also, Louis-Jean Lévesque de Pouilly, Theorie des sentimens agréables (Paris: 
1748), chapters 3-4. (Jacob Vernet, in his “Preface” to this work, sums up de Pouilly’s fundamental 
principle in this way: “Our faculties can neither be of use, nor display themselves farther than as we 
exercise them; motion or action is therefore so necessary to us, that without it we must inevitably sink into 
a deplorable state of insensibility and languor.  On the other hand, as we are weak and limited creatures, all 
excessive and violent action would impair and destroy our organs; we must therefore use only moderate 
motion or exercise, since by this means the use or perfection of our faculties is reconciles with our chief 
interest, which is self-preservation.  Now it is to this happy medium, I mean to a moderate exercise of our 
faculties, that the Author of our nature has so wisely annexed pleasure.” (“Preface” to Louis-Jean Lévesque 
de Pouilly, The Theory of Agreeable Sensations, trans. anonymous (Edinburgh: J. Dickson, 1766), vii-viii, 
cf. 24-46)) 
355
 Spectator 41l; VI: 75, my emphasis.  Indeed, the “secondary” pleasures of the imagination—those 
arising from the artistic representation of pleasant natural objects—arise, according to the PAS, from the 
pleasure of the action of comparison of the object represented to the thing itself: such pleasure “proceeds 
from that action of the mind, which compares the ideas arising from the original objects, with the ideas we 
receive from the statue, picture, description, or sound that represents them.” (Spectator 416; VI:99; cf. 418; 
III:107-9)   Moreover, it is interesting to note that one of Addison’s own sources for this principle is 
Bacon’s essays “On the Regiment of Health” which, like other early modern writings on the cure of the 
melancholy of the scholar by diversion, recommends the pleasures that attend the easy exertions of the 
mind that attend novel, sublime and beautiful objects over “subtle and knotty disquisitions”. (cf. Addison, 
Spectator 411; VI:75-6) 
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Addison
356
 also employed the PMAS more particularly to explain why novelty—one of 
the trio of qualities of objects which, along with greatness and beauty, give rise to the 
“pleasures of the imagination”—makes an object aesthetically pleasing:   
Every thing that is new or uncommon raises a pleasure in the imagination, 
because it fills the soul with an agreeable surprise, gratifies its curiosity, and 
gives it an idea of which it was not before possessed. We are indeed so often 
conversant with one set of objects, and tired out with so many repeated shows of 
the same things, that whatever is new or uncommon contributes a little to vary 
human life, and to divert our minds for a while with the strangeness of its 
appearance: it serves us for a kind of refreshment, and takes off from that satiety 
we are apt to complain of in our usual and ordinary entertainments…It is this 
that recommends Variety, where the Mind is every Instant called off to 
something new.
357
  
Novel objects “surprise” the mind by presenting it with a refreshing stimulation and 
“diversion” from those objects whose appeal has palled by repetition.  Addison also used 
the pleasures of variety to explain in part the pleasure the imagination takes in viewing 
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 Though Dubos also recognizes the influence of the PMAS on the imagination, as is made clear in the 
following remarks on the pleasures associated with “mental” exercise, which on Dubos’ account is of two 
sorts, one easy, one difficult: “[t]he first is, when the soul is affected by external objects, which is what we 
call, a sensible impression: the other is, when she amuses herself with the speculation of useful or curious 
subjects, which is properly to reflect and meditate.” (Critical Reflections I:5) The second method of 
agitation-seeking “requires continual efforts” which result ultimately in mental fatigue.  In this case, the 
mind “seeks to unbend itself” by the “easy” method of mental stimulation—that of attending to the lively 
objects of sense: 
The first of the abovementioned methods of occupying one’s self, which is that of yielding to the 
impression of external objects, is much the easiest.  ‘Tis the only recourse, which the greatest 
part of mankind have against wariness of mind [ennui], and even those who employ their time 
otherwise, are frequently obliged, in order to avoid being tired with the sameness of their 
occupation, to have recourse to the common amusements of mankind.  The changes of toil and 
pleasure set the spirits, that began to grow heavy, in motion, and seem to restore fresh vigor to 
the exhausted imagination.  (Critical Reflections I:7-8) 
What I have called the Moderate Agitation Cycle functions to preserve the moderate agitation or vigor of 
the imagination.    However, Dubos argues that the moderate agitation of the passions—that is, the 
agitation of passions moderated by fiction –is chiefly responsible for the pleasure of art. (cf. Critical 
Reflections I:21-8)   
357
 Spectator 412; VI:78.  Addison surely influenced Hume on this point, for on Hume’s account, it is 
because novelty is a moderate difficulty of conception that surprise alone (even without any accompanying 
pleasurable “evaluative” sentiment of beauty or deformity) can constitute the “separate pleasure” required 
to produce the indirect passion of pride when surprising objects are associated with oneself. (2.1.8.4-7; 
SBN 300-2, cf. 2.1.9.1; SBN 303-4) 
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“great” objects, not only those great in magnitude, but also those unified “scenes”, such 
as landscapes, which can be comprehended “as one entire piece”, but which are also 
characterized by a great, unbounded variety of objects over which the imagination 
naturally takes pleasure in ranging.
358
 
 However, I would argue that it is with Alexander Gerard’s An Essay on Taste 
(1759)—a work clearly indebted to Hume’s Treatise—that the Humean PMAS is most 
clearly established as a key explanatory principle of aesthetics.  In An Essay on Taste, 
Gerard attempts to anatomize Hutcheson’s internal sense theory in terms of Hume’s 
associationism, arguing not that the pleasing sentiments of beauty are merely 
providentially coupled with certain qualities in objects (as Hutcheson does
359
), but that 
they are caused by the “exertions” of the imagination to which the conception of such 
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 Spectator 412; VI:76-7; cf. 414; VI:87-8.  See also Spectator 420; VI:117-20, on the limits of the power 
of the imagination (and so the implied limits on the pleasure of imaginative difficulty). 
359
 In his Inquiry, Hutcheson argues that “uniformity amidst variety” (or what he calls elsewhere “regular 
form”) is that common feature of beautiful objects—those object which gives rise to simple ideas beauty by 
way of an internal sense. (cf. Inquiry 28-41, 79-80) Though our idea of beauty (a simple idea) is not 
equivalent to the idea of “uniformity amidst variety” (a complex idea) for Hutcheson, it turns out that God 
has providentially arranged things that we perceive beauty in cases where there is uniformity amidst variety 
(whether it is in mathematical figures, theorems, the natural world, musical composition, etc.). (Inquiry 79)  
Why this arrangement is good, Hutcheson explains in terms of the “balance” of facility and difficulty of 
conception.  For instance, his explanation of the utility of theorems: because we are beings of limited 
mental capacity, when we observe only a variety of phenomena not reducible to some sort of “general 
Canon” we are put in an “uneasy state of Mind.” (Inquiry 37) Such variety gives rise to “endless toil”. 
(Inquiry 79, 80) “The manner of Knowledge by universal Theorems, and of Operation by universal Causes, 
as far as we can attain it, must be most convenient for Beings of limited Understanding and Power; since 
this prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro the Multiplicity of Propositions, and Toil and 
Weariness to their Powers of Action…[I]t must be a long Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which 
can ascertain or fix the Idea of any irregular Form, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capable of 
retaining it...for such irregular Objects distract the Mind with Variety, since for every sensible Part we must 
have a quite different Idea.” (Inquiry 79)  On the other hand, “regular forms” or “Objects of Contemplation 
in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain’d, 
than irregular Objects.” (Inquiry 79)  Such theorems and forms thus combine a maximum amount of 
imagination into easily comprehensible form.  (Peter Kivy locates the philosophical origins of Hutcheson’s 
account in Descartes and Spinoza. (The Seventh Sense: Francis Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British 
Aesthetics. 2
nd
 ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 119) But, as I hope to have shown, its roots 
in early modern thought are more diverse.) 
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objects give rise, especially those objects which possess what Hutcheson calls 
‘uniformity amidst variety’. (An Essay on Taste 167)  Gerard employs a version of the 
PMAS to account for the beauty of “uniformity amidst variety” in this way.  Novelty 
pleases, as Addison had argued, because in overcoming a “moderate difficulty”, the mind 
attains a “lively and elevated temper.”  (An Essay on Taste 3)  As for beauty, Gerard 
writes in language clearly influenced by T 2.3.4-5, “The pleasure we receive from 
beautiful forms is resolvable into the pleasure of facility and that of a moderate exertion.” 
(An Essay on Taste 162) “Facility in the conception of an object, if it be moderate, gives 
us pleasure…Hence too it is that uniformity and simplicity become agreeable.  Objects 
endued with these qualities enter easily into the mind…” (An Essay on Taste 29)  
However,  
[U]niformity, when perfect and unmixed, is apt to pall upon the sense…Variety 
is necessary to enliven it…Variety in some measure gratifies the sense of 
novelty, as our ideas vary in passing from the contemplation of one part to that 
of another.  This transition puts the mind in action, and gives it employment, the 
consciousness of which is agreeable. (An Essay on Taste 31) 
Similarly, Gerard continues, “[w]ere the variety indeed boundless, the mind would be 
fatigued and pained with continual shifting from part to part, without the prospect of any 
end to its labors”, and so “a certain degree of uniformity must be blended with the variety 
of objects…”  In order to be truly pleased, the mind must attain “the opposite 
gratifications of facility and active exertion, mixed with, and mellowing one another.” 
(An Essay on Taste 33) This “mixture” of imaginative facility and opposition is precisely 
what the Humean PMAS dictates for the mind. 
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 The inherent pleasantness of this PMAS-dictated “mixture” of imaginative facility 
and difficulty, however, is not the center of Hume’s aesthetic theory.  As I noted above, 
Hume’s theory of sympathy is the primary pillar of his aesthetics, though he does employ 
the general PMAS in accounting mainly for the pleasures of a few specific forms of 
aesthetic response—sublimity, novelty and eloquence.  However, the PMAS and the 
effects of imaginative difficulty and facility which play such a significant role in 
Addison’s (and Dubos’) aesthetics, play significant roles in Hume’s theory of motivation.  
Following Addison, Hume argues that the mere novelty or surprising nature of any 
object, because it is naturally pleasing to the mind, may constitute the “separate pleasure” 
which gives rise to pride or love where the object is associated with oneself or another
360
, 
and so, a fortiori, an object of desire or aversion. (cf. 2.3.9.3-4, 3.3.1.2; SBN 438-9, 574)  
Accordingly, the pleasure (or pain)  that we anticipate upon the prospect of imaginative 
exertion or facility may ground a desire for (or aversion to) an object.  Where the novelty 
or uncertainty surrounding even an indifferent object, or the difficulty of its conception, 
too great, it gives rise to an uneasiness and pain, which degenerates into a passion akin to 
fear and a concomitant aversion.  (2.3.9.26-7; SBN 446-7) Indeed, this may happen even 
in cases where the novel object promises great pleasure (and so ought to produce joy), as 
in Hume’s example of the virgin on her wedding night, precisely because the imaginative 
                                                     
360
 If my account here is correct, then the (explanatorily basic) tendency of the imagination to attend to 
vivacious ideas (beliefs) may be aided and bolstered by the pleasure of vivacity, and the resulting desire of 
the imagination to attend to those ideas that possesses this vivacity: as Hume suggests in several places, 
“[b]elief must please the imagination by means of the force and vivacity which attends it; since every idea, 
which has force and vivacity, is found to be agreeable to that faculty.” (1.3.10.7; SBN 122, my emphasis; 
cf. 2.3.10.12; SBN 453) 
256 
 
 
 
difficulty and uncertainty surrounding it gives rise to too violent (and so painful or 
‘uneasy’) an agitation, exertion or ‘fluctuation’ of the imagination. (2.3.9.29; SBN 447) 
The primary motives that arise from the prospect of imaginative facility and 
difficulty are forms of curiosity and its opposite (a willful negligence): where the 
prospect of imaginative facility or difficulty promises either pleasure or pain, the 
imagination ‘pursues’ or ‘avoids’ the object by contemplating it closely, or by willfully 
turning away from it, respectively. Of course, we may also desire to own “curiosities” 
like antiques (to use Hume’s own example we will discuss below) because of this 
pleasure, for instance, but the desire for ownership is itself grounded more basically in 
this pleasure of satisfying our curiosity.  Accordingly, the importance of the originative 
role of imaginative facility and difficulty for the regulation of the moderate agitation of 
the mind can perhaps be illustrated most clearly by Hume’s account of the two of the 
forms the passion of curiosity takes in T 2.3.9-10.   
The first form of curiosity is what Hume calls the “love of truth” (or, in the 
Natural History of Religion, a “pure” or “speculative curiosity” (NHR 2.5)).  As he 
makes clear in T 2.3.10, the “love of truth” is in large part a desire for imaginative 
exertion and effort that results from imaginative difficulty, which desire arises from a lack 
of mental agitation (which is painful, per the PMAS).
361
  As Hume puts it, the “exercise 
of genius” (or the imagination) is “the principal source of that satisfaction we receive 
from the sciences” (2.3.10.4; SBN 449): 
                                                     
361
 Hume does not make this explicit in his explanation of the “love of truth”, but it is clearly implied in his 
comparison of this form of curiosity to “the passion of gaming” which does arise from the desire to relieve 
ennui. (2.3.10.10; SBN 452) This point is also implicit in Hume’s famous ‘Conclusion’ to Treatise, Book I. 
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The first and most considerable circumstance requisite to render truth agreeable 
is the genius and capacity, which is employ’d in its invention and discovery.  
What is easy and obvious is never valu’d; and even what is in itself difficult, if 
we come to the knowledge of it without difficulty, and without any stretch of 
thought or judgment, is but little regarded.  We love to trace the demonstrations 
of mathematicians; but shou’d receive small entertainment from a person, who 
shou’d barely inform us of the proportions of lines and angles, tho’ we repos’d 
the utmost confidence both in his judgment and veracity.  In this case ‘tis 
sufficient to have ears to learn the truth.  We never are oblig’d to fix our 
attention or exert our genius; which of all other exercises of the mind is the most 
pleasant and agreeable. (2.3.10.3; SBN 449, final emphasis mine)   
As I noted above, however, the objects on which we exert our imagination must, as I 
noted above, first “fix our attention”. (cf. 2.3.10.4-6, 10; 449-51, 452)  That is, they must 
be “supported” in the imagination by their vivacity, which they attain either by their close 
relation to one’s present situation (and the concomitant imaginative ease which allows for 
a greater transfer of vivacity to our conception of that object) or by their intrinsic 
“importance” or “weight”.  In the case of the “love of truth”, the truth which we desire to 
know fixes our attention, as Hume tells us explicitly, by means of its “utility” or 
“importance” or “consequence”. (2.3.10.4-6; SBN 449-51)  The “utility or importance of 
itself causes no real passion, but is only requisite to support the imagination.” (2.3.10.8; 
SBN 450) Once the mind acquires a suitable object, it proceeds to exert itself in forming 
a “full conception” of its object. 
 The PMAS, in its regulative role, also dictates that when imaginative opposition 
and difficulty becomes too great, it is the source of pain.  This pain is the source of the 
second form of curiosity Hume describes.  In T 2.3.10, this second sort of curiosity is 
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characterized as akin to ‘nosiness’.362  Again, as in all cases in which imaginative 
difficulty performs its originative function, the object of such curiosity must be already 
“supported” in the mind, as “where interest, relation, or the greatness and novelty of any 
event interests us in it.” (2.3.10.12; SBN 453)  However, in this case, the motivation to 
inquiry is not a PMAS-dictated desire for the pleasure of imaginative exertion (for, as 
Hume notes, gossip is rather cheaply had (2.3.10.11; SBN 452-3)), but an aversion to the 
pain of excessive imaginative fluctuation and difficulty that attends an idea so supported 
in the mind: 
‘Tis not every matter of fact, of which we have a curiosity to be inform’d; 
neither are they such only as we have an interest to know. ‘Tis sufficient if the 
idea strikes on us with such force, and concerns us so nearly, as to give us an 
uneasiness in its instability and inconstancy.  A stranger, when he arrives first at 
any town, may be entirely indifferent about knowing the history and adventures 
of the inhabitants; but as he becomes father acquainted with them, and has liv’d 
any considerable time among them, he acquires the same curiosity as the 
natives. (2.3.10.12; SBN 453-4) 
In Hume’s example, the object of our curiosity attains vivacity by means of its close 
relation to oneself, and the painful fluctuation and uncertainty of that object originates or 
gives rise to an aversion which drives us to remedy that pain by attaining knowledge.  
This same form of curiosity arises where our attention is fixed on objects “supported” by 
other means listed earlier (e.g. relations of interest, “greatness” and novelty), and where 
the fluctuation of the mind is very violent, it can give rise to an aversion to this 
imaginative fluctuation and uncertainty akin to fear. As Hume writes in T 2.3.9 in regard 
to novelty, “the suddenness or strangeness of an appearance naturally excite a commotion 
                                                     
362
 I borrow this characterization from Alex Gelfert. (“Hume on Curiosity,” British Journal for the History 
of Philosophy 21.4 (2013): 711-32, 721, 726)  (Though, not all instances of this second form of curiosity 
are akin to mere ‘nosiness’.)  
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in the mind, like every thing for which we are not prepar’d, and to which we are not 
accustom’d.  This commotion, again, naturally produces a curiosity or inquisitiveness.”  
The violence of this commotion arises from the “strong and sudden impulse” of the vivid 
object and becomes “uneasy” due to the “fluctuation and uncertainty” that attends its 
conception, which naturally turns into a fear-like aversion. (2.3.9.26; SBN 446) This 
aversion then prompts us to either avoid the object, or to determine its nature in order to 
render its idea fixed, or stable and constant in the mind by knowledge: for, as Hume 
writes, knowledge “fixes the idea, and prevents that fluctuation and uncertainty” which is 
painful and uneasy. (2.3.9.27; SBN 446-7; cf. 2.3.10.12; SBN 453-4) 
However, as I indicated earlier, this is not the only non-formative role imaginative 
facility and difficulty play in Hume’s account of the strength and violence of motives in 
T 2.3.4-10.  For, the emotional effect of this additional imaginative facility and difficulty 
affect the passions in a different way where an object not only fixes our attention, but 
promises pleasure or pain, and so raises a passion—that is where an object is a hedonic 
object.  In this case, the emotional affects of this additional imaginative facility or 
difficulty have an effect on the passions, not as the grounds of an original desire or 
aversion, but by affecting the stock of emotional agitation in the mind available for 
conversion by the MPP into some existing passion, altering that passion’s violence and 
strength.  This is what I will call the alterative function of imaginative facility and 
difficulty—that is, alterative of the strength and violence of existing passions.  Whereas 
formative imaginative facility and difficulty affect the force and violence of passions in 
their generation, and originative imaginative facility and difficulty give otherwise 
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hedonically indifferent objects the power to raise a passion (primarily curiosity), 
alterative imaginative facility and difficulty augment or diminish the force and violence 
of passions already formed.   
Again, the formative function of imaginative facility and difficulty was the 
subject of T 2.3.7, while their originative function was the subject of the later sections of 
T 2.3.9, and the whole of T 2.3.10.  The effects of alterative imaginative facility and 
difficulty are the subject of much of T 2.3.4-5.  Recall that in our treatment of the MPP 
and the effects of custom in Chapter 2, the effects of the imaginative opposition and 
facility Hume outlined in T 2.3.4-5 alter the strength and violence of existing passions, 
passions already formed.  For example, the effects of imaginative difficulty outlined in T 
2.3.4 all presuppose that a strong (‘predominant’) passion has already been raised by an 
apprehension of an object’s value, by a hedonic belief363: as Hume wrote there, where we 
know “enough [about an object] to pre-possess us in favour of” or against it—that is, 
where the perception of an object provides us enough information to appreciate its 
hedonic impact and so to raise a desire for or aversion to the object—but its fuller 
conception “leaves still some work for the imagination,” the additional subsequent 
“effort” the imagination must make to overcome such forms of opposition “rouzes the 
spirits”, making our corresponding desires or aversions more forceful and more violent 
by means of the MPP. (2.3.4.9; SBN 422, my emphasis)  Thus, the obscurity of our idea 
of an object of the passions (2.3.6.2; SBN 424-5), our uncertainty surrounding its 
existence (2.3.4.7-9; SBN 421-2), the spatiotemporal distance of the object (2.3.4.7, 9, 
                                                     
363
 Of course, in T 2.3.4 the same held for bodily (2.3.4.6; SBN 421) and passional opposition (2.3.4.4-5; 
SBN 421) as well.   
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10; SBN 421-2), or the imaginative effort or ‘difficulty’ which the conception of a novel 
or surprising object (2.3.5.2; SBN 422-3) create emotional fodder for the MPP, 
“augmenting” (2.3.5.2; SBN 422-3) our (predominant) passions by rendering them 
stronger and more violent.
364
  Thus, the augmentative effects of this alterative 
imaginative difficulty on the passions are precisely the opposite of the diminishing effects 
of its formative counterpart.  
On the other hand, the effects of alterative imaginative facility or mental custom 
Hume outlines in T 2.3.5 similarly presuppose the prior triggering of desires and 
aversions.  Where an object is already the object of a desire or aversion, any additional or 
subsequent facility the imagination attains by becoming accustomed to conceiving that 
object not only calms the passions, but weakens them to the extent that custom eliminates 
the MPP-feeding emotions of novelty and surprise which are generated by any alterative 
imaginative difficulty—we then survey such objects “with greater tranquillity”.365   
Hume’s discussions of the “contrary” effects of spatiotemporal distance in space 
and time of an object of our passions on the strength of our motives in T 2.3.4 and T 2.3.7 
are particularly useful for clarifying further this distinction between formative and 
                                                     
364
 In “Of Tragedy” Hume offers us another example—the mental agitation produce by the eloquence of 
the orator: “The same force of oratory, employed on an uninteresting subject, would not please half so 
much, or rather would appear altogether ridiculous; and the mind, being left in absolute calmness and 
indifference, would relish none of those beauties of imagination or expression, which, if joined to a 
passion, give it such exquisite entertainment.” (EMPL 220, my emphasis)  In this passage, Hume 
distinguishes what I have called the originative role of imaginative activity from its alterative one. 
365
 Of course, as I showed in Chapter 2, in the case of motives, the weakening effect of this subsequent 
(alterative) imaginative facility is countered by the concomitant strengthening effects of “active habits”: the 
simultaneous formation of active habits ‘replaces’, so to speak, that strength lost in the elimination of these 
MPP-feeding emotions occasioned by (alterative) imaginative difficulty, without making the passion more 
violent at the same time.  Again, this is why Hume’s brief account of “active habits” forms the crux of his 
account of the causes of strong, calm passions (and why it will form the crux of the general Humean 
account of the strength of ‘the calm passions’). 
262 
 
 
 
alterative imaginative opposition and facility.  Hume notes in T 2.3.4 that “long absence,” 
which is fundamentally a great distance in time (and generally in space as well) between 
oneself and the object of our desire, “is observ’d to have contrary effects, and in different 
circumstances either encreases or diminishes our affections.” (2.3.4.10; SBN 422) The 
“circumstance” which varies the effects of absence is precisely the nature of the 
imaginative difficulty which surrounds the object of that passion—that is, whether that 
imaginative difficulty is formative or alterative, whether it is antecedent or subsequent to 
the formation of our affections for the object.  Citing the Duc de la Rouchefoucauld
366
, 
Hume notes that absence “destroys weak passions” because it “weakens our idea, and 
[so] diminishes” the corresponding passion.  That is, the formative imaginative difficulty 
caused by spatiotemporal distance (outlined by Hume in T 2.3.7 and treated in detail in 
the previous chapter) diminishes the ‘supporting’ vivacity the object previously drew 
from its spatiotemporal contiguity to one’s self, which contiguity would have been a 
source of (antecedent or formative) imaginative facility.  However, Hume notes, “where 
the idea is so strong and lively as to support itself, the uneasiness, arising from absence, 
encreases the passion, and gives it new force and violence.” (2.3.4.10; SBN 422, my 
emphasis)  That is, where the vivacity of a hedonic belief is already “supported” either by 
a close relation to oneself other than spatiotemporal contiguity (e.g. either by some other 
advantageous casual relation, such as a close blood or business relation) or by its intrinsic 
“weight” or “consequence” (e.g. one’s admiration of the virtue or beauty of the object of 
the affection), the resulting desire is made stronger and more violent by the additional 
                                                     
366
 Maxims §276. cf. “Of Tragedy”, EPML 222. 
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imaginative difficulty resulting from the spatiotemporal distance of the object.  In this 
case, the emotional fodder generated by this alterative imaginative difficulty is converted 
into the predominant desire by means of the MPP.  But just as a passion founded in large 
part on the (formative) imaginative facility brought about by the spatiotemporal 
contiguity of the object of our passions is weakened by subsequent absence (a form of 
formative imaginative difficulty), the subsequent (alterative) imaginative difficulty that 
enflamed one’s existing desire for an object which, as Hume puts it, already “supports 
itself” in our imagination is gradually overcome by the formation of a custom which 
calms that passion by eliminating the emotional fodder for the MPP.   
We may put Hume’s point in plainer terms as follows.  In some cases, the strength 
of one’s attraction to someone is in very large part due to his or her convenient proximity 
to oneself—such an attraction is surely destroyed by a long absence, and often even by a 
very short one.  But, in a case where the object of our passion is, for instance, 
intrinsically worthy of love and admiration (i.e. it is an object which “supports itself” in 
the imagination, to use Hume’s phrase, such as by his or her virtue or beauty or by the 
possession of other “shining qualities” (2.1.9.3; SBN 304) which give the idea of that 
object “weight” in the mind), that same absence increases the force and violence of our 
affection by means of the “obstacles” we face not only in satisfying our passion but in 
overcoming the imaginative difficulty caused by the obscurity of and uncertainty 
surrounding its distant object. (cf. 2.3.9.27; SBN 446-7)  Where one is (again using 
Hume’s terminology) already “pre-possess[t]…in favor of the object” of a passion for 
some reason, any additional imaginative efforts one must make to “complete” our ideas 
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of those object enflames our passions.  However, even such a well-supported passion 
may eventually be destroyed by absence, where it cannot be satisfied in any measure by 
any action.  In such a case, we gradually and naturally become accustomed even to the 
imaginative difficulties posed by absence.  The resulting imaginative facility diminishes 
the emotional fodder that initially fed the MPP, and as there is no active habit to replace 
or supplement this diminishing strength, the passion will not only be calmed by this 
subsequent (alterative) imaginative facility, but ultimately weakened as well.
367
   
The effects of alterative imaginative facility and difficulty, and its difference from 
originative facility and difficulty, can be illustrated most clearly by attending to Hume’s 
account of the effects of uncertainty on grief.
368
  Uncertainty is characterized on Hume’s 
T 2.3.9 account as an oscillation or “fluctuation” of the mind—a “wavering and 
unconstant method of surveying an object” (2.3.9.21; SBN 444)—which is naturally 
uneasy.
369
  As I noted earlier, even where the uncertain object is not itself a hedonic 
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 Again, see Hume’s essay, “Of Tragedy”: “Absence is also a great source of complaint among lovers, 
and gives them the greatest uneasiness: Yet nothing is more favourable to their mutual passion than short 
intervals of that kind.  And if long intervals often prove fatal, it is only because, through time, men are 
accustomed to them, and they cease to give uneasiness.” (EMPL 222, my emphasis)  Again, in such a case 
where our passion is denied satisfaction, imaginative custom not only calms but weakens the desire because 
that denial prevents the formation of an active habit.  
368
 Given that curiosity arises from the mere instability and fluctuation of any idea that by some means first 
fixes our attention (e.g. by its “weight” or “importance”, or by its psychological proximity to our present 
situation), curiosity must also be the product of the passions of hope and fear, which are, as Hume portrays 
them in T 2.3.9, are violent motions of the entire mind—the imagination and the passions—and are the 
products of the uncertainty concerning either the good or evil an object has in store, or concerning the 
future existence of some object we know to be good or evil.  However, Hume does not develop this point 
explicitly in T 2.3.9, though it is clearly implied.  It is only fully developed by Hume in the Natural History 
of Religion, which clearly depends on the psychology of T 2.3.9 for its explanation of the origins of 
polytheistic superstition.  This psychology is itself  rehearsed almost verbatim in the Dissertation (DP 1) 
which, John Immerwahr (“Hume’s Dissertation on the Passions”) has persuasively argued, was to serve as 
theoretical support for the Natural History (as well as for the essay “Of Tragedy”) in Four Dissertations. 
(cf. NHR 1.6, 2.5) 
369
 The relationship between Hume’s account of the operations of the mind in probable reasoning in T 2.3.9 
and his earlier account in T 1.3.11-12 is problematic (in particular, his view, seemingly absent from the T 
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object, this fluctuation of mind is in itself a cause of that curiosity which will remove this 
uncertainty, or, where this uncertainty is too great, the natural ground of aversion to an 
object.  This is imaginative difficulty in its originative role.  On the other hand, where a 
hedonic object is accompanied by some uncertainty, this uncertainty makes the resulting 
passion more violent, by means of the MPP.  Again, as Hume argued in T 2.3.4:   
Uncertainty has the same influence as [bodily or mental] opposition.  The 
agitation of the thought; the quick turns it makes from one view to another; the 
variety of passions, which succeed each other, according to the different views: 
All these produce an agitation in the mind, and transfuse themselves into the 
predominant passion. (2.3.4.7; SBN 421)          
For instance, where the existence of some evil is certain—and so productive of grief 
(2.3.9.5; SBN 439)—but some other aspect of the evil object is uncertain, it makes grief 
more violent by giving the imagination “a tremulous and unsteady motion”, one which 
also gives that grief the character of fear, despite the certainty of the evil. (2.3.9.25; SBN 
445) “Let one be told by a person, whose veracity he cannot doubt of, that one of his sons 
is suddenly kill’d, ‘tis evident the passions this event wou’d occasion, wou’d not settle 
into pure grief, till he got certain information, which of his sons he had lost.”  (2.3.9.25; 
SBN 445)  Similarly: 
A person, who has left his friend in any malady, will feel more anxiety upon his 
account, than if he were present, tho’ perhaps he is not only incapable of giving 
him assistance, but likewise of judging of the event of his sickness…yet there 
are a thousand little circumstances of his friend’s situation and condition, the 
knowledge of which fixes the idea, and prevents that fluctuation and uncertainty 
so ally’d to fear. (2.3.9.27; SBN 446) 
                                                                                                                                                              
1.3 treatment, that probability causes an oscillation, “fluctuation”, or “tremulous motion” in the imagination 
between opposing probabilities) although Hume claims he is drawing on his earlier account..  I will not try 
to resolve these difficulties here, as they are well outside the purview of this paper.  See Loeb, Stability and 
Justification 230-7. 
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In both of these cases, though the object is a cause of uneasiness and pain, the great 
violence and fluctuation of the passions resulting from uncertainty naturally give rise to a 
sort of curiosity by which one may “fix” those uncertain details which surround the 
object of one’s grief, thereby eliminating the agitation and “tremulous motion” of the 
imagination which enflames that painful passion by the MPP, and gives it the character of 
fear.     
 
4.5 The Role of the PMAS in Hume’s ‘Science of Man’ (III): the Control of the 
Imagination by the Passions 
I have now outlined the three forms of influence the facility or difficulty of the 
imagination’s transitions have over the passions: 1)  Formative: determining the relative 
vivacity of our hedonic beliefs, and so the strength and violence of the passions that those 
beliefs cause, 2) Originative: making hedonically indifferent objects into objects of desire 
or aversion (e.g. by their novelty or familiarity), and 3) Alterative: augmenting or 
diminishing the relative strength and violence of passions already formed, not by means 
of the pleasure or pain they occasion, but by means of the emotional order or disorder 
they create in mind.   
Of course, the most basic role the imagination and its transitions play in relation 
to the passions is 1), their formative role, the subject of those sections of T 2.3 we treated 
in the previous chapter (T 2.3.6-7).  Again, as Hume notes at the very beginning of T 
2.3.6, it is “remarkable, that the imagination and affections have a close union together, 
and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter.” 
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(2.3.6.1; SBN 424)  It in this ‘formative’ capacity that the imagination has a basic 
influence over the production of passions, as well as over their strength and violence.  
And as we noted in the previous chapter, what primarily determines this influence of the 
imagination is the ‘ease’ with which it performs its operations in conceiving objects not 
present to the senses or to memory, the main cause of which ‘ease’ or facility is 
compliance of the mental customs which constitute causal reasoning with other “natural 
propensities” of the mind.  However, the direction of influence also runs in reverse: the 
passions or affections also affect our imagination and its operation.
370
  Given the 
emotional effects of imaginative facility and difficulty, it is a consequence of the PMAS 
in its role in regulating the inherently pleasing moderate agitation of the mind that the 
passions can in some circumstances manipulate the operations of the imagination in order 
to preserve this moderate agitation—that is, certain operations of the imagination 
themselves may often become the objects of passions.  Thus, it is also a consequence of 
the PMAS that imaginative facility and difficulty in their two non-formative roles—what 
I have called their ‘originative’ and ‘alterative’ roles—are also of very great import to 
Hume’s account of the maintenance of the moderate agitation of the mind.  And, more 
importantly, it is in Hume’s account of the control of the operations of the imagination by 
the passions that we get his account of the limits of the primacy of imaginative ease on 
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 Though this influence of the passions over the imagination is generally overlooked by commentators, 
there are many such examples in the Treatise , not least among which is the role the vivacity of hedonic 
beliefs and the violence of passions plays as mutually reinforcing forms of unphilosophical probability 
sketched in the previous chapter. (cf. 1.3.10.4; SBN 120, 1.3.13.10; SBN 148-9, 2.3.6.8; SBN 427)  
Interestingly, this feature of Hume’s account of the mind—the influence of the passions over the 
imagination— is, for Passmore, one of the prime “inconsistencies” generated by what he sees as the ad hoc 
nature of Hume’s explanations of the passions in Book II.  (Hume’s Intentions 127-8)  However, as I hope 
to show below, this influence of the passions is not at all inconsistent with Hume’s wider account of the 
governing principles of the mind. 
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the passions so important to an understanding of the cultivation of the “strength” of the 
mind. I will discuss this last issue in more detail later in this chapter.  In this section, it is 
my aim to bring out the importance of the ‘alterative’ role imaginative facility and 
difficulty plays in Hume’s account of the control of the imagination by the passions.   
 The alterative role of imaginative facility and difficulty is in general more 
important than its originative one because in the former role they have more of an effect 
on the agitation of the mind.  This is because, as Hume makes clear at several points in 
the Treatise, it is also a general consequence of the PMAS that our passions, being the 
strongest perceptions, have the greatest effect on the level of agitation in the mind. As 
Hume puts it, the passions are the “stronger principle” of our nature in the sense that they 
compose the greater part of the agitation of the mind, and for this reason, the moderation 
and constancy of their agitation is of more consequence to the movements and operations 
of the mind. (cf. 2.2.2.22-24, 2.2.4.4; SBN 343-44, 353, EHU 2.1-2; SBN 17-8) 
Accordingly, as the operations of the imagination also affect the agitation of the mind, the 
primary importance of these operations outside of their formative role lies in their 
contributions to the calmness or violence of the passions. As I will show below, this 
feature of Hume’s Treatise account of the dynamics of the mind is central to his 
discussion in T 2.3.8.     
Given the effects imaginative facility and difficulty may have on our passions, it 
is a general feature of Hume’s account of the relation between our passions and ideas that 
our passions not only often guide the train of ideas in the mind, but also often make the 
mind seek out ideas or, more importantly in the present context, chains of reasoning 
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which can sustain our passions.  As Hume puts it, to quote a passage cited above, “all the 
passions avoid as much as possible” any “considerable diminution” (2.2.3.10; SBN 
351)
371
: thus, they justify and sustain themselves by causing the imagination to conceive 
certain ideas rather than others though these others would arise more “naturally” were 
circumstances different.  This feature of human nature, for example, explains why we 
tend to attribute any action immediately to a person’s durable character—for instance, 
why we tend automatically to take any injury to ourselves to be intentional: by doing so 
we “justify and establish the passion” and give it a longer duration. (2.2.3.9; SBN 351, 
my emphasis) In such a case, “the idea of injury produces not the passions, but arises 
from it.” (2.2.3.9; SBN 351, my emphasis)  
Similarly, in the third of Hume’s T 2.2.2 “experiments to confirm” the system of 
the double relation of impressions and ideas that produce the indirect passions, he argues 
that when we are presented with many objects that are agreeable or useful, but which 
have no relation to ourselves or any others, the result is a change in the “turn” of our 
“disposition” or temper which subsequently pushes our imagination to find the proper 
objects of our passions.  For instance, where we ride through a series of beautiful, fecund 
meadows and fields, but neither know nor perceive their owners or inhabitants, we are 
put into such an “elevate [sic] or humane disposition” (2.2.2.8; SBN 335) that we are in 
turn moved to form ideas of their owners or inhabitants in order to “found” or “establish” 
this temper on their proper objects: 
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 Hume is certainly influenced by Malebranche’s treatment of this principle. (Search 5.11; LO 399-402) 
See also Éléonore La Jallé, “Hume, Malebranche, and the Self-Justification of the Passions” Hume Studies 
38.2 (2012): 201-20.  
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What our reason wou’d conclude from analogy, after ballancing these 
arguments, wou’d be, that an object, which produces pleasure or uneasiness, but 
has no manner of connexion either with ourselves or others, may give such a 
turn to the disposition, as that it may naturally fall into pride or love, humility or 
hatred, and search for other objects, upon which, by a double relation, it can 
found these affections; but that an object, which has only one of these relations, 
tho’ the most advantageous one, can never give rise to any constant and 
establish’d passion. (2.2.2.7; SBN 334-5, my emphasis)   
That is, this ‘elevation’ of our passionate disposition forces the imagination to look for 
objects which bear a relation to those objects which put us in that disposition so as to 
sustain and “establish” those passions.  Hume doesn’t spell out what this prompting of 
the imagination by the passions entails—likely, a curiosity that prompts us to inquire 
about the inhabitants, or a desire to purchase the land so as to connect it to ourselves by 
causation. (cf. 2.3.9.4; SBN 439)  Since human beings are the only proper objects of the 
indirect passions, only when these pent-up emotions are discharged on ourselves or 
others can they be considered “constant and establish’d”.372 
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 For an interesting discussion of such “venting” of pent-up emotion that is clearly related to Hume’s 
discussion, see Kames, Elements of Criticism I:63-6.  That the proper objects of these passions are always 
other persons, Hume seems to think is evident from experience. (2.1.2.2, 2.1.3.2, 2.2.1.2, 2.2.5.16, 2.3.2.6; 
SBN 277, 280, 329-30, 363-4, 410-11)  Why this is so, however, Hume does tell us explicitly, but the 
reason is easily inferred from Hume’s account of the “separate pleasure” that gives rise to these passions: 
this pleasure arises in most cases from sympathy.  The utility or immediate agreeableness of any quality is 
the result of a sympathy with the pleasure that quality gives rise to in other sensible beings, and as such our 
idea of that “pleasure” is not a simple idea, but a complex one—that is one that is a complex made of an 
impression of pleasure combined with an idea of a person experiencing it. As Hume puts it, though some 
may arise immediately from qualities of objects we pleasing find by the “original” arrangement of nature, 
most of our sentiments of beauty and deformity “have a reference to use.” (2.2.5.18; SBN 364, my 
emphasis; cf. 2.2.5.5; SBN 359, and 2.2.5.16, where Hume writes, “tho’ our first object be some senseless 
inanimate piece of matter, ‘tis seldom we rest there, and carry our view to its influence on sensible and 
rational creatures…” (SBN 363)) Compare also this passage from the second Enquiry: “In general, it is 
certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, everything still presents us with 
the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or 
uneasiness.  In our serious occupations, in our careless amusements, this principle still exerts its active 
energy.” (EPM 5.23; SBN 221)  Why turning our view renders the passion “constant and establish’d” is 
also left unexplained by Hume.  However, I would argue it is because human beings themselves provide 
more “durable” objects of our attention—we reflect on the myriad particular uses of and associated 
pleasures derived from an object by its proprietor, and by this means give our passion a longer duration by 
presenting us with a constant and durable chain of ideas over which to carry that passion.   
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 Another important example is the instrumental reasoning in which we naturally 
engage when the prospect of a hedonic object not within our immediate power raises a 
passion in us.  In many cases, the causal relations of objects within our immediate power 
to that end are not known, but must be discovered by further inquiry and causal 
reasoning: 
’Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any 
object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d 
to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction.  ’Tis also 
obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every 
side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the 
relation of cause and effect.  Here then reasoning takes place to discover this 
relation; and according as our reason varies, our actions receive a subsequent 
variation. (2.3.3.3; SBN 414, my emphasis)     
In this case, the imaginative difficulty caused by this inquiry into instrumental relations 
among objects would, in many cases
373
 be alterative of the desires and aversions which 
prompted that reasoning—the agitation occasioned by this added imaginative difficulty 
would augment the force and violence of our passions.     
More importantly, like the imagination, the passions have their own 
“propensities” to move in certain ways—in ways determined by that relation of 
resemblance among passions by which the constancy of our present temper is 
maintained.  And, as I suggested above, in accordance with the PMAS, these propensities 
ultimately have a greater influence on the mind than those of the imagination.  Again, 
Hume’s T 2.2.2 “experiments” contain his most explicit discussion of this issue.374  In 
                                                     
373
 In many other cases, however, this imaginative difficulty would be very great, and so would be the 
grounds of an aversion to the object (or of despair).   
374
 These “experiments” are barely commented on in the Hume literature, and where they are mentioned, 
they are discussed generally only as examples of the nature of Hume’s “Newtonian” approach to the study 
of human nature.  (See, for instance, R.W. Connon, “The Naturalism of Hume Revisited,” in McGill Hume 
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these experiments, Hume proceeds in a fashion similar to his initial T 1.3 investigation of 
belief: he first demonstrates his account of the necessary elements of ‘atomic’ indirect 
passions in his first four experiments
375
, and then proceeds to bring these passions out of 
the clinical isolation of the anatomist’s theater into common life by “plac[ing] the 
passions and objects in all the different positions of which they are susceptible”, all of the 
“complicated attractions and relations” to which our ideas and passions are normally 
subject in common life. (2.2.2.11; SBN 337, my emphasis; cf. 2.2.2.12, 18; SBN 338, 
341)  In particular, Hume’s aim is to show how the explanatory framework of the double 
relations of impressions and ideas explains not only the production of atomic “indirect 
passions”, but also the transitions of the passions and imagination beyond their 
                                                                                                                                                              
Studies, ed. David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi, and Wade L. Robison (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 
1979), 121-45, 135, James H. Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1973), 91, 118, David Owen, “Hume and the Mechanics of the Mind,” 95n36, and Louis E. Loeb, 
“Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument about Induction”, in Reflection and the 
Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume and Reid (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 270-
287: 272.)  There are some exceptions. Lilli Alanen also provides a thoughtful summary of some of these 
“experiments”. (“The Powers and Mechanisms of the Passions,” in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s 
Treatise, ed. Saul Traiger (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 179-198: 191-2)  And Peter Dietl outlines the 
arguments of the first six experiments (disregarding the seventh and eight), but only to argue that Hume 
does not understand the indirect passions to have a “merely contingent” relationship to their causal 
mechanism, as it is often thought. (“Hume on the Passions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
28.4 (1968): 554-66, 558-62) Albert Glathe acknowledges that these “experiments” go beyond merely 
confirming the system of the double relations, “and include the question of the transition from one of these 
passions to another”, a question which is “complicated by the fact that the associative transition of the 
indirect passions is influenced by certain properties of the imagination having no analogues for 
impressional transitions and in some cases opposed to the tendency of the latter transitions.” (Hume’s 
Theory 46) He does not, however, impute any importance to them beyond illustrating some interesting 
phenomena of the passions.  In what follows, I will attempt to show how these experiments bring to light 
principles of the mind which are integral for understanding Hume’s arguments in T 2.3.7-8.       
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 In the first three experiments (2.2.2.5-8; SBN 333-8), Hume “proves” his theory of double relation of 
impressions and ideas by showing (in the first experiment) that the absence of both relations of impressions 
and ideas, or (in the second and third) that the absence of either one or the other of these relations prevents 
the production of the indirect passions.  In the fourth, Hume changes one by one the objects, causes and 
relations in order to “compleat [sic] the round” and demonstrate the power of his theory. (2.2.2.9-10; SBN 
336-7) The transition of passions and ideas beyond the first productions of an indirect passion by these 
relations is explored in the remaining experiments.     
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production.  Accordingly, it is here in these experiments that the “propensities” of the 
imagination and passions and their mutual influence get their fullest treatment.
376
   
Earlier in this chapter, I noted that the imagination, in accordance with the PMAS, 
naturally tends to move from ideas of lesser vivacity to those of greater vivacity, that is, 
toward either of the two centers of ideational gravity—the ‘self’ and objects contiguous 
to it, or to ‘considerable’, ‘great’, or otherwise ‘weighty’ objects. Though the passions 
“pass easily from one object to another related to it” and naturally “extend themselves” 
(2.2.2.18; SBN 341) over all objects which bear a strong relation to the original object of 
our passion, they, too, have their own general “propensities” to move with greater facility 
in certain ways which in some situations are at odds with these general propensities of the 
imagination.
377
  As in the case of the imagination, the “propensities” of the passions are 
grounded in the principles of association that govern them.  Again, impressions are 
associated only by resemblance: “Now it has been observ’d, that impressions or passions 
place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions, it very naturally passes from the one 
to the other: As on the contrary, a repugnance in the dispositions produces a difficulty in 
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Accordingly, the sources of “attraction” that govern the imagination are the centers of ideational gravity 
outlined earlier: as the PMAS dictates, the “imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with 
difficulty from lively to obscure”. (2.2.2.15; SBN 339)  Because of their influence, though the causal 
relation between myself and my brother is “reciprocal”, the influence of that relation on the movement of 
the imagination is not.  My love of my brother’s virtue produces pride in myself, as the mind is naturally 
drawn along the relation of causation from a less lively (remote) object (my brother) to a more lively 
(contiguous) one (myself).  My pride in my own virtue, however, does not naturally transfuse itself into 
love of my relations precisely because it would proceed against this “natural propensity” of the 
imagination. (2.2.2.15; SBN 339; cf. 2.2.2.16, 21; SBN 339-40, 343) 
377
 Kames, in his Elements of Criticism, takes note of these propensities, and may be there drawing on 
Hume’s Treatise. (Elements of Criticism, ed. Peter Jones, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), I:22-3. 
The only modern commentator I know of to give significant attention to these “propensities” of the 
imagination and their central importance in Hume’s system is Wayne Waxman (“The Point of Hume's 
Skepticism with Regard to Reason” 254-8, and Kant and the Empiricists: Understanding Understanding 
[New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 455-6).   
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the transition of the passions.” (2.2.2.22; SBN 343-4; cf. 2.1.4.3-4, 2.1.5.10; SBN 283-4, 
289) A “repugnance” exists between any two passions that are contraries in respect of 
any of the features according to which passions are said to resemble one another on 
Hume’s theory (e.g. in their hedonic charge, “direction”, in their enfeebling or 
invigorating effect on the mind, and degree of calmness or violence).  And where a 
transition of ideas, however “natural” it would otherwise be, would give rise to a 
repugnance in the disposition, the mind will avoid that transition, and make another 
transition (often against any natural propensity of the imagination), one that avoids this 
repugnance, and complies with the propensity of the passions to move to other closely 
resembling passions.   
Thus, to use Hume’s own example, which is particularly relevant to our purposes, 
the passions have natural, general propensity to move with greater difficulty from calm to 
violent passions, and with greater facility from violent to calm: in the latter case, as one 
is already in a violent “temper” so, the mixing of a calm passion does not make a 
“considerable change in the disposition” (2.2.2.24; SBN 344) or a very “sensible 
alteration on the temper” (2.2.2.25; SBN 345; cf. 2.2.2.23; SBN 344)378, whereas in the 
former case, a calm disposition is entirely changed by the addition of a violent passion.  
Accordingly, where a transition of the imagination which complies with its own 
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 Hume’s rather obscure, and frankly ineffectual, example of this phenomenon in his seventh experiment 
is the greater ease with which we love a son because of our love for his father, or a servant because of our 
love for his master, rather than vice versa.  The passions in such cases “descend with greater facility than 
they ascend.” (2.2.2.19; SBN 341-2)  The reason is that given the father’s or master’s greater “weight” or 
“moment” our love, in moving from a “lesser” object (the son or servant) to a greater one (the father or 
master), would render a calmer passion significantly more violent, such that the latter would produce too 
great a repugnance in the disposition.  Though the imagination passes more easily from a lesser to a greater 
object, the passions do not, and as the passions are the more powerful principle of human nature, they 
overpower the imagination in this case.  
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propensities would give rise to a transition of passions which is “repugnant” to their 
natural propensity, the former transition is avoided.  As Hume points, where the 
imagination proceeds against its natural propensities, it “must be over-power’d by some 
strong principle of another kind; and as there is nothing ever present to the mind but 
impressions and ideas, this principle must lie in the impressions [i.e. impressions of 
reflection, or passions].” (2.2.2.22; SBN 343, my emphasis) In such cases, the passions 
“prevail” over the propensities of the imagination: as they “are a more powerful principle 
than the imagination, no wonder they prevail over it, and draw the mind to their side.” 
(2.2.2.24; SBN 344, my emphasis)
379
 
It is for this reason—the PMAS-dictated supremacy of the passions over the 
imagination—that the alterative role of imaginative facility and difficulty in particular 
plays an important role in Hume’s account of the dynamics of the mind.  The passions, 
being “a more powerful principle than the imagination” can manipulate the operations of 
the imagination in order to increase or decrease the emotional fodder that makes them 
more or less violent.  As Hume suggested in T 2.3.4, the violence-increasing effects of 
imaginative difficulty and opposition are sometimes sought out by the mind for precisely 
this reason: the mind “in order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment support by a 
new flow of passion.” (2.3.4.8; SBN 422-2, my emphasis)       
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 Alexander Gerard borrows this observation explicitly from Hume in his An Essay on Genius in order to 
show the power the passions have to control our ideas. ((London, 1774) 183-4) “At the same time the 
passion towards the superior, gives the imagination an irresistible propensity to run into the conception of 
the inferior or dependent: eager to extend itself, it [the passion] forces upon us the idea without which it 
could not be extended.” (184) Indeed, one of Gerard’s discourses (now lost) delivered to the Aberdeen 
Philosophical Society concerned “the manner in which association is influenced by the causes of the 
passions” (Ulman, Minutes 121), and Treatise, Book II’s discussion of this subject would have certainly 
influenced that discourse.  
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4.6 Sublimity and the “Distant” Objects of the Passions: T 2.3.8 
The imagination of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is remote 
and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most distant parts of 
space and time in order to avoid the objects, which custom has rendered too 
familiar to it. (Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 12.25) 
 
Nature has appointed us men to be no base nor ignoble animals; but when she 
ushers us into life and into the vast universe as into some great assembly, to be 
as it were spectators of the mighty whole and the keenest aspirants for honour, 
forthwith she implants in our souls the unconquerable love of whatever is 
elevated and more divine than we. Wherefore not even the entire universe 
suffices for the thought and contemplation within the reach of the human mind, 
but our imaginations often pass beyond the bounds of space, and if we survey 
our life on every side and see how much more it everywhere abounds in what is 
striking, and great, and beautiful, we shall soon discern the purpose of our 
birth. (Longinus, Peri Hypsous 35.2-3) 
 
 
In T 2.3.8, Hume utilizes all three of these PMAS-grounded features of his 
account of the mind, bringing them to bear on an account of the superior influence 
objects at a very great spatiotemporal distance from ourselves exert on the will and 
passions.  As I noted in the previous chapter, Hume argues in T 2.3.7 that objects 
contiguous to us in space or time have a greater influence on the imagination, and so will 
also have, ceteris paribus, a proportionally greater influence on the will and passions. (cf. 
2.3.7.1-3; SBN 427-8)  But in T 2.3.8, Hume proceeds to consider “phenomena, which 
seem to be, in a manner, the reverse” of those he treats in T 2.3.7, arguing that “a very 
great distance increases our esteem and admiration for an object.” (2.3.8.1; SBN 432, my 
emphasis)  
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T 2.3.8 is a section of the Treatise generally neglected by Hume scholars not 
interested in Hume’s aesthetics, and one likely reason for this neglect is that the 
phenomena Hume discusses in T 2.3.7-8 seem to indicate contradictory principles of 
human nature.  Indeed, because of the apparent contradiction, one commentator has 
dramatically concluded that these sections represent the “failure of Hume’s systematic 
physics of the passions (or the inadequacy of his experimental terminology and its 
mechanical model of mind).”380 However, it is important to note Hume’s double 
qualification in the passage quoted above: the phenomena accounted for in T 2.3.7-8, he 
says, only “seem to be, in a manner” the reverse of one another.  In fact, whatever 
appearance of contradiction there may be, it is easily ‘reconciled’ by drawing on the 
distinction made above between the formative and non-formative functions of 
imaginative facility and difficulty, and their effects on the production, strength and 
violence of the passions.  As I noted above, T 2.3.7 concerns their formative function; as 
I will argue below, T 2.3.8 deals with their non-formative functions.  Indeed, as I will 
show below, Hume employs his T 2.3.4-5 account of the alterative effects of imaginative 
opposition and facility on our passions as well as his account of the PMAS-based features 
of human nature discussed above in order to explain the ‘switch’ of passionate 
disposition which accounts for this apparent “contradiction” in our motivational 
psychology. 
More importantly, just as T 2.3.7’s treatment of the effects of psychological 
distance and imaginative difficulty offered us insight into the nature and utility of the 
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 John J. Richetti, Philosophical Writing: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 241.  I aim to show below that this conclusion is way off the mark. 
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“strength” of the imagination that grounds the virtue of “strength of mind”, so too, I will 
argue, does T 2.3.8 bear significantly on our understanding of the influence of this 
strength—that is, how it plays a role in explaining the mind’s resistance to 
unphilosophical probability—as well as its cultivation.  As I noted above, Hume 
explicitly treats in T 2.3.8 the strong influence of very “distant” objects can have on the 
passions.  Of course, as I argued in Chapter 3, this “strength” of the imagination is 
characterized in particular by Hume as an ability to persevere in our attention to “distant” 
objects and ends, in opposition to the natural propensity of the imagination to attend to 
objects contiguous to us.  The phenomena Hume sought to explain in T 2.3.7 were the 
result of the effects of the “ease” and facility the imagination found in complying with 
these “natural propensities”—the “easy” and facile transition of the imagination from the 
idea of oneself to an object fostered the transfer of vivacity from that idea to the object, 
giving it a effect on the will and passions superior to that of more “remote” objects, 
ceteris paribus.  In proposing to explain the “reverse” of these phenomena in T 2.3.8, 
Hume means to explain why the imagination is induced to run against its natural 
propensities, or, put differently, to exert what in T 2.3.8 Hume explicitly refers to as its 
“strength”. (2.3.7.8; SBN 431)  As I will argue in what follows, T 2.3.8 is, in large part, 
an explanation of the means by which the imagination can cultivate this “strength” and 
“firmness” so important to the successful pursuit of our greater good. 
Moreover, as I will show below, T 2.3.8 will provide us with the psychological 
basis of Hume’s related claims that whether or not ‘reason’ (either in the sense of 
‘reflective general rules’ or ‘the calm passions’ founded on these rules) prevails depends 
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on the “general character” or the “present disposition” of the person.381 In the previous 
chapter, I suggested that this claim reflects Hume’s repeated claim that no man is 
“constantly constant”: a man whose “general character” is constant, may at times be in a 
temper or disposition that makes him weak-willed and inconstant, while a generally 
weak-willed man may in a certain disposition act strong-mindedly.  In T 2.3.8, I argue, 
Hume accounts by means of the PMAS for this ‘switch’ in passionate “temper” or 
“disposition” which determines for the “prevalence” of either of these principles.  Recall 
that Hume’s notion of a “temper” or “disposition” was yet another one of the “causes” in 
Hume’s “program” for T 2.3 which determine in large part whether the “constant” 
principles of nature or the “momentary gusts” of passion will govern us.  It is in T 2.3.8 
that the importance of this parameter in determining the constancy of our actions comes 
most fully to light.   
Overall, T 2.3.8 is perhaps one of the most compressed sections of the Treatise, 
but, as I will argue below, the doctrines of this section of the Treatise are crucial not only 
for an understanding the fuller Humean picture of the relationship between the operations 
of the passions and imagination in the 1739 Treatise, but also for an understanding of 
how our imagination and passions work together to bring about the “constancy” of the 
passions necessary for happiness.   
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 1.3.13.12, 2.3.3.10, 2.3.8.13; SBN 150, 418, 437-8.  John Passmore, for instance, seems to think Hume’s 
explanation is ultimately circular: “Why should we prefer regularity to irregularity [i.e. the “constant” 
operations of the imagination to their capricious and uncertain ones]?  To this the only answer can be, 
Hume replies, that ‘the disposition and character of the person’ (T150) will determine the preference.  The 
‘vulgar’ prefer caprice, ‘the wise’ prefer regularity. Clearly, this is question-begging.” (Hume’s Intentions 
60) I aim to show in this chapter that this is incorrect. 
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4.7 Distance, Admiration and the Associative Sublime 
In order to appreciate fully the originality of Hume’s T 2.3.8 account of the 
effects of great “distances” on the imagination and passions, we will first need to 
approach it in the context in which it clearly and firmly embedded: that of the early 
eighteenth-century preoccupation with “sublimity”.382  Indeed, when read in abstraction 
from this wider historical and intellectual context, Hume’s theory of the effects of 
sublimity may seem, to use the words of one commentator, “unduly baroque”, and the 
claims made by Hume in support of it, “excessively ad hoc” and characterized by a 
“speculative audacity”.383  As I have already suggested, the principles of human nature 
Hume employs in T 2.3.8 are not ad hoc, but are developed elsewhere in the dynamics of 
the mind Hume elaborates throughout T 1-2, but as I hope to show in what follows, 
however “audacious” or “baroque” the claims of T 2.3.8 may seem, they are nevertheless 
firmly rooted in particular in the Longinian tradition of theorizing on sublimity.  An 
eighteenth-century reader of the Treatise could not have failed to recognize Hume’s 
engagement with this tradition, as well as the novelty of his contribution to it.
384
  As I 
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 Hume’s discussion of the effects of admiration is also clearly indebted to the early modern (particularly 
Cartesian) account of the emotion of wonder (admiration) and its effects on the imagination and passions. 
In particular, there are many points of resemblance and influence between Malebranche’s account of the 
use of wonder and curiosity in The Search After Truth. I cannot develop this point here, however, as it is 
beyond the limited scope of this chapter.  On this latter tradition, see Susan James, Passion and Action, 
chapter 8, and Deborah Brown, “Agency and Attention  in Malebranche’s Theory of Cognition”, in 
Emotions and Cognitive Life in medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Lisa Shapiro and Mark 
Pickavé (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).)  As Brown argues, wonder plays a role in correcting 
our cognitive errors because it directs our attention in a way that is disinterested, allowing a more objective 
view of an object.   
383
 Susan James, “Sympathy and Comparison,” in Impressions of Hume, 118.   
384
 Indeed, Hume’s Treatise account of sublimity exercised great influence on the accounts of later 
associationist critics such as John Baillie, Alexander Gerard, Archibald Alison and Dugald Stewart. (On 
Hume’s influence, see Martin Kallich, The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory in Eighteenth-Century 
England (The Hague: Mouton, 1970).  Hume’s influence on these thinkers is grossly underestimated, for 
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noted earlier, Hume was a careful reader of Longinus (and of other important early 
eighteenth-century British theorists of ‘sublimity’), and that this is crucial to an 
understanding not only of the doctrines of this section, but to Hume’s account of the 
causes of the “constancy” of the will in T 2.3. 
The most important point Hume draws from Longinus is his account of the 
psychological and emotional effects of sublimity.  On Longinus’ famous account, 
sublimity is an “image reflected from the inward greatness of the soul [ὕψος 
μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα]”385 of the author of sublime images (or, in the case of 
Longinus’ famous example of Ajax, of the author’s subject as well386)—an “echo” of 
their magnanimity in our own soul. However, a main emotional effect of the perception 
of such grandeur is this “natural elevation” of the mind, characterized by a pride in its 
own creative power and capacity: “the mind is naturally elevated by the true sublime, and 
so sensibly affected with its lively strokes, that it swells in transport [or ‘joy’] and an 
inward pride [πληροῦται χαρᾶς καὶ μεγαλαυχίας], as if what was only heard had been the 
product of its own invention [ὡς αὐτὴ γεννήσασα ὅπερ ἤκουσεν].” (7.2, my emphasis)387  
For Longinus, the perception of sublimity not only inspires emotions of grandeur, but in 
activating the powers of the mind, and making it conscious of the extent of its own 
                                                                                                                                                              
instance, by Rachel Zuckert (“The Associative Sublime: Gerard, Kames, Alison and Stewart, in The 
Sublime: from Antiquity to the Present, ed. Timothy Costelloe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012): 64-76), as well as by Peter Kivy, who attributes the influence of associationism on later aesthetic 
theory mainly to the work of David Hartley, despite the explicit attribution by these theorists of parts of 
their theories to Hume. (Seventh Sense 181))  Although an extensive examination of this tradition and 
Hume’s place in it is well beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will note in my discussion of the theses of 
T 2.3.8 those features of this tradition on which Hume clearly drew in that section of the Treatise. 
385
 Peri Hypsous 9.2; Smith 18. 
386
 Thus, Longinus praises Homer’s ability to “enter into [the state of mind of] heroic greatness [εἰς τὰ 
ἡρωϊκὰ μεγέθη συνεμβαίνειν].” (9.10) 
387
 Dionysius Longinus, On the Sublime, (trans. William Smith [London: J. Watts, 1739]), 7.3; Smith 14.  
This was the standard English edition used in the eighteenth century. 
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capacity and power, fills it with a sense of its own grandeur and disposes it to high-
minded thoughts.  It was this feature of Longinus’ account of our response to sublimity 
that eighteenth-century theorists developed as the kernel of their own explanations of the 
origin of the emotion of sublimity, assigning a central role to the pleasing pride the 
imagination takes in its own capacity and power.
388
  
As I will show below, Hume also incorporates this central feature of Longinus’ 
account of sublimity into a PMAS-based “anatomy” of the effects of sublimity on our 
imagination and passions in T 2.3.8.  First, in what is perhaps the first important example 
of the “associative sublime” in the eighteenth century, Hume extends his explanation of 
the sublimity of objects “great” in magnitude (the first PMAS-based feature of Hume’s 
science of human nature discussed above) to objects associated with great distance in 
order to explain in T 2.3.8 “why a great distance encreases our esteem and admiration for 
an object”. (2.3.8.2; SBN 432, my emphasis)  Accordingly, Hume opens T 2.3.8 with a 
sketch of the theory of sublimity we outlined in more detail above, and in Longinian 
fashion, Hume argues that the “mere view” or prospect of great distance “enlarges the 
mind” and gives it a “sensible delight and pleasure”:  
                                                     
388
 See, e.g. Baillie, An Essay on the Sublime 4, 6, 9, 11, 38, Gerard, Essay on Taste 12-13, (Indeed, Gerard 
criticizes Longinus for not investigating the causes of this noble pride (13n.)), Kames, Elements of 
Criticism I:159n.  Similarly, Joseph Priestley writes: “GREAT objects please us for the same reason that new 
objects do, viz. by the exercise they give to our faculties.  The mind, as was observed before, conforming 
and adapting itself to the object to which its attention is engaged, must, as it were, enlarge itself, to 
conceive a great object.  This requires a considerable effort of the imagination, which is also attended with 
a pleasing, though perhaps not a distinct and explicit consciousness of the strength and extent of our own 
powers.” (A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism 1777, 151; cf. 136).  See also Malebranche’s 
attribution of an innate love of grandeur to human nature (The Search After Truth 4.2.1; LO 269-70), and 
the pride in our imaginations it raises. (Search 5.8; LO 387) The latter passage from The Search is 
remarkably similar to Longinus’ own account of admiration of grandeur.  (On this feature of Malebranche’s 
theory, see Susan James, Passion and Action 171ff.) 
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’[T]is evident, that the mere view and contemplation of any greatness, whether 
successive or extended, enlarges the soul, and gives it a sensible delight and 
pleasure.  A wide plain, the ocean, eternity, a succession of several ages; all 
these are entertaining objects, and excel every thing, however beautiful, which 
accompanies not its beauty with a suitable greatness. (2.3.8.2; SBN 432)   
As Hume noted in T 2.3.7, the imagination is accustomed to an awareness of the distance 
of any object from oneself; accordingly, when the idea of a very distant object is 
“presented to the imagination”, we naturally reflect on the greatness of the distance 
between ourselves and the object.  When taken as a whole, the “mere view” of a great 
distance gives rise to that pleasing mental agitation we commonly feel in viewing any 
great object, and this is in turn associated with the distant object: as the imagination 
“transports…all the passions excited [by the distance]…” to the distant object itself, “the 
admiration, which is directed to the distance, naturally diffuses itself over the distant 
object.” (2.3.8.2; SBN 433, my emphasis)   
As Hume’s examples make clear, it is not necessary that the object actually be 
distant in space and time.  Objects that are not themselves actually distant, but are 
naturally associated with such distances likewise give rise to the same sentiments of 
admiration even when they are in fact contiguous to us in space and time, because each of 
these objects “conveys our view to the distance” by the very same associative process:  
A great traveller, tho’ in the same chamber, will pass for a very extraordinary 
person; as a Greek medal, even in our cabinet, is always esteem’d a valuable 
curiosity.  Here the object, by a natural transition, conveys our view to the 
distance; and the admiration, which arises from that distance, by another natural 
transition, returns back to the object. (2.3.8.2; SBN 433, my emphasis) 
By means of this “natural” association, we transfer our admiration at the vast distance to 
the object itself, whether that object is itself distant or proximate.  Indeed, the fact that the 
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psychological distance which produces this admiration is associated with objects 
otherwise contiguous to us allows Hume to skirt difficulties in explaining why every very 
distant object would not have the same effect, or how objects very distant in space and 
time even become the objects of our attention to a degree sufficient to allow them to 
weigh significantly in our mind at all relative to objects contiguous to us.  In any case, 
Hume’s examples in T 2.3.8 are primary objects that are sublime by association with 
great distances: a “Greek medal…in our cabinet”, or a “great traveller…in our chamber” 
(2.3.8.2; SBN 433, my emphasis), or “the relicts of antiquity” or “what is brought…from 
the remotest parts of the world”. (2.3.8.10; SBN 436, my emphasis)  All of these are 
objects already receive imaginative “support” from their actual spatiotemporal contiguity 
to ourselves (that is, from the facility with which the imagination conceives them), while 
at the same time presenting us with the prospect of additional imaginative difficulty that 
gives rise to a sentiment of admiration.  In these cases Hume presents in T 2.3.8, some 
object which fixes our attention but is not in itself a proper object of desire (and may 
even be in itself a proper object of an aversion
389
), the naturally pleasurable emotion of 
sublimity or admiration which attends their conception transforms these otherwise 
hedonically indifferent object into one to which our passions—here curiosity—
respond.
390
  Such objects, as Hume puts it, become “valuable curiosities” (2.3.8.2; SBN 
433) because they offer the prospect of the pleasure of the exertion and effort of 
imagination.  Accordingly, drawing on our earlier distinction between the functions the 
                                                     
389
 e.g. Malebranche’s examples of the objects of such admiration: “ancient medals…encrusted with rust,” 
or the “worm-eaten slipper of some ancient.” (Search 2.2.3.2; LO 139, my emphasis) 
390
 cf. Malebranche, Search 2.2.3.2 (OL 138-9).  Desire of possession, of course, may also follow curiosity. 
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imagination plays in the production of desires and aversions for objects, the role played 
by the agitation of the imagination generated by the contemplation of great distance in 
these examples is to this extent non-formative, and in particular, originative.     
 As in T 2.3.7, the strength of desires for such objects is determined not only by 
differences in the absolute spatiotemporal distance to which they cast the mind, by also 
varied by the relative difficulty the imagination encounters in traversing the parts of that 
distance.  And, as in T 2.3.7, differences in this respect are the result of two factors: 1) 
the difference in the properties of the media through which the imagination moves toward 
any distant object—space and time, and 2) the imagination’s naturally propensity to 
follow the “stream” or “flow” of time.  Accordingly, these differences are integral to the 
explanations of the “reverse” of the second and third phenomena Hume examined in the 
T 2.3.7: why 2) a very great distance in time has a greater effect on our imagination and 
passions that an equal distance in space (2.3.8.3-10; SBN 433-6), and 3) very great 
distances in past time produce greater “veneration and esteem” for an object than very 
great distances in future time. (2.3.8.11-12; SBN 436-7)  These sources of imaginative 
difficulty which attend an object are, like absolute distance in space and time, sources of 
additional admiration for that object.  It is for this reason that the history and artifacts of 
ancient Greece and Rome are more valued than “Japan tables”, or the “character, learning 
and government” of the present societies of distant lands. We “bestow more fruitless 
pains to clear up the history and chronology” of ancient peoples “than it wou’d cost us to 
make a voyage, and be certainly inform’d” the state of our distant contemporaries 
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(2.3.8.3; SBN 433; cf. 2.3.10.12; SBN 454)
391
, because the greater imaginative difficulty 
caused by the “brokenness” and “dividedness” (i.e. the discreteness) of the parts of time 
relative to the “unity” of the parts space gives rise to a greater admiration for those 
objects, ceteris paribus.  (2.3.8.10; SBN 436) Likewise, we tend to view our ancestors as 
our superiors, and our posterity as our inferiors because in conceiving our ancestors, the 
imagination must proceed against its natural propensity to follow the stream of time: the 
greater imaginative difficulty occasioned by this movement gives rise to a greater degree 
of admiration (ceteris paribus).
392
 (2.3.8.11; SBN 436-7)  In both cases, the “opposition” 
the imagination faces in traversing the great expanse of space or time increases that 
feeling of sublimity or admiration which we associate with an object. 
Hume’s explanation of why greater relative difficulty in the transitions of the 
imagination has this effect again draws on first PMAS-based features of Hume’s 
dynamics of the mind outlined earlier in this chapter.  Like the “mere view” of a great 
distance, the prospect of great imaginative difficulty also generates an emotion of 
sublimity or admiration we associate with the distant object.  However, the emotional 
effect generated by sources of imaginative difficulty as Hume accounts for it in T 2.3.8 is 
not the aggregate emotion ‘compounded’ from the emotions that attend each part of a 
great spatiotemporal distance upon the “mere view” of that distance, but, as Hume argued 
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 Susan James has pointed out that Hume’s discussion here is influenced by Malebranche’s discussion of 
“counterfeit scholars” (faux savants) in Search 4.7 (LO 295-8, especially 297-8) and his treatment of the 
effects of novelty and grandeur on the passions in Search 2.2.3.2 (LO 138-9). (James, “Sympathy and 
Comparison: Two Principles of Human Nature,” in Impressions of Hume) 
392
 This is the psychological anatomy that underlies, for instance, our tendency to view the past as superior 
to the present on Hume’ s account. (“Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations”, EMPL 464)  
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in T 2.3.4, is a emotional invigoration naturally generated by the anticipation of effort, 
including mental effort, which emotion is naturally pleasurable.   
Hume makes this point by means of a “digression” in which he accounts for the 
effect of the prospect of opposition in any form (that is, mental or bodily opposition) on 
the passions.  As Hume writes, the prospect of any great, but superable, difficulty tends 
to inspire us with an exalted pride—“a more than ordinary grandeur and magnanimity” or 
“elevation”:  
‘Tis a quality very observable in human nature, that any opposition, which does 
not entirely discourage and intimidate us, rather has a contrary effect, and 
inspires us with a more than ordinary grandeur and magnanimity.  In collecting 
our force to overcome the opposition, we invigorate the soul, and give it an 
elevation with which otherwise it wou’d never have been acquainted.  
Compliance, by rendering our strength useless, makes us insensible of it; but 
opposition awakens and employs it. (2.3.8.4; SBN 433-4, my emphasis) 
Where one proceeds in any “easy” course of thought or action—a course in which  one 
complies with the “natural propensities” of the mind or body— one does not have a need 
to call upon and exert one’s full strength, and so is not required to form any idea of that 
strength.  On the other hand, when confronted with any great prospective opposition or 
difficulty, one is prompted to take stock of the resources or strength one’s mind or body 
has to overcome the difficulty, and where one finds that strength up to the task, one feels 
a sense of ‘elevation’ or pride—a “grandeur and magnanimity” (2.3.8.4; SBN 433-4) or, 
what Hume calls in T 3.3.2, “greatness and elevation of mind”. (3.3.2.13; SBN 599)  
It is here that the “strength” of one’s mind, or more specifically, one’s appraisal 
of that “strength”—that feeling of determination one has to infer future success in 
overcoming the unphilosophical influences on our mind on the basis of past experience—
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has in influence on our conduct by giving rise to passions which in turn influence the 
operations of the mind.  Our judgments of our strength will either raise doubts about the 
likelihood of our overcoming opposition, or reasons to anticipate success, which 
judgments in turn produce the passions of humility and dejection or pride and elevation, 
respectively.  As Hume writes in his Essays, “[a] man’s genius is always, in the 
beginning of life, as much unknown to himself as to others; and it is only after frequent 
trials, attended with success, that he dares think himself equal to those undertakings, in 
which those, who have succeeded, have fixed the admiration of mankind.”393 In turn, 
where he is “prepossessed with a high notion” of his ability, “he will naturally endeavour 
to act up to it.”394  “Courage depends on opinion,” as Hume tells us, for this reason.395 
Thus, as Hume notes here, the “inverse” of his claim (i.e. that the prospect of 
superable opposition gives rise to pride and elevation) is also true: when the soul is 
elevated, and “full of courage and magnanimity” as a result of a conscious feeling of its 
own strength, it “in a manner seeks opposition.” 396 (2.3.8.5; SBN 434, my emphasis) As 
we noted above, the PMAS is a feature of human nature that explains not only the 
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 “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” EMPL 135.  Comparison plays an important role in 
such judgments and so on the pride and elevation such admiration prompts.  On the role of comparison in 
this respect, see T 2.2.8.13-17, 2.2.10.9-10; SBN 377-9, 392-3, “Of Eloquence,” EMPL 106-7, “Of the Rise 
and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” EMPL 135-7, “Of National Characters,” EMPL 207, 210-212, and 
NHR 10.2. 
394
 “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature”, EMPL 81, my emphasis. 
395
 “Of National Characters”, EMLP 212, my emphasis. 
396
 In order to illustrate this point, Hume quotes from the hunt scene in Book IV of Vergil’s Aenead in 
which Ascanius, feeling his oats on his fierce horse, prays for bigger game—lions and “foaming boars”—to 
hunt. (Vergil, Aeneid 4.156-9)  A metaphorical comparison of the motivational structure of philosophy or 
abstruse, difficult thought to that underlying hunting is employed by Hume in T 2.3.10 (the relationship of 
T 2.3.8 to which I hope to have made clear) and in his essay, “The Stoic”. (cf. Seneca, Epistles LXIV.4-5; 
439-41, and, in particular, Kames, Elements of Criticism I:63-6, where the account of character 
development Kames offers is very close to the one I develop in this chapter.)   
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tendency of both its main principles—the passions and the imagination—to seek and 
preserve (a moderate) agitation (the second of the PMAS-based features of human nature 
discussed earlier), but also the tendency of the passions to support themselves with “a 
new flow” of emotion or agitation by seeking out forms of opposition, including 
imaginative opposition (the third PMAS-based feature of Hume’s dynamics of the mind).  
Here, Hume reminds us of the second PMAS-based principle in regard to the passions: 
“Whatever supports and fills the passions is agreeable to us; as on the contrary, what 
weakens and infeebles them is uneasy.” (2.3.8.6; SBN 434) Accordingly, as the third 
PMAS-based principle dictates, as “opposition” has the effect of invigorating and filling 
the passions (an effect Hume discussed at length in T 2.3.4) and “facility” or compliance 
has the effect of calming and ultimately “enfeebling” them (an effect Hume discussed at 
length in T 2.3.5), it is “no wonder the mind, in certain dispositions, desires the former, 
and is averse to the latter.” (2.3.8.6; SBN 434, my emphasis)  
Crucial to an understanding Hume’s point here is his notion of a “temper” or 
“disposition”, which is, again, one of the “causes” of the relative violence and calmness 
passions Hume lists throughout T 2.3.1-2 and at T 2.3.3.10 and T 2.3.8.13.
397
  As I noted 
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 See 2.3.1.11; SBN 403, 2.3.1.15; SBN 404-5, 2.3.2.2; SBN 409.  Again, for Hume’s most explicit 
discussions of a “temper” or “disposition”, see T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283 and, in particular, T 2.2.2.22-5; SBN 
343-5.  Thomas Reid, who treats and generally criticizes Hume’s T 2.3 motivational psychology in his 
Essays on the Active Powers of Man, also offers us a useful definition that is clearly applicable to an 
interpretation of T 2.3.8: “By disposition I mean a state of mind which, while it lasts, gives a tendency, or 
proneness, to be moved by certain animal principles, rather than by others; while, at another time, another 
state of mind, in the same person, may give the ascendant to other animal principles.” (3.7.1) And: “Among 
some of the principles of action, there is a natural affinity, so that one of the tribe naturally disposes to 
those which are allied to it.” (3.7.4) Sir Richard Blackmore—also a key early eighteenth-century theorist of 
the sublime—describes something like these two dispositions of mind in the seventh of his Letters on 
Religion (1720), where he outlines, in addition, a “revolution of humours” similar to the disposition switch 
Hume describes in T 2.3.8.  (Letters of Religion Between Theophilius and Eugenio [London: J. Peele, 
1720], 18-9)  Like Hume, Blackmore suggests, however, that custom can over time increase the influence 
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there, where the passions maintain a temper, they tend to seek to preserve that temper by 
moving more easily to passions which resemble those which make up their present 
disposition: a “disposition” or “temper” just is this set or succession of resembling 
passions.  As we noted above, for Hume, impressions of reflection are associated with 
one another by resemblance, and as Hume told us in T 2.1.4: “All resembling impressions 
are connected together; and no sooner one arises, than the rest naturally follow…[O]ur 
temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself” into “other resembling 
affections” such as pride and courage (2.1.4.3; SBN 283, my emphasis)  
The particular temper or disposition operative in T 2.3.8 is constituted by passions 
which resemble one another more fundamentally in their “invigorating”, “elevating” or 
“exalting” effect on the mind.  Regarding this specific point of resemblance, Hume 
writes, 
Nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and vanity; tho’ at 
the same time love or tenderness is rather found to weaken and infeeble it.  The 
same difference is observable betwixt the uneasy passions.  Anger and hatred 
bestow a new force on all our thoughts and actions; while humility and shame 
deject and discourage us…[P]ride and hatred invigorate the soul; and love and 
humility infeeble it. (2.2.10.6; SBN)
398
 
As I noted above, on Hume’s account, such “invigorating” passions—for example, 
contempt, courage, magnanimity—are all “sublime passions” which ground those virtues 
                                                                                                                                                              
of our resolutions when we have acted on them repeatedly in the proper disposition. (I:18)  Malebranche 
also discusses something like these two dispositions as well. (Search 4.3.3; LO 279-80), 
398
 In the Treatise, Hume utilizes this distinction among kinds of passions in his complex T 2.2.10 
explanation of why certain qualities in another which give rise to love in turn do not by comparison give 
rise to any significant humility in ourselves, producing respect (which is a mixture of love and humility). 
(cf. 2.2.10.5-8)  In the second Enquiry, Hume makes a related distinction between the “sublime” and 
“pathetic” passions: “It is observable, that the great charm of poetry consists in lively pictures of the 
sublime passions, magnanimity, courage, disdain of fortune; or those of the tender affections, love and 
friendship; which warn the heart, and diffuse over it similar sentiments and emotions.” (EPM 7.26-7; SBN 
259)        
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which Hume calls species of “greatness” or “elevation” of mind, each of which is at 
bottom “nothing but a steady and well-establish’d pride and self-esteem”.  (3.3.2.13; SBN 
599)  Pride, of course, on Hume’s well-known account is not a motivating passion (cf. 
2.2.6.3; SBN 367), but its resemblance to “invigorating” motivating passions like 
courage and anger is often instrumental in putting us into that “invigorated” temper or 
disposition in which certain motivating passions more naturally arise.   
Indeed, as Hume notes in his account of the virtue of “greatness of mind” in T 
3.3.2, the primary function of pride is to make us aware of our own “strength” or “force” 
so as to give rise in us to “boldness” in our undertakings:  
‘[T]is certain, that nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, than a due 
degree of pride, which makes us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a 
confidence and assurance in all our enterprises.  Whatever capacity any one 
may be endow’d with, ‘tis entirely useless to him, if he be not acquainted with it, 
and form not designs suitable to it.  ‘Tis requisite on all occasions to know our 
own force; and were it allowable to err on either side, ‘twou’d be more 
advantageous to over-rate our merit, than to form ideas of it, below its just 
standard.  Fortune favors the bold and enterprizing; and nothing inspires us with 
more boldness than a good opinion of ourselves.” (3.3.2.8; SBN 596-7, my 
emphasis; cf. 3.3.2.14; SBN 600) 
Pride is not simply a product of our past experience of the extent of our own “strength” 
(which, as I noted in the previous chapter, is a causal judgment we derive from our 
reflections on the “history” of our conduct), but it is also that emotion which causes us to 
exert our strength.  Where we feel pride we are made aware or conscious of our own 
force and ability, and, elevated by that emotion, we are prompted to form “designs 
suitable” to our abilities. Thus, pride, though not a motivating passion, it nevertheless 
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“secretly animates our conduct” (3.3.2.13; SBN 600, my emphasis) as Hume’s puts it, by 
emboldening us with a conscious perception or feeling of our own strength.
399
  
Accordingly, the sublime, “invigorating passions”—those which “elevate” or 
“exalt” the mind—raised by the prospect of great difficulty or opposition thus play a 
crucial role in putting the mind in this opposition-seeking, or what we may call “heroic”, 
disposition.  In T 2.3.8, the “elevating” or “heroic” passions that compose this disposition 
are first admiration and joy, then pride or magnanimity, and finally courage or boldness. 
Then, echoing the passage from T 2.1.4 quoted above concerning the passions’ tendency 
to preserve their temper, Hume notes, “the soul, when elevated with joy and courage, in a 
manner seeks opposition, and throws itself with alacrity into any scene of thought or 
action, where its courage meets with matter to nourish and employ it”. (2.3.8.9; SBN 435, 
my emphasis)  Here, the importance of the third PMAS-based feature of Hume’s 
dynamics of the mind becomes clear: our experience of greatness raises in us “sublime 
passions”, which, when raised, cause the mind to move in such a way that preserves that 
sublime and elevated or heroic disposition.  It is no accident that all “heroic virtues” or 
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 cf. EPM 7.3-6, 16-8; SBN 252, 256-7, EHU 7.16-20; SBN 67-9, EMPL 153.  On the relevance of this 
feature of Hume’s account of pride for contemporary social psychology, see mark Collier, “Hume’s 
Science of Emotions” 12-15.  Given this account of the anatomical relationship between the “strength” of 
the mind and “greatness of mind”, I take Kate Abramson’s general observations that “[i]n Hume’s terms, 
greatness of mind is a special form of ‘strength of mind’” to be incorrect and misleading, though I do agree 
with her claim that “resoluteness in the face of temptation is an essential part of Humean greatness”.  
However, I find her insistent attempt to distinguish “greatness of mind” sharply from the passion of pride to 
be rather puzzling, and her claim that a durable and constant pride cannot be a “regulative passion” in our 
character to be wrong.    As I have shown above, though pride is not a motivating passion, pride can 
“temper” the mind in such a way that certain motives over the others arise more naturally. (Kate 
Abramson, “Two Portraits of the Humean Moral Agent,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly  83.4 (2002): 
301-34, 310-13) 
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forms of greatness of mind, such as constancy and fortitude or courage, all involve one’s 
useful ability to resist or oppose some natural, strong force on our thought or conduct.
400
 
 
4.8 The “Heroic” Imagination 
 Hume applies this PMAS-based account of the effects of opposition and pride on 
our passions to the remaining two questions of T 2.3.8.  The particular form this 
invigorating and emboldening pride takes in these explanations is what Hume refers to, 
clearly channeling Longinus, as a “pride or sublimity of imagination” (2.3.8.7; SBN 434, 
my emphasis), and so the “strength” of which this pride makes us aware is the “strength” 
of the imagination.  Given the natural propensity of the passions to transition to 
resembling passions—that is, to maintain the steadiness of its “temper” or 
“disposition”—this pride or sublimity of imagination in turn inspires the soul with a 
certain “boldness” or courage to exercise that power by overcoming the obstacles that 
confront it in order to maintain its invigorated disposition.  In the context of T 2.3.7-8, the 
obstacles are precisely those “natural propensities” of the imagination discussed in the 
previous chapter which affect our causal reasoning. 
 As in the case of opposition in general (whether mental or bodily), so too in the 
case of imaginative opposition: since facility “in the conception of [an] object” (a facility 
produced by “compliance” with the natural propensities of the imagination) has not 
merely calmed the agitation of our mind, but “enfeebled” it, we are moved (as the PMAS 
dictates) to invigorate our mind by seeking out imaginative opposition.  As Hume tells us 
                                                     
400
 On this point, see again, Kate Abramson, “Two Portraits of the Humean Moral Agent”, especially 310-
11.  
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in T 2.3.4, “the efforts which the mind makes to surmount the obstacle, excite the spirits” 
and by means of the MPP, “enliven the passion” (2.3.4.6; SBN 421) giving it additional 
force and violence. (cf. 2.3.4.9; SBN 422)  This pride in the “strength” of our mind 
“conveys to the fancy an inclination” to run against its natural propensities or the “natural 
stream” of its thought, which inclination “suits the present disposition of the mind; and 
the difficulty, instead of extinguishing its vigour and alacrity, has the contrary effect, of 
sustaining and encreasing it” (2.3.8.9; SBN 435), by means of the MPP.   
The interposition of this pride thus complicates an answer to the question of 
whether non-formative imaginative difficulty in such cases is originative or alterative.  It 
is the pleasing agitation of such exertion and difficulty that makes objects which promise 
such difficulty into objects of the desire of curiosity. However, Hume’s Longinian thesis 
concerning sublimity dictates that because the imaginative difficulty in this case is not 
trivial (like that occasioned by the mere novelty of an object) but great, the anticipation 
of our ability to overcome this resistance gives rise to pride in addition to the desire of 
curiosity.  Thus, the emotional agitation we desired on account of its pleasure in turn 
becomes necessary to sustain the “invigorated” disposition of the mind occasioned by this 
“pride or sublimity of imagination”.  Thus, the desire or curiosity raised is the product of 
the originative function of imaginative difficulty (here, prospective difficulty), while the 
maintenance of the invigoration of the temper is the product of the alterative effects of 
difficulty (here, occurrent difficulty).     
In the remainder of T 2.3.8, Hume brings this PMAS-based account of the effects 
of great imaginative opposition to bear on the questions he raised at the start of that 
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section regarding the greater value we attribute to antiques than to exotic goods 
(2.3.8.10; SBN 436), and to ancient objects than to objects very distant in the future. 
(2.3.8.11-12; SBN 436-7)  Thus, the prospect of great distance and of the difficulty that 
accompanies it work together to give the mind a double enlivening: “The mind, elevated 
by the vastness of its object, is still farther elevated by the difficulty of the conception; 
and being oblig’d every moment to renew its efforts in [its] transition…feels a more 
vigorous and sublime disposition” than it would in a train of thought “where the ideas 
flow along with easiness and facility.” (2.3.8.10; SBN 436, my emphasis)  Distance and 
difficulty produce the admiration and elevation, but a more “difficult” distance (here, a 
distance in time as opposed to space, and past time as opposed to future time) produces 
yet a greater admiration and elevation and give the imagination a proportionally stronger 
impetus to proceed against its natural propensities and enter into a “scene of thought” in 
which its strength can be employed. (2.3.8.9; SBN 435) 
 
4.9 “Scenes of Action” and the Strength of our Passions for “Distant” Goods  
However, in true Humean fashion, Hume’s attempt to anatomize what seem to be 
trivial phenomena—here, our admiration of and curiosity concerning points of history, 
antiques, exotic goods, and well-travelled people—reveals deep and important general 
principles of human nature, principle which have much wider significance and 
applicability within Hume’s ‘science of man’.401  In this case, the lengthy “digression” 
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 For instance, recall that similar digressions introduce (2.1.11.1-8; SBN 316-20) and reinforce (2.2.5.15-
6; SBN 392-4) the centrality of sympathy and its force to Hume’s theory of the passions.  Given the prima 
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Hume makes concerning the effects of opposition and difficulty on the soul (that is, on 
the passions and imagination) in order to explain these relatively trivial phenomena 
reveal principles of the mind which have direct relevance to the issues raised in the 
previous chapter, issues central to Hume’s theory of motivation—the successful 
regulation of our conduct, and the cultivation of the strength of the mind.  Regarding the 
former point, I noted in the previous chapter that on Hume’s account the successful 
regulation of our conduct depended in large part on the ability of the mind to overcome 
not only the natural propensities of the imagination which cause psychologically 
proximate objects to “weigh” more on the will and passions than psychologically distant 
ones (ceteris paribus), but also the strength of the passions to which the naturalness of 
these propensities gives rise. Regarding the latter point, I noted not only that “strong 
minds” are simply those which possess in a great degree this ability to resist or correct for 
the unphilosophical influences of the mind and the strong, violent passions they produce, 
but also that this “strength” of the mind—which is, I argued, rooted ultimately in the 
“strength” and “firmness” of the imagination—may be cultivated by custom where it 
repeatedly resists and overcomes the influence of these unphilosophical propensities of 
the imagination, and the opposition of the strong and violent passions which they foster.   
It is in his T 2.3.8 “digression”, I argue, that Hume provides us with the principles 
of human nature which bear directly on these issues, and my aim in the remainder of this 
chapter is to elaborate how they do so.  Though Hume’s focus in T 2.3.8 is on the effects 
of imaginative facility and difficulty and its non-formative effects on our passions and 
                                                                                                                                                              
facie desultory organization of Treatise, Book II I noted in the Introduction, digressions become for Hume 
a very important means of revealing such principles.    
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motives, his digression concerns the causes and effects of the opposition-seeking of the 
mind or soul generally.  In other words, Hume is attempting to apply general principles 
of human nature true of the whole mind—the imagination and the passions—to the 
narrower case of the imagination.  But as our aim is not so narrow—nor, as I have 
argued, are Hume’s aims in T 2.3.4-8—we need not apply these principles so narrowly.  
Hume’s digression, then, is an invitation to develop the consequences of its account of 
imaginative difficulty for the passions and motivation.  In particular, I will argue here 
that Hume’s T 2.3.8.4-9 “digression” also provides insight into the strength of our 
motives for those “distant” ends which organize our life into coherent, and extended and 
difficult “scenes of action”—to use Hume’s own examples in T 2.3.8, supremely 
valuable, “distant” ends such as virtue, power, knowledge and riches. (cf. 2.3.8.7, 9; SBN 
434-5)  
Given the clear roots of Hume’s T 2.3.8 account of the causes of the “aspiring 
progress of the imagination” in the PMAS, we may turn to our earlier account of the 
consequences of this principle on the passions in order to flesh out the wider importance 
of Hume’s digression.  As I argued earlier, it is a consequence of the PMAS that where 
our passions become too enfeebled, they seek a “new flow of passion” in order to 
“enliven” or “support” themselves and preserve their own (moderate) agitation. (2.3.4.8; 
SBN 421-2)  A primary way in which the passions “support” themselves is by the 
agitation of spirits caused by forms of mental and bodily opposition and effort, including 
not only imaginative exertion, and the opposition of other passions. (2.3.4.5; SBN 421) In 
addition, I argued that the PMAS dictates that the preservation of our passionate temper 
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takes precedence over the other operations of the mind, such that where some particular 
operation of the mind is required for the maintenance of that temper, the mind performs 
that operation.  In T 2.3.8, Hume shows how these two PMAS-based principles of human 
nature work together when faced with relatively great opposition.  The prospect of such 
opposition awakens our strength and makes us conscious or “sensible” of it—and where 
we find ourselves equal to the challenge, this assessment gives rise to the invigorating 
passion of pride. (2.3.8.4; SBN 433-4)  When our passions are put into this elevated or 
“heroic” disposition, they then seek to preserve it by exerting its strength and opposing 
those propensities of our nature with which we normally comply.  Together, these 
mechanisms of the mind explain why objects which present us with the prospect of an 
extended and difficult “scene of action” (2.3.8.9; SBN 435) often occasion stronger 
motives than what is more quickly and easily attained. 
Of course, on Hume’s account, the second PMAS-based principle of human 
nature may alone explain why we often desire objects merely for the opportunity they 
present for the coherent exertion of our mental and bodily faculties, as in the pleasures of 
gaming or hunting.  In these cases, it is mainly the desire for exertion (rooted in an 
aversion to ennui) that confers value on the object.
402
  Though that object may be of some 
discernible value or importance, this value or importance is not the primary cause of the 
strength of our desire, but what gives that object far more claim on our attention than 
some worthless or trivial item, and so makes it a more fitting focal point of our efforts 
and exertion.  (cf. 2.3.10.9; SBN 452)  To an extent, then, the desire to act in opposition 
                                                     
402
 In the terminology I outlined above, this opposition or difficulty would be largely ‘originative’.  
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to the violent temptations for present pleasure—to exert our faculties in resisting these 
temptations, may to some extent be accounted for by a desire to relieve the pain of a 
palled mind.  It is a consequence of Hume’s theory of motivation that our desires for and 
aversions to goods which are “psychologically proximate” to our present situation, being 
naturally strongest, are the most easily and so more frequently indulged and satisfied.  
The imaginative ease which gives these pleasures a superior vivacity, the compliance 
with the violent and strong passions which result, and the bodily ease with which such 
pleasures are often attained, all foster our frequent indulgence in them, which indulgence 
must gradually pall our enjoyment of them (cf. 2.3.5.4; SBN 423)—that is, where that 
indulgence does not first cause some costly error in conduct, or bring on some other 
positive evil which gives us an aversion to them.  When such enjoyment is palled to too 
great a degree, we either seek to enliven them by sympathy with others, or seek other 
“easy” pleasures that are novel.  However (as Hume illustrates nicely in his essay “The 
Epicurean”), even these “easy” enlivening mechanisms eventually fail.  It is here that the 
PMAS steps in, as Hume notes in T 2.3.4, and dictates that the mind seek more vigorous 
activity “in order to preserve its ardour” and to “support” itself “by a new flow of 
passion.” (2.3.4.8; SBN 421-2, my emphasis) 
However, there are also objects we take to be of supreme value, such as those 
Hume discusses throughout Treatise, Book II, and again in his T 2.3.8 digression—
virtue, fame, riches, knowledge, power, etc.—which are not merely desired for the effort 
they occasion as “distant” goods, but for their great value their importance to our 
happiness.  Such goods, for this reason, have much more of an influence on our passions 
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and motives.  As we noted earlier, these and “considerable” goods are naturally attended 
with a sentiment of sublimity on account of their extensive causal connections to pleasure 
and happiness, and the possession of them give a man a certain “lustre” and “weight” in 
the minds of others.  They are also for this reason the “grand” objects of our “schemes of 
action” (and so the primary objects of the traditional predominant or ruling passions), and 
the primary causes of pride.  Moreover, per Hume’s “digression” on the sentiments of 
sublimity and elevation that are raised by distance and difficulty, the fact that these goods 
are themselves only attained to any degree by an extended and difficult “scenes of 
action”, their “distance” and “difficulty” is yet another source of that elevation of mind 
they naturally produce, where we judge ourselves up to the challenge their attainment 
poses.  Thus, it is particularly fitting that upon the realistic prospect of attainment of such 
goods (that is, where we have judged the “strength” of our mind sufficient), one should 
feel a strong emotion of anticipatory pride and a consequent courage which drives the 
mind to seek to exert itself by fixing its attention on them, and opposing those contrary 
temptations which undermine the successful pursuit of these goods.
403
       
Of course, as I noted in the previous chapter, it is a consequence of Hume’s 
theory of motivation and “strength of mind” that this resistance to the violent passions 
also requires that the imagination resist its natural, ‘unphilosophical’ propensities.  
Accordingly, given the central role pride plays in accounting for the soul’s general 
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 Hume writes, “[t]he very essence of this power consists in the probability of its exercise, and in causing 
us to anticipate, but a true or false reasoning, the real existence of the pleasure. The anticipation of pleasure 
is, in itself, a very considerable pleasure.”  (2.1.10.11; SBN 315) Where we as possessed of a power in this 
sense, we anticipate the relation of the pleasing object to ourselves—the mind feels determined to conceive 
it as ours—and the result of this anticipation of pleasure is an anticipatory pride of possession or 
accomplishment which strengthens our motives for the object.. (cf. 2.3.9.3-4; SBN 438-9) 
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opposition-seeking, it follows, as Hume argues in his digression, that anything which 
gives rise to a sentiment of pride and elevation—whether it is an object that “touches the 
passions or imagination”—also naturally inclines the imagination to seek opposition as 
well: “every thing, which invigorates and enlivens the soul, whether by touching the 
passions or imagination, naturally…determines [the imagination] to run against the 
natural stream of its thoughts and conceptions.” (2.3.8.9; SBN 435, my emphasis)404 
(Indeed, as Hume writes in what may be his earliest essay, “‘[t]is a property very 
conspicuous in this Virtue [i.e. courage] that it naturally exerts itself on the View of any 
superior Strength or Prowess, & endeavors to overcome every possibility of Opposition, 
tho' not immediately directed against it.” 405) Hume’s examples of objects which “convey 
                                                     
404
 Hume illustrates this point by means of an ingenious and influential, though somewhat abstruse, 
explanation of the metaphor of “height” and “elevation” (hypsos) commonly employed to describe sublime 
objects and the emotions they elicit in us. (2.3.8.7-8; SBN 434-5)  I cannot treat Hume’s explanation in any 
detail here.  (It is is for this reason, for instance, that the sage greatness of mind “elevates” him above all 
other mortals on which he “looks down”. (EPM 7.16; SBN 256; cf. “The Stoic”, EMPL 151, 153-4) 
Conversely, “poverty, slavery and folly are conjoin’d with lowness.” (2.3.8.9; SBN 435-6)) Hume’s T 
2.3.7-8 explanation of the origin of the classical rhetoricians’ metaphorical description of a sublime 
magnanimity as “hypsos”—height or ‘elevation’—is original to Hume later borrowed explicitly from him 
by Alexander Gerard and Dugald Stewart. (Gerard, An Essay on Taste 17-20; Dugald Stewart, “On the 
Sublime”, in Philosophical Essays (Edinburgh & London, 1810), especially, 347-8) (However, D.A. 
Russell has pointed out that ‘hypsos’ always had an ethical connotation in Greek literature—its connection 
to rhetorical stile was not made by any metaphorical extension from any more literal meaning.)  Gerard 
credits Hume directly, and Stewart credits a reading of Gerard’s Essay on Taste with reminding him of 
Hume’s explanation. (Stewart, Philosophical Essays Note (Z), 574-6) See Alexander Gerard’s account of 
the “influence” associated with riches, power, and the sublime. (Essay on Taste 17)  In addition, Gerard 
paraphrases here T 2.3.8 later in that account, Hume’s “ingenious” reduction of this phenomenon into the 
principles of association: “Because we are accustomed every moment to observe the difficulty with which 
things are raised in opposition to the impulse of gravity; the idea of ascending always implies the notion of 
force exerted in overcoming this difficulty; the conception of which invigorates and elevates the thought, 
after the same manner as a vast object, and thus gives a distance above us much more an appearance of 
greatness, than the same space could have in any other direction.  The sensation of amplitude, which by this 
means comes to attend the interposed distance, is transferred to, and considered as excited by the object that 
is eminent and above us; and that object, by this transference, acquires grandeur and sublimity.” (21n)  
Dugald Stewart suggests that we find elevated objects moving because of their associations, for instance 
because height is expressive of the object’s surprising, unusual ability to resist gravity’s pressure to move 
downward. (Philosophical Essays 299-305)  
405
 “An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour” (ed. E.C. Mossner, Modern Philology 45.1 
(1947): 54-60, 58, my emphasis. 
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to the fancy” this inclination for opposition include those primary objects of pride 
discussed above, such as virtue, power, and riches. (2.3.8.9; SBN 435; cf. 2.3.8.7; SBN 
434)       
Most important among these points of relevance is the general role played by the 
“heroic” disposition or temper—that temper composed of the elevating and invigorating 
passions of pride, magnanimity and courage—in moving the mind to take on forms of 
opposition which “in another disposition” it would have otherwise avoided (i.e. in an 
“enfeebled” disposition made up of enervating passions like humility and love), and the 
relation of this disposition to one’s perception of the “strength” of one’s mind: “the soul, 
when elevated with joy and courage, in a manner seeks opposition, and throws itself with 
alacrity into any scene of thought or action, where its courage meets with matter to 
nourish and employ it.” (2.3.8.9; SBN 435, my emphasis)  As Hume argues in his 
digression, when in this disposition, the mind seeks out opposition generally (that is, 
forms of bodily or mental opposition) to overcome, in order to preserve that invigorated 
disposition by means of the emotional agitation that accompanies all effort and exertion.  
As we noted earlier in Chapter 2, this agitation is converted into the predominant passion 
and renders that passions stronger and more violent.  As Hume puts it in T 2.3.8, this 
opposition “sustains and encreases” the “vigour and alacrity” of the mind. (2.3.8.9; SBN 
435)   That is, per the MPP, these desires become not only stronger, but more violent by 
this opposition.      
In addition, as I have already indicated, with this PMAS-based principle in hand, 
we are in a position to understand Hume’s somewhat cryptic comments in both Treatise, 
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Books I and II regarding the roles of what he calls the “general character” and “present 
disposition” of the mind play in determining whether the ‘philosophical’ or 
‘unphilosophical’ principles of our nature will “prevail” in their influence on the mind. 
(1.3.13.12, 2.3.3.10; SBN 150, 418; cf. 2.3.8.13; SBN 438) As I noted in the previous 
chapter, the basis for this distinction between the general “character” and the momentary 
“disposition” of the mind is the inconstant constancy inherent to both the human 
imagination, and, as a consequence, the human will—neither can be “constantly 
constant” in resisting those ‘unphilosophical’ but naturally strong influences which are 
sources of errors and missteps in our reasoning and conduct.  A man may possess a 
“general character” that is relatively constant in its ability to resist these influences and 
adhere to ‘reason’ (in both the sense of corrective general rules, and the calm passions 
which they generate)—that is, he may possess the virtue of “strength of mind”—though, 
in some temporary disposition he may be prone to inconstancy, and to comply with those 
more ‘natural’ but often detrimental propensities of human nature.  Conversely, a man 
may not be generally strong-minded, but may nevertheless achieve a certain “disposition” 
in which he is prompted to exert the “strength” of his mind by resisting these more 
natural propensities.  In general, the “character” of the strong-willed man, as well as the 
temporary “disposition” of the weak-willed man are characterized by the heroic, pride-
based passions, with the difference that in the former case, such pride and ‘greatness of 
mind’ is a durable or constant quality of mind—what Hume calls a “steady and well-
establish’d pride and self-esteem.”406 (3.3.2.11; SBN 599, my emphasis) 
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 T 2.3.8, in this way, bears directly on the important question of how Hume “integrates” his theory of 
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4.10 Strong, Calm Passions and the Cultivation of Strength of Mind  
So far I have only considered Hume’s account of how “distant” objects may 
obtain the “counterbalance” they need to achieve greater relative strength over our blind, 
deceitful motives for proximate goods by means of a PMAS-based desire for the exertion 
of our faculties.  However, the account I have offered also has clear consequences for two 
remaining important issues raised throughout this dissertation.  First, given Hume’s 
general T 2.3.4 account of the effects of effort and opposition on the passions, this 
exertion of the mind—both the passions and imagination—in its attention to and pursuit 
of distant goods surely renders our motives not only stronger, but more violent, 
threatening the coherence our Hume’s account of our motives for such goods as ‘calm’.  
To address this difficulty, we need only turn once again to the centrality of custom and 
the formation of active habit to Hume’s account of motivation: though, in overcoming the 
forms of passional and imaginative opposition, these passions are rendered stronger and 
more violent, custom gradually calms these passions, while solidifying their relative 
strength by the formation of a positive tendency toward them.        
Second, the account offered above also bears on the possibility of the cultivation 
of the “strength” of the imagination.  As I argued at the close of the previous chapter, this 
question is not only bound up with, but also structurally parallel to the question of the 
antecedent relative strength of passions necessary for the formation of those customs or 
                                                                                                                                                              
motivation and his theory of the indirect passions.  Here I take myself to be expanding on Jane McIntyre’s 
fine analysis of some of the lines along which this integration may be achieved. (cf. McIntyre, “Hume’s 
Passions”) 
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active habits which consolidate and calm their relative predominance.  In causal 
reasoning, the movement of the imagination must achieve an antecedent relative 
predominance over similar contrary forces—the ‘unphilosophical’, natural and para-
causal propensities of the imagination detailed in the previous chapter—in order for 
custom to increase and consolidate that relative strength.  It is in T 2.3.8 that we get 
Hume’s account of the causes of the antecedent relative “weight” of our ideas of these 
“distant” and general goods: the PMAS-based desire for exertion as well as the PMAS-
based influence of the passions on the imagination.   
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Conclusion 
I began this dissertation by claiming that the “prevalence of the calm passions 
over the violent” rightly stands as Hume’s general formula for virtue and happiness, and 
that an account of the mechanisms of human nature which underlie this prevalence is a 
primary aim of Hume’s T 2.3 anatomy of motivation and deliberation.  In addition, I 
claimed that, given Hume’s intentions in publishing Treatise, Books I and II together in 
1739 as a “compleat chain of reasoning” concerning the precise relationship between 
reason, passion, and the regulation of conduct, this anatomy serves in a significant sense 
as the ‘climax’ of Hume’s treatment of the understanding and the passions in those 
books.  My overall aim in this dissertation has been to unpack the psychology that 
constitutes the basis of Hume’s ‘anatomy’ of this prevalence, particularly as it is 
elaborated in T 2.3.4-8, and at the very least, I hope to have established clearly the 
following two points: 1) that Hume’s anatomical treatment of the main mechanisms of 
deliberation and motivation in the later sections of T 2.3 offer us resources for accounting 
for this prevalence of the calm passions that are far richer and more firmly rooted in 
Hume’s wider ‘science of man’ than commonly thought (especially when supplemented, 
as I argue Hume intends, by the resources of his T 1.3-4 account of causal reasoning and 
the role it plays in the regulation of conduct), and 2) that this anatomy of the ‘prevalence 
of calm passions’ is neither incoherent, nor plagued by the difficulties and contradictions 
often attributed to it. 
A key part of my effort to establish these two conclusions and to elaborate a 
coherent Humean anatomy of the prevalence of the calm passions has been to 
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demonstrate the crucial importance of the ‘constancy’ of our desires to the achievement 
of this prevalence in our tempers on Hume’s account. In Chapter 1, I argued that Hume 
intended his anatomy of motivation and deliberation in the later sections of T 2.3 as an 
elaboration of the basic principles that account not only for the relative strength and 
calmness but also the relative constancy of our motives.  As I have attempted to show, the 
prevalence of the calm passions as anatomized in T 2.3 constitutes for Hume a complex 
ideal of character at the heart of which is ‘constancy’ in two primary senses.  First, the 
achievement of this prevalence requires that our motives be ‘constant’ and steady.  Both 
the strength and the calmness and tranquility of mind results from the gradual 
consolidation of the predominance of strong, constant motives over others by the force of 
custom and habituation (the calmness of the predominant passions). Second, constancy in 
this first sense also requires the possession of a virtuous ‘strength of mind’ (the virtue of 
constancy), a quality of mind which enables us to remain steadfast in our pursuit of what 
we judge to be our greater good, in opposition to more violent gusts of passion which 
undermine this pursuit.  I argued that Hume ultimately takes constancy in this second 
sense to be a product of that “strength and firmness” of our imagination which gives our 
judgments of the true value of objects both a superior motivational force and weight in 
our deliberations (the predominance of ‘the calm passions’).  If my reading of Hume’s 
‘climatology’ of motivation in T 2.3 is persuasive, the later sections of T 2.3 present us 
with an interesting and novel account of the role passions and emotions play in guiding 
motivation and deliberation, in determining both our proper ends, as well as the relative 
strength, violence and constancy of our motives for those ends.    
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